SS2 June 2021


Corvin LUPU

Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu


Abstract: After the Second World War, according to the agreements between the victorious Allies in the war, the greatest powers in the world, Romania was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence. Because of this, the historian must analyze this period as an objective situation of history, avoiding the politicization of the situation and regarding things as if they should have been different, and Romania would have had development alternatives outside the strict framework imposed by world power which controlled the area of ​​influence. 

From the beginning of the historical period of the state socialist regime, improperly called ”communist”, within the Romanian Communist Party, two camps emerged: that of the communists who spent many years in the regime’s prisons during the two decades after 1924, when the Communist Party of Romania was outlawed and the communists who were in exile in the Soviet Union, under the protection of the Kremlin authorities and who did not know the persecutions, harsh investigations, beatings and sometimes death, in Romanian prisons.

The article explains that Communist Party dignitaries and important Securitate commanders, as well as their agents in the military, remained loyal to the Soviet Union and secretly sabotaged the political line of national independence promoted by Romania’s collective leadership, led by Nicolae Ceaușescu. They acted in this way despite the explicit orders given.

At the forefront of the saboteurs of Romania’s independent national policy were the ethnic minorities of the Communist Party, primarily Jews, Gypsies and Hungarians and the Securitate leadership, which was the most important opponent of Romania’s nationalist leadership, especially Nicolae Ceaușescu.

The result of this sabotage of the policy of national independence was the collapse of Romania in December 1989, its plunder almost in its entirety and the transformation of the country, in the period that followed, into a colony of multinational economic companies.

Keywords: Romanian workers; Party; Romanian Communist Party; Security; Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej; NicolaeCeaușescu
Contact details of the authors: e-mail:
Institutional affiliation of the authors: Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security Studies
Institutions address: 550324 Sibiu, Calea Dumbrăvii nr. 34 

Tel. / Fax: +40-269-422169



The political regime established in Romania in the period after the coup d’état of August 23, 1944 was brought with the tanks of the Red Army victorious in the war. According to the agreements between the victorious Allies in the war, the greatest powers in the world, Romania was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence. For this reason, the historian must analyze this period as an objective situation of history, avoiding the politicization of the situation and regarding things as if they should have been different, and Romania would have had development alternatives outside the strict framework imposed by world power which controlled the area of influence.

From the beginning of the historical period of the state socialist regime, improperly called “communist”[1], within the Romanian Communist Party, two camps emerged: that of the communists who spent many years in the regime’s prisons during the two decades after 1924, when the Communist Party of Romania was outlawed, and the communists who were in exile in the Soviet Union, under the protection of the Kremlin authorities and who did not know the persecutions, harsh investigations, beatings and sometimes death, in Romanian prisons.

At the head of the first camp was Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and with him communist militants such as Emil Bodnăraș, Chivu Stoica, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and others. Ana Pauker (Hanna Rabinsohn) was initially at the head of the Comintern / Judeo-Bolshevik camp, along with Teohari Georgescu (Baruh Tescovici) and Vasile Luca (Laszlo Lukacs). After 1952, when the three Comintern leaders were purged, Iosif Chișinevschi (Ioșka Roitman), Miron Constantinescu (Mehr Kohn) and Constantin Pârvulescu, the latter being one of the few Romanian ethnics who fought against Romania’s independence policy, remained at the head of this camp.

After 1952 and especially after the purge of the group Iosif Chișinevschi (Ioșka Roitman) -Miron Constantinescu (Mehr Kohn), in 1957, the camp supporting the Romanian national socialism started to promote a policy of autonomy from the Soviet Union and development of Romania on national bases, focused on the Romanian ethnicity, on the cultivation of historical traditions and on international relations with all the states of the world, based on firm principles of political morality. Mainly these principles were: respect for full independence and national sovereignty, the principle of mutual benefit and non-interference of states in the internal affairs of other states. These principles received the highest international recognition in the document entitled The Final Act of the Conference on Peace and Security in Europe (OSCE), in August 1975. Most supporters of the Romanian nationalist political line in the Communist Party were Romanian ethnics, but there were also some followers of other ethnic groups who supported Romanian nationalist political line permanently, such as Emil Bodnăraș (Ukrainian father and German mother), Ion Gheorghe Maurer (Alsatian father, Romanian mother) and Richard Winter (Saxon).

The second camp, the Comintern camp, continued to support Romania’s unconditional subordination to the Moscow authorities. This camp could never be completely removed from Romania’s leadership. The main argument of this camp was the idea that without the protection of the USSR, Romania would not have withstood the pressure of the Western World, would have lost its freedom and would have been “swallowed”. This idea was not possible to fight, and today, after more than three decades since the coup d’état of December 22, 1989, when Romania became a colony of the West, all its natural and human resources being seized by multinational companies and Western states, seeing that the second camp did not err in its judgments.[2]

The national-Romanian political line was adopted by the collective political governing-body, it was not an individual will, taken by a single person, abusively, following singular opinions. It was not a line adopted only by the leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, or, later, by Nicolae Ceaușescu. The public opinion in Romania, in a very high majority as a percentage, welcomed this political line, supporting the detachment of Romania from the USSR, for various reasons. Some people of that time hoped that this detachment of the country from the grip of the Soviet Union would be a first step on a path that would bring Romania closer to the West,others saw it as a chance for Romania’s development in an own socialist way, and others saw it as a chance to obtain increased civil and economic rights. Because of this, we can say that the adoption of this political line was a democratic one, both in terms of internal political life in the Communist Party and in terms of popular support for the Romanian national political regime. The period 1964-1975 was, moreover, the period in which the state socialist regime and its main leaders enjoyed great popular support, one of the largest in the entire history of Romania, a history marked by ideological and political division.

