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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Eugen STRĂUȚIU
Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania

THE NEW ROMANIAN GEOPOLITICAL SCHOOL. RESEARCH TOPICS AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT

Abstract:	<p><i>In interwar Romania, a geopolitical school of exceptional quality operated, which explained the reasons for the Romanian state as it was unified in 1918, and proposed solutions for its consolidation in the Romanian geopolitical space.</i></p> <p><i>After a period of quasi-ignorance and hostility to geopolitics, after 1989 it forcefully returned to the attention of scholars and the public. The new research directions aim at the recovery of the interwar school, the systematization and interpretation of classical theories, and the approach of Romanian interests in the new geopolitical context. Universities, private research organizations, publishing houses, and journals mobilized for this purpose. A body of specialized experts has produced an impressive number of volumes, studies, and articles.</i></p> <p><i>We aim to list, as close as possible to reality, these publications, to classify them, to measure their usefulness, and to identify the beneficiaries. We will thus demonstrate that a new geopolitical school operates in Romania, in direct descent from the classical one.</i></p>
Keywords:	Geopolitics; geopolitical school; political geography; Romanian borders; Black Sea geopolitics; Danube geopolitics
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Preliminary considerations

Our objective regarding the description and explanation of the current state of Romanian geopolitical research involves two introductory conceptual approaches: the explanation of the term “school of thought” and the description, however brief, of the comparison term of the new Romanian geopolitical school - the traditional Romanian geopolitical school. On this basis, we will then explain what the new Romanian geopolitical school of thought is and what it looks like.

Therefore, the concept of “school of thought” is very little entered in the big dictionaries, out of proportion to the frequency with which it is used in specialized works in the social and humanistic fields (philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, cultural studies, political sciences, relations international affairs, security studies), in economic and medical sciences, and even in natural sciences. *Cambridge Dictionary* states, lapidary, that the school of thought represents “a set of ideas and opinions that a group of people shares about a matter”¹. In this sense, the concept is not specific only to scientific research but applies to the social sphere as a whole. For *Merriam-Webster*, the explanation is even more superficial: „a way of thinking”² – which does not help at all in understanding the specifics of the field of scientific research. In *Oxford Dictionary* the concept is missing.

Under these conditions, it has become a necessary and complicated task for epistemologists to define and describe the mode of aggregation and operation of a school of thought. We summarize here to extract the

¹ <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/school-of-thought> (31.01.2024)

² <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/school%20of%20thought> (31.01.2024)

gist of the contribution of the collective work of S. Phineas Upham, Lori Rosenkopf, and Lyle H. Ungar, for which “An epistemic community or mini-paradigm, often called a school of thought, is a socially constructed and informal community of researchers who build on each other’s ideas and share similar interests and who consequentially share patterns of citation in their work”¹. In this sense, we will understand the school of thought as the sum of the research works of some authors who produce knowledge in the same field, approaching related themes with the help of a similar research tool, without necessarily reaching similar or compatible conclusions (although, in the vast majority of cases, the results are compatible).

Thus we can understand the meaning in which numerous historical, sociological, and geopolitical researchers in the Romanian scientific space use the paradigm “Romanian interwar geopolitical school” or “classical Romanian geopolitical school” when they refer to the volumes, brochures and articles written in the 3rd-4th decades of the century passed by Ion Conea, Simion Mehedinți, Gheorghe I. Brătianu, M. Popa-Vereș, Vintilă Mihăilescu, Mihai David, Romulus Seișanu etc., who, in collective or individual research, offered the journal „Geopolitică și Geoistorie” [Geopolitics and Geohistory], as well as two monumental geopolitical atlases.

The years of the communist regime meant a withdrawal of national interest in the geopolitical interpretation of the Romanian space and state, geopolitics being fought as an instrument of imperialist policies. For the public, this propaganda found its place in the central newspapers of the Romanian Communist Party², and for professors and researchers – in translations of foreign authors³ or through their research⁴. More ideologically nuanced is the collaboration of Corneliu Bogdan with Eugen Preda, titled *Sfere de influență*⁵ [Spheres of influence], which was then translated and published at Columbia University Press⁶.

The regaining of freedom of thought and creation in December 1989, combined with the need for understanding, orientation, and creation of foreign policy solutions in a volatile regional and global context, led to the resumption of Romanian geopolitical research. They gained a prominent place in military and civilian higher education, produced university courses, doctoral research, and volumes generously hosted in the most valuable Romanian publishing houses and led to the appearance of specialized scientific journals indexed in international databases.

This is the context in which specialized research topics are produced with remarkable speed - to which different authors contribute, individually or collectively. These themes will be stated, described, and explained below.

Recovering the interwar Romanian school

First of all, the concern to recover classical texts published in the interwar period is remarkable. Some public libraries have digitized fundamental works such as the journal “Geopolitică și Geoistorie” or the 48-page booklet by Ion Conea, *Geopolitica – o știință nouă* [Geopolitics – a new science], printed in Bucharest in 1938, under the auspices of the Romanian Social Institute - Sociological Section⁷. The geopolitical atlas of Romulus Seișanu was re-edited, under the original title (principal edition at Editura Universul from Bucharest, in 1936) *România. Atlas istoric, geopolitic, etnografic și economic*⁸ [Romania. Historical, geopolitical, ethnographic, and economic atlas]. Also, Editura Militară printed a new edition of the atlas *Spațiul istoric și*

¹ S. Phineas Upham, Lori Rosenkopf, Lyle H. Ungar, *Positioning Knowledge: Schools of Thought and New Knowledge Creation*, “Scientometrics”, Vol. 83, No. 2, 2010, p. 557

² V. Iliescu, *Geopolitica – teoria falimentară a jefuitorilor și războinicilor imperialiști*, “Scânteia”, Year XXII, No. 2585, February 17, 1953

³ Günter Heyden, *Critica geopoliticii germane. Esența și funcția social a unei școli sociologice reacționare*, Editura Politică, București, 1960

⁴ Ion Nicolae Anghel, *Geopolitica de la ideologie la strategie politico-militară*, Editura Politică, București, 1985

⁵ Corneliu Bogdan, Eugen Preda, *Sfere de influență*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1986

⁶ Idem, *Spheres of influence*, Columbia University Press, 1988

⁷ By accessing the online catalog of the “Lucian Blaga” Central University Library in Cluj-Napoca, http://aleph.bcuccluj.ro:8991/F/?func=option-update-lng&file_name=find-b&F2=pc-latin&P_CON_LNG=RUM (31.01.2024)

⁸ Romulus Seișanu, *România. Atlas istoric, geopolitic, etnografic și economic*, Editura Asociației Române pentru Educație Democratică, București, 2000

*etnic românesc*¹ [The Romanian historical and ethnic space], which appeared in 1942, which was put on the table of the Paris peace conference in 1946, justifying Romanian rights.

The classic texts as they appeared in the journal “Geopolitica și Geoistoria” or at the Publishing House “Ramuri” from Craiova, were systematically reprinted under the title *Geopolitica* [Geopolitics], edited by Emil I. Emandi, Gh. Buzatu, Vasile S. Cucu, in the year 1994. We find there, among others, Ion Conea, *Geopolitica – o știință nouă*, Sabin Manuilă, *Studiu etnografic asupra populației României (I)* [Ethnographic study on the population of Romania], Vintilă Mihăilescu, *Unitatea pământului și poporului românesc* [The unity of the land and the Romanian people], din nou I. Conea cu *Destinul istoric al Carpaților* [The historical destiny of the Carpathians], M. Popa-Vereș, *Schemă privind cercetările geopolitice sub aspectul intereselor naționale* [Scheme regarding geopolitical research under the aspect of national interests], Anton Golopenția, *Însemnare cu privire la definirea preocupării ce poartă numele de geopolitică* [Note on the definition of the concern called geopolitics], Mihai David, *Probleme de ordin geopolitic ale locului și spațiului ocupate de statul roman* [Geopolitical problems of the place and space occupied by the Romanian state], Nicolae M. Popp, *Românii din Basarabia și Transnistria* [Romanians from Bessarabia and Transnistria]. Se adaugă cercetări recente ale unor autori străini, precum Christian Daudel, *Geografie, geopolitică și geostrategie: termeni în schimbare* [Geography, geopolitics and geostrategy: changing terms], dar și români - Grigore Posea, *Geopolitică și geopolitică românească*² [Geopolitics and Romanian geopolitics].

The reinterpretation and verification of the actuality of the interwar work is a continuous effort of geopoliticians who have worked in recent decades. Substantial volumes resulted under the signature of Călin Cotoi (*Primordialism cultural și geopolitica românească interbelică*³ [Cultural primordialism and interwar Romanian geopolitics]) and Marius-Cristian Neacșu (*Simion Mehedinți și geopolitica românească*⁴ [Simion Mehedinți and Romanian geopolitics]) or volume chapters in thematic compendiums of which we exemplify Marius-Cristian Neacșu (*Simion Mehedinți, precursorul școlii românești de geopolitică* [Simion Mehedinți, the forerunner of the Romanian school of geopolitics], then *Simion Mehedinți, marele absent de la Conferința de Pace de la Paris 1919-1920* [Simion Mehedinți, the great absentee from the Paris Peace Conference 1919-1920]), Silviu Neguț and Marius-Cristian Neacșu (*România în studiile românești de geopolitică din prima jumătate a secolului XX* [Romania in Romanian geopolitical studies from the first half of the 20th century]) Marius-Cristian Neacșu and Gheorghe Vlăsceanu (*Contribuția geografilor români la construcția României. Conferința de Pace de la Paris 1919-1920* [The contribution of Romanian geographers to the construction of Romania. The Paris Peace Conference 1919-1920])⁵, Eugen Străuțiu (*Ion Conea și geopolitica românească* [Ion Conea and Romanian geopolitics])⁶.

Geopolitical studies recalling and explaining the work of the Romanian classics appeared in journals specialized in geography (in “Terra” - Petre Deică, *Contribuții geopolitice ale geografilor români*⁷ [Geopolitical contributions of Romanian geographers] și Marius-Cristian Neacșu, *Ideile lui Simion Mehedinți asupra geopoliticii*⁸ [Simion Mehedinți's ideas on geopolitics]; in “Geographica Timisensis” - Radu Săgeată, *Personalități marcante în geopolitica românească interbelică*⁹ [Outstanding personalities in Romanian interwar geopolitics]), ethnography (in “Etnosfera” - Daniela Didă, *Chestiuni punctuale în geopolitica românească interbelică*¹⁰ [Specific issues in interwar Romanian geopolitics]) or regional studies (in

¹ *Spațiul istoric și etnic românesc - Vol. I. Spațiul istoric românesc*, 1992; *Vol. II. Ungaria “milenară”*, 1992; *Vol. III. Spațiul etnic românesc*, Editura Militară, București, 1993

² Emil I. Emandi, Gh. Buzatu, Vasile S. Cucu (Eds.), *Geopolitica*, vol. I, Casa Editorială Glasul Bucovinei, Iași, 1994, passim

³ Călin Cotoi, *Primordialism cultural și geopolitica românească interbelică*, Mica Valahie, București, 2007

⁴ Marius-Cristian Neacșu, *Simion Mehedinți și geopolitica românească*, CD Press, București, 2018

⁵ Toate în volumul omagia dedicat unui centenar de la Marea Unire, sub titlul *România 1918-2018. Un secol de frământări geopolitice*, Editura Academiei de Studii Economice, București, 2018

⁶ Eugen Străuțiu, *Ion Conea și geopolitica românească*, in *Științe politice, relații internaționale și studii de securitate. Sesiune internațională de comunicări științifice*, Vol. I, Editura Universității „Lucian Blaga”, Sibiu, 2011

⁷ Petre Deică, *Contribuții geopolitice ale geografilor români*, “Terra”, Vol. XXX(L), No. 2, 2000

⁸ Marius-Cristian Neacșu, *Ideile lui Simion Mehedinți asupra geopoliticii*, “Terra”, Vol. XLVIII (LXVIII), No. 1-2, 2017

⁹ Radu Săgeată, *Personalități marcante în geopolitica românească interbelică*, “Geographica Timisensis”, Vol. VIII-IX, 1999-2000

¹⁰ Daniela Didă, *Chestiuni punctuale în geopolitica românească interbelică*, “Etnosfera”, No. 3, 2010

“Milcovia” - Lucian Badea, *Ion Conea, mentor al geografiei românești*¹ [Ion Conea, mentor of Romanian geography], and Cătălina Cârstea, *Ion Conea, reprezentant al intelectualității românești din secolul al XX-lea*² [Ion Conea, representative of Romanian intellectuals from the 20th century]). Simion Mehedinți was evoked by Eugen Străuțiu in “Buletin Științific. Publicație științifică de informare a Academiei Forțelor Terestre”³, and Anton Golopenția – in the political science journal from Chisinau entitled “Moldoscopie. Probleme de analiză politică”⁴.

Attempting some explanations on the impressive quantitative dimension of the working tools and research products intended for the Romanian interwar school of geopolitics, we point out the following:

1. At the end of the Cold War, Romania was leaving a status of stability and predictability on the international level. The old themes of the geopolitical meaning of the Romanian nation have forcibly returned in the present, even if our neighbors appear reorganized into new state units (Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia). The usefulness of the old analyses and solutions regarding the geographical landmarks in the Romanian political construction was automatically rediscovered, along with the strong and weak points in the present and the future of the Romanian state.
2. Within the effort to recover the Romanian tradition, in the sociological, cultural, political, or military paradigms, the identification of the geopolitical tradition to update and reinterpret it was a necessary and inevitable objective. Even more so since neither in the interwar period nor in the contemporary one, clear lines of demarcation can be drawn. When we evoke Ion Conea or Simion Mehedinți as geographers, Anton Golopenția and M. Popa-Vereș as sociologists, Gheorghe I. Brătianu as a historian, we are already one step into geopolitics; things simply cannot be separated.
3. The demarcation of our society from communism was supposed to provide an intellectual and conscience component, which would fight back against censorship and research topics ordered and necessarily framed in the Marxist-Leninist paradigm. The names cited above represent cases of violent persecution by the communist regime, from the professional and social ones to the prison sentence (where Gheorghe I. Brătianu ended his life). In their memory, as an intellectual and civic attitude, we return to authentic, uncensored research, primarily oriented towards national interests.

Romanian contributions to international geopolitical theories

In the most general way, Romanian geopoliticians (we include here those from the Republic of Moldova, who published their research in Romanian and sometimes in Romanian publishing houses) offered the public working tools, which systematized in an informative manner (non -analytical) conceptual bases of the field. Thus we benefit from dictionaries (Oleg Serebrian, *Dicționar de geopolitică*⁵ [Dictionary of geopolitics]) or lexicons (Vasile Simileanu, *Lexicon geopolitic*⁶ [Lexicon of geopolitics]).

At a higher degree of analytical refinement lies the category of introductions and treatises, offers Silviu Neguț (*Introducere în geopolitică*⁷ [Introduction to geopolitics]), Alexandru Ilieș (*Elemente de geografie politică*⁸ [Elements of political geography]) or Ilie Bădescu (*Tratat de geopolitică*⁹ [Treatise on geopolitics]).

General geopolitical topics, which inventory and classify the most general concepts, the most circulated theories, the reference authors with short forays into their representative volumes, we find at Adrian

¹ Lucian Badea, *Ion Conea, mentor al geografiei românești*, “Milcovia”, Vol. IX, No. 17, 2013

² Cătălina Cârstea, *Ion Conea, reprezentant al intelectualității românești din secolul al XX-lea*, “Milcovia”, Vol. IX, No. 17, 2013

³ Eugen Străuțiu, *Fragments of Romanian Geopolitical School. Simion Mehedinți*, “Buletin Științific. Publicație științifică de informare a Academiei Forțelor Terestre”, Vol. XVII, No. 1(33), 2012

⁴ Idem, *Gândirea geopolitică a lui Anton Golopenția*, “Moldoscopie. Probleme de analiză politică”, Universitatea de Stat a Moldovei, Chișinău, Vol. LII, No. 1, 2011

⁵ Oleg Serebrian, *Dicționar de geopolitică*, Polirom, Iași, 2006

⁶ Vasile Simileanu, *Lexicon geopolitic*, Top Form, București, 2023

⁷ Silviu Neguț, *Introducere în geopolitică*, Meteor Press, București, 2015

⁸ Alexandru Ilieș, *Elemente de geografie politică*, Editura Universității din Oradea, 1999

⁹ Ilie Bădescu, *Tratat de geopolitică*, Mica Valahie, București, 2004

Pop (*Geopolitica*¹ [Geopolitics]), Silviu Neguț (*Geopolitica. Universul puterii*² [Geopolitics. The universe of power]), Ion Coșcodaru and Vasile Paul (*Centrele de putere ale lumii*³ [Power centers of the world]), Liviu-Petru Zăpârțan (*Geopolitica în actualitate*⁴ [Geopolitics today]), Sergiu Tămaș (*Geopolitica*⁵ [Geopolitics]), Alexandru Burian from Chisinau (*Geopolitica lumii contemporane*⁶ [Geopolitics of the contemporary world]).

Geopolitics as a subsystem of other ideational systems is in the attention of Oleg Serebrian (*Politică și geopolitică*⁷ [Politics and geopolitics]), Ilie Bădescu and Ioan Mihăilescu as volume editors (*Geopolitică, globalizare, integrare*⁸ [Geopolitics, globalization, integration]), Vasile Simileanu (*Geopolitică și centre de putere*⁹ [Geopolitics and centers of power]). In relation with other scientific paradigms, geopolitics is addressed by Antonia Colibășanu (*Geopolitică și geoeconomie contemporană*¹⁰ [Contemporary geopolitics and geoeconomics]), but also from Ilie Bădescu and Dan Dungaciu (*Sociologia și geopolitica frontierei*¹¹ [Sociology and geopolitics of the border]). Various categories of geopolitics are analyzed by Ionel Nicu Sava (*Școala geopolitică germană*¹² [The German geopolitical school], then *Geopolitica. Teorii și paradigme clasice. Școala geopolitică germană*¹³ [Geopolitics. Classical theories and paradigms. The German geopolitical school]), Constantin Anechitoaie (*Geopolitica sistemelor maritime*¹⁴ [Geopolitics of maritime systems]), Oleg Serebrian (*Va exploda estul? Geopolitica spațiului pontic*¹⁵ [Will the East explode? Geopolitics of the Pontic space], then *Geopolitica spațiului pontic*¹⁶ [Geopolitics of the Pontic space]) or Cozmin Gușe (*Imperialism în postcomunism. Geopolitica dezordinii în fostul lagăr socialist*¹⁷ [Imperialism in postcommunism. The geopolitics of disorder in the former socialist camp]). We make a special mention for the contributions signed by Alba Iulia Catrinel Popescu, who offers us a treatise on geopolitics in two volumes, investigating the geopolitics of maritime power and the geopolitics of continental power respectively¹⁸, to then return with a theme regarding the Russian empire's spaces of domination¹⁹.

Bold ideas, which question modern-day correlations in an up-to-date conceptual suitcase, are found dissipating in journals – mostly without geopolitical specialization. Thus, without any pretense of exhaustiveness or even representativeness, we can mention the contributions of Ilie Bădescu (*Semnele vremurilor și geopolitica „turbulențelor”*²⁰ [Signs of the times and the geopolitics of “turbulence”]), Nicolae Sfetcu (*Biopolitica și geopolitica*²¹ [Biopolitics and geopolitics]), Petre Deică (*Sistemicitatea economiei mondiale. Considerații geopolitice*²² [The systematicity of the world economy. Geopolitical considerations]) or

¹ Adrian Pop, *Geopolitica*, Sylvi, București, 2003

² Silviu Neguț, *Geopolitica. Universul puterii*, Meteor Press București, 2008

³ Ion Coșcodaru, Vasile Paul, *Centrele de putere ale lumii*, Editura Științelor Social Politice, București, 2003

⁴ Liviu-Petru Zăpârțan, *Geopolitica în actualitate*, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2009

⁵ Sergiu Tămaș, *Geopolitica*, Noua Alternativă, București, 1995

⁶ Alexandru Burian, *Geopolitica lumii contemporane*, Tipografia Centrală, Chișinău, 2002

⁷ Oleg Serebrian, *Politică și geopolitică*, Cartier, Chișinău, 2004

⁸ Ilie Bădescu, Ioan Mihăilescu (Eds.), *Geopolitică, globalizare, integrare*, Mica Valahie, București, 2003

⁹ Vasile Simileanu, *Geopolitică și centre de putere*, Top Form, București, 2010

¹⁰ Antonia Colibășanu, *Geopolitică și geoeconomie contemporană. Cu o prefață de George Friedman*, Tritonic, București, 2020

¹¹ Ilie Bădescu, Dan Dungaciu, *Sociologia și geopolitica frontierei*, Vol. I-II, Floarea Albastră, București, 1995

¹² Ionel Nicu Sava, *Școala geopolitică germană*, Info-Team, București, 1997

¹³ Idem, *Geopolitica. Teorii și paradigme clasice. Școala geopolitică germană*, Info-Team, București, 1997

¹⁴ Constantin Anechitoaie, *Geopolitica sistemelor maritime*, Top Form, București, 2008

¹⁵ Oleg Serebrian, *Va exploda estul? Geopolitica spațiului pontic*, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1998

¹⁶ Idem, *Geopolitica spațiului pontic*, Cartier, Chișinău, 2006

¹⁷ Cozmin Gușe, *Imperialism în postcomunism. Geopolitica dezordinii în fostul lagăr socialist*, Adevărul Holding, București, 2011

¹⁸ Alba Iulia Catrinel Popescu, *Tratat de geopolitică (I–II): Geopolitica puterii maritime. Geopolitica puterii continentale*, Top Form, București, 2020

¹⁹ Idem, *Spațiile de dominație ale Imperiului. Marea strategie de transformare a Rusiei în hegemon al Eurasiei*, Top Form, București, 2022

²⁰ Ilie Bădescu, *Semnele vremurilor și geopolitica „turbulențelor”*, “Infosfera, Revistă de studii de securitate și informații pentru apărare”, Year V, No. 3, 2013

²¹ Nicolae Sfetcu, *Biopolitica și geopolitica*, “Geopolitica”, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2022

²² Petre Deică, *Sistemicitatea economiei mondiale. Considerații geopolitice*, “Analele Universității București”, Vol. XLIII, 1994

the collaboration of Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Silviu Neguț and Gheorghe Vlăsceanu (*The Impact of Geopolitical Risks on Tourism*¹). We must also mention here the contribution of Svetlana Cebotari from Chisinau regarding the methodology of geopolitics research².

Finally, we propose an extremely brief inventory of publications in the interest of higher education that host geopolitics disciplines, their holders writing didactic materials in the form of “course”, “course notes” or “university textbooks”. They systematize the most general data of the discipline and put it in the canonical form corresponding to the didactic process. We can already intuit that the biggest contributors are the professors (military or civilian) who teach at the military academies - especially at the “Carol I” National Defense University (formerly the Academy of Advanced Military Studies), but also at the military academies of the various specializations. So, we appreciate Constantin Hlihor's contributions (*Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza istoriei imediate a relațiilor internaționale și în istoria artei militare contemporane*³ [Geopolitics and geostrategy in the analysis of the immediate history of international relations and in the history of contemporary military art], then *Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza relațiilor internaționale*⁴ [Geopolitics and geostrategy in the analysis of international relations]), Marius Hanganu (*Puterea maritimă și strategia navală*⁵ [Maritime power and naval strategy], then *Interesele României la Dunăre și Marea Neagră*⁶ [Romania's interests in the Danube and the Black Sea]), or Mircea Cosma (*De la geopolitică la geostrategie*⁷ [From geopolitics to geostrategy]). To these are added numerous contributions by professors from civil universities, including Vasile Marin, (*Geopolitica și noile provocări ale secolului XXI*⁸ [Geopolitics and the new challenges of the 21st century]), Ion Pâlșoiu, (*Geopolitica – știință interdisciplinară*⁹ [Geopolitics - interdisciplinary science]), Silviu Costachie (*Geografie politică: o nouă abordare*¹⁰ [Political Geography: A New Approach]), Voicu Bodocan, (*Geografie politică*¹¹ [Political geography]), Teodor Simion, (*Geopolitica Mării Negre și a spațiului pontic*¹² [Geopolitics of the Black Sea and the Pontic space]), Adrian-Vasile Popa (*Geopolitică și globalizare. Note de curs*¹³ [Geopolitics and globalization. Course notes]) or Gabriel Micu (*Bessarabia, Romania and the Great Powers' geopolitics 1914 - 1947*¹⁴). In 2003, the Geopolitics and Visual Anthropology Center of the University of Bucharest published the collective volume *Geopolitica integrării europene*¹⁵ [Geopolitics of European integration] – up to now it seems to be the only collection of geopolitical studies written in the universities.

A few concluding comments on the table above (which, again, we acknowledge as incomplete and perfectible):

1. By their nature, the contributions of Romanian authors to the knowledge of geopolitical theories of global resonance are limited to presentation, systematization, comments, and short references regarding their actuality or applicability in the Romanian case. It thus accommodates the target

¹ Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Silviu Neguț, Gheorghe Vlăsceanu, *The Impact of Geopolitical Risks on Tourism*, “Amfiteatru Economic”, Special Issue no. 12, Vol. XX, 2018

² Svetlana Cebotari, *Istoriografia și metodologia cercetării geopoliticii*, “Enciclopedica. Revistă de Istorie a Științei și Studii Enciclopedice”, No. 1-2 (6-7), 2014

³ Constantin Hlihor *Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza istoriei imediate a relațiilor internaționale și în istoria artei militare contemporane*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 2002

⁴ Idem, *Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza relațiilor internaționale*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2005

⁵ Marius Hanganu, *Puterea maritimă și strategia navală*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 2001

⁶ Idem, *Interesele României la Dunăre și Marea Neagră*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2007

⁷ Mircea Cosma, *De la geopolitică la geostrategie*, Editura Academiei Trupelor de Uscat, Sibiu, 1999

⁸ Vasile Marin, *Geopolitica și noile provocări ale secolului XXI*, Editura Universității “Transilvania”, Brașov, 2004

⁹ Ion Pâlșoiu, *Geopolitica – știință interdisciplinară*, Universitaria, Craiova, 2006

¹⁰ Silviu Costachie, *Geografie politică: o nouă abordare*, Editura Universității din București, București, 2004

¹¹ Voicu Bodocan, *Geografie politică*, Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj Napoca, 1997

¹² Teodor Simion, *Geopolitica Mării Negre și a spațiului pontic*, Pro Universitaria, București, 2022

¹³ Adrian-Vasile Popa, *Geopolitică și globalizare. Note de curs*, Top Form, București, 2023

¹⁴ Gabriel Micu, *Bessarabia, Romania and the Great Powers' geopolitics (1914 - 1947)*, Pro Universitaria, București, 2013

¹⁵ Centrul de Geopolitică și Antropologie Vizuală, *Geopolitica integrării europene*, Editura Universității din București, 2003

- audience, represented especially by students in geopolitical or related profiles, professors specialized in the profile, and the public passionate about knowledge beyond the superficial texts available online.
2. Quantitatively, this chapter is impressive. And I didn't even refer to the hundreds of articles published in Romanian geopolitics and political geography journals. I didn't even mention the fruit of the publishing house's collaboration with the Romanian translators, which resulted in the Romanian language editions of some prestigious titles from abroad. As examples, we can refer here to the work with universal circulation signed by Jacques Ancel¹, Thayer Mahan², Paul Claval³, Aymeric Chauprade și François Thual⁴, Robert Kaplan⁵, Aleksandr Dughin (la Bucharest⁶ and Chisinau⁷).
 3. The institutional support of the research direction of international geopolitics consists of universities (which financed, printed, and distributed the volumes in support of the educational process), and publishing houses (which collaborated with authors and reviewers specialized in geopolitics and disseminated their product to the public broad, on commercial criteria). Unfortunately, there are few research centers associated with universities, which are dedicated to geopolitics. The Center for Geopolitics and Visual Anthropology of the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of the University of Bucharest aims to investigate two rather weakly connected fields and does not have a specialized journal or a presentation website.

The geopolitical approach to Romanian interests

The geopolitical analysis of the Romanian space, which directly continues the interwar tradition (to which it massively appeals through bibliographic lists and initial concepts), can be placed in two categories, according to the criterion of the generality of the geographical of the investigated space.

We can identify a category of integral approaches, that target the entire Romanian space, whether it is understood as political space (the Romanian state) or as geopolitical space (the space of interests of the Romanian nation). Here we mention the collaboration of Silviu Neguț, Vasile Cucu and Liviu Bogdan Vlad - *Geopolitica României*⁸ [Geopolitics of Romania], that of Vasile Simileanu and Radu Săgeata with the same title⁹, that of Silviu Costachie and Alexandru Eugen Oprescu, placed under the auspices of the Research Center for Regional Development and European Integration - *Geopolitica spațiului românesc*¹⁰ [Geopolitics of the Romanian space] or that of Cristian Barna and Adrian Popa, *România între prieteni și dușmani: decupaje geopolitice și hărți imagologice*¹¹ [Romania between friends and enemies: geopolitical cutouts and imagological maps]. Individual efforts have materialized in the case of Vasile Cucu, *Fragmente din geopolitica României*¹² [Fragments from Romania's geopolitics], Vasile Simileanu - *România. Tensiuni Geopolitice*¹³ [Romania. Geopolitical tensions] and Alba Iulia Catrinel Popescu - *România între „gura de rai”*

¹ Jacques Ancel, *Frontierele românești*, Domino, Pitești, 1999

² Thayer Mahan, *Influența puterii maritime asupra istoriei 1660-1783*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 1999

³ Paul Claval, *Geopolitică și geostrategie. Gândirea politică, spațiul și teritoriul în secolul al XX-lea*, Corint, București, 2001

⁴ Aymeric Chauprade, François Thual, *Dicționar de geopolitică*, Corint, București, 2003

⁵ Robert Kaplan, *Răzbumarea geografiei. Ce ne spune harta despre conflictele viitoare și lupta împotriva destinului*, Litera, București, 2014

⁶ Aleksandr Dughin, *Bazele geopoliticii vol.1 Viitorul geopolitic al Rusiei. Cu o postfață de prof. Ilie Bădescu*, Eurasiatica.ro, București, 2011; Idem, *Destin Eurasianist*, Mica Valahie, București, 2017

⁷ Idem, *A patra teorie politică, Rusia și ideile politice ale secolului XXI*, Universitatea Populară, Chișinău, 2014

⁸ Silviu Neguț, Vasile Cucu, Liviu Bogdan Vlad, *Geopolitica României*, Transversal, Târgoviște, 2004

⁹ Vasile Simileanu, Radu Săgeată, *Geopolitica României*, Top Form, București, 2009

¹⁰ Silviu Costachie, Alexandru Eugen Oprescu, *Geopolitica spațiului românesc*, Transversal, Târgoviște, 2010

¹¹ Cristian Barna, Adrian Popa, *România între prieteni și dușmani: decupaje geopolitice și hărți imagologice*, Editura Militară, București, 2020

¹² Vasile Cucu, *Fragmente din geopolitica României*, Transversal, Târgoviște, 2007

¹³ Vasile Simileanu, *România. Tensiuni Geopolitice*, Top Form București, 2003

geografică și răspântia geopolitică¹ [Romania between the geographical “mouth of heaven” and the geopolitical crossroad]. Several articles published in scientific journals complete the general views on Romanian geopolitics; being too many to be listed, we limit ourselves to pointing out the one of Vasile Simileanu, *România 1918-2018: un secol de geopolitică* [Romania 1918-2018: a century of geopolitics], published in the journal “Geopolitica”.

The tribute crowning a century of Romanian geopolitical research, together with the centenary of the creation of Greater Romania, is the volume *România 1918-2018. Un secol de frământări geopolitice* [Romania 1918-2018. A century of geopolitical turmoil], offered by the Publishing House of the Academy of Economic Studies in 2018².

The second category sums up research focused on the complicated spaces within the Romanian space. Snake Island is targeted (Dominuț Pădurean, *Insula Șerpilor și implicațiile statutului său juridic asupra intereselor geostrategice ale României în Marea Neagră*³ [Snake Island and the implications of its legal status on Romania's geostrategic interests in the Black Sea]; Vasile Cucu, Gheorghe Vlăsceanu, *Insula Șerpilor*⁴ [Snake Island]), Danube (Iulian Cârțână, Eduardt Samoilă, *Geopolitica Dunării. Dunărea în relațiile internaționale*⁵) [Geopolitics of the Danube. The Danube in international relations], Black Sea (the collective volume edited by the “Geopolitica” editorial office and printed at Top Form, *Marea Neagră. Confluente geopolitice*⁶ [Black Sea. Geopolitical confluences]) or Romania's position in the context of the Ukrainian crisis (Daniel Hrenciuc, *Geopolitica frontierelor României în contextul crizei ucrainene*⁷ [The geopolitics of Romania's borders in the context of the Ukrainian crisis]). In the journals, assuming again an inevitably partial and subjective selection, we find questions and answers about *Binomul geopolitic România – Marea Neagră* [The geopolitical binomial Romania - Black Sea] (Petre Deică)⁸, *Transnistria în jocul geopolitic al Rusiei* [Transnistria in Russia's geopolitical game] (again Petre Deică)⁹ or *Reunificarea României. Elemente de infrastructură geopolitică* [Reunification of Romania. Elements of geopolitical infrastructure] (Radu Baltașiu)¹⁰.

A very brief attempt to evaluate the concerns of contemporary Romanian geopolitical research can refer to the following:

1. We are witnessing a consistent and continuous effort to problematize the Romanian geopolitical space and the geopolitical interests of the Romanian state, which is materialized in a significant number of authored volumes, collaborative volumes, and collections of studies. An impossible to specify number is added through the efforts of a single author, of articles in local magazines.
2. Unfortunately, almost all the literature that we could identify is available in Romanian. An additional presence of Romanian authors in front of the foreign public seems necessary and urgent because the affirmation of Romanian positions can and must dialogue with those of geopoliticians from neighboring states and beyond.
3. As a research direction, contemporary Romanian geopolitics benefits from very solid theoretical support in the previous two research directions: our classical school and the Romanian reception of international theoretical paradigms.

