Ștefania-Teodora COCOR
University of Bucharest, Romania
Abstract: | When he assumed the presidency in January 1993, Bill Clinton made Russia a top priority on his foreign policy agenda. Considering that a successful democratic transition in post-Soviet Russia was in the national security interest of the United States, Clinton tried to strike a strategic alliance with the Russian reform. As the leader of the reform process, Boris Yeltsin received the unconditional support of the U.S., regardless of whether the Russian President exceeded his constitutional bounds. This paper aims to analyse the American perceptions towards the Russian constitutional crisis of 1993. It seeks to find how the American officials evaluated the events that unfolded in the months leading to the 3-4 October bloodshed on the streets of Moscow and how they interpreted Yeltsin’s decisions. Drawing on declassified documents from the National Security Archive and Clinton Digital Library, the article argues that the American administration, influenced by how the Russian President portrayed Moscow’s political dynamic, preferred to avoid questioning the legality of Yeltsin’s actions and continued to view him as the only alternative for ensuring America’s strategic interests. |
Keywords: | Strategy; diplomacy; United States; post-Soviet Russia; Clinton administration |
Contact details of the authors: | E-mail: stefania.cocor@s.unibuc.ro |
Institutional affiliation of the authors: | Doctoral School of History, University of Bucharest |
Institutions address: | Șoseaua Panduri, nr. 90, Sector 5, 050663, Bucharest, Romania, Phone: +4021-305.97.30, E-mail: office@g.unibuc.ro |