At the same time, it is difficult to quantify the extent to which Romania’s collective leadership was aware of the long-term national security risks of tightening political relations with the superpower that controlled Romania’s area of influence following Soviet-Western agreements.

An important problem in various periods of Romania’s history, with serious negative consequences, was the lack of unity of action of the state apparatus and the betrayal of the leaders and the country by some of the high state dignitaries. This situation was also encountered during the state socialist regime.

The apparatus of repression of the regime established by the Red Army in Romania was the Security. It was created by the NKVD and remained connected to the Soviet secret services until the end of the second millennium. From 1948 until 1963 the head of the Securitate (General Directorate of People’s Security) was General Gheorghe Pintilie (Timofei Bodnarenko), a Soviet citizen, with General Alexandru Nicolschi (Boris Grünberg) as his deputy (until 1953), a Soviet citizen, later holding the important position of Secretary General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Deputy of Alexandru Drăghici, Minister of Internal Affairs (until 1961). In the period 1948-1952, the Minister of Interior was Teohari Georgescu (Baruh Tescovici). Between 1952 and 1965, Alexandru Drăghici was Minister of Interior, and the Securitate was an integral part of the Ministry of Interior. Between 1965 and 1972, Cornel Onescu was Minister of the Interior. Between 1968 and 1972, the head of the Securitate (called the State Security Council) was Ion Stănescu (Ianos Szilágy), who later became Minister of the Interior (1972-1973).

The security permanently served comintern, with some exceptions, the most notable being that of June 1952, when, listening to Stalin’s order, he supported Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in the elimination, arrest and trial of the Judeo-Bolshevik group led by Ana Pauker and in the elimination the politician Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu.[3]

At the end of 1961, the collective leadership of Romania decided to interrupt the collaboration of the Romanian security and army officers with the KGB and GRU. In this regard, party activists, members of the government, army and security officers were forbidden to cooperate with the intelligence services of the USSR and other socialist states. After 1971, it was forbidden for officers of all arms to take leave in socialist countries, in exchange for foreign officers spending their holidays in Romania.[4] All meetings with diplomats and foreign nationals of Romanian officials had to be reported to the party.

Under the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu, the secretary with organizational problems of the Romanian Workers’ Party, officers known to have relations with the Soviet secret services were invited to the CC headquarters of the PCR and were officially barred from continuing their collaboration with the KGB and GRU. Relations with the USSR were made transparent only, officially and under the control of the party leadership. This fact displeased both the USSR and the entire cominternist camp in Romania, in the party, in the Security and in the Army. Dissatisfaction was manifested by the violation of this record and the continued collaboration with the Soviet secret services[5] and those of the socialist states unconditionally subordinated to the Kremlin, such as the German Democratic Republic.[6]

Practically, during the Cold War, the subordination of security and intelligence services in the two main spheres of influence, Soviet and American, marked the beginning of the globalization of secret services, an important stage in the general process of globalization, coordinated under the leadership and control of major Jewish bankers from USA and Great Britain[7].

The policy of national sovereignty promoted after 1952 by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s regime determined the Soviets to try to assassinate him. Until 1963, the Romanian authorities were aware of three attempts to assassinate the head of the Romanian Workers’ Party. In 1963, a new attempt was made by the USSR military attaché in Bucharest with his daughter[8]. Among these assassination attempts is not counted the plane crash at an airport in Moscow, in 1959, when landing a Romanian plane with Soviet crew, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Gheorghe Preoteasa, died, and the CC Secretary of the PMR with organizational problems, Nicolae Ceausescu was seriously injured. The driver Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej should have been on board, but he gave up traveling to Moscow, a few minutes before takeoff. It was said that all the crew members died on the spot, which is not certain, as they may have been assassinated after the event, to hide the existence of the attack[9].

Many party activists served with conviction the interests of the political line of subordination of Romania to the Soviet Union and hindered as much as possible the efforts of the supporters of the Romanian national sovereignty line, since the years 1950-1960. I think it is enough to mention that there was a whole list of high party and state dignitaries who secretly gave information to the Kremlin, outside the agenda of the country’s leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, without his knowledge and against the existing firm orders from this point of view. This list includes at least: Ghizela Vass (born Gitta, Jew from Bessarabia), SorinToma (Jew, son of academician Solomon Moscovici), Chivu Stoica (Romanian), LeontinSălăjan (Jew, real name Ignacy Leon Szilágyi), Valter Roman ( Jew, real name Ernő Neuländer), Cristian Pârvulescu (Romanian), Alexandru Maghioroș (Hungarian, born Balogh Joszef), Alexandru Drăghici (Romanian, married to AVO agent Marta Cziko), Miron Constantinescu (Jew, real name Mehr Cohn), IosifChișinevski (Jew, real name JakobRoitman), Alexandru Bârlădeanu (Jew, real name Sasha Goldenberg)[10].