¹ Alba Iulia Catrinel Popescu, *România între “gura de rai” geografică și răspântia geopolitică*, Editura Militară, București, 2023

² *România 1918-2018. Un secol de frământări geopolitice*, Editura Academiei de Studii Economice, București, 2018

³ Dominuț Pădurean, *Insula Șerpilor și implicațiile statutului său juridic asupra intereselor geostrategice ale României în Marea Neagră*, Muntenia, Constanța, 2004

⁴ Vasile Cucu, Gheorghe Vlăsceanu, *Insula Șerpilor*, Casa de Editură și Presă Viața Românească, București, 1991

⁵ Iulian Cârțână, Eduardt Samoilă, *Geopolitica Dunării. Dunărea în relațiile internaționale*, Transversal, Târgoviște, 2010

⁶ *Marea Neagră. Confluente geopolitice*, “Geopolitica. Revistă de Geografie Politică, Geopolitică și Geostrategie”, Vol. III, No. 14-15, Top Form, București, 2005

⁷ Daniel Hrenciuc, *Geopolitica frontierelor României în contextul crizei ucrainene*, Mega, Cluj-Napoca, 2016

⁸ Petre Deică, *Binomul geopolitic România – Marea Neagră*, “Geopolitica. Revistă de Geografie Politică, Geopolitică și Geostrategie”, Vol. II, No. 6, Top Form, București, 2004

⁹ Petre Deică, *Transnistria în jocul geopolitic al Rusiei*, “Revista Română de Geografie Politică”, Vol. II, No. 1, 2000

¹⁰ Radu Baltașiu, *Reunificarea României. Elemente de infrastructură geopolitică*, “Sociologie Românească”, Vol. XVI, No. 3-4, 2018

4. Most of the authors indicated in the previous chapters return with analytical contributions of the Romanian space, practically specializing and updating their contributions of a more general nature. However, unlike the previous ones, in the approach to Romanian current affairs, collaborative works predominate over those by a single author - a fact that can be explained by the interdisciplinary nature and the greater need for documentation of current events. Unfortunately, universities seem to have retreated after solving their need to offer fundamental paradigms to students.

Contribution of the journals

A recapitative look at the bibliographic sources indicated above shows us that the scientific articles in the geopolitical field were hosted in magazines profiled in the fields of geography, sociology, military sciences, international law, security studies, and intelligence. In addition to these, Romanian research also benefits from journal titles specialized in geopolitics; some have ended their existence, while others continue a consolidated course on the path of excellence.

A less noted evolution had “Revista Română de Geopolitică și Relații Internaționale” [“Romanian Journal of Geopolitics and International Relations”], as a publication of the Center for International Relations, Studies and Research within the Romanian University of Sciences and Arts “Gheorghe Cristea”. In 2009 (the first year of publication), the editors proclaimed that “the area of interest of the Romanian Journal of Geopolitics and International Relations varies from the analysis of global problems (risks and threats in the context of the globalization of international relations) to the identification of the effects of the European integration process on new member states and investigating the relations between the European Union and other global actors”¹. The university ceased activity in 2020, but disparate issues of the magazine's collection can be found online only from 2009-2012.

Since the year 2009, it has started working “Revista Română de Geografie Politică” [“Romanian Journal of Political Geography”], under the auspices of the University of Oradea. The editorial office played an important role in organizing international congresses of political geography, under the auspices of the International Union of Geography². Currently, the magazine is presented as “a scientific international publication. The Journal is issued under the aegis and with the financial support of the University of Oradea, Department of Geography, Tourism and Territorial Planning, Territorial Studies, and Analyses Centre (Romania), and IGU – Commission on Political Geography. It is published since 1999, entirely in English, with 2-3 issues per year”³.

The flagship of the geopolitical field remains the magazine “Geopolitica. Revistă de Geografie Politică, Geopolitică și Geostrategie” [“Geopolitics. Journal of Political Geography, Geopolitics and Geostrategy”], edited as a private project by the “Ion Conea” Geopolitics Association. This presents itself as “the quarterly publication of analyses and syntheses of political geography, geopolitics and geostrategy, dedicated to international events and their impact both politically and in the dynamics of the business environment. *Geopolitica* is elitist, with the target audience being the state administration, civil society, international organizations accredited in Romania, the educational environment in the country and abroad, military bodies, and the business environment”⁴. The latest themed issues look particularly consistent, with an internal economy of over 250 pages.

Indexing in prestigious international databases of “Revista Română de Geografie Politică” and “Geopolitica” represents a recognition of the quality of published research and, on the other hand, an invitation for researchers to contribute with topics that will be promoted internationally.

¹ *Centrul de Cercetare CRISC lansează primul număr al REVISTEI ROMANE DE GEOPOLITICA SI RELATII INTERNATIONALE*, <https://www.comunicatedepresa.ro/universitatea-romana-de-stiinte-si-arte/centrul-de-cercetare-crisc-lanseaza-primul-numar-al-revistei-romane-de-geopolitica-si-relatii-internationale> (31.01.2024)

² Radu Săgeată, *Geopolitică, geografie politică, “Geopolitica”, No. 8, 2017*, <https://www.geopolitic.ro/2017/08/geopolitica-geografie-politica/> (31.01.2024)

³ https://www.rrgp.uoradea.ro/Aims_and_Indexing.html (31.01.2024)

⁴ <https://www.geopolitic.ro/in/revista-geopolitica/> (31.01.2024)

Conclusions

Based on the repertoire of essential research on Romanian geopolitics, as shown above, without the pretense of achieving a complete list (but with the conviction that the essential has been recorded), it is already obvious that we are in front of the necessary and sufficient arguments to declare the existence and high scientific standards of a new Romanian geopolitical school. If we list its arguments/components, we insist on at least the following:

1. A historical tradition that provides works, concepts, and theories of enduring value and ready for updating in the post-Cold War context. This is the interwar school, which also extended its activities in the early years of the Second World War.
2. Several directions of research can be classified differently. Opting for the use of the content criterion, we notice a) the recovery of the interwar school; b) contributions to classical theories; c) the geopolitical approach to Romanian interests after 1989. The number of volumes, studies, and articles related to the analyzed period is impressive.
3. A body of specialized experts, which includes researchers, university professors, and members of private research organizations, who hold at least doctorates in fields that intersect geopolitics (history, sociology, economics, etc.). It is interesting the phenomenon of professors from military institutions of higher education, military or civilian, who after retirement continue to work in civilian institutions of higher education, in research organizations, or as journal editors. Percentagewise, this category predominates in the professional structure of the body of experts.
4. A solid institutional foundation, consisting of universities and their publishing houses (which have published courses and books of introductory value), private research centers (Geopolitics Association “Ion Conea”), and scientific journals placed under the auspices of universities or private organizations. We add private publishers, who have capitalized on expert work and public interest, managing to make a profit while satisfying and stimulating public interest in geopolitics.

Who is this impressive output of geopolitical research for? Beneficiaries include students and professors from military sciences, intelligence, geography, sociology, history, law, and more. As for the students, they have sources to prepare papers, undergraduate, master, and doctoral theses. It adds segments of the public, with intellectual concerns, for whom the geopolitical theme represents general culture.

But perhaps the most important function of the new school of geopolitical thought is not resolved. Its products should be a policy resource for foreign, military, and security policymakers. In advanced democracies, decision-makers (personally or rather through their advisors) draw inspiration from geopolitical reading and organize consultations and advice with researchers. Moreover, professionals with geopolitical work are selected for decision-making positions in relevant ministries or in the presidential apparatus (relevant is the example of the Republic of Moldova, where Oleg Serebrian is deputy prime minister in the current government, where he is responsible for the issue of Transnistrian secessionism). In Romania, these best practices are far from being implemented, leaving the impression that decision-makers prefer not to discuss and explain the reasons for the policies they initiate. Somehow, the dialogue between politicians and geopoliticians will have to start here.

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HYBRID THREATS AND ACTIVITIES: MODERN PERCEPTION AND EVOLUTION

Abstract:	<p><i>The constantly changing security environment has recently been influenced by a series of hybrid threats, widely used by various entities, including states, to achieve the proposed objectives. The specific feature, characteristic of the ongoing events, including the war in Ukraine, denotes the merging of hybrid methods and tactics of action with the conduct of active armed operations. In this context, we consider it extremely important to study the forms of manifestation characteristic of hybrid attacks to identify, prevent and counter them.</i></p> <p><i>The use of hybrid methods, often extremely complex, requires combining the efforts of the international community and adopting concrete actions that would contribute to the protection and promotion of true democratic values.</i></p> <p><i>The danger of hybrid threats consists in combining a wide spectrum of tools, such as: disinformation, propaganda, cyber-attacks, use of cyberspace, support and promotion of terrorist forms of operation, frequently externalized through certain crimes of a terrorist nature, interference in the internal affairs of the state, manipulation of opinion public etc.</i></p>
Keywords:	Hybrid threat; hybrid war; disinformation; cyber-attacks; manipulation of public opinion; forms of hybrid threats; detecting; preventing and combating the hybrid threat; terrorist crimes
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Introduction

Hybrid threats represent a complex and multidimensional security challenge. The essence of this category of threats lies in the combination of several conventional and unconventional methods. The evolution and popularity of the concept of hybrid threats can be largely attributed to the involvement of non-state actors, the development of technologies, globalization and the evolution of the forms and methods of confrontation applied in conflicts. So, from a theoretical point of view, hybrid threats can be characterized by the involvement of different types of actors, guided by certain reasons, who apply specific methods and techniques and tend to cause major negative consequences to potential targets.

One of the specific features of hybrid threats concerns the nature of the subjects involved in this activity. Thus, promoters of hybrid attacks can be states, groups or non-state organizations, or a combination of them. States can use hybrid tactics, including propaganda, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, and conventional military force to achieve their strategic goals. Non-state groups or organizations, externalized through terrorist groups or criminal organizations, can also use hybrid tactics, such as: unconventional warfare, the use of propaganda, disinformation, cyber-attacks, etc. The need to carry out multilateral and in-depth studies is important for perceiving the motives and objectives of these actors, but also for the development of effective methods of prevention and countermeasures.

Another important aspect characteristic of hybrid type attacks, to be investigated at a theoretical level, refers to the methods and techniques used in this sense. Thus, hybrid threats can be characterized by their complexity, as they frequently involve several specific tactics and methods, including economic pressure, cyber-attacks, propaganda, disinformation campaigns, and finally the application of conventional military

force. The use of the performance of communication technology, such as social media platforms, offers certain opportunities that facilitate the way subjects of hybrid attacks operate. For this reason, the application of effective countermeasures must focus on a comprehensive approach, which involves the possibilities of several scientific and research fields, as well as applications, such as those related to cyber security, intelligence, and military strategy.

In this context, we consider that hybrid threats, both theoretically and practically, can be characterized by increased complexity. For the correct perception of the essence of the respective phenomenon, a detailed study of the subjects, their reasons and the applied methods and techniques is necessary. Hybrid attacks represent a serious challenge to global, regional, and national security, requiring joint efforts to ensure knowledge of the essence of this phenomenon and the development of effective detection and prevention methods.

The essence of hybrid threats

Hybrid warfare involves the coordinated use of multiple instruments of power, strategically designed to capitalize on specific weaknesses across all aspects of society, resulting in synergistic outcomes. The threat posed by revisionist actors employing hybrid warfare techniques significantly impacts societies, national governments, and multinational institutions alike¹.

A distinctive characteristic of hybrid threats involves the utilization of unconventional tactics and methods, including disinformation and propaganda, cyber-attacks, to influence public opinion and undermine trust in democratic state institutions. These tactics can be applied by both states and non-governmental organizations or groups to achieve their strategic goals. Moreover, the increasing use of social media and digital technologies facilitates the dissemination of false information, making it more difficult to identify and counter those threats.

Hybrid demonstrations can consist of “the extensive utilization of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military methods, orchestrated alongside the protest potential of the population, is further bolstered by covert military strategies”².

Hybrid threats can be characterized by several fundamental features:

- They involve the combined deployment of various power instruments to create imbalance by targeting a wide range of vulnerabilities.
- These threats employ a coordinated strategy that leverages both horizontal and vertical escalation axes.
- There's an emphasis on creativity and ambiguity to generate synergistic effects, especially within the cognitive realm.

Actors engaged in hybrid warfare may employ a diverse array of military, political, economic, civilian, and informational (MPECI) instruments of power. These tools are directed at the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure (PMESII) vulnerabilities of a target system. This approach enables escalation in both vertical and horizontal dimensions, aiming to achieve strategic objectives while complicating or avoiding decisive counteraction³.

The danger of hybrid threats is recognized by the states of the world, measures being taken to ensure protection against this kind of danger.

Thus, among the actions undertaken, the creation of structures specialized in the identification, prevention and combating of hybrid threats can be mentioned. We mention the European Center of Excellence for Combating Hybrid Threats which was established in Helsinki at the initiative of Finland. The aim of the Center is to support the efforts of member states in combating hybrid threats by strengthening civil and military capabilities, improving the resilience of states and their institutions, deepening NATO-EU cooperation in countering hybrid threats, pooling the expertise of practitioners, representatives of the academic environment and the environment business with member states and their institutions⁴.

¹ MCDC *Countering Hybrid Warfare Project: Understanding Hybrid Warfare*. January 2017, p. 3, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a8228a540f0b62305b92caa/dar_mcdc_hybrid_warfare.pdf (10.04.2024)

² Douglas Cantwell, *Hybrid Warfare in the Legal and Strategic Gray Zone*, ”Journal of European Security and Defense Issues” Vol. 10, No. 1, 2020. p. 41, https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-09/pC_V10N1_en_Cantwell.pdf (15.03.2024)

³ MCDC *Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, Understanding Hybrid Warfare*, January 2017, p. 13

⁴ <https://www.mae.ro/node/55174> (04.03.2024)

Definition and specificity of hybrid threats

We endorse the perspective that while definitions of hybrid threats may differ and should adapt to their changing nature, the concept aims to encompass the blend of coercive and subversive activities, conventional and unconventional methods (such as diplomatic, military, economic, and technological means), which can be orchestrated in a coordinated fashion by state or non-state actors to achieve specific goals while staying below the threshold of formally declared warfare. There's typically a focus on exploiting the target's vulnerabilities and creating uncertainty to impede decision-making processes. Extensive disinformation campaigns, leveraging social media to shape the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit, and direct proxy actors, can serve as conduits for hybrid threats¹. Hybrid threats are designed to exploit vulnerabilities within a country and frequently target the undermining of fundamental democratic values and liberties².

The Republic of Moldova also pays increased attention to the aspects of detecting and preventing hybrid attacks. Thus, RM Law No. 299 of 21.12.2017 regarding the approval of the Information Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova, in article 10 defines the notion of a “hybrid security threat as a subversive and/or information operation, conducted or placed under the command of states, non-state entities, organizations, individuals, which aims, specifically, the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of a sovereign, independent and wholesome government”³.

Hybrid threats and risks are also stated in the Decision of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova no. 134 of 19.07.2018 for the approval of the National Defense Strategy and the Action Plan regarding the implementation of the National Defense Strategy for the years 2018-2022, which provides in article 10 that the set of threats and risks identified following the analysis of the strategic security environment at the international, regional and national level represents interdependent elements of hybrid warfare, a form of expression of new generation warfare.

At the same time, this normative act also offers its own definition of the hybrid threat, namely: hybrid threat - type of threat from a state or non-state adversary (individuals, groups), which uses, combined and in an adaptive manner (fast, dynamic), conventional and non-conventional methods and means (political, military, diplomatic, economic, cybernetic, informational, etc.) to achieve the established objectives. This type of war is distinguished by a specific form of manifestation, one that oscillates between the conventional and unconventional spectrum of war, creating varied effects, difficult to anticipate and counter. At the same time, it is characterized by various actions, from the use of troops without identification marks or covert actions of military and paramilitary troops, to propaganda actions, information warfare and cyber-attacks⁴.

According to specialists, the primary technologies of hybrid threats applied against the security of the Republic of Moldova must be considered in two ways:

- Organizational: Both state and non-state actors employ hybrid threats as dictated by the situation and prevailing conditions.
- Methods and Means: The involved actors utilize both conventional and unconventional means, strategically combined to meet the demands necessary for achieving success⁵.

Characteristic elements of hybrid aggression

The main characteristic element of the hybrid aggression of hostile forces is the apparently legal nature of the actions carried out, which do not fall within the criminal law field, and respectively, for the conduct of

¹ Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, *Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response*, Brussels, 6.4.2016 JOIN (2016) 18, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=EN>, p. 2 (02.04.2023)

² *Idem*

³ Legea Nr. 299 din 21.12.2017 privind aprobarea Concepției securității informaționale a Republicii Moldova. Publicată la 16.02.2018, Monitorul Oficial No. 48-57, Art. 122, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=105660&lang=ro (22.04.2023)

⁴ Hotărârea Parlamentului Republicii Moldova nr. 134 din 19.07.2018 pentru aprobarea Strategiei naționale de apărare și a Planului de acțiuni privind implementarea Strategiei naționale de apărare pentru anii 2018–2022. Publicată la 03.08.2018 în Monitorul Oficial No. 285-294, Art. 441, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=110013&lang=ro (22.04.2023).

⁵ Svetlana Cebotari, *Războiul hibrid. Unele considerațiuni*, ”Revista Militară”, Vol. 1, No. 13, 2015, p. 28

these actions, the aggressor cannot be presented with legal claims, being generated a complex of qualification difficulties and legal regulation both nationally and internationally.

As the result of detailed studies on the "hybrid war", its following characteristic features were identified:

- in the case of a hybrid war, no official declaration of war is made, nor is there an official capitulation;
- hybrid war exploits national vulnerabilities in political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure terms;
- it can be initiated and carried out by both states and non-state structures;
- hybrid war can use means of organized crime (corruption, blackmail, etc.) and terrorist actions, assassinations, crimes, other acts committed to disturb public order;
- it exploits legislative loopholes and ambiguities at the international level to disrupt and even prevent decisions, including military ones, by which to react to such attacks;
- it often relies on the speed, volume and ubiquity of digital technology to disseminate information¹.

As we can see, the complex character and the wide spectrum of actions aimed at creating essential difficulties for entire state systems fully argue for the need to pay more attention to this phenomenon. We contend that integrating the expertise of both academic specialists and practitioners, including those from defense and security fields, in such a context is essential.

Referring to the topic under discussion, we consider it necessary to note that the essence of hybrid warfare remains unchanged – the attacker tries to destroy the opponent through covert operations, sabotage, cyber-attacks, disinformation, political propaganda, terror and economic pressure on the enemy².

We consider it important to note that among the specific forms of terrorism that possess features of some terrorist crimes and can be used as tools in the hybrid war are: instigation for theoretical purposes or public justification of terrorism, rounding up of terrorists, training people to commit crimes of terrorism, activities of financing the theory or providing material support for terrorist purposes, knowingly lying about the act of terrorism, organizing paramilitary formations or participating in them, organizing mass disorder, attacks on critical infrastructure objects, etc. Terrorism, being a weapon used by certain actors, has taken on increasingly diverse forms, moving from the category of asymmetric threats to hybrid threats³.

During hybrid attacks, terrorist organizations are strategically integrated into the external and internal affairs of the targeted state. Through targeted attacks, they aim to radicalize specific segments of the population and undermine the credibility of state policies, draws upon itself resources, and in the most vulnerable periods for society acts as a force that ultimately should push the unstable system to a situation of collapse and instability⁴.

By directing terrorist groups to definite targets in certain states, the manipulator gets the opportunity to create an information background that facilitates the inclusion or exclusion of those states in/from any processes and exercises a total influence on the situation. The changing context of world processes, the balance of power globally and the utilization of new means of warfare allow experts today to talk about the phenomenon of new terrorism as an element of the strategy of waging a "hybrid war"⁵.

Evolutionary elements of hybrid activities

Hybrid activities are increasingly prominent in the European security landscape, marked by a rise in concerns such as electoral interference, disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and attempts to radicalize vulnerable individuals as proxies for hybrid actors. This has turned European security into a complex and contested issue involving both state and non-state actors.

Unlike the straightforward dynamics of the Cold War, where superpowers competed openly, today's security environment is more intricate and potentially hazardous due to hybrid threats. These threats are characterized by their multidimensional nature, unclear links between different actions, and sometimes, an

¹ <https://www.moldova.org/republica-moldova-tinta-a-razboiului-hibrid-explicam/> (15.01.2024)

² <https://www.moldova.org/republica-moldova-tinta-a-razboiului-hibrid-explicam/> (15.01.2024)

³ Iuliana Udriou, *Detectarea timpurie a crizelor hibride de securitate*, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2619256 (15.09.2018)

⁴ Анатолий Рудаков, Сергей Устинкин, *Трансформированная идентичность как ресурс международного терроризма и элемент стратегии «Гибридной войны»*, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/transformirovannaya-identichnost-kak-resurs-mezhdunarodnogo-terrorizma-i-element-strategii-gibridnoy-voiny> (12.04.2024)

⁵ *Idem*

inability to verify certain aspects. While hybrid threats fall short of outright hybrid warfare, failure to detect or respond to them adequately can escalate into full-fledged hybrid warfare. For instance, hybrid threats existed even before events like the annexation of Crimea or the emergence of certain geopolitical tensions. They represent a combination of interconnected threats, where discerning the links between them can be challenging but crucial in preventing the escalation to hybrid warfare. It is important to note that the hybrid threats are transnational as well as transregional. Borders do not longer matter.

According to some opinions, hybrid threats blend military and non-military tactics, along with covert and overt actions. These tactics encompass disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, economic coercion, deployment of irregular armed groups, and even the use of regular military forces. The goal of these hybrid methods is to create ambiguity and blur the distinctions between wartime and peacetime, aiming to instill uncertainty and doubt in the minds of their targets¹.

The term "hybrid threats" encompasses the methods and tools employed by both state and non-state actors to advance their interests, strategies, and objectives. These methods are diverse and can include influencing information and propaganda, exploiting logistical vulnerabilities such as energy supply pipelines, engaging in economic and trade-related coercion, undermining international institutions to render rules ineffective, conducting terrorist activities, and creating insecurity through incidents like airspace violations or invoking "legitimate interests" in border disputes and immigration issues. Typically, actors resorting to hybrid methods are either weaker states/actors or those avoiding overtly declared warfare. Without resorting to hybrid activities, these actors would struggle to advance their agendas effectively².

Hybrid activities strategically exploit the vulnerabilities of the opponent while aiming to stay below the threshold of war. Nevertheless, these conflicts possess the potential to escalate into warfare that includes conventional military operations³. Hybrid threats are characterized as a blend of coercive and subversive actions, employing both conventional and unconventional methods such as diplomatic, military, economic, and technological measures. These tactics are orchestrated in a coordinated fashion by either state or non-state actors with the aim of achieving goals while deliberately staying below the threshold that would trigger formal warfare. Within the EU, hybrid threats are a significant concern, with critical infrastructures like energy playing a central role in this context⁴. As a whole, "hybrid methods of warfare, including propaganda, deception, sabotage, and other non-military tactics, have a history of being employed to destabilize adversaries."⁵ As a rule, "hybrid attacks are primarily conducted by states, yet non-state actors like terrorist organizations are also becoming increasingly capable due to their access to advanced technology and financial resources, enabling them to execute highly sophisticated cyber-attacks"⁶.

One of the forms of hybrid war outbreak is propaganda conducted to influence or modify human behavior and misinform public opinion about certain events or situations. It is used to promote a political cause or point of view and to change perceptions. Misinformation is false or misleading information which is passed on in good faith. Disinformation is information known to be false and willfully disseminated⁷.

In a geopolitical context, "hybrid war" is a relatively new concept, particularly relevant to special forces operations. This approach merges the practice of intense resistance and threats to international security with insights gained from combating state and non-state extremism. Hybrid war is propelled by both internal forces seeking to weaken or overthrow governments within a state or region, and external forces aiming to support and convert local actors for potential operational support.

The actions of external forces in hybrid warfare include influencing the economy and social spheres, coordinating diplomatic efforts, and orchestrating protest actions. Special Forces, intelligence agencies, criminal groups, information and psychological operations, and the full spectrum of technological innovations are employed to achieve these goals⁸.

¹ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm (14.09.2018)

² <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-what-are-we-talking-about/> (14.09.2018)

³ <https://www.anl.gov/tcp/combating-hybrid-threats> (14.09.2018)

⁴ <http://www.ee-isac.eu/hybrid-threats> (14.09.2018)

⁵ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm (14.09.2018)

⁶ <https://intelligence.sri.ro/razboi-hibrid-si-atacuri-cibernetice/> (22.03.2019)

⁷ <http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1186265/FULLTEXT01.pdf> (14.09.2018)

⁸ Svetlana Cebotari, *Războiul hibrid. Unele considerațiuni*, "Revista Militară", Vol. 1, No. 13, 2015, p. 25

From a political-military perspective, hybrid warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of actions executed by opponents, involving both military and irregular units while simultaneously engaging civilian components. N. Fraier, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, identifies several threats integral to hybrid warfare, including non-standard terrorist attacks and the deployment of advanced technologies superior to conventional military equipment¹.

We live in an era of hybrid influencing, where state and non-state actors challenge countries and institutions perceived as threats, opponents, or competitors to their interests and goals. Hybrid threats involve methods and activities targeting the opponent's vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may stem from historical memory, legislation, outdated practices, geostrategic factors (such as logistics, geography, natural resources, and infrastructure), societal polarization, technological disadvantages, and ideological differences. If the objectives of those employing hybrid methods and activities are not met, the situation can escalate into hybrid warfare, where the use of military force and violence will significantly increase. Hybrid threats represent the "power of the weak," and when effectively employed, they can provide substantial advantages to the weaker side and create potential for future conflicts involving military instruments².

Combating hybrid threats requires an all of government and all of society approach, including:

- New policies and doctrine
- Situational awareness of multidimensional, long-term hybrid campaigns
- Heightened civil and military preparedness.
- Innovative resilience and response strategies to mitigate subversive actions³.

Hybrid aggressors can gain confidence from carefully calibrated hostile actions that skirt de facto thresholds, often employing policies of 'plausible deniability'. While these gains may seem fleeting, they can leave lasting impacts and establish hazardous precedents. The capacity of hybrid warfare to sow destabilization within the international system underscores the need for a comprehensive strategic approach response⁴.

Conclusions

In today's interconnected world, the internet links everything, providing attackers with the freedom and resources needed to achieve specific objectives. These objectives often include undermining and destabilizing societies through coordinated efforts such as hacking, digital espionage, spreading fake news on social media, applying economic pressure, or manipulating elections. Frequently, tracing the source of these attacks is difficult or even impossible⁵.

It's crucial to acknowledge that hybrid threats have already demonstrated their effectiveness in achieving their goals. Cyberspace is extensively utilized for various purposes, with particular emphasis on the manipulation of public opinion, shaping perceptions of events through disinformation, interference in political processes, and the mobilization of large groups of people (often referred to as "Twitter revolutions"). These activities underscore the potency of hybrid threats in influencing and destabilizing societies. Manipulation of public opinion through virtual space presents a certain degree of danger, but we believe that it is not the most dangerous form of exteriorization.

In essence, those mentioned have a direct influence on consciousness, conscience, and the way of thinking. Thus, in this situation, a predisposition of the subject to be manipulated can be ascertained, that is, he/she consciously accepts the correctness of the received information, basing on a personal analysis. At the same time, we believe that the efforts of both theorists and practitioners are to be oriented towards the future, to prevent new non-standard forms of manipulation. Here we refer to the influence on the subconscious, the human psyche, which can be directed towards creating stereotypes of behavior in certain situations.

The danger of the stated form lies in the fact that the subject/s of the influence do not perceive that they are manipulated, but only proceeds in the way their subconscious was programmed. In the given situation, the danger of spontaneity of actions or their unpredictability is greatly increased. The manipulated person may at

¹ Svetlana Cebotari, *Războiul hibrid. Unele considerațiuni*, "Revista Militară", Vol. 1, No. 13, 2015, p. 27

² <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-what-are-we-talking-about/> (14.09.2018)

³ <https://www.anl.gov/tcp/combating-hybrid-threats> (14.09.2018)

⁴ MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, *Countering Hybrid Warfare March, 2019*, p. 18 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c8141e2e5274a2a51ac0b34/concepts_mcdc_countering_hybrid_warfare.pdf (10.04.2024)

⁵ <https://time.tno.nl/en/articles/how-gaming-can-raise-our-awareness-of-hybrid-threats/> (14.09.2018)

once, without reason, proceed in a predetermined way, voting, exposing, or supporting someone acceptable for the influence beneficiary. Even worse could be the situations where the affected person can commit crimes, including those of terrorist character, or other illegal acts.

Indeed, hybrid threats are not a new phenomenon, but their impact has been significantly amplified by factors like globalization, hyperconnectivity, and digitization. These trends have made hybrid tactics more potent and challenging to address. Therefore, there is a critical need to promote further studies and understanding of this complex and evolving phenomenon.

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CUCIURGAN POWER PLANT. RISKS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Abstract:	<i>Today, the energy dependence of the Republic of Moldova has its beginnings in the communist period. Through the secret Ribbentrop - Molotov pact (1939), Bessarabia was ceded to the USSR, which fully benefited from this territory, exploiting, and using all the natural and human resources to the maximum, therefore a multitude of plants and factories were being built for this purpose. However, given the fact that the small country located between the Prut and Dniester rivers has no natural fuel deposits and no energy resources of its own, to reduce production and logistics costs, it was necessary to supply this territory with energy. Thus, in 1964, the USSR built a thermoelectric plant not anywhere, but very strategically located on the banks of the Dniester River, in the city of Dnestrovsk in the region called Transnistria, on the border with Ukraine, which was closer to the USSR's sphere of influence than Romania. The operation of this energetic complex was also strategically thought out. The power plant was to operate based on natural gas, fuel oil and coal, which were not found on the territory of Bessarabia anyway. In 1992, through the direct involvement of the Russian Federation, the newly independent state Republic of Moldova, followingly lost constitutional control over this territory and the plant and other strategic industrial objectives. Heretofore, this territory is politically controlled by the Russian Federation, which, using the leverage it has in Transnistria, energetically blackmails the Republic of Moldova to obtain political dividends and to keep it in its sphere of political influence. However, the military conflict in Ukraine could change this situation in the region.</i>
Keywords:	Power plant; Cuciurgan; Electricity; Gas; Chișinău; Tiraspol; Ukraine; Risks.
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Introduction

At the beginning of the 1950^s of the 20th century, starts the great industrialization of the USSR¹. This phenomenon also reaches the Moldovan SSR (Bessarabia), where was located the industrial core of the area, with a multitude of factories and plants². But to achieve this great goal, it was imperative that a series of factors be met cumulatively: a) workforce, b) housing insurance for these workers, c) energy insurance.

Starting from this premise, in 1950, the construction of the Dubăsari hydroelectric plant began, and in 1951 the Chisinau - Dubăsari high voltage line was built³. At the end of 1954 this hydroelectric plant became functional, but with the increase in the number of industrial objectives, both on the side on the left bank of the Dniester, as well as on the right bank, this source of energy became insufficient, since in the region were no deposits and other energy resources that could be exploited. It was necessary to quickly find a solution.

In this sense, in 1959, a series of research were carried out on the shores of Lake Cuciurgan for the construction of a thermoelectric power plant. In 1961 the actual construction of the thermoelectric power plant

¹ John Pearce Hardt, Carl Modig, *The Industrialization of Soviet Russia in the First Half Century*, Research Analysis Corporation, Virginia, 1968, p. 41

² Vladislav Grosul, Nikolay Babilunga, *Istoriya Pridnestrovskoy Moldavskoy Respubliki*, RIO PGU, Tiraspol 2001, p. 250

³ *Ibidem*, p. 254

began. Together with the power plant, in the same year the city of Dnestrovsk¹ was born, the city where in fact this objective is located, and on September 26, 1964, the first energy block of the power plant from Cuciurgan was already put into operation².

The location of this major energy objective in the mentioned area was not chosen by chance, the geographical position of the power plant is exactly on the border between the Soviet Moldova (the left side of the Dniester) and the Soviet Ukraine, those being separated only by the Cuciurgan reservoir. This objective could also have been built elsewhere within the Moldovan SSR (Bessarabia), however, considering the geopolitical aspects and the historical events that took place previously (the union of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918)³, the leadership of the Communist Party in Moscow did not want such a strategically objective to be left in the hands of other countries in case history could repeat itself.

To deepen the interdependence, a network of energy connections was created, thus in 1957 the energy line Tiraspol - Bileaiivka (Ukraine) was put into operation, which allowed the interconnection of the energy systems of Moldova and the Odessa region with the USSR south energy system. With the commissioning in September 1964 of the first energy block of the Cuciurgan thermoelectric power plant, the Chisinau - Cuciurgan - Odessa thermoelectric power plant circuit was closed, so that in the end Moldovan SSR would be connected to this energy network. Initially, the power of the only energy block of the plant was only 600 thousand Kwh, following that in 1967, five other energy blocks were put into operation, generating a total power of 1.2 million Kwh. But the ambitions did not stop there. During the years 1967-1968, work was done to increase the energy generation power up to 2 million Kwh, but this also required the construction of more powerful Overhead Powerlines (OPL), with a voltage of 330 and, respectively 400 Kw, capable of receiving and transporting this energy to Chisinau, Odessa and even to Bulgaria, thus making the power plant be also an exporter for the Balkan area.

The Cuciurgan power plant was designed to run on coal, fuel oil and natural gas, but since its opening, it has only operated on coal and fuel oil, for the simple reason that there was no natural gas in the region. Thus, in 1966, the Odessa - Chisinau gas pipeline was put into operation, which transited the Transnistrian region of the Moldovan SSR and had a total length of 170 km. And between the years 1987-1988, the transition of four energy blocks of the plant from fuel oil to natural gas was carried out. During that period, the thermoelectric plant ended up having 12 energy blocks that generated a total power of 2,520 million Kwh, ensuring this way up to 80% of the energy needs of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic⁴, (the left bank of the Dniester and the right bank). However, this situation takes a different turn with the collapse of the USSR and the fall of the communist colossus.

December 25, 1991 - the date on which the USSR ceased to exist as a subject of international law⁵, and the Russian tricolor was raised instead of the Soviet flag above the Kremlin, is also the date from which the chronology of a new geopolitical reality of the post-Soviet space begins⁶. The Transnistrian conflict, which started in 1989 on the background of the linguistic problem within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova, during the evolution of events inside the USSR and the Moldovan SSR escalated into a political confrontation between Chisinau and Tiraspol with armed confrontations, and in the spring - July of 1992 evolved into a large-scale armed conflict with the participation of military units of the 14th Army⁷.

