A statement by
or about a chief of state or high governmental official is
news regardless of its importance or validity.
Murray Edelman,
Constructing the Political Spectacle
These days, the
American presidency is front and center of American and
world public attention. This situation is highlighted by a
world recession induced by the carelessness and selfishness
of financial tycoons abetted by an era of governmental
abnegation of its regulatory obligations, two foreign wars –
Iraq and Afghanistan – and the threat of Islamofascism,
global warming and a myriad of insistent environmental
concerns, human rights issues at home and abroad, questions
concerning dependence on fossil fuels and expensive and
unreliable foreign sources of energy, immigration issues,
and a pervasive global confusion, if not cynicism, regarding
what is to be done. No doubt Barack Obama is currently
enjoying a widespread well-spring of goodwill as the first
African-American president and for his engaging leadership
style and “audacity of hope.” Jeffrey Cohen’s new book,
The Presidency in the Era of 24-Hour News, written just
before the election of Obama, is provocative to suggest that
the American presidency in the “age of the new media”
receives relatively less public attention than it has
historically and that recent changes in the structure of
mass media have undermined the president’s ability to lead
in the public interest. One might wonder if there are a few
revisions buzzing about in Jeffrey Cohen’s bonnet.
Cohen surveys
extensive data honestly and with sophistication and his book
is methodical, articulate, clear, informative and
thought-provoking. His chief intellectual construct is what
he calls the “presidential news system,” by which he means
the dynamic interrelationships among the presidency, the
news media and the mass public. His principal argument is
that there has been a significant historical change in the
presidential news system beginning in the late 1970s as the
“golden age of television” – the era of broadcast television
– was gradually supplanted by the “age of the new media.”
The news media affect the relationship between the president
and the public, an essential “democratic linkage,” and with
the introduction of cable news channels offering news and
entertainment programming 24/7, along with the mass
appearance of the internet in the 1990s, the public’s
attention to the news – and presidential news in particular
– has declined; “soft” news has increased its share of the
“news hole,” and news about the president has become
increasingly negative and cynical.
Cohen’s
argument runs as follows: The structure of the news industry
in the golden age of television affected the presentation of
the news, the public’s reception of the news and the
president’s relationship to the mass public. Economic
concentration in the three major television networks (CBS,
NBC, ABC), and the dominance of television and the influence
of the “prestige press” (New York Times,
Washington Post, inter alia) over the definition
of the news, led to a relatively uniform “news product”
consumed by the American public. Broadcast news was largely
deferential to the president but if real problems arose with
presidential leadership, they often damaged the president’s
reputation and capacity to lead – viz. Lyndon Johnson
and the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and the Watergate
scandal. With the mass introduction of cable television in
particular, “new media age” viewers had opportunities to
choose entertainment programs over the news which in turn
exerted economic pressure on the traditional broadcast
networks to respond by reducing the amount of “hard”
political news (news about the president almost always fits
this bill) in order to retain market shares and remain
profitable corporate enterprises.
Regarding the
new media (cable television, internet, deregulated AM talk
radio), “because of greater competition [compared to the
oligopolistic broadcast age]…[news] became increasingly
negative toward the president…. The norm of negative or
critical news had important implications for the public. It
meant that the public could no longer tell, when faced with
negative news, if that news was truly bad or if it was just
typical journalistic reporting. In other words, the news
signal to the public became noisy and unreliable” (15). The
result has been a precipitous decline in the public trust in
the “institution” of the news media over the last 30 years
or so. Cohen concludes, “News in general [has] a smaller
impact on public opinion.”
With
increasing public inattention and distrust of the news media
and the change in the competitive structure of the media
industry and its reliance on “soft news” and a negative
tone, the presidents’ leadership style has been transformed
as well: “As a consequence, to some degree, presidents have
turned away from the mass public and toward narrower,
specialized publics as targets of their leadership efforts….
[This] may also buttress the political disengagement of the
broad mass from politics, as the public feels left out of
the political conversation” (203).
Cohen’s
arguments are nuanced and multi-layered and there are a
number of promising paths to further inquiry that emerge
from his book. But his ultimate concern is the impact of the
age of the new media on presidential leadership (read:
presidential power) and consequent “important
implications for our democracy” (15). “The president may be
the only actor in the political system capable of attracting
or focusing public attention; the fact that the office is
unitary also makes the president more intellectually
accessible for the public” (206).
Many other
leading American political scientists see things rather
differently. While they might agree with Cohen that
presidential power galvanizes public opinion in politically
important ways, they disagree with his positive assessments
of that power and its role in American democracy. Cohen’s
“presidential news system” bears a striking resemblance to
Murray Edelman’s “political spectacle” in which news
accounts typically focus on “a partly illusory parade of
threats and reassurances, most of which have little bearing
on the successes or ordeals people encounter in their
everyday lives, and some of which create problems that would
not otherwise occur” (96).[i]
The political spectacle of presidential news coverage most
often diverts public attention away from the effects
of public policies and ultimately serves to boost political
authority and reinforce the current distribution of social
and economic inequalities. Similarly, Theodore Lowi, in his
James Madison Lecture presented to a plenary session at the
recent American Political Science Association meeting in
Boston, warns of a “bend sinister,” a presidency with far
too much authority, a surfeit of leadership capacity – what
he calls an American republic of “presidential
transcendence,” rationalizing if not promulgating a timeless
“war footing.”[ii]
Such a presidency (no doubt he is thinking of George W.