Extremely high devotion to the Soviet Union was also shown by other senior officials of the Romanian leadership, such as Foreign Minister Ana Pauker (Jewish, real name Hanna Rabinsohn, daughter of a former rabbi of the capital Bucharest), Interior Minister TeohariGeorgescu (Jew, real name Baruh Tescovici), Minister of Finance, Vasile Luca (Hungarian, real name László Lukacs)[11], PCR CC Secretary Leonte Răutu (Jew, real name Lew Oigenstein), PCR CC Secretary Gogu Rădulescu (Gypsy and Russian Jew ), or the heads of the Securitate, Gheorghe Pintilie (Ukrainian, real name Timofei Bodnarenko[12]) and Alexandru Nikolschi (Jew, real name Boris Grünberg). All of them and many others have sabotaged in secret Romania’s internal and external policy of independence and national sovereignty.

As can be seen only from the short list above, most of the Soviet agency in Romania’s leadership was composed of ethnic minorities, especially Jews. From this point of view, as in many other historical moments, the national minorities in Romania have been and are a risk factor for the national security of the country, especially for the majority ethnic group, the Romanians.

Subsequently, the Soviet agency in the structures of the Romanian state also sabotaged the efforts to develop the economy, which allowed the consolidation of the freedom of domestic and international political action of the Romanian leadership, including efforts to increase the living standards of the population. In the latter case, I am referring first to the induction of the food, energy, and consumer goods crisis, from 1982-1989, meant to destroy the attachment of a large part of the population to Nicolae Ceaușescu’s political regime. While all the country’s warehouses were full of food and energy, the shops were empty, and Romanians had difficulty finding food and fuel[13].

Among the many examples of sabotage of the policy of national sovereignty and democratization of the Romanian regime, some can be mentioned in the lines below.

The institution that permanently supported Romania’s subordination to Moscow was the Securitate. Under the KGB umbrella, security officers felt protected and supported, especially in their external actions. Also, the Securitate did not agree with the relaxation of the political regime as it saw in the democratization of society the loss of a good part of its object of activity and, implicitly, of its influence in the society of the time. Thus, when, in 1954, Dej ordered the cessation of re-education actions[14] in Romanian penitentiaries and the release of many political detainees, the Securitate acted in the opposite direction and the terror regime continued in prisons until 1964[15]. The Securitate maintained persecution against real or alleged opponents of the regime and triggered a new wave of arrests among them, and the persecution continued, on a smaller scale of torture and torture, but continuously in all prisons with political prisoners[16]. This fact triggered a long and deep conflict between a part of the PCR leadership, led by Nicolae Ceausescu and the Security[17].

Regarding the illegal activity of the Securitate, Larry L. Watts shows that it did not comply with Romania’s political line, that it violated the regulations and orders of the country’s political leadership, and the Securitate leaders remained in secret contact with the KGB and other secret services states of the Soviet Bloc, although this was strictly forbidden[18].

The betrayal of the Security is today a reality demonstrated by many historians, security officers, investigative journalists, memorials. The evidence on which they are based is provided by documents, memoirs of military personnel, including the Securitate, the infiltration of Securitate agents in Free Europe to undermine Ceaușescu from the position of editor of the radio station with the largest audience[19], etc. However, the Romanian society remains, for the most part, confused even after three decades and does not understand correctly and completely this historical phenomenon.

The former security officers, especially the fundamentalists, from the treacherous wing of the former Romanian Security, who are the most active, strongly support the perpetuation of the lie about their “patriotism”, “heroism” and “devotion” to Romania, which is proven that it is not true, the betrayal of the Romanian Security being as clear as daylight today. These security officers are supported at least by complicit silence and by their many former supporters in the army and other state structures. During the communists there was a word: among the civilians out of three people one was an informant of the Securitate, and in the army, out of three people two were informants of the Securitate. Even if the parts / percentages may not correspond to reality, the quip has a grain of truth…

One reason for the frustration of the former security officers is the fact that their activity, which they thought they could keep secret for eternity, has been revealed. Many of their great secrets can be found today in articles and history books, and many kilometers of the Securitate’s secret archive can be found at the CNSAS to be studied by those interested. This infuriates them, and the fact that they were “smarter” and destroyed a lot of files, brushed others and forged some, does not change the substance of the problem: the secrets of the Securitate have been revealed enough to know the backbone of the activity of this institution and see that its positive role of defending the country, namely the defense of the national economy, the country’s leadership, citizens, defense against adverse secret services, etc., has been diverted in the direction the Security alliance with the enemy secret services that attacked Romania in December 1989 and in the direction of robbing the huge sums of money produced by the economic and foreign trade activities of the national economy and then by robbing the economic patrimony of Romania[20].