¹ Pridnestrovie Tourism, *Istoria Dnestrovska*, <https://pridnestrovie-tourism.com/city/dnestrovsk/istorija-dnestrovska/> (23.11.2023)

² Tourismpmr, *Moldavskaya GRES*, <https://tourismpmr.org/registry/moldavskaya-gres/> (23.11.2023)

³ Historia, *Unirea Basarabiei: prima treaptă spre idealul României Mari*, <https://historia.ro/sectiune/general/unirea-basarabiei-prima-treapta-spre-idealul-574190.html> (23.11.2023)

⁴ Vladislav Grosul, Nikolay Babilunga, *Istoriya Pridnestrovskoy Moldavskoy Respubliki*, RIO PGU, Tiraspol 2001, pp. 256-257

⁵ Robert Strayer, *Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? Understanding Historical Change*, Routledge, London, 2016, p. 81

⁶ Mihai Melinte, *Conflictul armat de pe Nistru în perioada martie-iulie 1992. Date și fapte*, "Yearbook of the Laboratory for the Transnistrian Conflict Analysis", <https://centers.ulbsibiu.ro/ccsprise/lact/mihai-melinte-conflictul-armat-de-penistru-in-perioada-martie-iulie-1992-date-si-fapte/> (29.11.2023)

⁷ *Ibidem*

However, these problems were preceded by two events: a) in the last years of the Soviet Union, in the Moldovan SSR, similarly to other Soviet republics, there was an increase in the national movement¹, culminating on August 31, 1989, with a declaration by the National Assemblies, which provided for the transition to the Latin script and the declaration of the state language, Romanian², b) on the background of these historical tumults, on September 2, 1990, in Tiraspol, the declaration of sovereignty of the Transnistrian Moldovan Socialist Soviet Republic³ (later renamed as the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic, PMR) was adopted, with the capital in Tiraspol, not recognized at the international level.

After July 21, 1992, the Tiraspol authorities nationalized all the infrastructure built on the left bank of the Dniester, including the energy infrastructure and the gas distribution network that transits this territory⁴.

On December 1, 2003, in the decree of the Tiraspol leader, No. 558, regarding the approval of the individual project regarding the privatization of 100% of the state-owned shareholding in the power plant at Cuciurgan, JSCo Moldavskaya GRES is talked about both the poor technical condition and the difficult financial situation of the enterprise. In the same privatization project, there is also talked about an estimated sale price of the power plant, but also about the amounts that should be invested by the potential buyer⁵.

The realization of the privatization project takes place on December 26, 2003, when, disregarding the intention of the Russian company Gazprom and those of RAO EES, the Tiraspol authorities sell the Cuciurgan power plant to a Russian-Belgian company for 29 million USD. However, during 2005, the owner of Moldavskaya GRES becomes the Russian holding company Inter RAO EES⁶. It should be noted that the Republic of Moldova rejects these privatizations and has adopted a law that stipulates that all privatizations in Moldova (including Transnistria) must be approved by the Moldovan Parliament⁷.

With the emergence of the new sovereign and independent state, Republic of Moldova, which was born on August 27, 1991⁸, a series of problems arose that had to be solved by the political class from Chisinau.

The energy problem was one of the most important and required finding quick solutions. In this sense, according to the Minister of Construction Vasile Cuhai, (May 2, 1991 - August 1992), "The political class in Chisinau was concerned with the country's energy security since independence, having clear plans in this direction. Thus, was proposed the solution as for the Republic of Moldova, in partnership with Romania, to invest in the construction of an energy block at the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant, with funds coming from external sources. But some decision-makers from Chisinau considered that there is a risk of getting too close to Bucharest, and this fact could upset Moscow. In the end, this proposal did not find political support and was abandoned"⁹.

During the 1990^s, the Republic of Moldova was forced to import electricity from Ukraine, but also from the Russian Federation, the latter being dependent on both natural gas and electricity. Technically, almost all the imported energy had to pass through the power plant at Cuciurgan and then, reach the right side of the Dniester. But given the fact that the political relations between the authorities on the two banks of the Dniester were very complicated, in many cases to secure its energy needs, Chisinau had to make some concessions in

¹ Alexandr Voronovici, *Anul 1924. Justificând separatismul: înființarea RASS Moldovenească și istoria politică în Republica Moldovenească Nistreană*, "Plural", Vol. 3, No. 1, Chișinău, 2015, p. 143

² Ziarul Național, *Istorie/Ziua Limbii Române*, 31.08.2023 <https://www.ziarulnational.md/istorie-ziua-limbii-romane-documentul-final-al-marii-adunari-nationale-din-27-august-1989-cerea-in-mod-expres-sa-fie-restabilite-numele-istoric-al-poporului-nostru-roman-dar-si-denumirea-limbii-lui-limba-romana/> (30.11.2023)

³ Alexandr Voronovici, *Anul 1924. Justificând separatismul: înființarea RASS Moldovenească și istoria politică în Republica Moldovenească Nistreană*, "Plural", Vol. 3, No. 1, Chișinău, 2015, p. 148

⁴ Anticorupție, *Caracatița Rusiei și controlul asupra obiectivelor energetice din Republica Moldova*, 28.06.2022 <https://anticoruptie.md/ro/investigatii/economic/caracatița-rusiei-si-controlul-asupra-obiectivelor-energetice-din-republica-moldova> (04.12.2023)

⁵ PMR, *Ukaz prezidenta Pridnestrovkoi Moldavskoy Respubliki* 01.12.2003 <https://ulpmr.ru/ul/show/AErFEvp5CnJ1ybkfwFYPRwQNdxgw6GDyTbJ0=> (04.12.2023)

⁶ Compro mat, *Aferisty Pridnestrovia ili kak ukrasty u naroda 71 mln*, 20.11.2005 https://www.compro mat.ru/page_17776.htm (04.12.2023)

⁷ Raport Transnistria, *Dezghetarea unui conflict înghețat: Aspecte legale ale crizei separatiste din Moldova*, https://statistica.gov.md/publications/137/ro/Raport_Transnistria_Meyer_rom.pdf, p.52 (08.12.2023)

⁸ Curtea Constituțională, *Declarația de independență a Republicii Moldova*, 27.08.1991 <https://www.constcourt.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=11&id=276&t=/Prezentare-> (08.12.2023)

⁹ *Personal archive (interview)*

favor of those from Tiraspol. In 1998, the Republic of Moldova faced a major energy crisis, when, due to external factors, the Cuciurgan plant stopped supplying energy to the right bank of the Dniester. The government in Chisinau expected to make up for the energy deficit by importing from Ukraine, but Kiev also drastically reduces the amount of energy delivered, relying on the electricity debts accumulated up to that point¹.

Gas insurance of the Republic of Moldova

On the background of a transition economy, the period of 1990-2000 was a difficult one from an economic point of view for the Republic of Moldova, which led to the accumulation of several external debts, especially for the supply of natural gas and electricity. As we have noted above, in addition to electricity, the Republic of Moldova also had to import natural gas, the only commercial partner in this energy segment being the Russian Federation through its SAP company Gazprom which through commercial contracts, signed with the State Concern MoldovaGaz founded in 1994, delivered natural gas on both banks of the Dniester. A good part of these deliveries was made on debt.

Thus, in 1998, by converting part of the claims held by the Russian giant on the Republic of Moldova, JSCo. Moldovagaz was founded. Gazprom took possession of the entire pipeline infrastructure of the Republic of Moldova, including the one controlled by the authorities on the left side of the Dniester. Currently, the shareholding structure of JSCo Moldovagaz is as follows: Gazprom - 50%, the Public Property Agency of the Republic of Moldova - 35.33%, and the Property Management Committee of Transnistria (left side of the Dniester) - 13.44%, in 2007 these shares were transferred to the management of Gazprom. The other 1.23% of the company's shares are owned by natural persons².

Tiraspoltransgaz is a gas company on the left bank of the Dniester, which in 1993 took over the entire gas distribution network in this region and since then has commercial relations with JSCo. Moldovagaz for gas insurance of PMR.

Among the biggest gas consumers in Transnistria are Moldavskaya GRES, which produces electricity and sells most of it on the right bank, and the Rybnitsa Metallurgical Plant, another industrial colossus built on the left bank of the Dniester back in Soviet times, which produces steel and various metal alloy products³, which they mostly export to European Union countries.

Based on what has been stated above and a simple analysis, it can be deduced that the basis of the formation of the Transnistrian region's budget is natural gas, which brings money to the region from exports from the two companies⁴. It should be noted, however, that while Moldovagaz pays Gazprom for gas consumption on the right bank of the Dniester, the money collected from Transnistria does not end up in Gazprom's pockets, but in the Transnistrian annual budget⁵. In the Transnistrian region, domestic tariffs do not cover the market price of gas, and all the income from the sale of gas are accumulated on the so-called "special gas account", after which the operator transfers them in the form of a loan to the regional budget⁶. The problem has persisted since the 90s and has a perpetual aspect, generating at the same time a trilateral dispute between

¹ Agora, *Porția de istorie, Cum a trecut R. Moldova prin criza energetică de la finele anilor 1990 și ce lecții au fost (ne)învățate*, 29.10.2022 <https://agora.md/stiri/109305/portia-de-istorie-cum-a-trecut-r-moldova-prin-criza-energetica-de-la-finele-anilor-1990-si-ce-lectii-au-fost-neinvatate> (14.12.2023)

² Anticorupție, *Caracatița Rusiei și controlul asupra obiectivelor energetice din Republica Moldova*, 28.06.2022 <https://anticoruptie.md/ro/investigatii/economic/caracatița-rusiei-si-controlul-asupra-obiectivelor-energetice-din-republica-moldova> (14.12.2023)

³ MMZ, *Uzina Metalurgică Moldovenească (MMZ) este o uzină modernă specializată în fabricarea de articole metalice de înaltă calitate*, <https://www.aommz.com/ro/about-us> (17.12.2023)

⁴ Europa Liberă, *Bugetul regiunii transnistrene, fără majorări de pensii și salarii*, 02.12.2019 <https://moldova.europa-libera.org/a/bugetul-regiunii-transnistrene-f%C4%83r%C4%83-major%C4%83ri-de-pensii-%C8%99i-salarii/30303935.html> (17.12.2023)

⁵ Anticorupție, *Caracatița Rusiei și controlul asupra obiectivelor energetice din Republica Moldova* 28.06.2022, <https://anticoruptie.md/ro/investigatii/economic/caracatița-rusiei-si-controlul-asupra-obiectivelor-energetice-din-republica-moldova> (17.12.2023)

⁶ Watchdog, *Moldova vs Gazprom: cine de fapt are datorii?*, 10.2022 https://www.watchdog.md/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Moldova-vs-Gazprom_cine-de-fapt-are-datorii.pdf, p. 2 (20.12.2023)

Moscow, Chisinau, and Tiraspol, regarding the historical debts totaling 756 million USD (as of 31.10.2021)¹ accumulated for the consumption of natural gas. It should be noted that over the years, the authorities from Chisinau have made efforts to pay at least part of these debts, but Gazprom, with the money paid by the Republic of Moldova, closed the debts of those from Tiraspol, and the Moldovan authorities are being still in debt².

Electricity insurance of the Republic of Moldova

For the time being, the Republic of Moldova can cover its electricity consumption from its own sources only in volume of 25-30%, the rest being ensured from imports.

Internally, the energy system of the country (the right bank of the Dniester) has only regional and industrial power plants (sugar factories) with a total capacity of 443.5 MW, including a hydroelectric power plant (CHE Costești)-16 MW, thermoelectric power plants (CET-1, CET-2, CET-Nord) – 330 MW, power plants of sugar factories – 97.5 MW³, apart from HEPP Costești all other plants generate electricity in large volume only in the cold period of the year when they also produce heating agent. But at the same time, during this period the consumption of electricity also increases, which anyway leads to the import of energy to ensure the country's energy stability.

As it can be seen, the consumption requirement of the Republic of Moldova far exceeds the volume of energy produced under its own direction, this situation has been going on since 1991 and continues to this day. After the Declaration of Independence, to ensure its electricity needs, the Republic of Moldova opts for the two suppliers from the immediate vicinity, the import of energy from Ukraine and from the Cuciurgan Thermoelectric Power Plant. It should be noted that from 2002 until the summer of 2006, Moldova also imported electricity from the Russian Federation based on a Moldovan-Russian-Ukrainian trilateral agreement. According to the document, Moldova received electricity in equal amounts from Ukraine and the Russian Federation. In June 2006, Russian deliveries were stopped on the grounds that the Ukrainian side increased the energy transport and transit tariff. Consequently, the significant price increase was no longer convenient for Moldova. Therefore, since summer of 2006, Ukraine has monopolized the supply of energy to Moldova, with the result that from January 1, 2009, the Moldovan (CERS) State Republican Power Plant from Cuciurgan will also supply electricity to the right bank of the Dniester⁴.

This situation regarding the supply of electricity out of two external sources continued until the fall of 2022, when, after the Russian bombing of the Ukrainian energy system, a part of the Republic of Moldova was left without electricity.

After these events, to be able to cover their own needs, the Ukrainian authorities decided to stop exporting energy to Moldova. At the same time, MGRES decided to stop energy supplies to the right bank due to the decrease in the volume of gas delivered by Gazprom to Moldovagaz and respectively, to Tiraspoltransgaz. In this situation, Chisinau turned to energy operators from Romania to procure electricity from the stock exchange, but at a much more expensive price than the one with which it was importing until then from the mentioned sources. As a result of the negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, in December 2022 a new electricity purchase contract from the Cuciurgan Power Plant was signed. The contract stipulated that Tiraspol receives the entire volume of gas delivered by Gazprom to Chisinau (5.7 mln. m³/day), and the validity of the contract will be extended monthly with the agreement of the parties⁵. The contract between

¹ Zdg, *Integral. Raportul de audit al datoriilor istorice ale Moldovagaz*. Sergiu Tofilat: „Consumatorii de pe malul drept nu au datorii față de Gazprom”, 06.09.2023 <https://www.zdg.md/stiri/doc-integral-raportul-de-audit-al-datoriilor-istorice-ale-moldovagaz-sergiu-tofilat-consumatorii-de-pe-malul-drept-nu-au-datorii-fata-de-gazprom/> (21.12.2023)

² Watchdog, *Moldova vs Gazprom: cine de fapt are datorii?*, 10.2022 https://www.watchdog.md/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Moldova-vs-Gazprom_cine-de-fapt-are-datorii.pdf, p. 9 (20.12.2023)

³ Alexandru Baltag, Dorina Baltag, *Securitatea energetică a Republicii Moldova: Alternative viabile*, ”IDIS Viitorul”, No. 3, Chișinău, 2009, p. 16

⁴ *Ibidem*, p.17

⁵ Europa Liberă, *Chișinăul va cumpăra energie electrică mai ieftină de la Cuciurgan*, 31.03.2023 <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/chi%C8%99in%C4%83ul-va-cump%C4%83ra-energie-electric%C4%83-mai-ieftin%C4%83-de-la-cuciurgan-/32343656.html> (23.12.2023)

Energocom, the energy market operator on the right bank, and the Cuciurgan Power Plant was extended in October 2023 for a span of one year, with the established price of 66 USD/MWh¹.

What has been done for the achievement of energy security?

Republic of Moldova is found on the geographical position that does not have the access to underground deposits, especially fossil ones. Since its formation as an independent and sovereign state, the Republic of Moldova has been and still is a net importer of both, electricity and natural gas. This fact is making it very vulnerable from the point of view of energy security, a pillar that is of major importance in the field of security of a state in general.

Starting from this statement, can be mentioned that the energy resilience of the state largely depends on external factors which cannot be controlled by the Chisinau authorities.

Referring to the natural gas segment - the first intentions regarding the change of the existing natural gas supply system of the Republic of Moldova were launched in 2009. An example of this is the construction of the Iași - Ungheni gas pipeline, which was put into operation in August 2014. At the time of before, the capacity of the Iasi - Ungheni - Chisinau gas pipeline is 1.3 billion cubic meters of gas per year but work still occurs to develop the gas pipeline's capacities². At the same time, the uncertainties regarding the signing of a new gas transit agreement between Ukraine and Russia motivated Moldovagaz in 2020 to mobilize efforts to ensure the delivery of gas also in reverse mode through the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline³.

Chisinau has been forced to fully use these alternative routes since the fall of 2022, when Gazprom decided to drastically reduce gas supplies to the Republic of Moldova, an aspect that forced the Chisinau authorities to diversify their natural gas supply sources.

Currently, Moldovagaz receives daily 5.7 million cubic meters of gas from Gazprom, which it fully transfers to the left bank of the Dniester, because of agreements between Chisinau, Moscow, and Tiraspol. The Republic of Moldova, with the help of external partners through various forms of subsidies, grants, and loans, secures all its gas needs from the European markets⁴.

At the moment- on the electricity segment- some directly quantifiable elements for the diversification of energy supply sources cannot be traced. Currently, the main and only external source of electricity remains the Cuciurgan Thermoelectric Power Plant, which provides energy needs of the right bank in a proportion of 80-90%, at an ad said, dumping price, which is equivalent to 66 USD for one MWh, (by comparison, in October 2022 with all the discount offered, the purchase price of one MWh from Romania was 90 EUR⁵, and in peak hours it ended up costing more than 200 EUR), the consumption difference being ensured by Thermoelectric Power Plants and green energy sources.

From another point of view, this situation suits both those from Chisinau and those from Tiraspol. On one hand, as I mentioned, the Republic of Moldova can secure its gas stocks from sources other than Gazprom and can afford to sell the 5.7 million cubic meters of gas to Tiraspol which uses it mostly to produce electricity, which Chisinau then buys at that irresistible price. On the other hand, MGRES practically has only one buyer for the electricity produced by them, namely, Chisinau.

That being said, through a simple circuit of the 5.7 million cubic meters of gas, two economies are kept afloat, the left bank - has gas for its own needs, but also money that enters the budget from energy sales to

¹ TVR Moldova, *Victor Parlicov: Contractul semnat cu Centrala de la Cuciurgan pune la dispoziție energie electrică la un preț avantajos pentru Chișinău și vine în sprijinul populației din stânga Nistrului*, 25.10.2023 <https://tvrmdova.md/article/b70b52e1b2f33bd8/victor-parlicov-contractul-semnat-cu-centrala-de-la-cuciurgan-pune-la-dispozitie-energie-electrica-la-un-pret-avantajos-pentru-chisinau-si-vine-in-sprajinul-populatiei-din-stanga-nistrului.html> (23.12.2023)

² Mihai Melinte, *Securitatea energetică a Republicii Moldova depinde de dosarul transnistrean*, "Energynomics", 16.08.2023 <https://www.energynomics.ro/securitatea-energetica-a-republicii-moldova-depinde-de-dosarul-transnistrean/> (05.01.2024)

³ Watchdog, *Moldova vs Gazprom: cine de fapt are datorii?*, 10.2022, https://www.watchdog.md/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Moldova-vs-Gazprom_cine-de-fapt-are-datorii.pdf, p. 16 (05.01.2024)

⁴ Europa Liberă, *Tiraspolul anunță că a ajuns la un "acord" în privința gazelor*, 20.10.2023 <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/tiraspolul-anunta-ca-a-ajuns-la-un-acord-in-privinta-gazelor-/32646417.html> (05.01.2024)

⁵ MIDR, *Republica Moldova va putea cumpăra energie electrică din România*, 13.10.2022 <https://midr.gov.md/noutati/republica-moldova-va-putea-cumpara-energie-electrica-din-romania> (05.01.2024)

Chisinau, the left bank has electricity at a price far below the average of the region, and with the price difference it covers his other quotidian expenses.

It is necessary to be mentioned that the Republic of Moldova has several ongoing projects to diversify electricity supply sources, which are the result of actions taken by the Moldovan authorities to become part of the community acquis. Becoming a member of the Energy Community in 2009, the Republic of Moldova committed itself to the transposition of the legal framework approved in the European Union to bring the standards and operating conditions of the electricity and natural gas sector closer to those of the EU member countries. In October 2011, the Chisinau Government signed the agreement for the transposition of the Directives and Regulations that form the III Energy Legislative Package. According to the agreement, this transposition was to be carried out by 2016¹. The main objectives of the Package are the liberalization of the internal energy market and the diversification of energy supply sources.

In this regard, the Chisinau authorities have approved a series of normative and administrative acts to bring national legislation in line with European legislation, such as: Law 108/2016 on natural gas², Law 107/2016 on electricity³, Government Decision no. 102/2013 regarding the Energy Strategy of the Republic of Moldova until 2030⁴, the Energy Strategy of the Republic of Moldova 2050⁵, and many others. In parallel with the legislative changes, agreements were also signed with external development partners to diversify the sources of electricity supply - the Isaccea-Vulcănești-Chisinau Overhead Powerline project with a capacity of 400 KW and a length of 157 km financed from EBRD and EIB loans. The purpose of this project is to bring electricity to the country without it passing through MGRES, but due to the uncertainty of the decision-makers in Chisinau, the status of the works did not exceed 20%, an estimated delivery time in exploitation would be 2025⁶. Another interconnection project with the European electricity grids would be the construction of the Suceava - Bălți Overhead Powerline. Up to this moment, only the feasibility study has been completed. There should also be the Strășeni - Iași line, which is only an undefined project, however, the Moldovan authorities consider that these lines should be operational by 2030⁷.

In the same vein, it can also be mentioned that in March 2022 the Electricity Transmission and System Operators (TSO) of Continental Europe achieved the emergency synchronization of the European Continental Energy System of ENTSO-E with the electricity systems of Ukraine and Moldova, thus ensuring the energy security of the two states⁸.

Energy risks for the Republic of Moldova

Although over the years the authorities from Chisinau have taken several actions to minimize the risks in the state's energy field, this risk remains high today. The degree of risk is directly dependent on a) the geopolitical situation in the region, b) the political situation in the international community, which are also strategic partners for development and financing of projects that are or are to be implemented in the country, c) and last but not the least, the political situation inside the country.

Therefore, these risks can be divided into two categories, external and internal:

¹ Renergy, *Pachetul trei energetic și reformarea pieței gazelor*, 08.09.2023, <https://renergy.md/pachetul-trei-energetic-si-reformatarea-pieteii-gazelor/> (12.01.2024)

² Registrul de stat, *Lege Nr. 108 din 27-05-2016 cu privire la gazele naturale*, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=105945&lang=ro (12.01.2024)

³ Registrul de stat, *Lege Nr. 107 din 27-05-2016 cu privire la energia electrică*, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=121988&lang=ro (12.01.2024)

⁴ Registrul de stat, *Hotărâre Nr. 102 din 05-02-2013 cu privire la Strategia energetică a Republicii Moldova până în anul 2030*, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=68103&lang=ro (12.01.2024)

⁵ Energie, *Strategia Energetică a Republicii Moldova până în anul 2050 (SEM 2050)*, https://energie.gov.md/sites/default/files/concept_strategia_enenergetica_act._-clean_1.pdf (12.01.2024)

⁶ IPN, *Constantin Borosan: Linia electrică Vulcănești-Chișinău va fi gata în 2025*, 07.02.2023, https://www.ipn.md/ro/constantin-borosan-linia-electrica-vulcanesti-chisinau-va-fi-gata-7965_1095078.html (12.01.2024)

⁷ Europa Liberă, *De ce a fost amânată din nou construcția liniei care va aduce curent din România?*, 11.09.2023, <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/explainer-de-ce-a-fost-amanata-din-nou-construcția-linii-care-va-aduce-curent-din-romania-/32587794.html> (16.01.2024)

⁸ MIDR, *Republica Moldova și Ucraina au finalizat procesul de sincronizare la rețeaua energetică europeană ENTSO-E*, 16.03.2022, <https://midr.gov.md/noutati/republica-moldova-si-ucraina-au-finalizat-procesul-de-sincronizare-la-rețeaua-energetica-europeana-entso-e> (16.01.2024)

External Risks:

- The Republic of Moldova stores its gas stocks on the territory of Ukraine, which is engaged in an armed conflict with the Russian Federation. If this conflict escalates in the regions where Moldova stores its gas, it may lose the reserves (but it is also in the process of negotiating with other countries in region).
- Nearly all the amount of gas coming from Gazprom to Moldova transits the territory of Ukraine. The latter has already announced its intention not to extend the transit contract signed between Naftogaz (UA) and Gazprom (RU), which expires at the end of 2024¹.
For the left bank - the economy of the Transnistrian region can no longer be sustainable without "free" Russian gas. No more gas, no more money (MMZ from Râbnîța and MGRES will no longer be able to operate), and this can be a premise for the economic collapse of the region and therefore, a possible humanitarian catastrophe, since around 400 thousand people live in the region, and around 350 thousand are Moldovan citizens.
For the right bank - a high price at the level of the European electricity market, a dilemma for the political class from Chisinau. Where to get gas for the left bank? Under what conditions can it be sold to them? Given the fact that Tiraspol does not have the capacity to pay, where would Chisinau get the money for this amount of gas, still considering the scenario of giving the gas away for free? It is possible an influx of citizens from the left bank to the right bank.
- To complete all the projects started, Moldova needs external financing, which can come or be continued only in the case of an international political stability, 2024 being an election year both for the international community (the European Parliament), in the EU member states, and in the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The results of these elections can directly influence the continuity of the started projects but also the economic development of the country. There is a risk that the started projects will no longer be sustainable or the political actors in the region will no longer be interested in them.

Internal Factors:

- Delayed decisions, the lack of interest from authorities in completing the started projects, the underfunding of these projects.
- Changing the political vector - in the Republic of Moldova, in 2024 there will be presidential elections, and in 2025 parliamentary elections. The result of these elections could directly influence the vector of foreign policy and, consequently, the interest of development partners for the projects started in the region.
- Domestic political destabilization - which would result in the stagnation of the country's economic development, external partners manifesting prudence towards investments at the country level.

Conclusions

For over three decades, the Republic of Moldova has had a problem regarding energy security, and this fact makes it vulnerable and at the same time, dependent on third parties that have influenced and still influence the state's development course. With a conflict frozen for over 30 years on its constitutional territory and with another armed ongoing conflict right on its border, the Republic of Moldova is still looking for solutions to ensure its energy security. To be able to reach independence and a stable energy situation, political willpower, and a clear vision of the overall picture by the political class in Chisinau is needed. At the same time, we can also mention the interdependence of the two banks of the Dniester, as it was also seen from the undertaken research, currently there is no solution to regulate the energy situation without the participation of one of the parties, whether we are talking about Chisinau or Tiraspol.

Another important aspect is the geopolitical situation in the region, Moldova is being directly affected by the evolution of events in the area, but also by the decisions made in one context or another, both by the important actors in the Black Sea region, by those in the European Community and by the leaders worldwide.

¹ Ziare, *Ucraina a decis să întrerupă tranzitul gazelor rusești spre Europa pe teritoriul său din 2024*, 29.10.2023, <https://ziare.com/naftogaz/naftogaz-nu-prelungeste-contract-livrare-gaze-rusesti-1833175> (16.01.2024)

At the local level, it is necessary for the dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol to have continuity to reach a compromise and to overcome the crisis situations that could possibly arise. Internally, the Republic of Moldova needs political stability, but also the strengthening of its administrative capacities to implement and complete the large-scale projects that have been started so far and which can be of major importance in ensuring its energy security. The diversification of external sources of energy supply, but also the diversification of own energy sources could contribute to the energy independence of the Republic of Moldova.

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CAUGHT IN THE MIX. AN APPRAISAL OF NIGERIAN MULTIPLE SECURITY CHALLENGES

ABSTRACT	<p><i>The fundamental necessity of every society is the security of her citizens against internal and external aggression. A secured society promotes development and attracts investors thereby promoting socio-economic well-being of the citizen and building responsible and responsive citizens. The high rate of insecurity has denied Nigeria government and citizens of peaceful atmosphere and socio-economic prosperity is at the low ebb. The intermittent conflicts such as ethno religious, communal, insurgency, farmers – herdsman conflict has weakened Nigeria security architecture. The emergence of ethnic militias and non-state actors contributed immensely to the insecurity in Nigeria.</i></p> <p><i>The complex security situation in Nigeria ranging from insurgency, ethno religious, oil theft, farmers- herdsman, kidnapping, drug, and human trafficking coupled with the porous borders and associated criminal activities among others were critically examined and posed that socio-economic development and livelihood of Nigeria are at risk, except proactive measure designing to incorporate bottom- top approach, Nigeria will soon slide into failed or collapsed state. This paper, therefore, recommends promotion of socio-economic, collaborative intelligence approach as well as empowerment will contribute in no measure to degrade insecurity and ensure peaceful co-existence.</i></p>
Keywords:	Armed bandits; security challenge; security; piracy; oil theft
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Introduction

Security challenges are a global concern, and Nigeria, like many other countries, is grappling with this issue¹. Non-state actors have taken control of Nigeria's security structure, resulting in violent clashes between farmers and herders, which have jeopardized national security and caused humanitarian crises². The conflict

¹ Charles Okechukwu Iwundu, Blessing Thom-Utoya, *Security Challenges as Threats to National Unity in Nigeria: Causes, Prevention and Treatment*, "Security Challenges", Vol. 14, 2013, pp. 16-21

² Joab-Peterside Sofiri, *Nigeria's Contemporary Security Challenges: Herders-Farmers Conflict and Banditry*, "Crisis 10", No. 17, 2020, pp. 27-38

between farmers and herders in several Nigerian states has exacerbated the country's security situation. This conflict, often characterized by violent clashes over land and water resources, has led to loss of lives and property, displacement of people, and heightened tension among ethnic groups. Despite the Nigerian government's efforts to curtail these threats by establishing multiple security agencies, it appears that the internal security threats have outpaced the internal security operations of the military and the police. This could be attributed to several factors including inadequate manpower, lack of modern equipment, corruption, poor welfare for security personnel, among others. Emerging internal security threats in Nigeria such as kidnapping, hostage and ransom-taking, illegal migration, discrimination, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) have further complicated the security landscape. These threats not only strain the resources of security agencies but also pose significant challenges to peace and stability. Kidnapping for ransom has become a lucrative business for criminals in Nigeria. This has been fueled by high unemployment rates, poverty, and weak law enforcement. Similarly, illegal migration is a major concern. Many Nigerians embark on perilous journeys through the Sahara Desert and across the Mediterranean Sea in search of greener pastures in Europe. This has led to loss of lives and human trafficking.

Discrimination based on ethnicity, religion or political affiliation is another issue that threatens peace in Nigeria. It breeds resentment and can lead to conflict. Furthermore, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has escalated violence in the country. These weapons are often used by criminals, insurgents, and even disgruntled individuals to perpetrate violence. Opongo provides a useful framework for understanding these challenges. He suggests that Africa faces four interconnected categories of conflict¹. These include armed conflicts primarily between the state and armed groups; sectarian violence led by militia or organized armed groups; political violence advanced by the state against the population, especially using security forces; and low-key communal conflicts. These categories are not mutually exclusive and often arise at different levels. For instance, an armed conflict could trigger sectarian violence or vice versa. Similarly, political violence could lead to communal conflicts or vice versa. This complexity makes conflict resolution a daunting task.

The impact of insecurity on Nigeria's development

Nigeria faces various security challenges, such as terrorism, insurgency, banditry, ethnic and religious conflicts, kidnapping, and cybercrime. These challenges have serious consequences for the country's development in various aspects. Some of the consequences include economic consequences, human capital and education consequences, infrastructure and development projects consequences, social cohesion consequences, migration and displacement consequences, healthcare and public services consequences, political stability consequences, and global reputation consequences².

Insecurity hinders economic activities, Farmers are often afraid to farm their lands due to the risk of attacks, leading to food scarcity and higher food prices. Businesses incur higher security costs, which can affect their profitability and competitiveness. Insecurity impacts education as many schools in insecure areas are forced to shut down, depriving children of education and increasing illiteracy rates. The fear of kidnapping and attacks can dissuade parents from sending their children to school, resulting in long-term consequences for human capital development^{3,4}.

Insecurity impedes the execution of vital infrastructure projects, such as roads, bridges, and power plants, limiting economic development. The threat of attacks can discourage investors from financing large-scale infrastructure projects, hampering modernization and industrialization efforts. Insecurity disrupts healthcare services, making it hard for citizens to access medical care during emergencies. Health workers may be unwilling to work in unstable areas, leading to healthcare shortages.

Ethnic and religious conflicts worsen social divisions, leading to distrust and tension among different groups, hindering social cohesion and unity. Displacement of communities due to insecurity can lead to the collapse of traditional social structures and support systems. Widespread insecurity can undermine political

¹ Elias O. Opongo, *Enhancing Conflict Resolution in Africa. in the Palgrave Handbook of Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa*, Cham Springer International Publishing, 2022, pp. 505-522

² Pedro Conceição, *Human Development Report 2020-the Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene*, "United Nations Development Program: Human Development Report", 2020

³ World Bank, *Nigeria Transport Sector Diagnostic, 2019*, <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/208051543901003724/nigeria-transport-sector-note> (28.05.2024)

⁴ Piers Pigou, *Revolt and Repression in Zimbabwe*, International Crisis Group, 2019

stability and trust in government institutions. It can create a fertile ground for extremism and radicalization, further destabilizing the region¹. Insecurity often leads to internal displacement, as people escape violence and seek refuge in safer areas, straining resources, and services in host communities. It can also contribute to international migration as people seek asylum or better opportunities abroad.

Persistent insecurity damages Nigeria's global reputation and can deter foreign investors and tourists. It can also strain diplomatic relations with other countries, affecting international cooperation and partnerships. Addressing the issue of insecurity in Nigeria requires a comprehensive approach that combines security measures with economic, social, and political reforms. Promoting dialogue, addressing root causes, improving governance, and investing in education and job creation are essential steps toward achieving sustainable development and lasting peace in the country.