Bush, but a presidency Barack Obama will inherit) has its
theorists as well, those who make the case for a “unitary
executive,” who believe the president has the rightful power
to interpret the constitution, and who “denigrate the
separation of powers” (7). Some political analysts worry
about the expanding and often unconstitutional power of the
modern presidency while Cohen more often opines the factors
that stymie “presidential leadership.”[iii]
Also one might
point out that Cohen’s analysis of the age of the new media
focuses too much on the waning influence of information
transmitted by the traditional news media, when he might
have cast a wider net to capture political communication
or political culture in order to understand something
more fundamental, what we might call “civic literacy.” Cohen
is right to say that democracy requires reliable and
trustworthy political information, but the norms and mores
of its distribution and exchange are every bit as important
(maybe more so). A deeper understanding of the political
significance of the age of the new media for democratic
societies might begin with less exclusive attention paid to
mainstream media sources and the “hard” v. “soft” news
distinction, and more to “a repertoire of news services, in
which the main aim of the popular news might well be that of
catching attention and stimulating interest.”[iv]
Communications scholar John Fiske continues, “If this
interest appears to be relevant to the social situation of
the viewer-reader, he or she may then turn to other forms of
news to satisfy the desire for further information” (192).
Fiske’s argument is important because what Cohen leaves out
of his analysis of the age of the new media in the United
States are elements of a broader frame of reference,
political culture. What are we to make of the huge
popularity of “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart” and the
“Colbert Report” on cable television’s Comedy Central? The
political satire in the on-and-offline newspaper, The
Onion? The uncommonly politically sophisticated
fictional (mainstream) network television series, “West
Wing”? Even the long-running animated television program on
FOX Network, “The Simpsons,” has an undeniable political
sophistication. Also requiring consideration would be
Hollywood films, independent films, photography, plays,
novels, songs and music videos, art exhibitions, as well as
a more rigorous understanding of the multitude of sites for
the provision of political news about the president on the
internet. (It is not satisfying when Cohen notes, “The
internet as a mass public phenomenon comes relatively late
in the development of the new media age” [46]. And “…there
is little indication that people have been substituting new
media age news sources, such as 24/7 cable news networks and
internet news sites for traditional media such as newspapers
and broadcast television” [157].)
Finally, to
return to the question at the beginning of this review, one
wonders what Cohen would make of the recent election and
governing style of President Barack Obama. Obama appears to
be an exception to Cohen’s conclusion that in the new media
age, presidential leadership style involves turning to
“special interests, narrower publics and/or their own
partisan base” (207) as well as taking more extreme
positions at the expense of appealing to the broad American
public. Obama appeals to a broad mass of public support
and to a plethora of special constituencies. One need
only witness what CNN recently labeled Obama –
“Politician-in-Chief” – to wonder if Cohen might want to
revise some of his assessments of the new presidency, at
least by way of more forcefully pointing out that the change
in the “presidential news system” as we move from the golden
age of broadcast TV to the new media age is not simply a
unilinear trajectory, but also may involve reversals,
standstills, cycles and exceptions.
Recently
President Obama has initiated a blitz of media appearances
to reach out to the public (and to influence Congress)
regarding his economic “stimulus package,” new foreign
policy initiatives, national security and so on. This has
included prime time television addresses, presidential news
conferences (when, on one recent occasion, he largely
bypassed the major media and opened the floor to questions
from non-mainstream media like Ebony Magazine,
Politico.com and the Spanish language television network
Univision), and a variety of high-visibility forms of
political communication including the first appearance by an
elected American president on a major network late night
television talk show, “The Tonight Show with Jay Leno,” two
appearances as president on the venerable television
newsmagazine, “60 Minutes,” an appearance on the sports TV
network ESPN with his predictions for the final four
contestants in college basketball’s “March Madness”
championship tournament, and his recent “electronic town
hall meeting” (compared to Franklin Roosevelt’s live radio
broadcasts or “fireside chats”) which was screened live over
the internet, for which 104,000 online questions were
submitted and 3 million came on line to help select (along
with the president’s staff) which questions would be posed
to the president, garnering a viewing audience of 12.8
million. Regarding this latter form of presidential
political communication, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, media
scholar at the Annenberg Public Policy Center, remarked,
“This new communication strategy…is appealing to an online
audience that looks increasingly like the American public as
a whole” (PBS, “Jim Lehrer News Hour,” 3/26/09). Jamieson
further noted that the president not only took questions
directly from the online public and that they were
encouraged to interact with each other (perhaps “twitter”),
but that we might also take into account the “echo effect” –
many others who did not participate in this “electronic town
meeting,” who did not see it, know about it and will want to
talk about it.
Jeffrey E.
Cohen’s The Presidency in the Era of 24-Hour News is
an important contribution to the political communications
and information literature and to the literature on the
modern American presidency. But his analysis is still
haunted by nostalgia for the golden age of broadcast
television, which, on closer examination and with enough
historical hindsight, may come to be regarded as a form of
regimentation of American public opinion and not a high
point in civic literacy.
WILLIAM STEARNS
Independent
Scholar
Notes
[i]
Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political
Spectacle (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1988). See esp. Ch. 5 “The
Ambiguities of Political News.”
[ii]
Theodore J. Lowi, “Bend Sinister: How the
Constitution Saved the Republic and Lost Itself.”
James Madison Lecture, presented at the American
Political Science Association, Boston,
Massachusetts, August 29, 2008. Reprinted in PS:
Political Science & Politics Volume 42, Number 1
(January 2009).
[iii]
To be fair Cohen also warns that presidential
leadership style in the age of the new media forces
the president to appeal to narrower segments of the
public, his partisan base, and thus he is inclined
to support more extreme positions that are out of
touch with the opinions of the public-at-large.
[iv]
John Fiske, Reading the Popular (Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1989). See esp. Ch. 8 “Popular News.”
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