Referring to the treacherous activity of some leaders of the former Securitate in the period after the implementation of the “Dniester” Plan, to replace Nicolae Ceausescu with a socialist leader devoted to the USSR, I will start with the president of the State Security Council from 1967-1973, with the rank of minister, the successor of AlexandruDrăghici, in the person of Ion Stănescu, born Szilágy and disguised in Romanian, according to the custom of foreign and minority cominternwho took Romanian names to hide their ethnicity and to be able to speak and decide with more credibility on behalf of the Romanians. Even today, minorities and foreigners speak on behalf of Romanians and especially decide, and ethnic Romanians who have decided in Romanian interest are denigrated, outlawed, and against them are unconstitutional and deeply undemocratic laws, such as Law 217/2015.

Regarding the treacherous activity of Ion Stănescu/Ianos Szilágy, the American historian Larry L. Watts cites documents of the security of the German Democratic Republic (Stasi), which came into the possession of the US secret services, after the reunification of Germany and the transcript of the hearing of General Victor Neculicioiu. of the” anti-KGB” Security Unit 0110, of June 12, 1994, made by the Senatorial Commission for the Investigation of Events of December 1989. Also quoted are the certain statements made abroad by General NicolaeDoicaru, former head of DGIE/DIE, in the name of Ion Stănescu, also discovered in the reports from the STASI archives[21].

Larry L. Watts also quotes KGB General Oleg Kalughin, the head of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB’s First Directorate, who since 1972 reported to the leadership of the Soviet security service about Ion Stănescu’s anti-Ceaușescu conspiracy and of his accomplices at the top of the Securitate. On behalf of this group, Col. Victor Dorobanțu, the head of the encrypted transmissions from the Securitate, conveyed to Oleg Kalughin their decision to overthrow Nicolae Ceaușescu. This was happening in a historical period in which the leader of Romania enjoyed great popularity, one of the largest in the history of Romania, in that time the country was developing at a pace that far exceeded the pace of development of Western states, and the level living was really growing.

Larry L. Watts had access and quoted from the documents containing the conclusions of the investigation carried out by order of Nicolae Ceaușescu at DSS, in 1973, which clearly shows that the recruitment and use of Mihai Caraman by the KGB was done with the approval of Ion Stănescu. Larry L. Watts also used top-secret State Security Department documents. The evidence produced by Larry L. Watts is undeniable. His documentation is very solid.

Larry L. Watts points out that Ion Stănescu’s irregular plans to establish a secret alliance of close cooperation with the secret services of the USSR and its satellites violated the orders of Supreme Commander Ceaușescu and the policy of sovereignty and independence of the Romanian state at that time. The draft developed by the State Security Council was forwarded to the head of East German espionage, General Markus Wolff.

Larry L. Watts, historian by profession, scientific researcher, had unlimited access to the secret archives of the USA, Stasi, the Warsaw Pact and Romania, a country in which he held, for a long time (1992-2009), the quality US adviser to the Romanian Department of Homeland Security for the reform of the secret services. An American document clearly states that Minister Ion Stănescu, together with other Securitate accomplices, whom the author nominates, “were looking for allies to overthrow the party’s leadership at that time and to return Romania’s independence policy, bringing Again under Soviet control”.[22] I add that this is an act of serious national treason which, in accordance with the legislation of the time, should have ended before the execution platoon.

Because in these lines I quoted insistently the historian Larry L. Watts, I must show that the approaches of the historian Larry L. Watts regarding the history of the Security of Socialist Romania are a model of historiographical method. He dismisses the assumptions and maintains only certainties around which further research can be done. He is a very honest historian, who does not relate politically to the system of which he is a part and which he served as a US servant. For example, years ago, Romanian Television produced the show”Clandestine Heritage”, presented by director Monica Ghiurco. The main protagonists of the show recorded and broadcast later were Larry L. Watts and SRI General and historian Cristian Troncotă. Among other things, Larry L. Watts referred to an American document stating that in 1969, the US State Department sent to European embassies the mission to lobby for Nicolae Ceaușescu to be awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. The American historian-dignitary made this report, although, for eminently political reasons, Nicolae Ceaușescu was put on the list of outlaws by the censorship of the current globalist political regime, which rejects the nationalist-sovereignty personalities of history, especially the recent one. The show aired in December, when Larry L. Watts was away on Christmas vacation in the United States. He enjoyed a large audience. On his return, in January, when the show was rebroadcast by TVR, Larry L. Watts watched it and was surprised to find that it was censored and the details of the recommendation that Nicolae Ceausescu receive the Nobel Peace Prize were removed. He was interested in who censored, he found out that the culprit is Rodica Culcer, who was the head ofRomanian Television Newsreel. Larry Watts intervened at a high level and Rodica Culcer was dismissed and retired, later continuing her globalist propaganda through the Social Dialogue Group[23], in other circles.