Security architecture in Nigeria

Ojatorotu put it that security sector in Nigeria is not people oriented; it is often disarticulated from the larger society, and it is obsolete in structure. He further noted that the security structure has not been palatable; rather is getting worse day by day. Alemika observed that Nigerian security again comprises of the armed forces- Army, Air force and Navy, the Nigeria Police, department of state security national intelligence agency, Nigerian immigration services, Nigeria custom service, Nigeria prison service, national Drug, law and enforcement agency, federal road safety commission, federal fire services and Nigeria security and civil defense corp. It is oblivious that the extension of this timeline security and intelligence agencies should guarantee national security but the security situation in Nigeria has totally collapse. Nigeria, like many other countries, is grappling with significant security challenges. The country's security situation has been exacerbated by a myriad of issues, including the farmers-herders conflict, kidnapping, hostage and ransom-taking, illegal migration, discrimination, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The farmers-herders conflict in several Nigerian states has led to loss of lives and property, displacement of people, and heightened tension among ethnic groups. Kidnapping for ransom has become a lucrative business for criminals in Nigeria, fueled by high unemployment rates, poverty, and weak law enforcement. Illegal migration is another major concern, with many Nigerians embarking on perilous journeys through the Sahara Desert and across the Mediterranean Sea in search of greener pastures in Europe. This has led to loss of lives and human trafficking². Discrimination based on ethnicity, religion or political affiliation breeds resentment and can lead to conflict. Furthermore, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has escalated violence in the country. These weapons are often used by criminals, insurgents, and even disgruntled individuals to perpetrate violence.

Despite these challenges, the Nigerian government has made efforts to curtail internal and external security threats by establishing multiple security agencies. However, these efforts appear to be insufficient as internal security threats have outpaced the internal security operations of the military and the police. Nigeria's security architecture comprises of the military (Air Force, Army, navy), police, customs, and lately the Civil Defense Corps. However, despite boasting robust security architecture, the impact of these agencies in tackling the nation's security challenges is yet to be felt. The state of insecurity in Nigeria can be linked to government failure. This is manifested by the incapacity of the government to deliver public services and to provide basic needs for the masses. The scale of insecurity threatens the very fabric of Nigerian society: "With every attack, human lives are lost or permanently damaged. In response to these challenges, there have been calls for reforming Nigeria's security architecture. Every nation reform or restructures its security formations, institutions, and strategies in response to established attacks or as a consequence of informed analysis of an anticipated threat to national security or both.

In conclusion, addressing Nigeria's security challenges requires a holistic approach that takes into consideration the complexities of these challenges and their impact on state stability. It involves not only strengthening security agencies but also addressing socio-economic issues that fuel these challenges. This includes addressing root causes such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption among others. There is

¹ Council of Foreign Relations, *Nigeria's Insecurity Problem: Causes and Solutions*, February 12, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nigerias-insecurity-problem-causes-and-solutions> (12.05.2024)

² Adeniji A. Agunloye, *Urban Transport Challenges in Nigeria: The Need for a Paradigm Shift*, "Journal of Transport and Supply Chain Management", Vol. 11, No. 1, 2017, pp.13-27

also a need for capacity building for security agencies. This includes training in modern security techniques, provision of modern equipment among others. There is also a need for community engagement in security matters. Communities should be involved in identifying security threats and finding solutions. The transcoder related crime has various implications on development of Nigerian state including the activities of touts and illegal migrants, illegal lumbering and poaching and host of others. Essentially, security is primarily a preoccupation of the state to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity, citizen and their values.

Transportation and insecurity in Nigeria

Transportation is a critical element in the socioeconomic development of any nation, as it enables the movement of people, goods, and services, thereby supporting economic activities³. However, in developing countries like Nigeria, transportation systems often encounter numerous challenges that impede economic progress. This essay will explore the implications of transportation insecurity in Nigeria, including issues such as poor road conditions, inadequate transportation infrastructure, overcrowded modes of transport, and bureaucratic hurdles that undermine the efficiency of the transportation sector. One of the major challenges facing transportation in Nigeria is the poor condition of roads. Nigeria has one of the highest rates of road accidents in the world, primarily due to the poor state of its road network¹. The lack of maintenance and rehabilitation of roads leads to frequent potholes, which not only slow down transportation but also contribute to accidents and vehicle damage. This hampers the movement of goods and people, resulting in increased transportation costs and reduced efficiency¹. In addition to poor road conditions, Nigeria also suffers from inadequate transportation infrastructure. The World Bank (2019) highlights that the country's transportation infrastructure, including ports, railways, and airports, is insufficient to meet the growing demands of its population and economy³. This inadequacy leads to congestion, delays, and increased costs in transporting goods and services. Furthermore, the lack of modern transportation infrastructure limits the country's ability to attract foreign investment and promote economic growth³. Moreover, overcrowded modes of transport pose a significant challenge to transportation in Nigeria. The country's population continues to grow rapidly, resulting in increased demand for transportation services. However, the existing modes of transport, such as buses and trains, are often overcrowded, uncomfortable, and unsafe². This not only compromises the safety and well-being of passengers but also reduces the efficiency of transportation, as overcrowding leads to delays and longer travel times. The bureaucratic hurdles further hinder the efficiency of the transportation sector in Nigeria. The World Bank (2018) highlights that the complex and time-consuming processes involved in obtaining licenses, permits, and clearances for transportation-related activities create unnecessary delays and increase transaction costs³. This bureaucratic red tape discourages investment in the transportation sector and stifles innovation and competition, ultimately hampering economic growth¹. Transportation insecurity in Nigeria has significant implications for the country's socioeconomic development. Poor road conditions, inadequate transportation infrastructure, overcrowded modes of transport, and bureaucratic hurdles all contribute to the inefficiency of the transportation sector. Addressing these challenges is crucial for Nigeria to unlock its economic potential and promote sustainable development. The Role of Transportation in Economic Development. Transportation is an integral part of human activity, laying the groundwork for socioeconomic interactions. It involves the physical movement of people and goods from one place to another, enabling trade, commerce, and social connectivity². Efficient transportation systems contribute to economic growth and development in several ways: Trade Facilitation: A well-functioning transportation system allows for the smooth movement of goods between producers and consumers, fostering trade and market access. In Nigeria, however, inadequate transportation infrastructure hinders the movement of goods, leading to higher costs and reduced economic efficiency. Transportation networks provide access to essential resources such as raw materials, which are vital for manufacturing and industrial processes. When transportation systems are unreliable, businesses face difficulties accessing these resources, impeding economic development². The transportation sector itself generates employment opportunities. Efficient transportation systems create jobs in areas such as logistics, maintenance, and operation, contributing to reduced unemployment rates. Regional

¹ World Bank, *Nigeria: Transport Sector Note 2018*, <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/208051543901003724/nigeria-transport-sector-note> (07.05.2023)

² Oyeyinka Akinwumi, *Transportation Infrastructure and Economic Development in Nigeria*, "Journal of Transport Geography", Vol. 74, 2019, pp. 45-63

Integration: Effective transportation infrastructure connects regions and facilitates economic integration. In Nigeria, disparities in transportation infrastructure between the north and south can exacerbate regional economic inequalities. Nigeria faces a multitude of challenges in its transportation sector that contribute to transportation insecurity and hinder economic development.

According to a report by the World Bank, Nigeria's road network is in a poor state, resulting in increased travel time and higher maintenance costs for vehicle². The lack of a robust rail network, efficient water transport systems, and modern ports in Nigeria has been highlighted by various experts². Overcrowding in Nigeria's transportation system has been documented by several studies². Poorly enforced traffic regulations in Nigeria have been linked to chaotic road conditions and safety risks for commuters. Transportation insecurity in Nigeria exacerbates these challenges and has severe implications for the country's economic development. Recent events such as the attack on the Abuja-Kaduna train on April 6, 2022, highlight the vulnerability of Nigeria's transportation system.

Arms proliferations and insecurity in Nigeria

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is a critical issue that impacts global security and development. Despite the establishment of the UN Program of Action in 2001, which aimed to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW, it has struggled to meet the expectations of states and civil society. The proliferation of SALW remains a daunting challenge due to the vast number of military and civilian-held weapons, making the goal of addressing the illicit trade in "all its aspects" seemingly unattainable at the current juncture¹. Research has shown a significant rise in civilian ownership of SALW since 2006. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, it is estimated that there are approximately 11 million state-owned SALW and a staggering 40 million in the hands of civilians². This region exemplifies the difficulties in controlling the spread of these weapons, which are often exacerbated by weak governance, internal conflicts, and porous borders³.

The pursuit of democratic governance in West Africa has been fraught with challenges for over fifty years, including coup d'états, the spread of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW), ethnic violence, and armed conflicts. The region is notorious for its resource conflicts, political crises, insurgencies, and intra-state wars, often described as a theater of anarchy or bloody civil wars⁴. Legal arms exports between states are a source of concern, and the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms (UNPoA) has been criticized for its inadequate and ineffective arms control and disarmament efforts¹. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the production of new SALW is outpacing global disarmament efforts⁵. The proliferation of SALW in Africa poses a significant threat to the continent's long-term social and economic development⁶. There is a consensus that this proliferation has led to increased criminality, youth violence, hostage-taking, and cross-border crimes⁷. Despite the recognition of the dangers posed by SALW, Africa has yet to develop the necessary resilience to effectively address the problem⁸. It is suggested that Africa needs to manage SALW through national action, the implementation of treaties, and strengthened international cooperation⁹. The hope is that effective management of SALW will create conditions conducive to realizing Africa's socio-economic goals, as outlined in Agenda 2063¹⁰.

¹ *Idem*

² Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2019: Global Estimates of Civilian Held Firearms*, Geneva, 2019, p. 412

³ Florquin Nicolas, Eric G. Berman, (Eds.), *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns and Human Security in the Ecowas Region*, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2005, pp. 332-333

⁴ Bøås Morten, Kevin C. Dunn, (Eds.), *African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007, pp. 9-35

⁵ Richard Guy Parker, Marni Sommer, (Eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Global Public Health*, Routledge, 2011, pp. 506

⁶ Owen Greene, Nic Marsh, *Small Arms, Crime and Conflict*, Taylor&Francis, 2011, pp. 248-262

⁷ Rachel J. Stohl, Stohl Ernstgendoorn, *Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development*, Center for American Progress, 2010

⁸ Robert Muggah, Peter Batchelor, *Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development*. UNDP, April 2002, p. 8

⁹ Guy Lamb Grant, *Disarmament: A Basic Guide* (4th ed.) United Nations Publications, 2013, pp. 1-30

¹⁰ African Union Commission, *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*, 2015

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has several implications, particularly in regions. The post-Gaddafi Libya serves as an example of how instability can be exported within a region. Socio-cultural and environmental dynamics that transcend national boundaries, such as refugee flows, insurgency, transnational conflict, and crime in the Sahel are examined⁴. The state's legitimate monopoly on violence links arms to national power. In practice, this monopoly involves exchanging capital for arms to equip security forces with weapons of war. The focus is on Libya and how small arms and light weapons diffused out of the power vacuum following its breakdown. Before the 2011 uprising, Libya's armed forces were considered one of the best equipped in Africa¹. However, when the regime collapsed, Libya became a hub for an illicit arms market supplying rebels and extremist groups across the Sahara-Sahel. The proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has several implications, particularly in regions that are already facing socio-economic and political challenges. Here are some of the key implications: The availability of SALW can escalate violence, lead to the outbreak of conflicts, and prolong existing ones. These weapons can be used by armed groups, insurgents, and criminals, leading to a breakdown of law and order. To mitigate these implications, it's crucial for nations and international organizations to work together in implementing effective arms control measures, strengthening legal frameworks, promoting disarmament, and enhancing border security.

Farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria

Salau, Ogezi, and Yusuf investigate the root causes of farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria and assess the scope of the conflict, which has transformed from a disagreement over agricultural resources to an indistinct crisis threatening national unity². The ongoing misconceptions and misinterpretations of the conflict's causes and motives further underscore the polarized nature of Nigerian inter-ethnic interactions and the gradual fading of national identity. The escalating frequency and intensity of the farmer-herder conflict have given rise to more violent herders and a tribal militia movement aiming to counteract the aggression. Analysts have voiced concerns about these conflicts spiraling into a complex civil war, emphasizing the need for government intervention. Sunday and Muhammad probe the link between criminal labeling and the scourge of insecurity in contemporary Nigeria, using case studies such as the farmers-herders conflict, banditry, terrorism, secessionist agitations, and human trafficking for sexual exploitation³. They argue that there is a causal relationship between crime, criminal labeling, and insecurity in Nigeria. Moreover, they suggest that the nature of crime and the policing system in Nigeria, in relation to the criminal justice system, has led to certain forms of crime and associated groups or individuals being stigmatized.

Farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria have emerged as a persistent issue with profound implications for societal harmony, food security, and economic growth. These conflicts, often rooted in competition for resources such as land and water, are further complicated by ethnic, religious, and socio-economic factors. This essay aims to explore the causes and impacts of these conflicts and propose potential pathways to resolution. The primary catalyst for farmer-herder conflicts is resource scarcity, particularly concerning arable land and water. With Nigeria's population on the rise, the demand for these resources intensifies. Climate change-induced phenomena such as prolonged droughts and desertification in northern Nigeria have compelled herders to migrate southwards in search of greener pastures, thereby increasing competition with farmers. The surge in cattle rustling and banditry has further fueled these conflicts. Herders often resort to violence to safeguard their livestock, leading to clashes with farming communities. Nigeria's ethnic and religious diversity plays a significant role in these conflicts. Differences between herding communities, predominantly Fulani, and various ethnic farming communities often escalate into hostilities. The lack of clear land tenure systems in many parts of Nigeria contributes to disputes over land ownership and usage. The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria intensifies these conflicts, making them more lethal and challenging to manage.

¹ Kerry Chávez, Ori Swed, *Conflict Contagion via Weapons Proliferation Out of Collapsed States*, "Small Wars&Insurgencies", Vol. 35, No. 2, 2024, pp. 191-227

² Salau Ogezi, Yusuf Nasiru, *Latent Causes and Magnitude of Farmers-Herder Agricultural Resource Conflicts that has Formed the New Wave of Conflict in Nigeria*, "Asian Journal of Agricultural Extension. Economics&Sociology", 2022, pp. 94-103

³ Sunday Omotuyi, *The Burden of Borders: Reassessing the Impacts of Nigeria's Border Closure on the National Security*, "African Security", Vol. 15, No. 3, 2022

These persistent conflicts have far-reaching consequences: conflicts have led to the loss of thousands of lives and displacement of communities. Both farmers' and herders' livelihoods have been severely disrupted. Conflicts disrupt agricultural activities and herding patterns, leading to reduced agricultural output and food scarcity. Conflicts result in property damage, leading to financial losses for both agricultural and pastoral communities. The uncertainty surrounding land use also deters investment in agriculture. These conflicts deepen divisions along ethnic and religious lines, resulting in mistrust among communities that were previously peaceful neighbors. Millions of Nigerians have been internally displaced due to these conflicts, causing humanitarian crises in affected areas. Clashes often occur along Nigeria's borders with neighboring countries, potentially straining diplomatic relations.

Border crimes, narcotics/drug trafficking

Esan, Ngwira and Osunmakeinde observed that the surge in the flow of people, goods, and ideas has given rise to a new wave of smuggling, trafficking, terrorism, cross-border crime, illegal migration, and other issues¹. Aniche, Moyo and Nshimbi argued that the "coloniality", "permeability", and "ungovernability" of borders in West Africa have led to undocumented migration for economic reasons such as herding, farming, fishing, hunting, and trading². This occurs alongside human smuggling, human trafficking, gun-running, terrorism, and money laundering. The rise in these cross-border criminal activities has generated national, regional, and global concerns. Ismail and Rabi noted that border crimes such as narcotics/drug trafficking, internet crime (advance fee fraud/money laundering), human trafficking, firearms trafficking, recruitment of child soldiers, mercenaries, smuggling of illegal goods, minerals and natural resources and cash crops among others are rampant across these borders³. They emphasized the need for improved manpower, sensitization and enlightenment of border security, technological improvement, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration for peace building, security, mobilization, and management of resources. Obi posited that although ECOWAS has remained central to Nigeria's responses to transnational security threats in the sub-region, the country has not been able to match its rhetoric on addressing transnational security threats with far-reaching concrete achievements⁴. The involvement of Nigerians in the illicit trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances has gained global attention since the 1980s. Despite punitive measures adopted by various governments to discourage drug trafficking, the involvement of Nigerians in the illicit trade persists. It is argued that drug trafficking will continue to constitute a threat to security and stability within Nigeria so long as the demand for drugs in destination countries and profits from the illicit trade remains attractive while strong social values are widely overlooked in preference to materialism.

Nigeria serves more as a transit route through which cocaine and heroin are trafficked to other countries mostly in Europe and to a minimal extent, the United States. Nigerian drug traffickers usually use air transportation as the means for trafficking prohibited drugs and narcotics substances through Nigeria to target destinations. However, as drug control and anti-narcotic war intensify and arrests of couriers are made by NDLEA personnel at various airports, traffickers sometimes resort to using sea routes and land borders to avert detection. UNIDOC opined that the production, use, and trafficking of illicit drugs pose another danger originating from organized crime in Nigeria. Despite Nigeria's diverse climates that could support the cultivation of various drug crops, cannabis remains the only widely cultivated drug crop. The transborder related crime has various implications on development of Nigerian state including the activities of touts and illegal migrants, illegal lumbering and poaching and host of others. Essentially, security is primarily a preoccupation of the state to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity, citizen, and their values. It is on the bases that Nigerian.

¹ A. Esan Omobayo, S. M. Ngwira, Isaac Olusegun Osunmakeinde, *Bimodal Biometrics for Financial Infrastructure Security*, "Information Security for South Africa", IEEE, 2013, pp. 1-8

² Aniche Ernest Tooche, Inocent Moyo, Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, *Interrogating the Nexus Between Irregular Migration and Insecurity along 'Ungoverned' border Spaces in West Africa*, "African Security Review", Vol. 30, No. 3, 2021, pp. 304-318

³ Ismail B. Rabi, *Strategies, Challenges, and Options for Effective Responses to Cross-Border Crimes: An Analysis of Nigerian-Cameroon Borders*, "KIU Interdisciplinary Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences", Vol. 3, No. 2, 2022

⁴ Cyril I. Obi, *Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Transnational Security Challenges in West Africa*, "Journal of Contemporary African Studies", Vol. 26, No. 2, 2008, pp. 183-196

The issue of drug trafficking in Nigeria requires a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach. Enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies, such as the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), to detect and intercept drug trafficking operations is crucial. This could involve providing them with advanced training and equipment. Drug trafficking is a transnational issue. Therefore, cooperation with international partners, including sharing intelligence and best practices, can be instrumental in tackling this problem. Reviewing and updating existing laws to ensure they are effective in deterring drug trafficking is another important step. This could include imposing stricter penalties for drug trafficking offenses. Conducting public awareness campaigns about the dangers of drug abuse and the legal consequences of drug trafficking can deter potential traffickers and users. Providing support for drug users to overcome their addiction, including access to rehabilitation services, can reduce the demand for illicit drugs. Additionally, efforts should be made to socially reintegrate former drug users to prevent them from returning to drug use. Addressing underlying socio-economic issues that may drive individuals towards drug trafficking, such as poverty and unemployment, is also essential. This could involve implementing policies aimed at job creation and poverty reduction.

Environmental security and the effects of climate change

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) describes climate change as a shift in the climate that can be directly or indirectly attributed to human activity. This shift alters the composition of the global atmosphere and is observed over a comparable period, in addition to natural climatic variability¹. Due to its diverse impacts and far-reaching consequences, climate change is now acknowledged across policy and academic circles as a significant threat to human security. Despite the growing focus on environmental security and the effects of climate change in the region, there has been limited research on its connection to organized criminal activities in the sub-continent. The discourse has primarily centered around migration, extreme weather conditions, and food insecurity. In Nigeria, there is a growing call for more contextualized research on the relevance of climate change to increasing insecurity, particularly in relation to the rising incidence of conflict among groups. Concerns about climate change-conflict linkages stem from the increasing incidence of violent conflict arising from disputes among groups over climate-related declines in the availability of renewable natural resources. The challenges of terrorism and organized crime are escalating. The activities of Boko Haram have severely affected social and economic activities in border communities of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger Republic, and Chad². This has resulted in a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin with nearly 2.2 million people forcibly displaced in the region¹.

The global food crisis has also seen a marginal increase due to Boko Haram's nefarious activities. Northern Nigeria, known as the "food basket of Africa" for producing and exporting food products such as onions, peppers, yams, potatoes among others, has been negatively affected. Farmers have been scared away by Boko Haram and farms abandoned after locals were threatened with extermination by the terrorists³. Climate change also has other less apparent and indirect consequences that may combine with and exacerbate other challenges thereby undermining security at a broader level⁴.

Piracy and attacks against shipping vessels

Saliu posits that maritime piracy has re-emerged as a global security threat, particularly in the waters off the Horn of Africa and West Africa⁵. However, he notes that security discussions in Nigeria seem to focus more on the activities of militants, banditry, and terrorism, often downplaying the frequent risk of piracy in the

¹ Daniel Bodansky, *The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary*, "Yale J. Int'l L", Vol. 18, 1993, p. 451

² Abdulrasheed Olowoselu, Aishatu Bello, Adaobi Onuselogu, *Historical Analysis of Boko Haram Insurgency on Educational Management in Northern Nigeria*, "Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences", Vol 2, No. 10, 2014, pp. 77-83

³ Adeoye O. Akinola, Okeke Uzodike Ufo, *Ubuntu and the Quest for Conflict Resolution in Africa*, "Journal of Black Studies", Vol. 49, No. 2, 2018, pp. 91-113

⁴ Jon Barnett, Neil W. Adger, *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict*, "Political Geography", Vol. 26, No.6, 2007, pp. 639-655

⁵ Mustapha Saliu, *An Analysis of Youth Deradicalization Programs in Northeast Nigeria: a Study on Boko Haram*, "European Scientific Journal", Vol. 17, No.13, 2021, pp. 21-40

Gulf of Guinea. The escalation of piracy attacks within the Gulf of Guinea has been a significant hindrance to trade and economic activities, contributing to a decline in revenue for the federal government. Majiga highlights that in recent years, there has been a worrying increase in acts of piracy and attacks against shipping vessels on African coastlines¹. Despite various measures taken to prevent piracy, the problem persists. This chapter addresses the issue of piracy by examining its underlying causes and adverse effects and evaluating the effectiveness of current anti-piracy initiatives on the continent. UNODC 2023 alluded to the IMO records that three out of the four maritime offenses, specifically theft, seizure, and abduction, have been significant at various times in Nigeria's recent past. The report statement further revealed that from 1995 to 2010, the majority (71 percent) of documented successful attacks were robberies. In the period between 2011 and 2015, robberies continued to be prevalent, but there was also a rise in hijackings, accounting for approximately 25 percent of recorded successful attacks. Furthermore, from 2016 to 2020, there was a noticeable increase in kidnappings, which constituted 40 percent of recorded successful attacks.

The states in the region lack the technical and logistical capability or the financial resources to counter the threat effectively. In addition, limited regional integration in the maritime sphere creates further concern. However, international initiatives have proven insufficient and ineffective due to most of them primarily addressing the effects of piracy through military means.

According to UNODC, in 2023 there were a total of 203 successful maritime attacks between 2015 and 2021. These attacks can be categorized into different types of crimes, with robbery accounting for 38% of the incidents, theft accounting for 33%, hijacking accounting for 25%, and kidnapping accounting for 4%. Piracy and attacks against shipping vessels have long been challenges for the maritime industry, posing threats to global trade, seafarers' safety, and international security. Pirates, often armed and organized, target commercial vessels in various regions around the world. The causes and consequences of piracy and attacks according to UNODC 2023 is that after the amnesty by President Yar Adua, there was a noticeable increase in the occurrence of hijackings of entire vessels. From 2011 to 2015, approximately 25% of all successful attacks involved the hijacking of vessels. The main objective behind these hijackings was to obtain the cargo, which primarily consisted of oil and fuel. Typically, the hijacked vessels would transfer the fuel to another vessel, often while at sea. It is probable that the increase in hijacking incidents is connected to developments in the oil market, considering that petroleum products have been frequently targeted in these attacks. 1,274 incidents of kidnapping attacks on vessels from 2015 to 2021, the types of vessels most targeted are container ships, accounting for 21% of the incidents. Following closely behind are supply ships at 14%, general cargo ships at 16%, and fishing vessels at 11%. Other types of vessels targeted include bulk carriers, refrigerated cargo carriers, product tankers, LPG tankers, chemical tankers, and oil tankers, each making up a smaller percentage of the incidents. The data, interpreted by the UNODC 2023 from IMO data, provides insight into the preferred targets of kidnapping attacks on vessels. Container ships, which transport a wide range of goods, seem to be the most attractive to kidnappers, possibly due to their high value cargo. Supply ships, general cargo ships, and fishing vessels are also frequently targeted, likely because they are often found in remote or vulnerable areas. The remaining types of vessels, such as bulk carriers and tankers, are targeted to a lesser extent, suggesting that kidnappers may prioritize vessels carrying specific types of cargo.

These initiatives have only managed to reduce the number of attacks and their success rate, while failing to address the underlying reasons for piracy or solve the problems ashore in a sustainable manner. The suggestion that a combination of military and non-military approaches would go a long way in addressing and potentially solving the problem of piracy on the continent is rife. Piracy and attacks against shipping vessels have long been challenges for the maritime industry, posing threats to global trade, seafarers' safety, and international security. Pirates, often armed and organized, target commercial vessels in various regions around the world. This essay will explore the causes and consequences of piracy and attacks against shipping vessels, with a specific focus on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa.

¹ Majiga Prince Bright, *Combating Piracy in African Waters. In The Palgrave Handbook of Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa*, Cham Springer International Publishing, 2022, pp. 343-364

Oli theft in Nigeria

Umar and Mohammed argued that the pilferage of crude oil in Nigeria constitutes a significant portion, approximately 10%, of the illicit financial outflows originating from the African continent¹. This nefarious activity results in a staggering annual loss of approximately US\$6 billion. Oyefusi noted that the incidence of oil theft in Nigeria has witnessed a marked increase since 2009, which can be attributed to the government's inability to address fundamental concerns and recent developments². This phenomenon underscores the need for a political resolution that fosters a sense of ownership among citizens towards safeguarding oil resources and related infrastructure³. The persistent occurrence of oil theft in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria can be attributed to a confluence of factors including corruption, high rates of youth unemployment, inadequate law enforcement agencies, and collaborations with international criminal networks. These challenges continue to undermine the government's efforts to effectively address this issue.

Soremi observed that the phenomenon of oil theft in the Niger Delta has been attributed to Nigeria's rentier state structure, which has fostered corruption and conflict⁴. The resource curse theory, which is exemplified by the Dutch disease, provides an economic explanation for this phenomenon, and highlights the national-level implications of oil theft, such as reduced revenue, increased unemployment, and the need for economic diversification. He stated further that at the local level, the rentier state structure has led to social implications, including sustained conflict, curtailed social development, and displacement of persons. To address this issue, it is recommended that transparency and accountability be prioritized in the relationships between the government, oil-producing communities, and multinational corporations. This will help to combat the illegal practice of oil theft and promote sustainable development in the Niger Delta region.

Oyefusi opined that the recent increase in oil theft in Nigeria through the lens of ethno political settlement. It argues that while the persistent theft of oil has historically served as a means of facilitating and maintaining a predatory and exclusionary social order, it has now become a tool for challenging the existing establishment¹. The significant surge in oil theft after 2009 can be attributed to the government's failure to effectively utilize the amnesty program to address the underlying issues fueling the conflict in the region. These issues have become even more crucial considering recent events in the country, including the unintended publicity surrounding illegal mining in other areas, the discovery and advancement of oil exploration in other states, revelations about the actual ownership of oil wells, and provocative statements regarding the current resource wealth-sharing formula made by influential figures from different ethno regional groups. Oyefusi further stated that the situation is complicated by the presence of a large number of marginalized and excluded youths who feel neglected by the Jonathan administration, the exposure of widespread corruption in the nation's oil sector, and developments in the political sphere that pose a threat to national unity¹. In response to these challenges, the paper proposes a political settlement that offers incentives for ordinary citizens and host communities in the Niger Delta to actively participate in safeguarding the country's oil and gas resources and infrastructure. By providing these incentives, such as ensuring fair resource distribution and involving local communities in decision-making processes, the proposed settlement aims to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility among the citizens.

In the face of government inability or unwillingness to aggressively combat the menace, old actors have become 'barons' and many more are sucked into the oil theft business due to its lure⁵. It found that the prevalence not only poses serious threat to national security and economy, but also feeds into a wider pattern of criminality in the Gulf of Guinea. It recommends that the illicit enterprise can be dismantled if the Nigerian government aggressively addresses the internal factors propitious to its outbreak and partners with the

¹ Bello Umar, Mohammed Zayyanu, *The Effects of Illicit Financial Flows on Oil and Gas Revenue Generation in Nigeria*, "Journal of Money Laundering Control", Vol. 24, No. 1, 2021, pp. 177-186

² Aderoju Oyefusi, *Oil Bunkering in Nigeria's Post-amnesty Era: An Ethnopolitical Settlement Analysis*, "Ethnopolitics", Vol. 13, No. 4, 2014, pp. 552-545

³ Boris Odalonu, *Happy, Upsurge of Oil Theft and Illegal Bunkering in the Niger Delta Region Of Nigeria: Is There A Way Out?*, "Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences", Vol. 6, No. 3S2, 2015, pp. 343-364

⁴ Soremi Titilayo, *The Implications of Oil Theft on Social and Economic Development in the Niger Delta*, "Global Journal of Social Sciences", Vol 19, 2020, pp. 1-11

⁵ Onuoha Freedom Chukwud, Joachim Chukwuma Okafor, Osinimu Osebeba Femi-Adedayo, *Nigeria, Militancy, Insurgency and the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapon*, "The Palgrave Handbook of Small Arms and Conflicts in Africa", Springer, 2021, pp. 777-802

international community to suppress factors facilitating its persistence. The phenomenon of oil theft and illegal refineries in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has been a long-standing issue, with its negative economic impact on the national economy and multinational oil companies becoming increasingly apparent after the Presidential proclamation of amnesty in 2009¹. Oil theft and illegal refineries in Nigeria are mainly caused by State and multinational oil company failures in infrastructure development and social responsibility, rather than militants' greed¹. The critical theoretical school which attributes the causes of oil theft and illegal refineries to the failures of the State and multinational oil companies in infrastructural development and social responsibility commitments to the indigenous minority ethnic communities of the Niger Delta region. This is in contrast to the orthodox school, which blames the militants for their "greed not grievance" instincts. The interdiction of oil pipelines in Nigeria exhibits a strong correlation with poverty, displaying notable variations in occurrence patterns across different regions².

Kidnapping and insecurity in Nigeria

The phenomenon of kidnapping has emerged as a highly profitable enterprise in Nigeria in recent years. Initially gaining national attention on 26 February 2006, when Niger Delta militants abducted foreign oil workers to assert their demands, kidnapping has now become pervasive, politicized, and commercialized. Its prevalence has extended beyond the Niger Delta region, permeating every corner of the count. Osumah and Aghedo opined that the act of abduction in Nigeria has evolved into a lucrative enterprise, characterized by substantial financial gains, motivated by economic sustenance, political and commercial benefits, and the government's involvement in the negotiation and regulation of this criminal activity³. Ottuh and Aitufe identified various causes of kidnapping, particularly in relation to economic and political motivations. It also considers the conceptualization of kidnapping as a means of liberation struggle. Factors such as the government's failure to provide essential services, high levels of unemployment, inefficiency, and corruption within the security system are all identified as potential catalysts for this criminal enterprise.

Armed banditry has had a significant impact on education in northwestern Nigeria. The activities of bandits directly affect the seven states of northwestern Nigeria – Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara¹. In the realm of education, banditry is responsible for the abduction and kidnapping of students and teachers, killing of students and teachers, destruction of educational facilities, disruption of academic activities and closure of schools in the affected areas. Mass kidnappings and brutal raids on civilians in vulnerable villages by bandits are driving a humanitarian crisis¹. This has created a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon) with close to 2.2 million people forcibly displaced in the region.

The prevalence of armed banditry in Nigeria appears to have been high and rising over the years. In Nigeria, since 2013, incidents of violence caused by armed bandits have heightened. The menace of banditry is becoming rampant because of high level of unemployment, weak security system, poverty, porosity of Nigeria's borders and arms proliferations which has plunged the region into a state of insecurity in all spheres of life. Therefore, addressing the issue of armed banditry is crucial not only for improving security but also for ensuring the continuity and quality of education in northwestern Nigeria. The phenomenon of ransom-driven kidnappings in Nigeria is predominantly motivated by economic and spatial considerations, yet operates as a highly organized, interrelated, and interdependent system⁴.

According to SB Morgan Nigerians have paid kidnappers an estimated \$18.34 million in ransom between June 2011 and March 2020. Most of this amount, approximately 60%, was paid between January 2016 and March 2020, indicating a significant increase in recent years. An expert interviewed for this report estimated that kidnappers received ransoms exceeding 2 billion naira (\$4.8 million) in 2020. Interviews with

¹ Chukudi Okwelum. *Rights to Oil Theft and Illegal Refinery in Nigeria*, "Scholarly Journal of Advanced Legal Research", Vol 1, No. 4, 2021

² Peter O.O. Ottuh, V. O. Aitufe, *Kidnapping and Moral Society: An Ethico-Religious Evaluation of the Nigerian Experience*, "European Scientific Journal", Vol. 10, No. 14, 2014, pp. 420-434

³ Nnam Macpherson, Mercy Chioma Arua, Mary Sorochi Out, *The Use of Women and Children in Suicide Bombing by the Boko Haram Terrorist Group in Nigeria*, "Aggression and Violent Behavior", Vol. 42, 2018, pp 35-42

⁴ Emanemua Adebowale Bandele, Toyosi Nathaniel Akinlosotu, *Kidnapping for Ransom in Nigeria: Implications and Quest for a Permanent Solution*, "AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities", Vol. 5, No. 2, 2016, pp. 20-27

convicted kidnapers revealed that ransoms per operation ranged from 500,000 to 2 million naira for a single victim. Kidnapping of school children directly affect the seven states of northwestern Nigeria – Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara¹. the abduction and kidnapping of students and teachers, killing of students and teachers, destruction of educational facilities, disruption of academic activities and closure of schools in the affected areas. Mass kidnappings and brutal raids on civilians in vulnerable villages by bandits are driving a humanitarian crisis. This has created a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon) with close to 2.2 million people forcibly displaced in the region. In December 2020, 344 schoolboys were kidnapped in Kankara, Katsina State. The government secured their release after six days, but it was reported that a ransom of 30 million naira was paid. In February 2021, 277 schoolgirls were kidnapped in Jangebe, Zamfara State, and they were also released after negotiations with the kidnapers. The government denied paying any ransom. Similar attacks occurred in other states until September 2021, but no mass school kidnappings have been reported since then. In March 2022, the Nigerian Senate passed a bill prohibiting the payment of ransoms, with penalties of up to 15 years for noncompliance.

In March 2022, a train traveling from Abuja to Kaduna in Nigeria was derailed by explosives and attacked by gunmen, resulting in eight deaths and the kidnapping of 65-168 passengers. The Governor of Kaduna State claimed that Boko Haram and bandits were responsible for the attack. Hostages were released as ransom payments were privately negotiated, and the principal negotiator was detained in Cairo and later arrested in Nigeria. The DSS withdrew a suit to prolong his detention in November 2022, and the final 23 hostages were reportedly released without force or payment of ransom in October 2022. Effective governance plays a pivotal role in mitigating the security challenges posed by the rampant occurrence of kidnapping for ransom in Nigeria. The implementation of proactive security measures and timely response mechanisms are essential components of a comprehensive strategy to combat this menace¹. The multifaceted aspects of kidnapping in Nigeria, this paper seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. It underscores the need for a holistic approach in addressing the root causes of kidnapping, to effectively combat this grave social issue.

Terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria

In recent years, Nigeria has experienced an unprecedented level of insecurity and terrorism, marking a significant shift since the advent of the current democratic dispensation. The nature of insecurity has regionalized, with militia groups in the south, insurgency in the north, kidnapping in the east and south, ritual killings in the east and west, and calculated political and non-political assassinations across the nation. This regional pattern of insecurity has led to the formation of regional security structures to curb the alarming rate of insecurity. From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the 2009 Boko Haram up-rising, Nigeria has been plagued by ethno-religious conflicts that have resulted in significant human and material losses. The Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 was particularly noteworthy as it not only established a precedent but also reinforced the efforts of Islamic conservative elements to impose a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state^{Error!}
Reference source not found.

The religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided a conducive environment for the emergence of the Boko Haram sect, which was further fueled by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics, and the desperation of politicians for political power^{Error! Bookmark not defined.}. The ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders also contributed to the sect's growth, as they either did nothing to prevent it from fomenting or only weakly condemned it. These internal factors, combined with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism worldwide, have created a highly volatile Nigerian society that is prone to violence, as evidenced by the Boko Haram uprising. Given the Nigerian state's approach to religious conflict, this violence may persist as a recurring problem.

Boko Haram's activities have been particularly severe between 2008 and 2015 (Oyeleye, 2016), with recurrent attacks leading to loss of lives, destruction of property, population displacements, and other forms of aggression. These terrorist activities have not only disrupted peace and stability but also significantly impacted

¹ Abimbola Adesoji, *The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria*, "Africa Spectrum", Vol. 45, No. 2, 2010, pp. 95-108

socio-economic development in the affected regions. The rise of Boko Haram has been attributed to various factors, including socio-economic disparities, political instability, religious extremism, and weak governance structures. The group's ideology is rooted in a rejection of Western education and values, which it views as corrupting influences on society.

The phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria can be attributed to religious identity and the perception of relative deprivation, thereby underscoring the imperative for heightened security measures and national cohesion within the country¹. The impact of Boko Haram's activities extends beyond immediate violence and loss of life. The group's attacks have disrupted education, healthcare services, and economic activities in affected areas. Schools have been targeted for attacks, leading to closures and interruptions in education for thousands of children. Healthcare facilities have also been attacked or abandoned due to insecurity, limiting access to essential health services for local populations. Economically, Boko Haram's activities have led to a decline in agricultural production due to insecurity in rural areas. This has contributed to food insecurity and increased dependence on food aid in affected regions. Moreover, the insecurity has deterred local and foreign investment, further undermining economic development².

In response to these challenges, the Nigerian government has implemented various counter-terrorism measures. These include military operations against Boko Haram, strengthening intelligence capabilities, and promoting deradicalization and reintegration programs for former Boko Haram members. However, these efforts have been hampered by challenges such as corruption, lack of coordination among security agencies, and inadequate resources. The Nigerian government's deradicalization program faces structural weaknesses, potentially contributing to violent extremism, and requires strengthening measures for a successful counter-terrorism operation. The issue of terrorism in Nigeria requires a comprehensive approach that goes beyond military measures. This includes addressing underlying socio-economic issues that fuel extremism, strengthening governance structures, promoting religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue, improving access to quality education and economic opportunities, and enhancing regional cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts.

Epidemic of violent killings and insecurity in Nigeria

The Cables on May 2, 2023, reported that between January 1 and April 30, a total of 1,228 individuals lost their lives in Nigeria. Among the fatalities, 1,074 were unarmed Nigerians, 68 were vigilantes, 50 were police officers, 20 were soldiers, 10 were officers of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), 3 were immigration officers, 2 were security guards, and 1 was an officer of the vehicle inspection service. The number of killings has been steadily increasing month by month, with the highest death toll reported in April (441 fatalities). Benue recorded the highest number of casualties (232), while Akwa Ibom and Jigawa had the lowest with 2 reported deaths each. In terms of abductions, a total of 844 people were kidnapped during the same period. Zamfara had the highest number of cases with 211 reported incidents, while Bauchi, Ekiti, and Oyo had the lowest with 1 recorded abduction each.

The security officers were also killed across the country, a total of 186 security operatives, including military personnel, members of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, and the Nigeria Police Force, have tragically lost their lives while carrying out their duties. These statistics were obtained from news reports spanning from January to September 2023. The states where these incidents have occurred most frequently are Zamfara, Niger, Borno, Delta, Imo, Anambra, Benue, and Enugu, among others. This alarming trend of violence, with the perpetrators remaining at large, only serves to embolden them. It is imperative that a strong and forceful response is taken against these non-state actors. Without decisive action, the current strategies implemented by security agencies will not be sufficient to deter such acts.

The Punch Newspaper on 25 December 2023, reported that the alarming levels of violence and insecurity in Plateau State, Nigeria. Despite government interventions, including a presidential order and a special military operation, the attacks continue unabated. The recurring nature of these incidents underscores the need for urgent and comprehensive measures to address the root causes of violence and ensure the safety and security of the residents. The escalating violence and insecurity in Plateau State, Nigeria, pose a significant

¹ Daniel Agbibo, *Living in Fear: Religious Identity, Relative Deprivation and the Boko Haram Terrorism*, "African Security", Vol. 6, No. 2, 2013, pp. 153-170

² Ahmad Muhammad Baballe, et. al., *Need for Security Alarm System Installation and Their Challenges Faced*, "International Journal of New Computer Architectures and their Applications", Vol. 9, No. 3 Vol, 2019, pp. 68-76

threat to the lives and well-being of its residents. There is urgent need for a multi-faceted approach to address the root causes of violence, strengthen security measures, and promote peacebuilding initiatives. The government, in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, must prioritize the safety and security of the residents and work towards sustainable solutions to prevent future occurrences of violence in Plateau State.

Conclusion

These conflicts require a comprehensive understanding of their complexities and their impact on state stability. Conflict resolution strategies in Africa, including Nigeria, must consider these factors. This involves addressing the root causes of conflicts such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption, weak institutions among others. There is a need for capacity building for security agencies. This includes training in modern security techniques, provision of modern equipment, improving welfare for security personnel among others. There is also a need for community engagement in security matters. Communities should be involved in identifying security threats and finding solutions. In addressing security challenges in Nigeria requires a holistic approach that takes into consideration the complexities of these challenges and their impact on state stability. It involves not only strengthening security agencies but also addressing socio-economic issues that fuel these challenges.

Achieving peace and stability in Nigeria requires effective conflict resolution mechanisms and inclusive economic and political strategies aimed at improving the living conditions of the majority of the population. In addition, Nigeria needs to manage Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) through national action, implementation of treaties, and strengthened international cooperation. The aspiration is that if Nigeria can effectively address the issue of SALW, it will create conditions conducive to realizing its socio-economic goals for the betterment of its people.

Recommendations

1. Invest in modern security infrastructure and technology to enhance the capacity of security agencies. This includes surveillance systems, intelligence gathering tools, and advanced training for security personnel.

2. Collaborate with neighboring countries to share intelligence and coordinate counter-terrorism efforts. Regional cooperation is crucial in tackling transnational threats like terrorism and armed banditry.

3. Implement policies aimed at reducing poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Socio-economic development can address some of the root causes of extremism and armed banditry.

4. Invest in quality education and promote moderate religious teachings to counter extremist ideologies. Education can provide youths with alternatives to joining extremist groups.

5. Enhance governance structures and ensure the rule of law to address grievances that may fuel extremism. This includes tackling corruption, promoting transparency, and ensuring accountability in public institutions.

6. Enhance border security to prevent illegal cross-border activities such as smuggling of arms, which often fuel insecurity. This includes strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries on border management.

7. Implement peacebuilding initiatives that promote dialogue and reconciliation in conflict-affected areas. This includes supporting community-based conflict resolution mechanisms.

8. Support Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Programs: Support DDR programs for former members of extremist groups and armed bandits. These programs can help reintegrate former combatants into society and prevent them from returning to violence. Addressing insecurity and terrorism requires a comprehensive approach that involves all sectors of society, including government, security forces, civil society, religious leaders, and communities.

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HUMAN SECURITY

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ENHANCING COMMUNITY SECURITY IN POST-DAYTON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. THE IMPACT OF IDENTITY POLITICS ON EUROPEAN STATE-BUILDING STRATEGIES

Abstract:	<i>Bosnia and Herzegovina have progressed extremely well in the last few years on its path towards the European Union. The latest success was represented by the opening of the accession negotiations after they successfully improved their compliance with the political criteria. But their EU membership is still far away, and they need to confront major challenges. The goal of this paper is to analyze the level of community security by looking at the influence of identity politics in both the internal political life of Bosnia and the European Union's state-building strategy during Ursula von der Leyen's Commission. This paper answers the question of a new Dayton Agreement to be worked upon by the political leadership from BiH and together with the European incentives. By looking at the rhetoric of several levels of leadership in both national and European dimensions, this paper outlines the impact of ethnic discrimination as the key factor that affects the European integration process. As a result, it could be argued that if BiH wants to achieve membership, it clearly needs to create a new constitutional framework that goes beyond ethnic narratives, reduces the interests of political elites, and needs the support of actors such as the High Representative.</i>
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Introduction and research design

Since the end of 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been one of the candidate countries for European Union membership but has progressed slowly to advance to accession negotiations until respect for the required level of adherence to the membership requirements is met, and the Commission offered a report to the Council on developments by March 2024, followed by the final decision of the European Council. Looking into the main obstacles, the one that is outstanding for BiH and, at the same time, a unique issue in the history of European integration is ethnic discrimination due to the political life in Bosnia being constructed around the three constitutive ethnicities.

Thus, the purpose of this research is to examine the European Union's role in Bosnia and Herzegovina's state-building strategy to define the necessity for a new Dayton Agreement to drive a major constitutional and democratic transformation. With that purpose in mind, the research question at the core of this academic effort is "Does the advancement of European integration in Bosnia imply Dayton 2.0?". To define the state-building strategy, it is crucial to examine how the EU has been involved in BiH's state formation since the DPA, as well as the current leadership of the European Commission.

To tackle the research issue of this paper, the methodology will be a mostly qualitative interpretation of the main document or report of the EU towards the integration of BiH, combined with a discourse analysis of the different levels of the European Commission responsible for the enlargement policy. Analysis of public discourse in a poststructuralist way specific to the Copenhagen security school by presenting the speaker and his importance in context, the structure and content of the discourse, registers related to language and expression, and the connectors used. From the previously obtained results, it can be delineating the ambivalence of the construction relationship between the variables of identity and foreign policy and see how they influence each other through processes of association and differentiation through a series of discourse analysis techniques, such as the intertextual model.

Brief history of the conflict

In a recent study, I explored the international dimensions of the Bosnian War through a socio-constructivist lens, examining the intricate relationship between identity and foreign policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina¹. Building on this research, this paper aims to investigate the contemporary nexus between identity and foreign policy, focusing on the EU's perspective and the socio-political landscape post-Dayton Agreement².

The Bosnian War, integral to the dissolution of Yugoslavia³, marked a pivotal moment in the emergence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent nation. Unlike other former Yugoslav states, Bosnia's multicultural composition, comprising Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats, added layers of complexity to the conflict. It wasn't merely a struggle for independence from Yugoslavia but also a quest by these groups to forge their distinct national identities within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Scholars have scrutinized various factors contributing to Yugoslavia's demise, including the leadership void after Tito's death and the artificiality of the Yugoslav project, which was largely sustained by historical circumstances and communist rule. However, ethnic nationalism stands out as a key variable. My research highlighted the nationalist rhetoric of leaders like Slobodan Milošević and Alija Izetbegović⁴, whose competing visions—Milošević's⁵ “Greater Serbia” versus Izetbegović's⁶ inclusive Bosnian nationhood—shaped the contemporary identity politics in Bosnia.

These discourses fueled intense identity politics, transcending mere political discourse to manifest in wartime realities⁷. The conflict's parties—Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs—embodied their respective ethnic identities, with Bosniaks striving for independence, Bosnian Croats briefly attempting Herzegovina's secession before aligning with Bosniaks, and Bosnian Serbs seeking to establish Republika Srpska with Yugoslav army support.

The war's brutality, including ethnic cleansing and genocide in Srebrenica, underscored the depth of ethnic animosity. Despite public outcry for intervention⁸, the international community's response, characterized by the “lift and strike” strategy, was perceived as belated and inadequate. US intervention proved instrumental

¹ George Horațiu Bontea, *A Socio-Constructivist Retrospection of the Internationalisation and Outcomes of the Bosnian War*, István-József Polgár, Mircea Brie (Eds.), “The Legitimacy of New Regionalism in the European Integration Process”, Debrecen University Press, Debrecen, 2023, pp. 141-153

² Vesna V. Godina, *The outbreak of nationalism on former Yugoslav territory: a historical perspective on the problem of supranational identity*, “Nations and Nationalism”, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2004, pp. 409-422, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.1998.00409.x> (20.12.2023)

³ Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel the Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the fall of Milosevic*, Westview Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 7-35

⁴ George Horațiu Bontea, *Op cit.*, pp. 141-153

⁵ Christina M. Morus, *Slobo the Redeemer: The Rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic and the Construction of the Serbian People*, “Southern Communication Journal”, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1-19, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10417940601174660> (21.12.2023)

⁶ Enes Karić, “*Alija Izetbegović (1925—2003)*”, “Islamic Studies”, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2004, pp. 181-189, doi: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20837336> (21.12.2023)

⁷ David Campbell, *MetaBosnia: narratives of the Bosnian War*, “Review of International Studies”, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, pp. 261-281 doi: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097522> (27.12.2023)

⁸ Yaeli, Bloch-Elkon, *Studying the Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy in International Crises: The United States and the Bosnian Crisis, 1992—1995*, “The International Journal of Press/Politics”, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2007, pp.20-51, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1081180X07307184> (28.12.2023)

in ending the conflict and facilitating the Dayton Agreement, aimed at achieving negative peace and addressing ethnic disparities. However, the agreement's implementation resulted in a federation rife with ethnic divisions, political fragmentation, and minimal progress in democratic reforms. Over time, the US receded as a primary influencer in Bosnia's state-building endeavors, with the European Union assuming a more prominent role, driven by the prospect of Western Balkans' integration.

Shortcomings of the Dayton Agreement and towards European integration

The Dayton Peace Agreement was the basis for the constitutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina. DPA instituted a state-building structure with two “entities”¹ or federal units: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska². The new politico-social reality established during the peace negotiations at Dayton is based on the separatism of Bosnian Serbs and their control over the Republika Srpska, the collaboration between the majority Bosniaks and the minority of Bosnian Croats, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and obviously the special case of the autonomous Brčko District. Even in the internal political order of these entities, the reality is based on the ethnic narrative since Republika Srpska tends to have a more centralized constitutional framework. In contrast, the Federation is divided into ten cantons based on the proportionality of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, and its internal political order is characterized by constitutional autonomy for each region. At the level of the state, BiH, the coordination is limited to only three political levels, such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Civil Affairs. As a result, although the DPA was successful in ending the violent demonstration, it was unable to establish a state-building capacity for democratic political cooperation between the three constituent ethnic groups³ or to prepare the way for a potential future revision of the structural framework, which would have been overseen by the High Representative of the Dayton Agreement.

As a result of the Dayton Agreement, many scholars identified a series of structural issues that negatively impact the democratic perspectives of Bosnia and Herzegovina that are well summarized in one of the latest academic works of Roberto Belloni⁴ in three structural weaknesses. The first one outlines the idea that the DPA established political institutions that were not intended to create the conditions for effective government but to prevent each group from imposing its own views on the others. A set of institutions is not creating a democratic environment but rather forcing a consociationalistic framework that just maintains the political conflict between the three ethnic groups⁵.

The second one demonstrates that not only did the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina create ineffective institutions, prey to nationalist manipulation, but it also elevated ethnic discrimination as a principle of law, with important consequences for individual human rights⁶. Based on the structural weakness, there are already two major processes at the European Court of Human Rights: Sejdić-Finci in 2009 and Kovačević in 2023.

The third one explains the main structural weakness of the Dayton Agreement, which involves the role assigned to international actors in the implementation of peace. The civilian head of the peacekeeping operation, the High Representative of the International Community, and its Office, was given the task of overseeing the implementation of the agreement but did not give it any military component⁷. The Bonn Powers

¹ Roberto Belloni, *Civil Society in War-to-Democracy Transitions* in Anna K. Jarstad, Timothy D., Sisk (eds.), *From War to Democracy Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 182-210

² Stefano Costalli, *Does Peacekeeping Work? A Disaggregated Analysis of Deployment and Violence Reduction in the Bosnian War*, “British Journal of Political Science”, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2014, pp. 357–380, doi: <http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract/S0007123412000634> (29.12.2023)

³ Paul C. Szasz, *The Protection of Human Rights Through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia*, “The American Journal of International Law”, Vol. 90, No. 2, 1996, pp. 301-316, doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2203694> (30.12.2023)

⁴ Roberto Belloni, *The Rise and Fall of Peacebuilding in the Balkans*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2020, pp. 83-90

⁵ Foreign Policy Initiative Bosnia-Herzegovina Herzegovina, *Governance structures in BiH: Capacity, ownership, EU integration, functioning state* https://vpi.ba/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/BiH_Governance_Structures.pdf (9.01.2024)

⁶ Asim Mujkic, *We, the Citizens of Ethnopolitics*, “Constellations”, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 112-128 doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2007.00425.x> (9.01.2024)

⁷ Emir Vajzović, *Bosnia and Herzegovina in the EU integration process: A Carrot-and-Stick marathon* in Branislav, Radeljić (Ed.), *Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space*, Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, 2013, pp. 157-182

offer extremely important political leverage for the High Representative, who underperformed his attributes during several mandates.

Based on the former academic work of other scholars in this paper, it could be argued that nowadays, the Dayton Agreement could be described as one of the major issues in the European integration process of the country. The state-building framework of the DPA represents a major issue in the fulfilment of the criteria of *Acquis Communautaire*, especially in the case of the principle of rule of law, since it seeks to consolidate a democracy that confronts ethnic interests. Then the question arises: How should the democratic vote be balanced with ethnic tensions?

Before looking into the current situation of the state-building capacities of the EU, it is essential to look at the historical transition from USA influence on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union and major issues that arose during these years. The European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been analysed by many specialists in close connection with the integration process of the Western Balkans region, and due to the tense situation between the three constituent ethnic groups, Bosnia seemed to encounter the most extensive negotiation process. After Bosnia was given candidate membership status by the European Union in December 2022, significant discussions about the primary goals and difficulties have resurfaced. The last statement of significant impact in this sense was made on March 12, 2024, when the European Commission published the report that recommends the opening of the accession negotiations with Bosnia and by the President of the European Commission: “Since we granted candidate status, Bosnia and Herzegovina has taken impressive steps forward. More progress has been achieved in just over a year than in a whole decade. Of course, more progress is necessary to join the Union, but the country is showing that it can deliver on its membership criteria and on its citizens aspirations to be part of our family. This is the reason for which we recommend to the Council that it open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. And for which we recommend that the Council adopt the negotiating framework once Bosnia and Herzegovina have taken further steps in line with the Commission’s report. We remain ready to report back to the Council about the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina on these steps. The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in our union“. It is very important to highlight that among the multitude of approaches that the academic community has taken on this subject, we will emphasize those that define this integration process from the perspective of the concept of state-building, in which the EU’s attraction factors help to develop stronger central democratic institutions that better represent citizens’ interests. Thus, by analyzing the specialized literature on this subject with an essential reference point from Roberto Belloni’s work “The Rise and Fall of Peacebuilding in the Balkans,” we will analyze three periods of the democratic consolidation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The first period is immediately after the installation of the Dayton agreement and the main systemic problems generated by it. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, the United States of America represented the main international actor defining the foreign policy of the Western partners in post-conflict Bosnia. The Dayton period, also called “liberal imposition of peace”¹, was characterized by the strategy of consolidating peace in Bosnia by imposing institutions modelled on Western societies, implementing a series of policies, or even suspending democratic procedures. All these measures were justified as being undesirable for the maintenance of stability, which implied the construction of internal sovereignty, the development of market economies, the defence of human rights, and multi-ethnic coexistence.

The second period was represented by a transition process in which the USA became a secondary actor in the region, and the European Union considerably increased its sphere of influence by opening the European integration process for the states of the Western Balkans. At this stage, democratic practices were no longer imposed by external decision-makers², and even the role of the High Representative was diminished *de facto* as an involvement, even though the powers in Bonn gave him a key *de jure* role. Governance was no longer carried out by the external environment but was only stimulated to help local and national authorities mature politically to respond to the needs of citizens³. The democratic reforms had to be taken independently by the representative entities and were stimulated by the political and economic support of the approach to future European integration.

¹ David Chandler, *Peacebuilding: The twenty years’ crisis, 1997-2017*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017, pp. 63-67

² Timothy Donais, *Peacebuilding and Local Ownership Post-Conflict Consensus-Building*, Routledge, New York, 2012, pp. 78-96

³ Gëzim Visoka, *Normal Peace: A New Strategic Narrative of Intervention*, “Politics and Governance“, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2017, pp. 146-156, doi: <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/53942> (13.01.2024)

The last stage was represented by highlighting the main gaps in the European pull factors, how financial incentives were seized by political elites, and a Eurosceptic current of Bosnian citizens starting to take shape¹. Precisely for this reason, the specialized literature talks about the need for bottom-up measures that help a much easier integration process for Bosnian citizens from each ethnic group and that help an effective political dialogue between the EU and Bosnian citizens².

Starting from the issue raised by the specialized literature, it is proposed that the main problems encountered by both Bosnia and the EU in the process of integration will be analyzed through the research, with the aim of outlining a model of democratic state-building with multi-ethnic coexistence. Through this research paper, the observation of how the European identity should be built in Bosnia is desired to reduce tensions between the three constituent ethnicities and create a democratic context that is less influenced by ethnic elites but without leading to the discrimination of one of the constituent groups.

European integration and its state-building capacities

The European path gave a series of opportunities for the Bosnian citizens and the state itself, and this part will briefly present the main negotiation process and incentives for reform offered to Bosnia³. The negotiations for the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) started at the end of 2005, and this agreement entered into force ten years later. SAA represents an important framework of relations between the EU and Western Balkan countries, with the main goals of creating a free-trade area and a higher regional level of collaboration between the WB countries. Generally, this process sets out common political and economic goals⁴. All BiH citizens were granted visa-free entry to Schengen and EU countries in 2010. Another major step was in 2016, when Bosnia and Herzegovina officially applied for EU membership. In 2019, the EU offered its first response with the adoption of an opinion on the EU membership application of Bosnia and Herzegovina, identifying 14 key priorities, most of them pointing towards the negative impact of ethnic discrimination on democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights. The latest and most important event was at the end of 2022, when the European Council granted candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since then, in November 2023, the Commission recommends opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in December 2023, the European Council decides it will open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a very important condition: “once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved, and invites the Commission to report to the Council on progress at the latest in March 2024, with a view to making a decision”. Finally, these goals were met, and at the end of March 2024, the EU opened accession negotiations with BiH.

Besides the clear advantages of this EU integration process that offers access to European funding, promotes liberal exchanges of goods, services, capital, people, and obviously the perspective of EU membership, this state-building framework outlines two major perspectives for the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, the EU seems to focus on the case of Balkan states on a regional approach with the SAA process in relations with Western Balkans countries. Second, an extremely important condition for the advancement of the European integration process in BiH is the issue of ethnic discrimination as a major factor in the improvement of the functionality of democracy, the improvement of the principle of rule of law, and the need to improve the respect of fundamental rights.

How could it be explained that the EU is more inclined towards a regional approach? Even the rhetoric of the leadership in the EU Commission⁵ proves that during the Ursula von der Leyen mandate (2019–2024),

¹ Oliver Richmond, *Failed Statebuilding, Intervention, the State, and the Dynamics of Peace Formation*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2014, pp. 1-30

² Roberto Belloni, Jasmin Ramović, *Elite and Everyday Social Contracts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Pathways to Forging a National Social Contract?*, “Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding”, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2020, pp. 42-63, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2019.1579160> (13.01.2024)

³ European Commission, *Bosnia and Herzegovina – Key Milestones*, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/bosnia-and-herzegovina_en#key-milestones (24.01.2024)

⁴ European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), *Stabilisation and Association Process*, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/glossary/stabilisation-and-association-process_en (25.01.2024)

⁵ European Commission, *Press material from the Commission Spokesperson's Service*, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en> (1.02.2024)

the regional approach was more important. During her appearances as the president of the European Commission, von der Leyen discussed the Western Balkans 126 times and just 32 times about Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same level of leadership, with a more emphasized role for the European integration process, Oliver Várhelyi, as the commissioner responsible for neighborhood policy and enlargement, mentioned the Western Balkans 262 times and only Bosnia and Herzegovina 94 times. Moving from the political-leadership level, even at the mission level, the Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR)¹ BiH comes in second in rhetoric relevance, with just 49 news reports compared to 195 news reports about the Western Balkans. Obviously, the Western Balkan approach is not exclusive to the problems of BiH and is still a very important step in the evolution of the European integration process from a regional perspective but taking into consideration the specific case of BiH and all the individual challenges of each state and the general evolution towards accession negotiations, the EU should start to give more importance to the regatta principle. The Western Balkans is an important strategy for the EU's state building, but it is quite hard to believe that the European process will align with all the necessities of each state, and thus BiH and all the other states should be more closely involved in the discourse of European leaders as unique member states and less as a region.

In their public discourses, there are a couple of common points regarding the European integration of Bosnia. The first one, and it could be deduced from the statistics of speaking about the individual case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region of the Western Balkans, is that the European Commission under von der Leyen preferred to continue the regional approach in the enlargement policy. Besides the state performance of BiH, now all countries in the Western Balkans (except Kosovo) are officially candidates for membership in the European Union. Based on the future European Commission, it will be decided if the region of the Western Balkans will evolve in the accession process in a block of states or if the new College will rather promote the regatta principle again, as was the case in Croatia back in 2013. The second important correlation between the discourse of both Ursula von der Leyen and Oliver Várhelyi and the DG Near is the high level of attention given to the 14 key points that need to be better tackled by the government of Bosnia. Now obviously, in the rhetoric of the European leaders, it is not quite clear who should take more responsibility for the important reforms in Bosnia, taking into consideration the fragmentation of political parties, the considerable level of identity politics, and the decentralized government. The only important mention in that regard is the tension situation in the Republika Srpska, the need for more democratic principles, and the need during the electoral process for the High Representative to interfere in 2022.

In the case of the regional approach towards the Western Balkans (summits evolved during von der Leyen), it is important to outline the artificiality of the term due to its short history and rather being a Europeanization of the Balkan space. The origin of the term "Western Balkan" is very complicated to define in a clear way², but many scholars have rather described it as an EU approach to the region of Balkan states that moves towards the European path and as a result needs a de-balkanization process. A defining moment for this term was during the 2003 EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki³, when the European Union adopted very clearly the regional strategy for the WB countries and established this format for EU-Western Balkans summits. Since then, it has been more and more used by the epistemic community, which has opened a very important debate about this concept and its influence on the integration process.

The Commission believes that the implementation of 14 key points is necessary for the BiH to become a member of the EU⁴. The topics covered by these principles are broken down into four groups: fundamental

¹ European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, *DG NEAR Latest News*, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/about-us/latest-news_en?f%5B0%5D=near_news_themes_near_news_themes%3A173 (4.02.2024)

² Pål Kolstø, *Western Balkans' as the New Balkans: Regional Names as Tools for Stigmatisation and Exclusion*, "Europe-Asia Studies", Vol. 68, No. 7, 2016, pp. 1245-1263, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1219979> (27.02.2024)

³ European Commission, *EU-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki*, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_03_163 (27.02.2024)

⁴ European Commission, *Key Findings of the Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's EU Membership Application and Analytical Report*, file:///C:/Users/horat/Downloads/Key_findings_of_the_Opinion_on_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_s_EU_membership_application_and_analytical_report.pdf (27.02.2024)

rights, public administration reform, the rule of law, democracy, and functionality. The first structural weakness of the DPA has a significant impact on points 1, 2, 4, 7, and 8 in the context of democracy/functionality and the rule of law because most Bosnian institutions were designed to prevent each group from imposing its own beliefs on the others rather than to foster an environment conducive to effective governance. A set of institutions is imposing a consociationalistic framework that merely serves to sustain the political rivalry between the three ethnic groups without fostering a democratic environment. As with the Preamble, which states that “Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” the second structural weakness resulting from ethnic discrimination being embodied in the Bosnian constitution could account for points 9, 10, 11, and 13 that fall under the third category, Fundamental Rights.

Out of these 14 points, nine are directly affected by the structural weakness presented in the second part of this paper. The EU Commission suggests a series of reforms, such as “The country faces several structural issues stemming from its complex institutional set-up coupled with ethnicity-related procedures that adversely affect its functionality“ and “to prevent systematic disputes and ensure effective implementation of the acquis, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to ensure legal certainty on the distribution of competences among the levels of government”. From this opinion, it is rather expected that these reforms be implemented by the BiH, but the question is, how can they be done taking into consideration the structural weaknesses?

The reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina proves that just the internal political order is not capable enough to fully develop the constitutional reforms alone due to several failures to vote in Parliaments between 2006 and 2014¹ based on the structural weaknesses of the constitution and the ethnic elites’ interests to maintain the status quo to keep the political power based on identity politics². The constitutional reform process started with the famous “April Packages”, officially launched in 2005 and promoted in Parliament in 2006, with the main goal of these sets of reforms being to strengthen the federal institution and create a more representative structure for Bosnian citizens. Some of the main proposals were about one indirectly named president and two vice presidents, a stronger Council of Ministers, a larger Parliament, and a House of Representatives that is not so dependent on the three ethnic constituencies. Unfortunately, the pack failed to be adopted during that time and came again in several forms³, such as the Prud Process and the Butmir Process. In that case, it could be argued that it is not just about the political will of the political elite of Bosnia and Herzegovina but also about the structural framework that encourages the political leadership to use ethnic elements in their political agenda and to create a narrative of the possible comeback of the war and the discouragement of multiethnic parties.

At the same time, voters were encouraged to vote based on ethnic terms, and the recent results in 2022 show that three of the biggest parties represented could be described as rather ethnic. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA, Bosniak Party) won first place with 8 seats, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD, Serb Party) in second place with 6 seats, the Social Democratic Party (SDP, multiethnic party) in third place with 5 seats, and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, Croat party) in fourth place with 4 seats⁴. Obviously, it needs to be mentioned that the political life in Bosnia is very fragmented with many parties⁵, but these three ethnic parties have a very long history of being represented in the general elections and are constantly based around political agendas on ethnic terms. This political reality could be described as a rhetorical choice of people validating political ideas, with Bosniaks’s discourse for more central power, Croats

¹ Valery Perry, *Constitutional Reform Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Top-down Failure, Bottom-up Potential, Continued Stalemate*, Soeren Keil and Valery Perry (Eds.), *State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Routledge, New York 2016, pp. 15-40

² Ana Mijić, *Identity, ethnic boundaries, and collective victimhood: analysing strategies of self-victimisation in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina*, “Identities Global Studies in Culture and Power“, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2021, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2020.1748348> (28.02.2024)

³ Michal Mochtak, Ensar Muharemović, *The Abyss of Ethnic Division: Two Decades of Discussing War in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, “Ethnopolitics“, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2024 doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2022.2120283> (3.03.2024)

⁴ Opći izbori 2022, *General elections 2022 Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, https://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati_izbora/?resId=32&langId=4#/2/0/0/0/0 (3.03.2024)

⁵ John Hulsey, *Party Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina* in Soeren Keil and Valery Perry (Eds.), *State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Routledge, New York, 2016, pp. 41-60

discourse for a federal state, and Serbs discourse about independence. Of these four frontrunners, three (SDA, SNSD, and HDZ) are considered ethnic parties based on their political agendas. There are two common features among them, even if they have very different positions on how power should be distributed in the internal political order of BiH. Paradoxically, all three ethnic political groups assume to protect the interests of the identity that they represent, but at the same time, they fully agree with the European integration process. If it is to correlate this duality with the European Commission recommendations on the need for democratic reform, just outline how dependent the current political reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina is on the ethnic affiliations of the three constituent elite groups—a political reality that is neither tackled by the European state-building strategy nor by the citizens that are dependent on political agendas based on conflictual rhetoric. The main problem could not just be reduced to corruption, low incentives for political elites to reform, or even the lack of resources to form a more active civil society, but also the restrictive political flexibility of the consociationalism made after the Dayton Agreement and the structural framework.