In 1973, Ion Stănescu was removed, for the moment, from all executive positions, even if he was not dismissed from the honorary quality of member of the CC of the PCR. I show that the position in which he was moved after his dismissal was that of head of sector at the party household. Only after a few years, during which time he was in total conservation, in 1984, he was appointed Minister of Tourism, supported by another Soviet agent, Prime Minister Constantin Dăscălescu, one of the pillars of inducing in Romania food crisis, energy crisis, and consumer goods for the population crisis, to create dissatisfaction of the population towards Nicolae Ceaușescu, which can be used at the time of the coup d’état and the fulfillment of the Soviet mission: to remove Nicolae Ceaușescu and to bring Romania back under Soviet control.

Vladimir Tismăneanu (Vol.odea Tismenițki), son of the well-known Judeo-Bolshevik fighter Leonte Tismăneanu (Leonid Tisminețki) and of the Judeo-Bolshevik Hermina Marcusohn, connoisseur of the events behind the closed doors of the Communist Party, claims that Ion Stănescu “was directly inVol.ved in the dark of the death of Dr. Abraham Schechter, for years a personal doctor of Nicolae Ceaușescu and Elena Ceaușescu…”[24].

After December 22, 1989, while high-ranking communist dignitaries such as Ioan Totu or Nicolae Giosan were assassinated by the new “democratic” power in Bucharest, and others were clogging up FSN prisons, Ion Stănescu was kept for a few more months as minister of Tourism in the government of Petre Roman (Piotr Neulander), after which he became one of the leaders of the Socialist Labor Party, ally of the FSN and used by him in the fight against historical parties, with the support of many former security officers directly inVol.ved in this fight. It is known that in the period immediately following the events of December 1989, only the highly trusted people of Moscow or of the Kremlin’s Romanian agency were appointed or retained in important leadership positions. I also mention that the SRI established by the Soviet network represented at the highest level by Ion Ilici Iliescu, Vasile Ionel, Nicolae Militaru, Gheorghe Logofătu and Virgil Măgureanu, was set up in the offices of the Ministry of Tourism, led by Ion Stănescu. If Ion Stanescu had not been a man of great confidence in Moscow, he would not have been inVol.ved in those operations that practically meant the resumption of Soviet control over Romania and its intelligence services, control against which Nicolae Ceausescu fought to the death.

The Deputy Minister of Security Ion Stănescu / Ianos Szilágy for foreign espionage was General Nicolae Doicaru, a proven Soviet agent[25]. In the run-up to the events of December 1989, he had a meeting in Herăstrău Park in Bucharest with Soviet Rear Admiral A. G. Mihailov. On December 22 and 23, 1989, in the headquarters of the CC of the PCR, where the coup d’état took place and the evacuation of Nicolae Ceausescu from power, in the office where Generals Iulian Vlad and Ștefan Gușă acted, General Nicolae Doicaru stood permanently, without leaving for a moment to ensure that the generals who then controlled the military operations at the CC headquarters of the PCR lead events in the direction set by Moscow. After the success of the coupd’état, Nicolae Doicaru held important positions in the secret services of the new power, until his assassination[26].

The betrayal of Romania’s policy and its leadership by some party activists and some Securitate officers, the support of some of them from abroad, the participation of some of them in the anti-Ceaușescu conspiracy is also recognized by the Minister of Security, Iulian Vlad and Aurel Rogojan, the head of Cabinet of General Iulian Vlad. Thus, about the ethnic minority Gog uRădulescu (gypsy father and Jewish mother), married for the third time to the Jew Dorina Rudich, gen. Vlad says he was supported from the outside, referring to the USSR and Israel. About Constantin Dăscălescu, Prime Minister of Romania (1982-1989), General Vlad shows that he did a long training period in the USSR, where something happened, without specifying what, so that after returning to Romania he was promoted quickly[27].

Following an in-depth investigation, the historian Cristian Troncotă conducted a study, which he continues to work on, compiling a list of no less than 62 traitors from the State Security Department who left Romania and surrendered to foreign secret services, some among them together with diplomatic briefcases, containing figures, passwords, secret documents, mailbox addresses of the Romanian espionage, etc. Cristian Troncotă also makes concrete references to traitors from the Romanian army, who served in the Soviet secret services[28]. Some of these traitors were sent by Securitate commanders to surrender to enemy secret services[29], to undermine the Romanian leader from abroad and contribute to his removal and replacement with a communist leader devoted to the Soviet Union. As a result, for some of these traitors, their desertion was an operational moment in the Dniester Plan developed by the KGB and GRU. General Ion Mihai Pacepa, former deputy director of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the State Security Department, who deserted and surrendered to the US secret services in July 1978[30], said that they, Romanians in the West, collaborated with Romanians in Romania and – they tore down Ceausescu[31].

There is clear evidence of the betrayal of many other high Romanian dignitaries, who plotted against Romania’s policy of sovereignty and independence during the last years of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s rule and during the entire period of NicolaeCeaușescu’s,which we no longer refer to.


  • CC of the PCR = Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party
  • CNSAS = National Council for the Study of Security Archives
  • GDS = Social Dialogue Group
  • GRU = Main Directorate of Military Espionage (in Russian: GlavnoeRazvetivatelnoeUpravelnie)
  • KGB = Acronym for the USSR Security Service between 1953-1991
  • NKVD = Acronym for of the USSR security service between 1917-1953
  • PMR = Romanian Workers’ Party
  • SRI   = Romanian Intelligence Service
  • SSI = Secret Intelligence Service
  • USA = United States of America
  • USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics




  1. Aioanei, Constantin; Troncotă, Cristian, Trădarea se cuibărise demult în DSS…”, Editura Elion, București, 2018
  2. Lupu, Corvin, Cristian Troncotă, Prăbușirea mitului Securității. Adevăruri ascunse despre generalul Iulian Vlad și istoria Securității regimului comunist din România, Elion Publishing House, Bucharest, 2018
  3. Lupu, Corvin, Ioan Bâlbă, Trădarea României Socialiste în viziunea unui ofițer de securitate, Techno-Media Publishing House, Sibiu, 2019
  4. Lupu, Corvin, Trădarea Securității în decembrie 1989. Secrete ale intervenției străine împotriva României, Elion Publishing House, București, 2015
  5. Olaru, Stejărel, Georg Herbstritt, Stasi și Securitatea , Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005
  6. Porter, Ivor, Operațiunea Autonomous (Autonomous Operation), Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991
  7. Rogojan, Aurel I., Iulian N. Vlad-confesiuni pentru istorie, Proema Publishing House, Baia Mare, 2017
  8. Troncotă, Cristian, Duplicitarii. Din istoria serviciilor de informații și securitate ale regimului comunist din România (1965-1989), Editura Elion, București, 2014
  9. Troncotă, Cristian, Istoria securității regimului comunist din România (1948-1964), Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, București, 2003
  10. Troncotă, Cristian, Istoria serviciilor secrete de la Cuza la Ceaușescu, Vol.. III, Duplicitarii – 1965-1989, Editura Paul Editions, București, 2020
  11. Troncotă, Cristian, Torționarii, Editura Elion, București, 2006
  12. Watts, Larry L., Fighting Along Interior Lines: Romanian Security Policy During the Cold War, 2018, Editura RAO, București, 2018
  13. Watts, Larry L., Romania, the Clash within the Warsaw Pact & the End of the Cold War, Editura RAO, București, 2013
  14. Watts, Larry L., With Friends like These, 2010, Editura RAO, București, 2011

Studies and articles

  1. Lupu, Corvin, Cauze ale dezertării generalului Ion Mihai Pacepa în lumina unor documente din arhivele Securității, in “Studia Securitatis”, Vol. VIII, Nr. 2/2014
  2. Lupu, Corvin, Inducerea crizei alimentare, energeticeși de bunuri de larg consum, componentă a Planului „Dniestr”, in the Volume International Conference of the Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security Studies, Sibiu, 22-24 May 2015
  3. Tismăneanu,Vladimir, Pinacoteca malefică: Ion Stănescu, aparatcik, cadrist și securist (Evil art gallery: Ion Stănescu, Aparatcik, Staff Functionary and Security Guard), in and in, of May 8, 2015
  4. Toma, Valentin, Stalinist Terror in Romania: Real face of the Popular Democracy, in ”New International”, Vol.. 14, No. 1 September 1948
  5. Watts, Larry L., Fighting Along Interior Lines: Romanian Security Policy During the Cold War, 2018, Editura RAO, București, 2018

[1] Communism is an utopia that has never existed anywhere.

[2] In fact, it has been seen that some Eastern European states, which unconditionally subordinated themselves to the Soviet Union, were not punished in 1989 and managed to balance themselves after the abolition of the socialist state regimes and to follow a much more favorable path than that of Romania. As a result, today states like Poland and Hungary, even the Czech Republic and Slovakia, do not have the colonial status of Romania, the first two states having control over important parts of banking systems, energy distribution, national security industry, natural resources and they do not allow the implementation of the will of Western corporations and the policy of the European Commission, unless they do not contradict the national interests of those states, unlike Romania, which, at the time of writing, can no longer defend its deep national interests.

[3] The main accusation brought against Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu was that he was an agent of the Anglo-Americans. At the time of his execution, the Romanian public did not believe this accusation. Many years after his execution, British secret agent Ivor Porter, a member of the Autonomous group, who was parachuted into Romania in December 1943, showed his investigators during his imprisonment in Romania, when British spies were in custody Romanian secret services, that British agents received a list of people to ask for support and shelter in case of great difficulties. One of the people on the list was Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu. The head of the SSI, Eugen Cristescu, took special care of the captured British spies. It is very possible that between 1944-1950, when Eugen Cristescu was arrested and gave some information to the authorities of the new regime, in the hope that he will be saved from death or from the gulag, he also denounced Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu.