Fig. 1. Graphic based on discourse analysis of the program declaration of SDA, SNSD, and HDZ^{1,2,3}

Conclusions

The European Union played a major role in conflict resolution during the Dayton Peace Process and was one of the signatories to the final agreement in 1995. Since then, with the promise of enlargement, the EU has become the most important external factor in the state-building capacities of Bosnia. The High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina was held only by EU member states; the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a major observer of the progress in BiH, and obviously, the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, the candidate status, and the opening of the accession negotiations represent major steps in the influence of the EU. In its state-building strategy, the EU focused on a regional approach towards the Western Balkans and targeting ethnic discrimination in Bosnia, both of which were questionable decisions taking into consideration the artificial construction of the Western Balkan region and the lack of political will in internal order to change the constitutional framework due to the high degree of identity politics supported by the institutional framework of the DPA.

¹ Савез независних социјалдемократа, *The Statute of the SNSD adopted at the 6th Parliament*, <https://snsd.org/dokumenti/> (5.03.2024)

² Stranke Demokratske Akcije, *Program Declaration of the 8th Sda Congress*, <https://www.sda.ba/stranica/programska-deklaracija/15> (5.03.2024)

³ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine, *Statut and Progame*, <https://www.hdzbih.org/hr/dokumenti> (5.03.2024)

The Dayton Peace Agreement successfully obtained a negative peace for Bosnian citizens but failed to offer them a democratic environment and rather created a structural framework that promotes identity politics and discourages multicultural institutions and collaboration between political representatives of the three main ethnic groups. Even the European institutions describe ethnic discrimination as a major challenge in the integration process, so there is a clear need for a major structural change. Unfortunately, due to the influence of identity politics inside the internal political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina, democratic reform never happened, even though there was a high-intensity period of negotiations and proposals during 2005–2014. The European Union should work more with bottom-up initiatives, to focus on stimulating a civic context that is not dependent on identity politics, and to offer more incentives to political parties to move beyond ethnic terms and re-open the dialogue for reform to obtain their goal of progress in the European integration process, but then it is a question of leverage. Thus, the important political lever for change could be the role of the Office of the High Representative in close collaboration with the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Coming back to the research question established at the beginning of this research paper, the European integration process is closely connected to the need for a major reform in Bosnia. Not just a series of packages but rather a retrospective analysis of the Dayton Agreement and to work together with the European Union for Dayton 2.0 that reduces the consociationalistic framework and creates a better democratic environment. To achieve this, political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to move beyond ethnic parties, and discourses of identity politics need to be reduced when discussing future reforms. This process should not be unilateral from the EU or Bosnian parties but must look upon the collaboration between political parties, civil society groups, and initiatives with the help of the High Representative and an EU special observer. Bosnia is coming closer and closer to the European Union with the opportunity offered by the opening of accession negotiations, but the challenges analyses earlier could be defining points on the agenda of the political leadership of BiH and the future European Commission.

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**EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF HUMAN SECURITY. THE LEGAL AND
SCIENTIFIC DIMENSIONS OF SCENT DETECTION CANINES**

Abstract:	<i>As the literature review has shown, the legal debate for the use of scent detection canines is ongoing in all areas of life. There are no blanket acceptances for warrantless detection in public, such as vehicles or personal odor, as there are no blanket denials of regarding homes. Science is also an ongoing process to understand how the canine olfactory system works in detecting VOCs (volatile organic compounds) and how the canines discriminate odors. Human technology is currently not as sensitive as canines in detecting weathered traces of blood after long periods of time, so reliability questions will still arise. Studies and statistics on canine training and performance will need improvement to consistently stand up to Fry and Daubert reliability challenges.</i>
Keywords:	Legal; canine; detection; marijuana; odor; reliability
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Due to their superior olfactory system, canines are trained in scent detection and have been widely used in various industries, such as conservation, law enforcement, search and rescue, medicine, and the military. In some areas of their scent detection work, canines have become the subject of legal debate because of their unique abilities to identify illegal drugs, explosives and people based on their odors¹. Scent detection canines have also been involved in cadaver detection, scent lineups, personal sniffs and to form probable cause for forfeitures of currency tied to drug trafficking². Canine alerts to odors have been used by law enforcement to form reasonable suspicion and probable cause to further investigate vehicles and homes for various drugs³. As privacy interests have intensified in their last decades, the canine olfactory system and canine reliability have come into question due to a lack of scientific knowledge and lack of unified standards for canine and handler training and certification⁴.

The literature review will take a thematic approach, addressing seven major areas of legal debate to illustrate the use of scent detection canines in forensic science. The literature review will analyze 13 articles and books regarding canine odor detection in public, near private homes and protected curtilage, reliability challenges, human remain detection, human tracking, cocaine and currency forfeitures and cannabis legalization and decriminalization. Through scientific evidence and case law, the literature will highlight canine sniffs of vehicles, personal curtilage in public, differences between private homes and other modern homes, volatile organic compounds, body odor discrimination, discrimination between cocaine and snapdragon

¹ Tadeusz Jeziorski, John Ensminger, LE Papet (Eds.), *Canine Olfaction Science and Law* (1sted.), CRC Press, 2016, pp. 215-222

² Carmen M. Cusack, *Animals and Criminal Justice* (1sted.), Routledge, New York, 2015, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315082301>, p. 56

³ *Ibidem*, p. 58

⁴ Kenneth G Furton, Norma Iris Caraballo, Michelle M Cerreta, Howard K Holness, *Advances in the use of odor as forensic evidence through optimizing and* –13, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24505154>, DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2014.0262

flowers and the new challenges with cannabis legalization and decriminalization. Some questions will be answered while new ones will surface regarding reasonable suspicion, probable cause and reliability hearings involving scent detection canines. Lastly, the literature review will identify an immediate need for policy reform in the nationwide use of cannabis detection dogs, as legalization and decriminalization of medical and recreational marijuana has taken root among states and was recently passed in the House¹.

Literature review. Canine odor detection in public

The US Constitution, through the Fourth Amendment, grants people the right to be free against unreasonable search and seizure unless a warrant is issued based on probable cause or the search falls within a specific exception. The Supreme Court held that most drug detection canine sniffs located in a public area are not a search under the Fourth Amendment, therefore it is not necessary to justify or determine the admissibility of a warrantless canine alert because it's not a search². However, real world cases are not as plain as simple as that. In *US v Place*, 1983, luggage was seized for 90 minutes before the canine was deployed to conduct the sniff. The court reasoned that even though a brief seizure of property was supported by *Terry v Ohio*, in this case the delay was too long and violated the Fourth Amendment. In 1984, the court in *US v Jacobsen*, upheld warrantless field testing stating that individuals lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in possessing illegal contraband. Similarly, *Illinois v Caballes* in 2005 relying on *Place* and *Jacobsen* held that canine sniffs during lawful traffic stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there is no legitimate protected privacy interest in the possession of contraband. Furthermore, the *Caballes* court distinguished *Kyllo v US* because a canine sniff, unlike a thermal imaging device, cannot detect lawful activities³. Like *Place*, *Rodriguez v US* police had an extended stop, causing a 7- or 8-minute delay for the canine sniff and even though the delay was minimal it was deemed to violate the Fourth Amendment⁴.

In canine vehicle sniff instances without probable cause, canines entering the vehicle while performing the sniff violates the Fourth Amendment as shown by *US v Willingham*, 1998, unless the entry was instinctual and not trained (*US v Vazquez*, 2009⁵ and *US v Sharpe*, 2012⁶).

Smith provides other examples of canine sniffs in public areas that were not deemed to be a search to necessitate probable cause and a warrant. They include canine sniff outside trailer facility (*US v Ibarra*, 1991⁷), hotel room door (*US v Roby*, 1997⁸ and *US v Marlar* 1993⁹), school lockers (*Horton v Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.*¹⁰) and rail sleeper compartment (*US v Colyer*¹¹).

¹ Morgan Smith, *Beware of the drug detection dog: the fourth amendment, drug detection dogs, and state legalization of marijuana*, "SMU Law Review", Vol. 73, No. 3, 2020, pp. 611-636

<https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol73/iss3/11/> (24.03.2024)

² Carmen M. Cusack, *Animals and Criminal Justice* (1st ed.), Routledge, New York, 2015, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315082301>, p. 65

³ Morgan Smith, *Beware of the drug detection dog: the fourth amendment, drug detection dogs, and state legalization of marijuana*, "SMU Law Review", Vol. 73, No. 3, 2020, pp. 611-636, <https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol73/iss3/11/> (24.03.2024)

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 8

⁵ United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, *United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Antonio VAZQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant*, No. 08-4044, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-10th-circuit/1025922.html> (24.03.2024)

⁶ United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, *United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David W. SHARP, Defendant-Appellant*, No. 10-6127, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-6th-circuit/1607477.html> (25.03.2024)

⁷ U.S. Supreme Court, *United States v. Ibarra*, 502 U.S. 1 (1991), No. 90-1713, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/502/1/> (25.03.2024)

⁸ United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, *United States of America, Appellee, v. Kevin Anthony ROBY, Appellant*, No. 97-1051, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-8th-circuit/1004707.html> (25.03.2024)

⁹ U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, *United States v. Marlar*, 828 F. Supp. 415, N.D. Miss. 1993 August 9, <https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/828/415/2352244/> (25.03.2024)

¹⁰ United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, *Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School Dist.*, 677 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1982), <https://casetext.com/case/horton-v-goose-creek-independent-school-dist> (25.03.2024)

¹¹ United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, *U.S. v. Colyer*, 878 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989), <https://casetext.com/case/us-v-colyer> (25.03.2024)

Personal curtilage in public

Ferguson in 2014 defines the theory of personal curtilage as a person's protected area in public intended to be secure from intrusion by others using sense enhancing technologies. Traditionally curtilage was applied to against helicopter surveillance (*Florida v Riley*¹ and *California v Ciraolo*²), wiretap (*Katz v US*³), GPS monitoring (*US v Jones*⁴) and thermal imaging (*Kyllo v US*⁵). Personal curtilage borrows from these cases and needs to demonstrate a relation to intimate or personal information. Just as the traditional sense enhancing technologies, odor detection canines don't require physical intrusion and if a person can demonstrate a space to be personal curtilage, an invasion without a warrant could violate the Fourth Amendment⁶.

One of the personal curtilage interests people seek to protect is odor. Courts have ruled that a "plain smell" can be used to develop reasonable suspicion and probable cause and it is not considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. As mentioned earlier, a canine sniff of luggage and cars does not constitute a search⁷, however there is debate whether canine sniff of a person can constitute a search if it's invasive enough. *Doe v Renfrow*, 1980⁸ found that a proximity suspicion less canine sniff was not a search, but *Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District*, 1982⁹, on the contrary found the proximity sniff to be offensive. In *US v Kelly* 2002¹⁰, a canine sniff that contacted the person was deemed to be a search, but *Illinois v Caballes*¹¹ illustrated that no legitimate privacy interest existed in the possession of contraband and the sniff did not intrude on a protected privacy interest¹². In *US v Reyez* 2003¹³, the court upheld the canine sniff and alert from four to five feet away and similarly, in *Jones v Texas* 2015¹⁴, the court upheld the canine sniff and found that non-contact sniff was only minimally intrusive.

However, the theory of personal curtilage may be applicable to whether an area may be defended against surveillance by using masking agents. In *Florida v Jardines*, the defendant covered his house in mothball smell to mask the odor of marijuana. Detector canines alerted to marijuana on the front porch. Even though the case was resolved under the protected curtilage, it could be asserted that by using masking agents, Jardines indicated a desire to protect against sniffing and inspection so under Ferguson's in 2014 theory, Jardines would be protected in this regard as well.

¹ U.S. Supreme Court, *Florida v. Riley*, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), No. 87-764, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/488/445/> (25.03.2024)

² U.S. Supreme Court, *California v. Ciraolo*, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), No. 84-1513, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/476/207/> (25.03.2024)

³ U.S. Supreme Court, *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), No. 35, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/389/347/> (25.03.2024)

⁴ United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, *United States v. Jones*, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), No. 10-1259, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/565/400/> (01.04.2024)

⁵ Certiorari to the United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit, *Kyllo v. United States*, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), No. 99-8508, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/533/27/> (01.04.2024)

⁶ Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, *Personal curtilage: fourth amendment security in public*, William&Mary Law Review, 55(4), 2014, pp. 1283-1364, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol55/iss4/2/> (01.04.2024)

⁷ Tadeusz Jezierski, John Ensminger, LE Papet (Eds.), *Canine Olfaction Science and Law* (1st ed.), CRC Press, 2016, pp. 215-222.

⁸ United States Court of Appeals, *Seventh Circuit, Doe v. Renfrow*, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), <https://casetext.com/case/doe-v-renfrow-2> (01.04.2024)

⁹ United States Court of Appeals, *Fifth Circuit, Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School Dist*, 677 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1982), <https://casetext.com/case/horton-v-goose-creek-independent-school-dist> (01.04.2024)

¹⁰ United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, *United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Patrick Kelly, Defendant-Appellant.*, No. 01-40467, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-5th-circuit/1156105.html> (01.04.2024)

¹¹ Supreme Court of The United States, *Illinois V. Caballes*, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) No. 03-923, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/543/405/> (01.04.2024)

¹² Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, *Personal curtilage: fourth amendment security in public*, William&Mary "Law Review", Vol. 55, No. 4, 2014, pp. 1283-1364, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol55/iss4/2/> (01.04.2024)

¹³ United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, *US v. Ramon Reyes*, No. 03-1119, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-2nd-circuit/1423190.html> (01.04.2024)

¹⁴ Court Of Appeals Second District of Texas Fort Worth, *Jones v. State*, No. 02-14-00073-CR (Tex. App. Jan. 8, 2015), No. F-2013-1447-A, <https://casetext.com/case/jones-v-state-5552> (01.04.2024)

Homes and protected curtilage

Florida v Jardines in 2013¹ is the first recent case to apply strict standards towards canine sniffs of a private home. After an unverified tip, the canine sniff was performed on the defendant's front porch. The positive alert was used to secure a search warrant, which turned up a marijuana growing operation in the house. The court relied on US v Jones in 2012² to rule that the canine sniff in this case was a search because it was a physical intrusion of curtilage³. The court also held that a police officer has implied license to walk up to the door by the prescribed path to engage the resident, but it's not customary to introduce a detection canine to explore the area⁴. However, not all homes are given the same protection. In North Dakota v Nguyen in 2013⁵, the court upheld a warrantless canine sniff of a common area of an apartment building because there is not a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hallways.

Connor also illustrates that recent case have further addressed questions of protected curtilage when dealing with canine sniffs of modern home designs. While the area outside an apartment is not considered curtilage in Lindsey v Maryland, 2015⁶, underneath an apartment window is a protected area according to US v Burston, 2015⁷. An apartment staircase and landing are also not deemed curtilage (US v Bain, 2015⁸), but it was said that a small apartment building with a locked front door may have a higher expectation of privacy than a large building without a lock. In US v Soza, 2016⁹, the court regarded the condominium porch like a single-family home porch as opposed to a common hallway of an apartment building, giving it protection¹⁰.

A townhouse designed with exterior doors instead of an indoor hallway is also treated as protected curtilage. US v Hopkins in 2016¹¹ used the Dunn test (proximity to home, area within enclosure of home, nature of use and steps taken to protect area from observers) to establish the area 6-8 feet in front of the unshared exterior door as curtilage¹². US v Whitaker, 2016¹³, took a different approach to canine sniffs of an area at the front door of an apartment. Judge Kagan based her decision not on curtilage protection, but she took the Kyllo approach (enhancement device not available to the public) to contend that common areas of an apartment building provide an intermediate level of privacy and residents have a right to expect certain norms of behavior in the hallway, which doesn't include a warrantless canine sniff. This decision, however, does not

¹ Supreme Court of The United States, *Florida V. Jardines*, No. 11–564, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/569/1/> (01.04.2024)

² Supreme Court of The United States, *United States v. Jones*, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), No. 10-1259, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/565/400/> (01.04.2024)

³ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

⁴ Eric Connon, *Growing Jardines: Expanding Protections against Warrantless Dog Sniffs to Multiunit Dwellings*, "Case Western Reserve Law Review", Vol. 67, No. 1, 2016, pp.309-315 <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol67/iss1/13> (10.04.2024),

⁵ Supreme Court State Of North Dakota 2014 Nd 211, *State of North Dakota v. Matthew D. Nguyen*, No. 20140183, <https://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20140183.html> (10.04.2024)

⁶ Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, *Shaun D. Lindsey V. State of Maryland*, No. 0146, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/md-court-of-special-appeals/1721054.html> (10.04.2024)

⁷ United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, *United States of America, v. Democrus Pernell Burston*, No. 14–3213, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-8th-circuit/1719311.html> (12.04.2024)

⁸ United States District Court, D. Massachusetts, *United States v. Bain*, 155 F. Supp. 3d 107 (D. Mass. 2015), No. 14-10115, <https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-bain-8> (12.04.2024)

⁹ United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, *United States of America, v. Darrin Antonio Soza*, No. 16-41689, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-5th-circuit/1878610.html> (12.04.2024)

¹⁰ Eric Connon, *Growing Jardines: Expanding Protections against Warrantless Dog Sniffs to Multiunit Dwellings*. Case Western Reserve Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2016, pp.309-315, <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol67/iss1/13> (12.04.2024)

¹¹ United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, *United States v. Hopkins*, 824 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2016), <https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-hopkins-124> (12.04.2024)

¹² Eric Connon, *Growing Jardines: Expanding Protections against Warrantless Dog Sniffs to Multiunit Dwellings*. Case Western Reserve Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2016, pp.309-315, <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol67/iss1/13> (12.04.2024)

¹³ United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, *United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Lonnie Whitaker*, Nos. 14–3290, 14–3506, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-7th-circuit/1731606.html> (12.04.2024)

change precedent because the Supreme Court differentiated between thermal imaging in *Kyllo*, which can detect lawful activity, and a canine sniff in *Place*, which only detects illegal contraband¹.

Human remain detection (HRD canines)

Canines trained in HRD can detect minute traces of blood, bone, fat, teeth and cadaver odor even when area and objects have been weathered or cleaned. HRD canines have been used by police in the US since 1974. More recently, training using the Scent Transfer Unit (STU-100) has yielded 90% response using different concentrations and different decomposition target odors². However, the HRD canine's scientific reliability comes into question in court when no remains can be located or confirmed at the alert site³. The canine olfactory system can detect volatile organic compounds (VOCs) to identify a particular source of odor, although it is not yet determined whether canines are alerting to a single compound, a compound class, or the entire odor profile⁴. The most recent studies in VOC profiles of human remains, animal remains, and live humans found definite distinguishable features in the profiles. However, it was found that for weathered latent blood, chemical presumptive tests with comprehensive two-dimensional gas chromatography (GC×GC) and luminol could not replicate the reported sensitivity of canines. Furthermore, current analytical instruments for blood detection found no blood traces on weathered porous and non-porous surfaces after two months⁵. This suggests that traces found by canines after two months without remains cannot be verified by current technology and may be questioned in court.

A lack of research exists regarding whether individual blood has a unique odor and in analysis of blood in forensics to provide insight about the effects of VOC profiles as blood decomposes. Scientific reliability requires data supporting the canine's sensitivity (odor concentration or threshold) and specificity (locating target odor only). These are often produced from training records, assessments, and certifications⁶. In 2007 HRD canines were taken to places the suspect visited and alerted to residual cadaver odor, but no remains were found. The court denied the admission of cadaver canine evidence because while it was relevant, the canines were not found to be reliable at alerting to human remains⁷. In a similar case, the 2007 *Trejos v Texas*⁸ case, the reliability of the canine was examined for whether the breed worked well off-lead, was trained to discriminate between human and animal scents and whether the canine's experience proved he was reliable. The discussion was based on the canine training records, certifications, past performance, the handler's testimony, the search method and whether the evidence was unfairly prejudiced since not a body was found. The court admitted the evidence because the canines worked independently and off-lead, and their records proved their reliability⁹. In the 2015 *California v. Herring*¹⁰ and 2015 *US v Burgos Montes*¹¹ the canines

¹ Eric Connon, *Growing Jardines: Expanding Protections against Warrantless Dog Sniffs to Multiunit Dwellings*, "Case Western Reserve Law Review", Vol. 67, No. 1, 2016, pp. 309-315, <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol67/iss1/13> (12.04.2024)

² Paola A. Prada, Allison M. Curran, Kenneth G. Furton, *Human Scent Evidence* (1st ed.), CRC Press, 2014, p. 98, <https://doi.org/10.1201/b17469> (12.04.2024)

³ Lauryn E. DeGreeff, Craig A. Schultz (Eds.). *Canines: The Original Biosensors* (1st ed.), Jenny Stanford Publishing, 2022, p. 255, <https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003261131> (12.04.2024)

⁴ *Idem*

⁵ *Idem*

⁶ *Idem*

⁷ Tadeusz Jezierski, John Ensminger, LE Papet (Eds.), *Canine Olfaction Science and Law* (1st ed.), CRC Press, 2016, pp. 215-222

⁸ Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.), *Roberto Yarit Trejo, v. The State of Texas*, No. 14-06-00168-Cr, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/tx-court-of-appeals/1180978.html> (13.04.2024)

⁹ Susan M. Stejskal, *Death, Decomposition, and Detector Dogs: From Science to Scene* (2nd ed.). CRC Press, 2022, pp. 5-29, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003217251> (13.04.2024)

¹⁰ United States District Court Northern District of California, *People v. Herring*, No. B249468 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015), <https://casetext.com/case/people-v-herring-104> (13.04.2024)

¹¹ United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, *United States of America, v. Edison Burgos-Montes*, No. 13-2305, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-1st-circuit/1700881.html> (13.04.2024)

alerted to human remains, but no remains were subsequently found. In both cases the canine evidence was corroborated by other evidence and the convictions were upheld¹.

Tracking canines

For tracking purposes, scent detection canines are trained to differentiate and discriminate the body odor trail of identical twins on the same path. To collecting human scent evidence for target odors, there are currently four methods: canine smelling article directly, direct wiping with sterile gauze, headspace absorption (non-contact method using sorbent material directly on object and both wrapped in aluminum foil for scent enhancement) and Scent Transfer Unit (STU-100) (a portable vacuum through sterile gauze pads). Caution must be taken in collection procedures to avoid contamination of source scent in direct approaches². Research in human scent shows that personal odor originates from bacterial flora, unique biological processes, and a variation of lifestyle factors. Further questions arise regarding the effect of body odor has on the decaying VOC profile³ and the length of time odors remain at the source. In *California v Gutierrez, 2007*⁴, the scent detection canine evidence was deemed inadmissible because the canine was deployed after 6 days of the crime, which was deemed less reliable than more immediate searches and the canine certification procedures were deemed inadequate to show reliability⁵.

Currency forfeitures

The foundation of forfeitures of illicit currency requires probable cause demonstrated by the relationship of the currency to drug trafficking, based on *US v Dickerson, 1988*,⁶ and an aggregate of facts linking the currency to drug trafficking, based on *US v \$215,300 in 1989*⁷. The court in the 1988 case *US v \$83,310.78*⁸ found an aggregate of facts to support the detection dog by the suspect's two prior convictions and drug possession charges⁹. The standards are a considerable challenge when currency and drugs are not found together. Scent detection dogs were employed to find the association, but challenges to the reliability of their alert emerged with findings that most circulating banknotes contain traces of cocaine.

In *US v \$30,060, 1994*¹⁰, a narcotics detection canine alerted to the suspect's money, but a follow up search did not find drugs. The court ruled the canine provided strong evidence but insufficient to establish probable cause after the forensic toxicologist testified that 75% currency in LA contained minute traces of cocaine. Similarly, the court in the 2003 case *US v \$62,552*¹¹ found that a substantial connection was not established by a preponderance of evidence. Recent research has focused on finding the mathematical likelihood that circulating currency is more highly contaminated with cocaine than the general minute level.

¹ Tadeusz Jezierski, John Ensminger, LE Papet (Eds.), *Canine Olfaction Science and Law* (1st ed.), CRC Press, 2016, pp. 215-222

² Paola A. Prada, Allison M. Curran, Kenneth G. Furton, *Human Scent Evidence* (1st ed.), CRC Press, 2014, p. 98, <https://doi.org/10.1201/b17469> (13.04.2024)

³ Lauryn E. DeGreeff, Craig A. Schultz (Eds.), *Canines: The Original Biosensors* (1st ed.). Jenny Stanford Publishing, 2022, p. 255, <https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003261131>, (13.04.2024)

⁴ California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division, *People v. Gutierrez*, No. B195786 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2007), <https://casetext.com/case/people-v-gutierrez-566> (13.04.2024)

⁵ Tadeusz Jezierski, John Ensminger, LE Papet (Eds.), *Canine Olfaction Science and Law* (1st ed.), CRC Press, 2016, pp. 215-222

⁶ Eschbach, Senior Circuit Judge, *United States v. Dickerson*, 857 F.2d 414 (1988), No. 87-3138, <https://www.anylaw.com/case/united-states-v-dickerson/seventh-circuit/09-14-1988/4IZiP2YBTITomsSBZXII> (13.04.2024)

⁷ United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, *U.S. v. \$215,300 U.S. Currency*, 882 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1989), No. 87-5826, <https://casetext.com/case/us-v-215300-us-currency> (13.04.2024)

⁸ United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, *U.S. v. U.S. Currency \$83,310.78*, 851 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1988), No. 87-1853, <https://casetext.com/case/us-v-us-currency-8331078> (13.04.2024)

⁹ Tadeusz Jezierski, John Ensminger, LE Papet (Eds.), *Canine Olfaction Science and Law* (1st ed.), CRC Press, 2016, pp. 215-222

¹⁰ United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, *U.S. v. U.S. Currency*, 39 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1994), No. 92-55919, <https://casetext.com/case/us-v-us-currency-3006000>, (13.04.2024)

¹¹ United States District Court, D. Kansas, *U.S. v. Culpepper*, No. 03-40086-01-SAC (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2003), <https://casetext.com/case/us-v-culpepper-4> (13.04.2024)

Evaluating the level of cocaine contamination on the currency may satisfy the evidence requirement in future cases¹. In *US v \$100,120*², the threshold of methyl benzoate, the active odor of cocaine, was questioned. Considering earlier studies, was deemed that enough cocaine residue would last longer than 48 hours. Unfortunately, the amount of cocaine on the currency could not be established because the money was deposited into a bank³.

Reliability challenges

In *Florida v Jardines*⁴, an amici curiae brief called into question the selectivity and reliability of canines. They highlighted the fact that canines alert to methyl benzoate, the active odor of cocaine, not the contraband itself. Methyl benzoate is also found in common items such as snapdragon flowers, so it was proposed that canine cannot distinguish the cocaine reliably⁵. Studies by Fulon in 1997, 2002 and Cerreta and Fulton in 2014 assessed the canine's ability to distinguish between the odor of cocaine and snapdragon flowers and discovered that canines were able to discriminate between the two. Fulton also stated that most canines were even able to discriminate against pharmaceutical grade cocaine. In the 2014 study, 21 scent detection canine teams were presented with potted and cut snapdragon flowers and none of the canines alerted to the flowers. Cocaine was used as the control, to which all the canines alerted, proving that trained canines can distinguish cocaine's odor profile. Component analysis of the snapdragon flower at various stages of life, showed that other compounds contribute significantly more than methyl benzoate to the flower's odor profile⁶.

In *Florida v Harris*, 2013⁷, the Supreme Court examined how courts should determine a canine's reliability to establish probable cause. The court considers the dog's certification, training records and field performance records if available to establish reliability. The court established that challenges may be raised based on the adequacy of the training and certification, the canine and handler's performance in assessments. The court does not require field records but allows the defense to question handler about the canine's field accuracy. It was established that during probable cause hearings, the government would introduce evidence of canine's certification and training, which the defense may challenge, and the judge would weigh the competing evidence and the totality of circumstances through common sense. Standardization guidelines and scientific research for canine programs are more imperative than ever before if canine scent detection reliability is to stand up to Frye and Daubert challenges. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) initiated through the Scientific Working Group on Dog and Orthogonal Detector Guidelines (SWGDOG) the creation of nationwide practical guidelines. Aside from standard training guidelines, recent research into the Universal Detector Calibrant (UDC) proposes the new training aid for early olfactory enrichment to stimulate positive behaviors. It is also useful for nonspecific detection training before the canine is assigned a scent disciple and requires no extinction training. The UDC can be controlled for various sensitivity and thresholds and can assist handlers in canine selection⁸.

Marijuana legalization and decriminalization

¹ Tadeusz Jezierski, John Ensminger, LE Papet (Eds.), *Canine Olfaction Science and Law* (1st ed.), CRC Press, 2016, pp. 215-222

² Federal Courts District Courts, Northern District of Illinois, *USA v. \$100120 US Currency, No. 1:2003cv03644 - Document 219 (N.D. Ill. 2011)*, <https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2003cv03644/135030/219/> (15.04.2024)

³ Tadeusz Jezierski, John Ensminger, LE Papet (Eds.), *Canine Olfaction Science and Law* (1st ed.), CRC Press, 2016, pp. 215-222

⁴ U.S. Supreme Court, *Florida v. Jardines*, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), No. 11-564, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/569/1/> (15.04.2024)

⁵ Michelle M Cerreta, Kenneth G Furton, *An Assessment of Detection Canine Alerts Using Flowers That Release Methyl Benzoate, the Cocaine Odorant, and an Evaluation of Their Behavior in Terms of the VOC's Produced*, Forensic Science International, Elsevier, 2015, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2015.03.021>. (15.04.2024)

⁶ *Idem*

⁷ U.S. Supreme Court, *Florida v. Harris*, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), No. 11-817, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/568/237/> (15.04.2024)

⁸ Michele N. Maughan, Jenna D. Gadberry, Caitlin E. Sharpes, Patricia E. Buckley, Aleksandr E. Miklos, Kenneth G. Furton, Lauryn E. DeGreeff, Nathaniel J. Hall, Robin R Greubel, Katylynn B. Sloan, *Calibrating Canines - A Universal Detector Calibrant for Detection Dogs*, "Front. Allergy, 12 March 2024, Sec. Rhinology", Vol. 5, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.3389/falgy.2024.1366596> (15.04.2024)

States have begun to legalize marijuana in small quantities for medical use and for recreational use, while some states have only decriminalized marijuana, but currently the federal government still considers it a crime. Considering these changes, the continued use of detection canines trained to target marijuana, may open the government for challenges based on the premise was that detection dogs could only detect illegal contraband. It may become easier to associate marijuana detection canine to the thermal imaging in *Kyllo*, since in states where the law has changed the canines will no longer be able to discriminate legal from illegal substances¹. In the Colorado case, *People v McKnight*, 2019², the substance involved was not marijuana, but the canine involved was trained to detect several substances including marijuana, which became legal. The challenge was since a minute amount of marijuana would have caused the canine to alert in the same way as if the scent was meth. The court recognized that although guns and alcohol can be unlawful in some instances, people expect privacy in lawful possession of those items, and it should be the same for marijuana³.

Decriminalization of marijuana also poses a problem such as in *Pacheco v Maryland*, 2019⁴, where possession of less than 10 once became a civil offense instead of a criminal offense. The question was whether possession of less than 10 once was probable cause that the person possessed more than 10 once. The court answered in a negative. In Texas, one of the stricter marijuana states, legalized hemp, which is 3% THC and inadvertently changed the way canine investigations would be conducted. Neither crime labs nor canines can differentiate between hemp and marijuana in higher concentrations, so Texas may be headed in the same direction as *McKnight*⁵.

Currently, HR 3617, the Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act (MORE) has passed in the House⁶. The bill would remove marijuana from the list of schedule substances and eliminate criminal penalty for manufacturing, distributing, and possessing marijuana, which would change the entire way the nations conduct scent detection with canines trained in marijuana detection.

Conclusions

Canine odor detection in public spaces plays a significant role in crime prevention and resolution, contributing to human security. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution safeguards citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, necessitating a delicate balance between effective law enforcement and individual privacy rights. Supreme Court rulings have generally deemed canine sniffs in public areas as non-intrusive under the Fourth Amendment, allowing them to be conducted without a warrant. However, real-world applications reveal complexities that challenge this straightforward interpretation.

Several landmark cases highlight the nuances in canine odor detection jurisprudence. In *U.S. v. Place*, 1983 and *Rodriguez v. U.S.*, 2015, the courts emphasized that extended delays in canine sniffs could constitute unreasonable seizures, violating the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, cases like *Illinois v. Caballes*, 2005 upheld that canine sniffs during lawful traffic stops do not infringe on privacy rights, as individuals do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in illegal contraband.

The concept of *personal curtilage* further complicates the legality of canine sniffs in public spaces. Traditionally applied to home environments, this concept can extend to areas in public where individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For instance, *Florida v. Jardines*, 2013, recognized the area immediately surrounding a home as protected curtilage, thus requiring a warrant for a canine sniff. This protection,

¹ Eric Connon, *Growing Jardines: Expanding Protections against Warrantless Dog Sniffs to Multiunit Dwellings*, Case Western Reserve Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2016, pp.309-315 <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol67/iss1/13> (20.04.2024)

² Supreme Court of Colorado, *The People of the State of Colorado v. Kevin Keith McKnight*, No. 17SC584, <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/co-supreme-court/1999220.html> (20.04.2024)

³ Morgan Smith, *Lingsbeware of the Drug Detection Dog: The Fourth Amendment, Drug Detection Dogs, and State Legalization of Marijuana*, "SMU Law Review", Vol. 73, No. 3, 2020, pp. 611-636, <https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol73/iss3/11/> (20.04.2024)

⁴ Maryland Supreme Court Decisions, *Michael Pacheco v. State of Maryland*, No. 17, 2019, <https://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2019/17-18.html> (20.04.2024)

⁵ Morgan Smith, *Abeware of the Drug Detection Dog: The Fourth Amendment, Drug Detection Dogs, and State Legalization of Marijuana*, "SMU Law Review", Vol. 73, No. 3, 2020, pp. 611-636, <https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol73/iss3/11/> (20.04.2024)

⁶ *Idem*

however, does not uniformly apply to all residential settings, as seen in *North Dakota v. Nguyen*, 2013, and *U.S. v. Bain*, 2015, where common areas in apartment buildings were not afforded the same privacy expectations.

The reliability and scientific credibility of canine detections are crucial, especially in sensitive applications like Human Remains Detection (HRD) and currency forfeitures. While HRD canines have shown remarkable abilities to detect traces of human remains, their alerts must be corroborated by additional evidence due to challenges in scientific validation and potential for false positives. In currency forfeitures, the presence of drug residues on commonly circulated currency complicates the establishment of probable cause, as demonstrated in *U.S. v. \$30,060*, 1994.

The evolving legal landscape regarding marijuana legalization poses additional challenges for canine odor detection. As seen in *People v. McKnight*, 2019 and *Pacheco v. Maryland*, 2019, changes in marijuana laws necessitate reevaluation of canine alerts as potential probable cause, given that canines cannot distinguish between legal and illegal substances.

To ensure the effectiveness and legality of canine odor detection in public, it is imperative to adopt standardized training and certification protocols, supported by robust scientific research. This approach would address concerns regarding the reliability and specificity of canine alerts, reinforcing their role in safeguarding human security while respecting constitutional rights. The development and implementation of guidelines by bodies like the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Scientific Working Group on Dog and Orthogonal Detector Guidelines (SWGDOG) are steps in the right direction.

In conclusion, while canine odor detection remains a valuable tool in crime prevention and resolution, it must be carefully regulated to align with constitutional protections and evolving societal norms. Balancing the need for security with the preservation of individual rights will ensure the continued legitimacy and effectiveness of this practice.

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THE EUROPEAN DISCOURSE ON MIGRATION: BETWEEN SECURITIZATION AND DESECURITIZATION (2019-2021)

Abstract:	<i>Migration and security are two complex and interconnected concepts, which have become increasingly relevant and discussed in the context of the continuous development of the globalization phenomenon and at the same time, in the current geopolitical context on the international stage, in which the political situation in certain states becomes critical and conflictual. The phenomenon of international migration from the non-EU area has materialized more and more frequently in recent years, in terms of waves of refugees and illegal migrants arriving in the European Union, reaching the highest figures recorded in 2015. In this respect, the issue of migration, refugees and asylum seekers has become in the last decade a topic included on the European security agenda of the European Union and at the same time a main topic of discourses by European leaders and research dealing with the issue of "securitization of migration". Starting from the hypothesis according to which the migration phenomenon known as the "refugee crisis of 2015", by the way it unfolded and by the management proposed by the institutions of the European Union, produced a division at discursive level among European leaders, the purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that migration from the European Union has been catalogued and perceived at a discursive level, in 2019-2021 a threat to European security.</i>
Keywords:	Securitization; desecuritization, discourse analysis; refugee crisis, ideological discourses, migration
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Introduction

In the context of the emergence of the globalization phenomenon and the implications it created by the abolition of space barriers, in a pejorative sense, but also by the abolition of the borders existing during the Cold War, migration has become an increasingly common mobility process that has undergone a series of transformations and forms, and which, if uncontrolled or unregulated depending on its magnitude, It comes to be considered at the community leadership level or at the national level as a security issue and a primary source of insecurity.

The migration from the European Union started in 2015, labelled by the European political class and mass media as the refugee crisis of 2015, has brought back to the European security agenda, issues such as refugees, illegal migration, and their integration in the Member States. The migration phenomenon triggered in previous years, but which has materialized in a broader form since 2015, has brought back in discourses of European political leaders and on the security agendas of the Member States the relationship between migration and security, seen through the prism of identity. The refugee crisis of 2015, a phenomenon that combined both forced migration from conflict areas and political instability, as well as illegal migration from states in the Middle East and North Africa, was perceived due to its scale as a threat to the security of the European Union (in the form of an uncontrolled phenomenon affecting border security) and an insecurity to societal security, in the Member States (in the form of a threat to European identity). This phenomenon was presented at EU level in the form of massive flows of refugees and (illegal) immigrants, who were trying to

enter the territory of the Member States and cross the internal borders to reach the Western states. Images of refugees and illegal migrants embarked off the Mediterranean Sea or at the borders of Schengen states soon became central themes in the discourses of European leaders, who began to use migration, refugees, and migrants in power relations as a security issue or humanitarian crisis.

In this respect, we notice in the specialized literature of the field of security studies that research issues on migration, refugees and legal or undocumented immigrants have become one of the most important topics approached in relation to European security and security policies¹. Referring to the current period and to the events that include migration in the European Union, we will notice that for both the political class and researchers this is a topic of interest, as it represents one of the main points on the European security agenda. Moreover, in the last 8 years the European Union has faced three major events framed at the level of refugee crisis and identified as existential problems for the European Union (Syrian and African refugee crisis in 2015, Afghan refugee crisis in 2021 and Ukrainian refugee crisis in 2022).

Referring to the situation created in the European Union by this migration crisis, official political discourses have been highlighted from the very beginning of this phenomenon, using narratives and interpretative statements, different labels of migration, refugees, and immigrants as the main sources of problems in the European Union. One of the main reasons for choosing this research topic was the novelty of this topic that gained momentum in 2015 and have been conducted until now, but at a decreasing level. A crucial factor in choosing to study migration from a threat perspective has been the recurrence of the use of the subject over several years. The refugee crisis was a main topic approached both in the media and in the political environment, but presented more from a negative perspective, labelled as a problem, both for destination societies and for the security of the European Union.

Another key factor motivating the choice of this research topic was the identification of gaps in existing research on migration securitization of the refugee crisis, most of the research being based only on assumptions and presenting only certain passages removed from certain press statements, which methodologically disqualified the research. Moreover, consulting research in the field of migration and security studies on migration securitization, we identified that most of the papers relate to the period 2015-2018 and do not capture an overall picture analysing a broader body of discourses.

The title of the paper "The European discourse on migration: between securitization and desecuritization, 2019-2021" delimits the subject and the temporal period, clearly framing the research in the topic of the study of migration by using the theoretical basis on security. The focus of the paper is on the discursive practices used by the European leaders of the institutions and Member States in the discourses on migration, refugees, and illegal immigrants and, implicitly, on the way they position themselves on the main topic, migration in the European Union. The present research aims to present both from a theoretical perspective and in a practical and applied way how international migration is considered as a threat to European security, together with the implications it generates at discursive level. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that migration started in 2015 through the event of the refugee crisis in the Middle East and North Africa and which continued until the current period (in a continuous decrease) was catalogued and perceived during 2019-2021 as a threat to European security and societal security, by European leaders.

Starting from the current European context and wishing to achieve our goal presented above, we will use the applied discourse analysis on a corpus of nineteen official discourses delivered during 2019-2021 by the official leaders of the European Union institutions and five leaders of Member States (Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Germany), through which we tracked how they relate to migration, immigrants, and refugees. Reporting through discourses allows us at the end of the paper to see if European leaders support the initiatives

¹ Didier Bigo, *Migration and Security*, in Viginie Guiraudon, Christian Joppke, (Eds.), *Controlling a New Migration World*, Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 121-122; Jef Huysmans, *The European union and the Securitization of Migration*, "Journal of Common Market Studies", Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 751-777; Rens van Munster, *Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management, and the War on Terror*, "Political Science Publications", No. 10, 2005, pp. 1-18; Thierry Balzacq, *A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions and Variants*, Thierry Balzacq (Ed.), *Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve*, Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 1-30; Claudia Anamaria Iov, *Security as a Speech Act – From Theory to Practice. Discourse Construction on Migration in the European Union*, Claudia Anamaria Iov (Ed.), *The European Union in the Age of (In)Security*, Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2020, pp. 15-38

made by the European Union on migration management through a process of desecuritization or if they carry out a securitization process through their discourses.

The methodology used to answer in an objective way to the research question "How do European leaders position themselves at a discursive level regarding migration in the period 2019-2021?", is a qualitative one, focused on discourse analysis. We considered this qualitative method to be relevant because it allows us, through the study of text and the examination of language, to identify how European leaders construct reality with the help of techniques, fragments, and the structure of interaction, but also how they present their intentions through language and words. By using discourse analysis, focused on the construction of argumentation, we aim to highlight the main themes addressed in the European discursive act by political leaders in the context of migration of the refugee crisis in the European Union, during 2019-2021. This analysis will then allow us to present how the Member States, Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Poland position themselves at a discursive level, in relation to migration, by analysing their official speeches during 2019-2021.

In order to achieve the objectives proposed in this paper we consider that this methodology, which combines critical discourse analysis according to the model proposed by Ruth Wodak² and Norman Fairclough³; together with a socio-communicative analysis (focused on the use of language in relation to the communication situation), allows us to identify from a complex perspective the typologies of discourses and the positioning of leaders through speeches.

The corpus is a homogeneous one, containing only speeches held officially, as leaders of European institutions or states. I consider the choice of the corpus to be analysed in this research to be quite important from a temporal perspective (2019-2021) because analysing these discourses will give us a transparent image of how European leaders perceive and build migration, at a discursive level. Moreover, seen from the perspective of the fact that starting with 2019, the flows of refugees and illegal immigrants are 10 times lower compared to 2015, these speeches will allow us to identify the strategies that European leaders present at discursive level.

As regards the choice of speeches by Member States' leaders, it was done in a logical way, based on the routes used by migrants and refugees in their mobility to destination states. To be able to get a comprehensive look at how European leaders relate to migration, we chose the speeches of the German leader, because he was their main destination country. The other three states whose speeches are part of the corpus were chosen to observe how they deal with migration, starting from the consideration that the leaders of Romania, Hungary and Poland approached in 2015 a critical discourse against the EU's management of the crisis on the one hand, and a discriminatory and rejection of refugees and immigrants (Hungary's leader) on the other.

The originality of the paper consists primarily in the method of analysis approached in studying discourses, which uses a discourse analysis grid, which contains the dominant theme, actors, context, categories that define the theme, items that support the theme and ideology transposed through discourse, made to highlight how leaders position themselves and report through discourse on migration. In addition, another element of originality is represented by the period under analysis, which contains speeches from a period considered by some researchers to be a period of closure of the refugee crisis in the European Union. Through this research, I aim to contribute to increasing the interest given to this method of analysis on the process of securitization of migration, and to offer, through a transparent analysis, how European leaders from several Member States and institutions of the European Union position themselves on migration and the refugee crisis in the period 2019-2021.

Furthermore, we consider that this research meets the need to highlight the importance of studying migration and the discourses associated with it in political debates in the European Union. In this respect, the paper not only documents the evolution of the European discourse on migration in a crucial period, but also highlights the continuous relevance of the topic of migration in the context of European security and the 2024 European Parliament elections when the issue of migration, security and inefficient migration management

² Ruth Wodak, Michel Meyer, *Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology*, in Ruth Wodak, Michael Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, Sage Publication, London, 2009, pp. 1-22

³ Isabela Fairclough, Norman Fairclough, *Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students*, Routledge, London, 2012

have become central themes again in the nationalist and Eurosceptic political discourse, highlighting and confirming at the same time, that this topic remains of urgent topicality.

Literature review: security practices, migration, and discourse analysis

Thus, this article presents a multidisciplinary approach to three main research areas, represented by the theme of security, migration, and discourse analysis. After consulting the literature in the field of international relations and security studies, we notice that the definition process has created among researchers an important debate on extending the field to other threats different from the traditional, military ones, in which the reference object in security analysis is no longer the state. In this sense, Hans Morgenthau defined security from a realistic perspective as the prevention and elimination of threats to the state and political integrity⁴, while Arnold Wolfers, in his work "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol" defines security as the absence of fear about values. In line with the previously stated idea, John Mearsheimer states that the security of states is achieved through "military power and increased armed capabilities"⁵. Following the disappearance of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the transfer of the focus of security analysis from military threats to non-conventional threats. In this regard, the researchers of the Copenhagen School proposed an original approach to security analysis, from a constructivist perspective encompassing the 5 sectors of security⁶, thus becoming, according to researcher Job Claudia Anamaria, an umbrella concept, combining both the traditional perspective of security and the one extended through sectors⁷.

The reconceptualization of security proposed by researchers Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, introduced, besides the diversification of reference objects, a security practice, called securitization, which, as Ole Weaver argues, represents "a social and political construction that involves choosing a threat and presenting it through discourse, as a security issue"¹. From the perspective of theorist Bigo Didier, securitization is a discursive practice that allows "understanding how problems are moved in security and how threats are created",⁹ involving an immediate response. Referring to the works dealing with the practice of securitization, we notice that both in the paper "Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe" and in "Security as a "Speech act" - from Theory to Practice. Discourse Construction on Migration in The European Union" Migration, refugees and immigrants as perceived as insecurity, in the discursive act, to societal security in general, and to identity in particular.

Regarding the topic of migration, in the literature we identify that, viewed from the perspective of researchers Castles Stephen, Alastair Davidson and Mark Miller¹², migration appears increasingly often as a problem caused by the nature of the changes made in relation to globalization. Although, according to them, migration was considered for a long time a social and economic phenomenon, specific to historical and sociological fields, it began to be increasingly present at the centre of researchers in the field of international relations and a topic brought up more and more frequently in political debates. Defined according to researchers in the field of sociology and population studies, migration is considered a "complex phenomenon consisting in the movement of people from one territorial area to another, followed by a change of domicile and/or employment in a form of activity in the area of arrival"¹³. The implications that this phenomenon has

⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1948

⁵ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Norton, New York, 2001, p. 11

⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea: un nou cadru de analiză*, CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p. 14

⁷ Claudia Iov, *Rethinking (In)Security in the European Union the Migration-Identity-Security Nexus*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, UK, 2020, p. 22

¹ Ole Waver, *Securitization and Desecuritization*, Ronnie, Lipschutz, *On security*, Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 46-86

⁹ Didier Bigo, *The (In)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy–Border Guards/Police–Database Analysts*, "Security Dialogue", Vol. 45, No. 3, 2014, pp. 209-225

¹² Stephen Castles, Davidson Alastair, *Citizenship and Migration. Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*, Routledge, New York, 2000; Stephen Castles, *Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration a Social Transformation*, "Sociology", No. 37, 2003, pp. 13-34; Stephen Castles, Miller Mark, *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, MacMillan, London, 1993

¹³ Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Migrație și securitate*, National Defense University "Carol I", București, 2008, p. 8

created at European level through irregular flows of refugees and illegal immigrants have labelled migration in Koser Khalid's sense as a security threat¹⁴.

Starting from the connectivity relationship created between security and migration and aiming to identify at a discursive level how it relates to migration in the European Union, the official leaders in 2019-2022, we aim to conduct a literature review in the field of discourse analysis. According to Mrs. Rosca Luminita, expert in the field of communication, discourses are the main theoretical basis on which the analysis and description of texts is based. Seen from a multidisciplinary perspective, discourse analysis, according to researcher Rosca Luminita, allows a courageous and direct proposal of certain theses¹⁵.

In the constructivist conception, discourse is presented and understood from the perspective of two dimensions, as social practice, and as individual practice. Discourse as a social practice involves the use of language, but also other communicative resources "as elements of social life" through established language practices in institutional spheres, organizations, and the media. Discourse is, at¹⁶ the same time, an individual practice, because it involves the use of verbal and nonverbal language mechanisms, by a social actor in relation to his interlocutors, to present and assign a position. This type of discourse, through both dimensions, depending on how it is perceived, can generate new social practices.

The discourse from a conceptual point of view highlights how the social actor uses language, regardless of its form, together with other communication resources, to build an attitude/process regarding what he communicates, relating to his interlocutors. It is also important that the speech is not confused with the text because, through speech, the communication process is conducted and goes beyond the text. Moreover, speech can be perceived as a grid for interpreting a situation or action, when an actor or an institution uses a specific language in a social situation that is characterized by norms and values.

Michel Foucault, one of the most relevant theorists in the field of discourse analysis defined discourse as the result of the existence of a social structure, and discursive practice in the form of a social practice. Considering this approach, theories of discourse are also part of the social sciences and are not limited to linguistics and the sciences of language use. The notion of discourse, according to the theorist, is conceived as a supra-individual reality, in the form of a practice belonging to collectives/groups and less to individuals¹⁷. According to Foucault's social theory, which contributed to the development of discourse analysis, the production of a speech is conditioned by the formation of a relationship between the transmitter and the content of speech, and the formation, circulation, and reproduction of speech within the framework of power relations. In Foucault's view, the social actor communicates within a framework imposed by the limits of a discursive regime, which implicitly shapes the content of a discourse. First, according to him, the discourse of a social actor is not entirely its product, but rather that of the discursive regime, made up of the totality of social rules and practices¹⁸. Secondly, the speech must include a group of material elements such as institutions, practices of exposure and justification in the public space and contain or present truthful evidence, because it represents more than a linguistic order¹⁹. Moreover, a discourse must use rules and practices for producing basic statements, based on a set of rules specific to a certain discursive regime, even discursive norms belonging to another discursive regime, different from the one used in the initial speech. A relevant example is political discourse, which is based on specific rules, but also uses discursive practices belonging to the advertising field.

Discourse, according to the theory developed by Foucault, also creates power relations between actors, who delivers the speech and to whom the speech is addressed. The power relations created are defined by Michel Foucault as "unequal and mobile" and represent "the operation of political technologies" in an entire

¹⁴ Khalid Koser, *When is Migration a Security Issue?*, "Brookings", 2011, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/when-is-migration-a-security-issue/> (11. 06. 2023)

¹⁵ Luminița Roșca, *Mecanismele ale propagandei în discursul de informare: presa românească în perioada 1985-1995*, Polirom, București, 2006, pp 13-14

¹⁶ Norman Fairclough, *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, Routledge, London, 2003, p. 26

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, Pantheon, New York, 1972, p. 225

¹⁸ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Pantheon, New York, 1977, p. 50

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 51

social field. Power means the exercise of a relationship of force, not necessarily violent, but sufficient to coerce, influence or intended to act on an actor, at a given moment, in each society²⁰.

The major interest in studying and analysing discourses was constituted by the appearance of ideologies in the public space, through discourses. In this sense, speeches are a tool for large-scale transposition of ideologies and ideas²¹. Discourse analysis in the field of international relations also demonstrates that the power of words and discourses creates ideological effects on the international stage using discursive practices. The critical approach to discourse analysis, according to researchers Fairclough Norman and Fairclough Isabela, demonstrates how the language used in discourse creates power relations or ideological effects.²² The assumptions from which critical discourse analysis starts are about social reality, which is built through discourse, and the main goals are to expose the ideology of discourse and identify the power relations underlying the construction of discourse²³. According to theorists of the field of critical discourse analysis, any discourse also refers to power relations and when we refer to this concept, we aim to favour certain dominant social categories; Just as no other speech can be considered neutral in a total sense. Discursive neutrality, as well as objectivity are myths belonging to mass media communication, justifying that journalists (not just journalists) cannot be objective and neutral in the process of reporting a given situation.

Ruth Wodak believes that the analysis of discourse that is carried out to observe what is pursued through linguistic constructions, sometimes considered according to the concepts used the construction of social practices, could be extended to the level of all discursive acts. Moreover, Ruth Wodak believes that critical discourse analysis can transmit critical knowledge, allowing individuals to detach themselves from the forms of domination exercised by certain ideologies, through a process of self-reflection. The role of critical discourse analysis is not only to describe and explain certain phenomena or ideologies, but even more so through analysis is intended to highlight the existence of certain types of "illusions"²⁴. CDA can help raise awareness among the public about its needs and interests.

Analysis of the official European discourse delivered by leaders in the context of migration in the European Union

The concept of discourse is an important notion in creating the theoretical basis on the description and analysis of texts in relation to specific communication situations²⁵. Discourse analysis focuses on speech and texts as social practices, but also on the resources that are used to enable these practices. An example is given by discursive analytical studies of racism that have been concerned with how texts in the media, for example, or public discourses are constructed to legitimize blaming a group that is part of a minority²⁶, and the resources that are available in a special cultural framework for legitimizing racist practices²⁷.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) highlights how the language used creates ideological effects, sometimes unequal power relations between interlocutors, through discursive practices. The purpose of the analysis is to understand the relationships that are created between discourse and elements of social life, social relations, ideologies, institutions, and social organizations, but also to create new ways of analysing and researching social relations. As a research model, it includes conceptual-methodological approaches, which aim to identify discourse strategies²⁸.

The socio-communicative analysis of the discourse analyses the way in which a social actor uses language, in accordance with the communication situation, more specifically analyses the relationship

²⁰ Hubert Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, The University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 185

²¹ Luminița Roșca, *La sphère publique, la démocratisation de la vie sociale et politique et les médias en Roumanie*, Tritonic Publishing House, București, 2012; Luminița Roșca, *Mechanisms of Propaganda in Information Discourse. Press of the Years 1985-1995*, Polirom, Iasi, 2006

²² Isabela Fairclough, Norman Fairclough, *Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students*, Routledge, London, 2012

²³ Ruth Wodak, Michel Meyer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-6

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 7

²⁵ Luminița Roșca, *Op.cit.*, pp. 13-15

²⁶ Jonathan Potter, Margaret Wetherell, *Discourse and Social Psychology*, Sage, London 2020

²⁷ *Idem*

²⁸ Isabela Fairclough, Norman Fairclough, *Op. cit.*, p. 78

practices, among which there are themes and arguments, framed in a specific purpose of the situation. The communication situation in this case signifies the instructions for producing and interpreting what is offered through the speech. Through this type of analysis, we follow how social actors position themselves towards the content of communication and how they relate to its topic by assuming their point of view. The socio-communicative perspective highlights the discursive choices in relation to the specifics of the communication situation and implicitly its positioning within the given situation.

The official speeches of the leaders of the European institutions, together with those of the leaders of states, are held during 2019-2021 and present as a main communication situation the phenomenon of migration on the territory of the European Union, which began with the refugee crisis of 2015 and which was ongoing, indeed in a smaller form, also during the period included in our discursive selection. The refugee crisis of 2015, in the form of a migration phenomenon, continues to pose a threat to European security, especially to societal security. Moreover, we can say that these speeches deal with how to address migration, through policies and actions, from the perspective of both the leaders of the European institutions and national leaders. In this respect, the perspective on migration, in this analysis we will consider both the institutional approach and the approach from the perspective of a state actor.

By analysing the speeches made by European Commission President von der Leyen, High Representative of the Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Joseph Borell, European Commission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas, former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, European Council Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatovic and European Commission Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, we aim to identify the perspective approached by the European institutions on migration, which are the main discursive themes used, but also what are their recommendations to Member States regarding migrant management policies. As regards the analysis of the speeches of the leaders of the European states, I would like to identify how Member States position themselves at a discursive level, in relation to waves of immigrants or in relation to migration. In this regard, I decided to analyse the official speeches of the leaders of Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Poland in 2019-2021.

In the analysis of the European discourse, we use an analysis grid (Table 1) that will allow us to identify the main themes used by leaders through discourse and the ideologies transposed by them. To be easier to follow in interpreting the data, the nineteen speeches were encoded with the letter "D" in the analysis grid. It is scientifically essential to mention that quotations taken from speeches and used in the text and Table 1 have been personally translated²⁹. Applying the analysis grid proposed in the previous subchapter on the official speeches of the leaders of the European Union and the European institutions, we identified a set of themes that support and promote, as such, the policies pursued by the European Union for an efficient management of migration flows (Table 1). The main themes identified in the speeches of the official actors of the European Union were cooperation (D1, D2, D7, D8), solidarity (D3, D5), provision of humanitarian protection (D4) and respect for human rights (D6).

The predominant theme in their speech was Member States' cooperation in managing migration, being used to strengthen migration policies, manage, and protect the external borders of the European Union, engage internationally with strategically positioned states, step up efforts by certain states and provide humanitarian aid to migrants at risk.

Solidarity as a dominant theme is used in two speeches in a context where some Member States, also called frontline states, in relation to migration to Europe, need the solidarity of other Member States to manage this situation. By solidarity, European leaders mean providing financial support, relocating migrants to other member states, and sharing responsibilities fairly. Another theme encountered in the official speech of the leaders of the European institutions is represented by providing humanitarian protection to migrants and is used to empower Member States and convince them to get involved in managing this phenomenon. The last theme promoted in speeches by representatives of the EU institutions is respect for human rights, by offering international protection to migrants in difficult situations, and international cooperation to promote migrants' rights.

Compared to the speeches of official EU leaders who promote the policies, directives and actions carried out by the European Union and adopt a common position stating topics aimed at managing migration in Europe as efficiently as possible, we notice that national leaders, officials of the Member States approach

²⁹ The table of coded discourses is attached to the article.

discursive themes that support EU policies, but also different themes, some of which are contrary to the lines proposed by the institutions of the European Union. For example, Romania's leaders present through their official speeches the need to strengthen and support European policies (D9), but also the need for cooperation to ensure the security of external borders and coherent management of migrant flows (D10). The speeches of the German leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel, present cooperation as the main theme, being clearly stated and found in all three speeches under our analysis (D14, D15, D19). The theme of cooperation is found in the speeches in the form of cooperation in the implementation and implementation of EU policies.

The speech promoted by the national leader, Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary is positioned differently and in total contradiction to the speeches promoted by the official leaders of the institutions of the European Union and those of the leaders of the member states, Germany, and Romania. The speeches of Hungary's national leader (D11, D12, D13, D16, D17) present themes such as: rejecting cooperation on migration policies and rejecting solidarity towards immigrants, introducing populist nationalist elements against immigrants, by addressing subthemes and discursive narratives highlighting the rejection of multiculturalism, to protect national identity.

On a similar note, Polish President Andrzej Duda's speech (D18) presents a theme of rejecting solidarity towards migrants and actions carried out by the European Union, opposing participation in the implementation of actions proposed by EU leaders, and carried out by them.

Another observation we expose is related to the way in which both the official leaders of the European Union and the leaders of the Member States position themselves at a discursive level in relation to migration, immigrants, and refugees. Following the analysis of the speeches, we identified that the official leaders of the European Union, together with the leaders of Romania and Germany, adopt a positive position on migration, and when I refer to the positive term, we aim to highlight how they relate to migration legislation and policies carried out by the EU.

Instead, the speeches of the Hungarian leader and the speech of the Polish leader promote and present an illiberal position on migration and on immigrants and refugees, by rejecting multiculturalism, a principle promoted by the European Union, adopting a critical position even towards the European institutions, which support migration and refugees.

European leaders' discourse: between securitisation and desecuritisation

Starting from the research hypothesis that constituted the realization of this article: dividing the perceptions of European leaders regarding the common and external security policies of the European Union and using the results obtained from the discourse analysis on the corpus consisting of the nineteen official speeches of the leaders of European institutions and Member States, we notice that the group of leaders positions itself differently from the point of view discursive in relation to migration policies and implicitly to migrants, both refugees and immigrants.

Following the analysis of the speech carried out, we find that the positioning of European leaders through the speeches of 2019-2021 is different both from the perspective of the themes they use regarding migration caused by the refugee crisis, and from the ideological perspective they translate into the discourse. In this regard, we notice in the analysed corpus of speeches a division of state leaders regarding the themes they present and the arguments they use in the speech.

The first group of leaders, identified as pro-European and who support the project of the European Union and implicitly its policies in the field of migration and asylum, including the adopted legislation, consists of leaders of the European institutions – Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borell, Jean Claude Juncker, Margaritis Schinas, Dunja Mijatovic and Ylva Johansson; and the leaders of the member states Germany, Romania – Angela Merkel, Viorica Dăncila and Klaus Iohannis.

The above leaders recur their official speeches use themes such as solidarity with member states facing large numbers of refugees, member states' cooperation in managing migration flows, promoting EU directives, and providing humanitarian aid to migrants.

Discourse coding	European leader	Dominant theme
D1	Jean Claude Juncker	Cooperation of Member States
D2	Ursula von der Leyen (September 2020)	Cooperation of Member States in support of refugee crisis management policies

D3	Margaritis Schinas	Solidarity with migrants and Member States in crisis
D4	Dunja Mijatovic	Solidarity/ Providing humanitarian protection
D5	Ursula von der Leyen (November 2020)	Solidarity/Responsibility/ Supporting Member States
D6	Josep Borell (May 2021)	Respect for human rights and migrants/refugees
D7	Ylva Johansson	Cooperation of Member States
D8	Josep Borell (November 2021)	Cooperation to manage the crisis
D9	Klaus Iohannis	Strengthening and supporting migration policies
D10	Viorica Dăncilă	Cooperation of states to manage migration efficiently
D11	Viktor Orban (September 2019)	Rejecting cooperation on migration management policies
D12	Viktor Orban (April 2019)	Rejecting European/supranational policies on migration and integration of migrants
D13	Viktor Orban (July 2019)	Rejecting the European Commission's migration and asylum policies / Promoting Euroscepticism
D14	Angela Merkel (December 2019)	Cooperation of Member States
D15	Angela Merkel (July 2020)	Cooperation to manage migration from the EU
D16	Viktor Orban (September 2020)	Rejecting political cooperation on migration / Introducing a false perception of immigrants
D17	Viktor Orban (June 2021)	Protecting national, European identity / Critique of European elites
D18	Andrzej Duda (September 2021)	Rejecting solidarity with migrants
D19	Angela Merkel (December 2021)	The need for Member States' cooperation in migration management

Table of coded discourses

All these themes, together with the arguments presented in Table no. 1, reinforce the idea that their discourse is a European one, democratically supported in order to make the entire European community responsible and to convince Member States to cooperate in the process of efficient and fair management of migration, which is an issue on the security agenda of the European Union and not only for the Member States at the external borders.

In relation to the political ideology found in the speeches of the above leaders, we notice that they position themselves in the two pro-European ideologies of center-right and center-left. To achieve this ideological classification of their speeches, we have related to the themes they mainly use and to the policies they mainly support/promote. Although within the discourses of our corpus there are no textual elements specific to an ideology, which would allow us to identify a particular ideology by the way it relates to migration, we have managed to identify with the help of secondary sources how center-right and center-left ideologies treat migration and asylum policies.

For example, the center-right ideology emphasizes the cooperation of member states in managing migration flows and the security of the external borders of the European Union, compared to the center-left ideology that emphasizes granting and respecting the rights of immigrants while promoting an effective border management policy. Consequently, we argue that these two ideologies present in the speeches of European leaders are mostly intertwined and support especially the policies that the European Union carries out regarding security and migration. More precisely, discourse analysis does not identify arguments specific to one ideology or another.

In a totally different way from the leaders of the European institutions and the leaders of the Member States Germany and Romania are the official speeches delivered by the leader of Hungary – Viktor Orban; and Poland's leader Andrzej Duda. Although this migration phenomenon represents a security problem for the entire European Union, and its management is necessary to be carried out according to the principle of multilateral collaboration, because the phenomenon is a transnational one, the two leaders adopt a nationalist

position, like the ideology they promote, regarding migration and immigrants and a critical one towards the European Union.

The speeches of the Hungarian and Polish leaders belong ideologically to the nationalist current because the themes they promote at a discursive level are in most cases rejection of the policies and directives of the European Union, criticizing each time the political elites – the leaders of the European institutions. Moreover, the leaders' speeches are nationalist, because besides criticism of the European Union, they contain rhetoric that promotes the idea of respecting sovereignty in decision-making related to migration policies. In addition to his criticism of the European Union, Viktor Orban's speeches aimed at national voters and national elites present immigrants, without distinguishing between immigrants and refugees, as a threat to European Christian identity, while also considering them to be a potential terrorist danger.

Conclusions

Starting from the conceptualization of security made by the theorists of the Copenhagen School in the work *Security*, a new framework for analysis, irregular and illegal migration represents a threat to societal security and, implicitly, to European identity. In this context, the security issue represents a discursive construction, in which it is necessary to convince the audience of the threat that migration poses to the identity and values of European communities.

In this sense, through his speeches, Viktor Orban carries out a process of securitization of migration regarding Christian identity, for which immigrants of Muslim religion pose a threat, which would lead to conflicts in society. The image of the immigrant is built in his speeches according to the model of the theory developed by Carl Schmitt in his work *The Concept of the Political* in which the distinction between friend and foe is distinguished. This distinction can be found in populist discursive practices such as: "We will not give in to the crisis"³⁰ and "through these elections we will decide"³¹ used mainly by leaders Viktor Orban and Andrzej Duda, aimed at attracting the electorate to their side.

Also seen from the perspective of security theories in the form of discursive practice, the speeches of the leaders of the European institutions and those of the leaders of Romania and Germany present and carry out a process of desecuritization, supported by communication and negotiation practices aimed at reducing the degree of migration threat generated by the Syrian refugee crisis, promoting policies based on cooperation and various reconciliations³². In this respect, achieving both at discursive and political level a shift of migration from the sphere of European security issues to the sphere of public policies.

Following all this, the discourse analysis conducted on the nineteen speeches demonstrates that migration generated by the refugee crisis is still perceived at a discursive level, a security problem for the European Union and, at the same time, a threat to national security for the Member States.

Seen from the perspective of European security, the management of this phenomenon requires policies and directives to be conducted by the main decision-making institutions of the European Union, aimed at removing the feeling of insecurity created in the European community. At the level of the European discourse, a debate was created based on pros and cons, through which the leaders of the Member States positioned themselves in two groups: pro-European and nationalist.

In conclusion, we find that through public speeches, the leaders of the Member States look at migration differently during the period under analysis, the debate being theoretically between securitization and desecuritization of migration, and in practice between applying policies and actions in a way that meets the needs and interests of citizens, both at national and Community level.

Another finding that the research of this paper argues, by applying the analysis grid to the discourses, is represented by the identification of the securitization process by European leaders, who hold nationalist speeches. Instead, leaders who share through discourses pro-European ideologies of the center right and center

³⁰ Andrzej Duda, *Address to the UN General Assembly*, New York, 20 September 2021, <https://www.gov.pl/web/un/speech-by-the-president-andrzej-duda-at-the-76th-session-of-the-un-general-assembly> (9.05.2022)

³¹ Viktor Orban, *Speech Delivered during the Electoral Campaign for the European Parliament*, Budapest, 7 April 2019, available online: <https://visegradpost.com/en/2019/04/07/viktor-orban-introduces-his-programme-for-the-eu-elections-full-speech/> (5.05.2022)

³² Thierry Balzacq, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, Routledge, 2011, pp. 116-117

left, conduct a process of desecuritization of migration that is the subject of our research, promoting in a positive way solidarity with immigrants and refugees and encouraging multiculturalism, solidarity, and cooperation in the European Union.

The limits of the research

Considering the complexity of the research topic and the elaboration of a multidisciplinary analysis methodology, it was inevitable to register research limits. Looking from a methodological perspective, the limits captured are related to the use of a single research method, the qualitative one. Another empirical limit recorded could be the limited number of speeches that were subjected to analysis. The choice of nineteen speeches being imposed by the context that intervened during the research, more precisely during the COVID-19 pandemic, in which the issue of migration was no longer a main topic in the leaders' speeches, just as migration was no longer considered the main concern for European leaders and the institutions of the European Union, until 2021, when illegal migration from North Africa began to increase in numbers.