[4] Larry L. Watts, With Friends like These, 2010, Romanian version: Beware of my friends … The secret war of the Soviet bloc with Romania, Editura Rao, București, 2011, p. 583

[5] Regarding the betrayal of leaders of the Securitate, the Army and the Communist Party, in violation of the policy established by the collective leadership of Romania and their illegal collaboration with the intelligence services of the USSR and other states, see Larry L. Watts, With Friends like These, 2010, Editura Rao, București, 2011, Larry L. Watts, Romania, the Clash within the Warsaw Pact & the End of the Cold War, Editura Rao, București, 2013, Larry L. Watts, Fighting Along Interior Lines: Romanian Security Policy During the Cold War, 2018, Editura Rao, București, 2018, CorvinLupu, Trădarea Securității în decembrie 1989. Secrete ale intervenției străine împotriva României, Editura Elion, București, 2015, Marian Oprea, Conspirația Securității, Editura Lumea Magazin București, 2004, CorvinLupu, CristianTroncotă, Prăbușirea mitului Securității. Adevăruri ascunse despre generalul Iulian Vlad și istoria Securității regimului comunist din România, Editura Elion, București, 2018, Valentin Raiha, În decembrie 89 KGB a aruncat în aer România cu complicitatea unui grup de militari, Editura Ziua-Omega Press, București, 1995, Ion Sandu, Decembrie ’89. Scenariul și regia, în  “Scrisul Românesc”, Craiova, 1999, Filip Teodorescu, „În decembrie 1989 a fost o lovitură de stat organizată de serviciile de informații străine in “Stained-glass-lights and shadows-Magazine of Veterans of Romanian Intelligence Services”, Year I, No. 1/December 2009, pp. 49-54, Valentin Zaschievici, Securitatea și-a încălcat îndatoririle față de Ceaușescu, in “JurnalulNațional”, Year XII, Number 3320 of April 15, 2004

[6]Stejărel Olaru, Georg Herbstritt, Statul și Securitatea, Editura Humanitas, București, 2005

[7] During the period of detente, especially after Mikhail Gorbachev came to the political leadership of the USSR and during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, the closer collaboration of the secret services of the two politico-military blocs led to a new stage of globalization.

The globalization of the secret services resulted in the mutual penetration of the great powers and even their inability to secrete their databases, which was a major vulnerability of national security. Also, the globalization of the secret services represents a great difficulty for the political leaderships of the states that want to regain their sovereignty in front of the powers in whose area of ​​influence they are.

[8] Larry L. Watts, With Friends like These, 2010, in Romanian: Ferește-mă doamne de prieteni…Războiul secret al blocului sovietic cu România, Editura RAO, București, 2011, p. 511

[9] After the Second World War, the USSR did not allow Romania to own an aviation industry, a field in which it excelled worldwide. The aircraft factory in Brasov was confiscated by the Soviets. Because of this, until 1963, all flights of Romanian planes were made with crews from the USSR, and the aviation equipment used was exclusively Soviet. Subsequently, under the leadership of Nicolae Ceaușescu, the Romanian aviation industry was rebuilt, and after 1990 it was again partially destroyed, and what was left was alienated.

[10] Larry L. Watts, Op cit, p. 177

[11]Vasile Luca (László Lukacs) had fought alongside the Hungarian Red Army against Romania in the Romanian-Hungarian war of 1919. In the late 1920s, he was the leader of the communists in Brașov, being arrested and imprisoned in Chernivtsi prison. After the occupation of Bukovina by the Red Army in July 1940, he was released and became deputy mayor of Chernivtsi. In this capacity he was directly responsible for the deportation of 30,000 ethnic Romanians (“class enemies”) to Siberia and other parts of the USSR. Also, Vasile Luca (László Lukacs) committed a pogrom against the Romanians. Valentin Toma, Stalinist Terror in Romania: Real face of the Popular Democracy, in Romanian, in ”New International”, Vol. 14, nr. 1 (septembrie 1948), pp. 213-215

[12]Timofei Bodnarenko’s daughter, Ioana Constantin, stated that her father was not a Jew from Ukraine, but was of Ukrainian ethnicity. However, she emigrated to Israel, where she received citizenship.

[13] Corvin Lupu, Inducerea crizei alimentare, energetice și de bunuri de larg consum, componentă a Planului „Dniestr”, in ”International Conference of the Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security Studies”, Sibiu, 22-24 May 2015

[14]”The re-education” also called the Pitesti Experiment, was a torture operation (sometimes carried to death) that sought to renounce political prisoners of their political and religious beliefs and ideas and, ultimately, to lead to personality disorders until to the point of absolute obedience of the detainees to the regime.

[15] In 1964 a general amnesty was decreed, and Romania became the only country in the Soviet bloc that ended”the class struggle”, the socialist leadership of the country wanting a reconciliation with the entire Romanian people.

[16] Former political detainees Vasile Bucelea and Ion Bucelea, my wife’s father and uncle, testified in an episode in the spring of 1964 at Jilava Prison, Fort 13. One day, all detainees were taken out of their cells and gathered on the prison plateau. The commander and the management of the prison accompanied a leader of the Romanian Workers’ Party who came to speak to the detainees. The two former detainees who reported the moment did not remember the name of the Romanian leader. The high official said that soon all detainees will be released and amnestied. After their release, they will be able to see with their own eyes the great achievements of the regime of popular democracy and will be able to appreciate its own superiority. They will be re-employed in accordance with the studies and functions held prior to arrest and conviction. The country’s leadership, he continued, knows that abuses have also been committed against detainees, and detainees will have the opportunity to address a commission of inquiry and get justice for the suffering caused by those abuses. After the high guest of the prison left, the detainees were reintroduced into their cells, and after about two hours they were taken out again on the prison plateau to listen to the prison commander, who addressed them in the following way: “Bandits, don’t think it has changed something! After you get out of jail, donot talk about what happened here, because we’ll bring you back here and then you’ll see what happens to you!” This confession confirms that behind the country’s policy, the repressive bodies led by the Securitate behaved like a state within a state, acting outside the provisions of the country’s leadership and sometimes against them.

[17] Corvin Lupu, Trădarea Securității în decembrie 1989. Secrete ale intervenției străine împotriva României, Editura Elion, București, 2015, pp. 43-103

[18] Larry L. Watts, Romania, the Clash within the Warsaw Pact & the End of the Cold War, in Romanian: Cei dintâi vor fi cei din urmă. România și sfârșitul Războiului Rece, Editura RAO, București, 2013, pp. 49-50

[19]Corvin Lupu, Trădarea Securității în decembrie 1989. Secrete ale intervenției străine împotriva României, Editura Elion, București, 2015, pp. 91-95

[20]Corvin Lupu, Ioan Bâlbă, Trădarea României Socialiste în viziunea unui ofițer de securitate, Editura Techno Media, Sibiu, 2019

[21]Larry L. Watts, Op cit, pp. 582-591, Stejărel Olaru, Georg Herbstritt, Stasi și Securitatea, Editura Humanitas, București, 2005, pp. 64, 67, 87-90, 288-310

[22] Ibidem, pp. 526, 586

[23] The Social Dialogue Group (GDS) is a foundation set up immediately after the December 1989 coup d’état by George Soros (who came to Bucharest on December 28, 1989, with the first plane to arrive in Romania after the country’s airspace opened), together with Silviu Brucan (Saul Brukner), the Jewish-Bolshevik ideologue conspirator of the National Salvation Front, who created a cultural political polices and an ideological censorship, in the name of the new false Romanian democracy

[24]Vladimir Tismăneanu, Pinacoteca malefică: Ion Stănescu, aparatcik, cadrist și securest,,,  May 8, 2015

[25] Larry L. Watts, Op cit, pp. 582-591

[26]After December 22, 1989, General Nicolae Doicaru was an adviser on the intelligence services of Deputy Prime Minister GeluVoicanVoiculescu. In February 1990, Nicolae Doicaru participated in a bird hunt during which he was shot with a bullet, although all participants in the hunt used shotguns.See also Corvin Lupu, Cristian Troncotă, Prăbușirea mitului Securității. Adevăruri ascunse despre generalul Iulian Vlad și istoria Securității regimului comunist din România, Editura Elion, București, 2018, pp. 255-256; Corvin Lupu, Trădarea Securității în decembrie 1989. Secrete ale intervenției străine împotriva României, Editura Elion, București, 2015, p. 286

[27]Aurel I. Rogojan, Iulian N. Vlad – Confesiuni pentru istorie, Editura Proema, Baia Mare, 2017, pp. 354-355

[28]Cristian Troncotă, Istoria serviciilor secrete de la Cuza la Ceaușescu Vol. III, Duplicitarii – 1965-1989, Editura Paul Editions, București, 2020, pp. 173-193 și 446-454. Researcher CristianTroncotă, who was a security and SRI officer for 10 years at the Security and SRI Archive, started this research about two decades ago. CristianTroncotă confessed to the author of the present lines that when he managed to identify the files of 31 deserters from the Securitate and drafted a paper presented in the internal framework of SRI, General IulianVlad, who read the paper, stopped him in the corridor and he said, “Professor, you haven’t done your homework! Well, that’s all we sent abroad?” It is significant that none of the traitors who deserted from the Securitate (all during the period when General IulianVlad was in charge), led by General Pacepa, made public all kinds of abuses of the Romanian regime, but none he did not criticize General IulianVlad in any way

[29] Under the conditions of the policy of full independence and national sovereignty promoted by Romania, in the period 1964-1989 and in accordance with national security legislation and the orders of the supreme commander and president of the country, all foreign secret services had to be treated as enemies.

[30]Regarding General Pacepa’s desertion, see also CorvinLupu, Cauze ale dezertării generalului Ion Mihai Pacepa în lumina unor documente din arhivele Securității (Causes of General Ion Mihai Pacepa’s Desertion in the Light of Documents from the SecuritateArchives), in „Studia securitatis”, Anul VIII, Nr. 2/2014, pp. 58-75

[31]Cristian Troncotă, Duplicitarii. Din istoria serviciilor de informații și securitate ale regimului comunist din România (1965-1989), 2nd edition revised and added, Editura Elion, București, 2014, pp. 165-166