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**ASPECTS FROM COLONIAL HISTORY. A FORMAL RECONCILIATION REGARDING
 THE AUSTRALIAN NATIVE PEOPLE**

Abstract:	<p><i>Genocide can take many forms and be justified in many different ways. The cultural genocide that was intended to annihilate the identity of the Aboriginal people in Australia during the 20th century was based on the assumption that these people were visibly “inferior” to those who colonized Australia and thus, had to be “civilized”. It was a process of internal colonialism present in other parts of the world, too, and its intention was to assimilate the ethnic groups of Aboriginal people and integrate them by educating their children by force, in the schools of the white people.</i></p> <p><i>To admit the wrongs done, and the injustice of governmental programmes was not an easy task but, in Australia, it happened in 2008 when Prime Minister Kevin Rudd delivered a public speech, which took him a lot of courage, saying officially “sorry” for the “stolen generations; that were affected by the forced removal of children on racial grounds” made fully lawful by the authority. In his speech The Prime minister mentioned they could resolve together all the common problems while preserving the dignity of difference and trying to give Australia a new beginning, a new chapter in looking for a new kind of identity which should include “cultures that provide a unique uninterrupted human thread, linking the Australian Continent the one of the most ancient prehistory of our planet!</i></p>
Keywords:	Genocide; internal colonialism; superiority of race; cultural identity; reconciliation; courage
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The West and the Rest

The West has dominated the Rest because of imperialism through different forms of colonization and settlement, even extraction, which had had very different long-term impact.¹ Edward Said cited Thomas Hodgkin who talked about the difference between theories of imperialism that try to “describe it” and theories of imperialism that try to “end it”². “Ethnic cleansing has been used by many countries in the past, including democracies such as Australia, New Zealand,...which saw settlers violently removing or killing off the indigenous populations of the territories in which they settled”³. In order to create a new national identity some states tried “to assimilate minority populations into the culture of an existing ethnic or linguistic group”⁴. These were different ways to reshape national identity to fit the existing characteristics of modern Australia.

¹ Niall Ferguson, *Civilization-The West and the Rest*, Penguin Books, London, 2012

² Edward W. Said, *Power, Politics and Culture*, Bloomsbury, London, 2005, p. 185

³ Francis Fukuyama, *Identity, Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition*, Profile Books, London, 2019, pp.140-141

⁴ Idem

As we know, many victims of colonialism have increasingly put forward their views, demanding redress of grievances, inherited from colonial rule, or symbolic recognitions of wrongs, done to their ancestors¹.

Aboriginals demanded land rights in Australia, “their claims being given a judicial imprimatur with the Mabo decision by the High Court in Canberra in 1992. Groups of African-Americans and other descendants of enslaved Africans claimed reparation for the evils of the slave trade while cultural leaders of many formerly colonized people have asked for the restitution of sacred items (and human remains) enshrined in Western museums.”²

But, the reception of such demands has proved ambivalent and many leaders have been reluctant to say “sorry” for colonial racist policies, offering only symbolic compensations for such injustices³. John Howard, a former Prime Minister of Australia from the Liberal Party, and the predecessor of Kevin Rudd, even had held the widespread view that “an apology would open the floodgates to litigation (and expensive compensation) and that the present generations could not be held to account for past actions of others!”⁴

Today, debates continue to rage on such topics as the extent of systematic torture practised by French troops in colonial Algeria, the level of cruelty of Belgians in the Congo, the “genocide” of the Herero people caused by the Germans in 1904, in Namibia, “and the role of colonialism in creating an inequitable and iniquitous disparity in wealth between the North and the South”⁵. There are many such arguments about the benefits and demerits of contemporary globalization which perpetuate claims of development and underdevelopment in the areas of the ex-colonies⁶. Some commentators have found in colonial conditions the origins of bloody post-colonial conflagrations visible in recent years from Northern Ireland to Palestine, from Rwanda or the Sudan to East Timor⁷. This colonial legacy, the many volatile accusations of “colonialism” and “imperialism”, the public interest in empire and many scholarly debates about overseas expansion are manifestly issues of the present, not just the past⁸.

Such a debate took place at Oxford in 2015 with the topic: “Britain Does Owe Reparations”, a debate started by Dr Shashi Tharoor M.P., who supports the idea that Britain caused India a lot of big problems that are still present in the Indian society. In his speech, Dr Tharoor mentioned that “India was already Britain’s biggest cash cow, the world’s biggest purchaser of British goods and exports and the source for highly paid employment for British civil servants. We literally paid for our own oppression. And as has been pointed out, the worthy British Victorian families that made their money out of the slave economy, one-fifth of the elites of the wealthy class in Britain in 19th century owed their money to transporting 3 million Africans across the waters. And in fact in 1833 when slavery was abolished and what happened was a compensation of 20 million pounds was paid not as reparations to those who had lost their lives or who had suffered or been oppressed by slavery but to those who had lost their property”⁹.

Moments of reconciliation

Kevin Rudd became Australia’s Prime Minister after the 2007 election. A diplomat turned politician, with a strong religious conviction, he headed a government that was broadly to the left of his predecessor John Howard. Among his first priorities, he was gearing up for a landmark speech on the maltreatment of Australia’s Aboriginal people, supported by a series of governmental policies, that made this genocide official and lawful¹⁰. One of the most relevant examples is represented by the 1997 official report, entitled *Bringing Them*

¹ Robert Aldrich (Ed.), *The Age of Empires*, Thames&Hudson, London, 2020, p. 13

² *Ibidem*, pp. 13-14

³ *Ibidem*, p. 14

⁴ Simon Sebag Montefiore (Ed.), *Speeches That Changed the World*, Quercus, London, 2014, p. 226

⁵ Robert Aldrich, *Op. cit.*, p. 14

⁶ *Idem*

⁷ *Idem*

⁸ Robert Aldrich, *Op. cit.*, p.15

⁹ Shashi Tharoor’s Full Speech Asking UK to Pay India for 200 Years of Its Colonial Rule, <https://www.news18.com/news/india/read-shashi-tharoor-s-full-speech-asking-uk-to-pay-india-for-200-years-of-its-colonial-rule-1024821.htm> (2.05.2024)

¹⁰ Simon S. Montefiore, *Op. cit.*, p. 226

Home. This document examined former federal and state policies to remove young Aboriginal children from their families and send them to institutions or white foster homes¹.

This document offers a clear perspective regarding the governmental policies that were followed by massive removal of children from their families. “The questions this history raises for us to contemplate today, at the very least, are what implications it has for relations between Aboriginal and white Australians, and what traces of that systematic attempt at social and biological engineering remain in current child welfare practices and institutions...Indigenous children have been forcibly separated from their families and communities since the very first days of the European occupation of Australia”². “Violent battles over rights to land, food and water sources characterised race relations in the nineteenth century. Throughout this conflict, Indigenous children were kidnapped and exploited for their labour. Indigenous children were still being ‘run down’ by Europeans in the northern areas of Australia in the early twentieth century...Governments and missionaries also targeted Indigenous children for removal from their families. Their motives were to “inculcate European values and work habits in children, who would then be employed in service to the colonial settlers”. In 1814 Governor Macquarie funded the first school for Aboriginal children. Its novelty was an initial attraction for Indigenous families but within a few years it evoked a hostile response when it became apparent that its purpose was to distance the children from their families and communities”³. “Although colonial governments in the nineteenth century professed abhorrence at the brutality of expansionist European settlers, they were unwilling or unable to stop their activities. When news of the massacres and atrocities reached the British Government it appointed a Select Committee to inquire into the condition of Aboriginal people (...). The violence and disease associated with colonisation was characterised, in the language of social Darwinism, as a natural process of ‘survival of the fittest’⁴. “According to this analysis, the future of Aboriginal people was inevitably doomed; what was needed from governments and missionaries was to ‘smooth the dying pillow’. The government response was to reserve land for the exclusive use of Indigenous people and assign responsibility for their welfare to a Chief Protector or Protection Board. By 1911 the Northern Territory and every State except Tasmania had ‘protectionist legislation’ giving the Chief Protector or Protection Board extensive power to control Indigenous people. In some States and in the Northern Territory the Chief Protector was made the legal guardian of all Aboriginal children, displacing the rights of parents. The management of the reserves was delegated to government appointed managers or missionaries in receipt of government subsidies. Enforcement of the protectionist legislation at the local level was the responsibility of ‘protectors’ who were usually police officers”⁵. In the name of protection Indigenous people were subject to near-total control. Their entry to and exit from reserves was regulated as was their everyday life on the reserves, their right to marry and their employment. With a view to encouraging the conversion of the children to Christianity and distancing them from their Indigenous lifestyle, children were housed in dormitories and contact with their families strictly limited⁶.

This Committee Inquiry proposed to establish a protectorate system, because “the education of the young will of course be amongst the foremost of the cares of the missionaries; and the Protectors should render every assistance in their power in advancing this all-important part of any general scheme of improvement. The protectorate system was based on the notion that Indigenous people would willingly establish self-

¹ Idem

² Australian Human Rights Commission, *Bringing them Home Report (1997)*, April 1997, <https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/projects/bringing-them-home-report-1997> (2.05.2024)

³ Idem

⁴ *Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Report Bringing Them Home. Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families April 1997*, <https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/projects/bringing-them-home-report-1997> (2.05.2024)

⁵ Idem

⁶ *Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Report Bringing Them Home Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families April 1997*, <https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/projects/bringing-them-home-report-1997> (2.05.2024)

sufficient agricultural communities on reserved areas modeled on an English village and would not interfere with the land claims of the colonists”¹.

Race ideology and its consequences

As race ideology developed in the 19th century, the American scholar Thomas Metcalve has shown how this ideology in that era defined European civilization as being at the peak human attainment, while the darker-skinned races were portrayed as being primitive, weak and dependent on European Tutelage in order to develop. “This was present in the territories of the white man’s dominance where the cult of British superiority was present”.² James Ramsey, a surgeon and Anglican priest stated that “lighter-skinned people would naturally attach themselves to the white race, as the more honourable relation, and so become a barrier against the designs of the black”³. “White children came into the state’s control, benefitting from greater care. In the case of Aboriginal children, it was taken that they never saw their parents or families again. They were often given new names, and because of distances involved in rural areas, it was easier to prevent parents and children on separate missions from meeting each other.”⁴ Government officials considered, that by forcibly removing Indigenous children from their families and separating them from their communities and work for non-Indigenous people, this mixed descent population would, over time, ‘merge’ with the non-Indigenous population, as shown in Brisbane’s *Telegraph* newspaper reported in May 1937⁵.

The Chief Protector of WA, Mr Neville, considers that “within one hundred years the pure black will be extinct. But the half-caste problem was increasing every year. Therefore, their idea was to keep the pure blacks segregated and absorb the half-castes into the white population.”⁶ He mentioned that, sixty years ago, there were over 60,000 full-blooded natives in Western Australia. Nowadays there are only 20,000. And in the future, there would be assimilated. Perhaps it would take one hundred years, maybe longer, but the race is dying as programmed. As the pure-blooded Aboriginal was not a quick breeder, but the half-caste was. In Western Australia there were half-caste families of twenty and upwards. That showed the magnitude of the problem⁷. In Neville’s view, skin colour was the key to assimilation. He considered that, children with lighter skin colour would automatically be accepted into non-Indigenous society and lose their native identity⁸.

Assuming the fact that, the theory is right, argument in government circles centered around the optimum age for forced removal. Experts at a Royal Commission in South Australia, in 1913 at disagreed whether children should be removed at birth or about at the age of two years old. The ‘protectionist’ legislation was generally used in preference to the general child welfare legislation to remove Indigenous children. In that way government officials under the authority of the Chief Protector or the Board could simply order the removal of an Indigenous child without having to establish to a court’s satisfaction that the child was neglected. In Queensland and Western Australia, the Chief Protector⁹ used his removal and guardianship powers to force all Indigenous people onto large, highly regulated government settlements and missions, to remove children from their mothers at about the age of four years and place them in dormitories away from their families and to send

¹ *Victorian Government Submission in Response to the Australian Universities Accord Discussion Paper, May 2023* <https://www.education.gov.au/system/files/documents/submission-file/2023-05/Victorian%20Government.pdf> (2.05.2024)

² Shashi Tharoor, *Inglorious Empire. What the British Did to India*, Penguin Random House, London, 2017, p. 107

³ Padraic X. Scanlan, *Slave Empire, How Slavery Built Modern Britain*, Robinson, London, 2022, p. 160

⁴ *Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families*, https://bth.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/report/bringing_them_home_report.pdf (2.05.2024)

⁵ *The National Apology to the Stolen Generations*, https://healingfoundation.org.au/app/uploads/2021/02/HF_Apology_Fact_Sheet_Feb2021.pdf (2.05.2024)

⁶ Idem

⁷ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families*, Bringing them Home Report (1997) | Australian Human Rights Commission (29.05.2024)

⁸ Idem

⁹ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families*, Bringing them Home Report (1997) | Australian Human Rights Commission (29.05.2024)

them off the missions and settlements at about 14 to work. Indigenous girls who became pregnant were sent back to the mission or dormitory to have their child. The removal process then repeated itself¹.

Another method used of forcing people of mixed descent away from their native families and communities and into non-Indigenous society was to change the definition of 'Aboriginality' in the protection legislation to fit the government's current policy in relation to Aboriginal affairs. Those with more than a stipulated proportion of European descent were disqualified from living on reserves with their relatives or receiving rations. This tactic of 'dispersing' Aboriginal camps was used in Victoria and New South Wales².

According to an analysis of the definition of 'Aboriginality' it has been found more than 67 definitions in over 700 pieces of legislation. In the 1980s a new definition was proposed in the Constitutional Section of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs' Report on a review of the administration of the working definition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. The section offered the following definition: "An Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander is a person of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent who identifies as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander and is accepted as such by the community in which he (she) lives. This three-part definition (descent, self-identification, and community recognition) was soon adopted by Federal Government departments as their 'working definition' for determining eligibility to some services and benefits. The definition also found its way into State legislation (e.g. in the NSW Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983: where 'Aboriginal means a person who: (a) is a member of the Aboriginal race of Australia, (b) identifies as an Aboriginal, and (c) is accepted by the Aboriginal community as an Aboriginal') and was accepted by the High Court as giving meaning to the expression 'Aboriginal race' within s. 51 (xxvi) of the Constitution (Justice Deane in *Commonwealth v. Tasmania* 1983). It was also used by the Federal Court when, in a first instance decision, it found that the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody had no jurisdiction to inquire into the death of Darren Wouters as the community did not identify him as Aboriginal nor did he identify himself as Aboriginal (although the Full Federal Court subsequently found in *Attorney-General (Cwlth) v State of Queensland*, July 1990, that the Royal Commission's letter patents were framed in such a way as to make Aboriginal descent a sufficient criterion). The advantages of this three-part definition were not, however, apparent to all³.

“Bringing Them Home” and reconciliation go on

Thus, the Report entitled “Bringing Them Home” reflects the cultural and ethnic genocide that took place in Australia, lawfully supported by the government, between 1910 and 1970. During this period “as many as 30 percent of Aboriginal children – the stolen generations”, numbering 50, 000 people – were treated in this way, all part of an attempt to assimilate them into modern Australian culture”⁴. Campaigners and activists had claimed that the consequences of such dislocation were often disastrous for the individuals concerned, not to mention their birth families and numerous stories began to emerge of physical and psychological maltreatment”⁵.

On 13 February 2008, Kevin Rudd completed an electoral pledge when he gave an address to the Parliament on that “unfinished business of the nation” in order to provide “an apology without qualification”⁶. Rudd spoke at long last to a full House of Representatives and a packed public gallery, containing many prominent members of the Aboriginal community. Outside Parliament, crowds gathered, listening to the live broadcast. Rudd a calm, measured speaker gave a speech reflecting a pattern of reiteration and statement and response: “For the pain, suffering and hurt we say sorry”⁷ making and justifying a formal apology on behalf of

¹ Idem

² Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families*, Bringing them Home Report (1997) | Australian Human Rights Commission (29.05.2024)

³ Department of the Parliamentary Library, *The definition of Aboriginality*, "Research Note", No. 18, 2000 <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22library/prspub/7M036%22> (2.05.2024)

⁴ Australian Human Rights Commission, *Bringing them Home Report (1997) Op..cit.*

⁵ Simon Sebag Montefiore (Ed.), *Op. cit.*, p. 228

⁶ House of Representatives, *Apology to Australia's Indigenous Peoples Speech. Wednesday, 13 February 2008* https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansardr/2008-13/0003/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (2.05.2024)

⁷ Simon Sebag Montefiore (Ed.) *Op.Cit.*, p.229

the federal government, Rudd also highlighted individual cases of suffering and administrative cynicism which had emerged from the investigations”¹

In practical terms, Rudd didn’t propose compensation for the “stolen generations” but rather new initiatives on “indigenous policy” and new funds to “close the gap that lies between us in life expectancy, educational achievement and economic opportunity”². Rudd’s willingness to apologize formally has clearly resonated beyond Australia, perhaps most notably in Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s apology on 11 June 2008 to Canada’s equivalent of Australia’s “stolen generations” – the children forced into Indian Residential Schools since the 1870³

“To the Stolen Generations...I Am Sorry”

Kevin Rudd, Parliamentary motion apologizing for the mistreatment of Australia’s Aboriginal people, 13 February 2008

Speech (fragments)

I move:

That today we honour the Indigenous peoples of this land, the oldest continuing cultures in human history.

We reflect on their past mistreatment.

We reflect in particular on the mistreatment of those who were Stolen Generations - this blemished chapter in our national history.

The time has now come for the nation to turn a new page in Australia's history by righting the wrongs of the past and so moving forward with confidence to the future.

We apologise for the laws and policies of successive Parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on these our fellow Australians.

We apologise especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country.

For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry.

To the mothers and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of families and communities, we say sorry.

And for the indignity and degradation thus inflicted on a proud people and a proud culture, we say sorry.

We the Parliament of Australia respectfully request that this apology be received in the spirit in which it is offered as part of the healing of the nation”⁴.

The Prime Minister also added that:

“We today take this first step by acknowledging the past and laying claim to a future that embraces all Australians.

A future where this parliament resolves that the injustices of the past must never, never happen again.

A future where we harness the determination of all Australians, indigenous and non-indigenous, to close the gap that lies between us in life expectancy, educational achievement and economic opportunity.

A future where we embrace the possibility of new solutions to enduring problems where old approaches have failed.

A future based on mutual respect, mutual resolve and mutual responsibility.

A future where all Australians, whatever their origins, are truly equal partners, with equal opportunities and with an equal stake in shaping the next chapter in the history of this great country, Australia”⁵.

Minister Kevin Rudd, being extremely decided, mentioned that “There comes a time in the history of nations when their peoples must become fully reconciled to their past if they are to go forward with confidence

¹ Idem

² *Sorry - Kevin Rudd and Brendan Nelson's speeches*, <https://www.ozpolitic.com/articles/sorry.html>, (2.05.2024)

³ Michael Tager, *Political Apologies to Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228195299_Political_Apologies_to_Indigenous_Peoples_in_Comparative_Perspective (02.05.2024)

⁴ Australian Government, *Apology to Australia’s Indigenous People*, <https://www.indigenous.gov.au/reconciliation/apology-australias-indigenous-peoples> (2.05.2024)

⁵ Parliament of Australia, *Kevin Rudd's Sorry Speech*, <https://www.smh.com.au/national/kevin-rudds-sorry-speech-20080214-gds0xh.html> (2.05.2024)

to embrace their future. Our nation, Australia, has reached such a time. That is why the parliament is today here assembled: to deal with this unfinished business of the nation, to remove a great stain from the nation's soul and, in a true spirit of reconciliation, to open a new chapter in the history of this great land, Australia."¹

The hurt, the humiliation, the degradation, and the sheer brutality of the act of physically separating a mother from her children is a deep assault on our senses and on our most elemental humanity. These stories cry out to be heard; they cry out for an apology. Instead, from the nation's parliament there has been a stony and stubborn and deafening silence for more than a decade; a view that somehow we, the parliament, should suspend our most basic instincts of what is right and what is wrong; a view that, instead, we should look for any pretext to push this great wrong to one side, to leave it languishing with the historians, the academics and the cultural warriors, as if the stolen generations are little more than an interesting sociological phenomenon. But the stolen generations are not intellectual curiosities. They are human beings; human beings...The uncomfortable truth for us all is that the parliament of the nation, individually and collectively, enacted statutes and delegated authority under those statutes that made the forced removal of children on racial grounds fully lawful"². Because the time has come, well and truly come, for all peoples of our great country, for all citizens of our great commonwealth, for all Australians - those who are indigenous and those who are not - to come together to reconcile and together build a new future for our nation.

Some have asked, why apologise?

Let me begin to answer by telling the parliament just a little of one person's story - an elegant, eloquent and wonderful woman in her 80s, full of life, full of funny stories, despite what has happened in her life's journey, a woman who has travelled a long way to be with us today, a member of the stolen generation who shared some of her story with me when I called around to see her just a few days ago"³.

Real stories to be told

Prime Minister Rudd not only spoke about general problems of the natives, but also insisted on presenting particular cases of natives that he considered to be relevant to the general story.

"Nanna Nungala Fejo, as she prefers to be called, was born in the late 1920^s.

She remembers her earliest childhood days living with her family and her community in a bush camp just outside Tennant Creek.

She remembers the love and the warmth and the kinship of those days long ago, including traditional dancing around the camp fire at night.

She loved the dancing. She remembers once getting into strife when, as a four-year-old girl, she insisted on dancing with the male tribal elders rather than just sitting and watching the men, as the girls were supposed to do.

But then, sometime around 1932, when she was about four, she remembers the coming of the welfare men.

Her family had feared that day and had dug holes in the creek bank where the children could run and hide.

What they had not expected was that the white welfare men did not come alone. They brought a truck, two white men and an Aboriginal stockman on horseback cracking his stock whip.

The kids were found; they ran for their mothers, screaming, but they could not get away. They were herded and piled onto the back of the truck. Tears flowing, her mum tried clinging to the sides of the truck as her children were taken away to the Bungalow in Alice, all in the name of protection.

A few years later, government policy changed. Now the children would be handed over to the missions to be cared for by the churches. But which church would care for them?

The kids were simply told to line up in three lines. Nanna Fejo and her sister stood in the middle line, her older brother and cousin on her left. Those on the left were told that they had become Catholics, those in the middle Methodists and those on the right Church of England. That is how the complex questions of post-

¹ House of Representatives, *Apology to Australia's Indigenous Peoples Speech*. Wednesday, 13 February 2008), *Op. cit.*

² *Idem*

³ Parliament of Australia, *Kevin Rudd's Sorry Speech*, <https://www.smh.com.au/national/kevin-rudds-sorry-speech-20080214-gds0xh.html> (2.05.2024)

reformation theology were resolved in the Australian outback in the 1930s. It was as crude as that. She and her sister were sent to a Methodist mission on Goulburn Island and then Croker Island. Her Catholic brother was sent to work at a cattle station and her cousin to a Catholic mission. Nanna Fejo's family had been broken up for a second time. She stayed at the mission until after the war, when she was allowed to leave for a prearranged job as a domestic in Darwin. She was 16. Nanna Fejo never saw her mum again.

After she left the mission, her brother let her know that her mum had died years before, a broken woman fretting for the children that had literally been ripped away from her. I asked Nanna Fejo what she would have me say today about her story. She thought for a few moments then said that what I should say today was that all mothers are important. And she added: Families - keeping them together is very important. It's a good thing that you are surrounded by love and that love is passed down the generations. That's what gives you happiness. As I left, later, Nanna Fejo took one of my staff aside, wanting to make sure that I was not too hard on the Aboriginal stockman who had hunted those kids down all those years ago.

The stockman had found her again decades later, this time himself to say, Sorry. And remarkably, extraordinarily, she had forgiven him. Nanna Fejo's is just one story.

Remembering the past can heal the present

There are thousands, tens of thousands of them: stories of forced separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their mums and dads over the better part of a century¹. We, the parliaments of the nation, are ultimately not those who gave effect to our laws. And the problem lay with the laws themselves. Therefore, for our nation, the course of action is clear: that is to deal now with what has become one of the darkest chapters in Australia's history. To the Stolen Generations, I say the following: as Prime Minister of Australia, I am sorry. On behalf of the Government of Australia, I am sorry. On behalf of the Parliament of Australia, I am sorry. And I offer you this apology without qualification. We apologize for the hurt, the pain and suffering we, the parliament, have caused you by the laws that previous parliaments have enacted. We apologize for the indignity, the degradation, and the humiliation these laws embodied. We offer this apology to the mothers, the fathers, the brothers, the sisters, the families, and the communities whose lives were ripped apart by the actions of successive governments under successive parliaments. My proposal is this: if the apology we extend today is accepted in the spirit of reconciliation in which it is offered, we can today resolve together that there be a new beginning for Australia. And it is to such a new beginning that I believe the nation is now calling us.

It is for our nation to bring these first two centuries of our settled history to an end, as we begin a new chapter. We embrace with pride, admiration and awe these great and ancient cultures we are truly blessed to have among us—cultures that provide a unique, uninterrupted human thread linking our Australian continent to the most ancient prehistory of our planet. Let us turn this page together, Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, government and opposition, Commonwealth and state, and write this new chapter in our nation's story together². Following documents, we can go deeper into the Story of the Stolen Generations, discovering more elements about the Aboriginal people of Australia. We are told that the Native Australians, also called the First Nations people, are believed to have lived in Australia, for more than 65,000 years. "Following the arrival of the British in 1788, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations across much of Australia were decimated through frontier, violence, introduced diseases, loss of access to land, resources, and traditional lifestyles. As a result of colonization many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were removed from their traditional homelands and relocated to reserves or missions on the fringes of non-Indigenous settlements"³.

"From the 1860s, jurisdictions such as Victoria and Queensland had legislation that allowed for the removal of Aboriginal children from their families. Across the late 19th and early 20th centuries, colonies and then states, implemented 'protection' legislation and by 1901 all states except Tasmania have a 'Chief Protector

Parliament of Australia, *Kevin Rudd's Sorry Speech*, <https://www.smh.com.au/national/kevin-rudds-sorry-speech-20080214-gds0xh.html> (2.05.2024)

² House of Representatives, *Apology to Australia's Indigenous Peoples Speech*, Wednesday, 13 February 2008, <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansard%2F2008-02-13%2F0003%22>, (2.05.2024)

³ *Australia's First Peoples*, <https://aiatsis.gov.au/explore/australias-first-peoples#toc-who-are-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-peoples-> (2.05.2024)

or Protection Board. These protection departments had extensive powers that were used to control all aspects of Aboriginal peoples' lives. People needed permission to move in and out of the reserves and settlements, to marry or to hold employment, and in many places their wages were controlled by the government. In most places, people were not allowed to practise culture or speak their traditional languages. Parents lost decision-making autonomy over their children”¹.

“In the 1950^s, following more than 150 years of violence against and dispossession of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, Australia formally adopted a policy of assimilation. This meant policies of all Australian governments were aimed at ensuring Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and those of mixed descent, were to be absorbed into mainstream society”².

This document reveals more information regarding these dark policies of discrimination, mentioning that “A key part of this objective was forcing children to grow up white. It is estimated that under protection legislation and the policy of assimilation, between the 1910s and 1970s, as many as one in three Aboriginal children were forcibly removed from their families and communities. The children were placed in dormitories and other institutions, non-Indigenous foster homes or adopted by non-Indigenous families”³. The frightening ultimate aim of this governmental programme was “to eradicate Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people as a distinct cultural group. The policies have not only overtly racist, but the resulting disruption to families, communities and culture has contributed significantly to many of the challenges facing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people today”⁴.

The consequence of these policies intended by the authorities was in fact a program of eugenics. It was intended to change the natives radically and assimilate them, in spite of the harm it caused, the “result of forcibly removals was comprehensively documented and acknowledged for the first time through the then Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission's national inquiry into the separation of these children from their families, launched in 1995. The Inquiry’s final report, bringing them home, was tabled in 1997 and described the physical, psychological and sexual abuse, sexual and labour exploitation, racism, grief and suffering, disruption of family life and loss of identity, culture heritage and community suffered by members of the Stolen Generations and their descendants. Evidence presented to the Inquiry underscored the ways that children were emotionally and psychologically isolated from their families- many were taught to believe their families had relinquished them because they were unwanted and unloved, or told that their parents were dead. Aboriginality was denigrated and Aboriginal people were discussed in derogatory ways, in an attempt to indoctrinate children and diminish their desire to return to family, Country and culture”⁵.

The documents about these programs speak about harsh living conditions in dormitories and other kinds of discrimination. They mentioned that “Children were often left hungry and cold. With a view to them becoming laborers or domestic servants, they were taught only basic literacy and numeracy. Punishment for minor transgressions was often severe and children were vulnerable to sexual abuse and exploitation in dormitories, as well as foster homes, adoptive families, and larger institutions. For many survivors the resulting trauma, pain, and suffering remains long after these laws, policies and practices ended in the 1970s. These native people had to come to terms with the realization that they had been targeted for the purposes of assimilation, lied to, and that their forcible removal from their families, Country and Culture was not only deliberate but sanctioned by law”⁶.

On 13 February 2008, the then Prime Minister Kevi Rudd made a formal apology to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, to the Stolen Generations, on behalf of the Australian Parliament. The journey to the national apology began with the Bringing them home report with recommendation 5 a stating “that all Australian parliaments officially acknowledge the responsibility of their predecessors for the laws, policies and practices of forcible removal”⁷. The national apology was an important part of the healing journey for Stolen Generations survivors. “Healing for survivors, their descendants, families and communities is crucial to end

¹ Idem

² Idem

³ Idem

⁴ Idem

⁵ Idem

⁶ <https://aiatsis.gov.au/family-history> (29.05.2024)

⁷ Idem

the trauma cycle and to overcome, the impacts of complex intergenerational trauma that exists as a result of past government policies”¹.

Conclusions

As we have seen it is so clear that “politics raises questions to that cannot be answered by political calculation alone. For sure, there is no escape from this wider issue of morality and responsibility but if we ignore them, history suggests that they will return in the form of anger, resentment, and a burning sense of injustice, which will make our already fragile order more precarious still”².

In spite of the fact that so much effort was made to stop and diminish the effects of the governmental programs of “whitening” the natives, that is, assimilation, genocide, eugenics, “the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in-state care has continued to rise. This is not just, an issue of the past. It is happening today. While the intent of children's removal today may be different to that experienced by the Stolen Generations, the effect is the same: a loss of identity and the exacerbation of intergenerational trauma”³.

Nyree (Ngari) Reynolds (born in Wollongong NSW, 1948) is a Wiradjuri artist and art tutor based in the Central West region of NSW. In describing her body of work, Nyree explains: “As an Aboriginal woman of the Wiradjuri Nation I like to tell stories through my paintings. As part of my art practice, I paint the Aboriginal children of the Stolen Generations blending into the landscape, their own Country from which they were removed. My hope is that when people view my work, they will leave with a new understanding of people who have been taken away from their family, home and Country. That they are real people with real stories to be told. Then I know my painting narratives achieved what I hoped they would.”⁴

The painting titled *Sorry* was created in 2006, six years after Nyree participated in the event of the Reconciliation Bridge Walk on 28th May 2000. This event involved more than 250,000 people marching together across the Sydney Harbour Bridge, over the course of nearly six hours, to show their support for the concept of ‘reconciliation’ between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia.

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¹ aiatsis.gov.au (29.05.2024)

² Jonathan Sacks, *The Dignity of Difference. How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations*, Bloomsbury, London, 2003, p. 4

³ *About Bringing Them Home*, <https://www.humanrights.vic.gov.au/legal-and-policy/australias-human-rights-framework/>, (2.05.2024)

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NEW BOOKS

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**”ROMÂNII DIN ȚARA FĂGĂRAȘULUI PARTICIPANȚI LA PRIMUL RĂZBOI
MONDIAL”
[”ROMANIANS FROM FĂGĂRAȘ COUNTRY PARTICIPATING IN THE FIRST WORLD
WAR”]
BY VASILE TABĂRĂ AND RADU TABĂRĂ**

Abstract:	<i>The monograph "Romanians from Făgăraș Land Participating in the First World War" published in 2024 by the Andreiana Publishing House and Astra Association Publishing HOUSE represents a relevant assessment dedicated to remembering events, facts and certain events regarding the Făgăraș town inhabitants. It includes data about each village related to the consequences of the First World War. The main aim of this book is to present accurately a possible answer to how today and future generations can know the special deeds of their forebears, accurately, so that their sacrifices may receive their reward of eternal appreciation and gratitude.</i>
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The work, with a number of 638 pages, is of particular importance for what the patriotic spirit and respect for the sacrifices of our ancestors mean, as it was created based on the nominal tables of the localities in Făgăraș Country that were drawn up by ASTRA in 1922 and transcribed. The authors specify that these tables prepared in the ASTRA¹ survey have the value of standardized questionnaires. Due to the size of their target population, they can generate relevant statistical indicators with a low error margin². The historical incursion necessary for this endeavor considers the human and material contribution of the Romanians in Transylvania to the First World War, the authors referring to a series of previous harsh bibliographic references³.

The book is divided into five chapters: "Brief history of the approach of recording the human and material contribution of Romanians in Transylvania to the First World War", "Methodological considerations on the work"; Romanians from Făgăraș Country participating in the First World War"; "The participation of the inhabitants of Făgăraș Country and Transylvania in the First World War. Summary table", followed by annexes showing pages from the original tables and photographs of war monuments.

¹ Asociația Transilvană pentru Literatura Română și Cultura Poporului Român, established in Sibiu, 1861

² Ioan Popa, *Ancheta ASTREI privind jertfele românilor transilvăneni în Primul Război Mondial. Noi valorificări metodologice*, "Astra Sabesiensis", No. 3, 2017, p. 239

³ Teodor Păcățian, *Jertfele românilor din Ardeal, Banat, Crișana și Maramureș, aduse în Războiul Mondial din anii 1914-1918*, "Transilvania", Vol. LIV, No. 1-2; Sebastian Stanca, *Contribuția preoșimii române din Ardeal la războiul pentru întregirea neamului (1916-1919)*, Argonaut, Episcopia Devei și Hunedoarei, Deva, 2015; Augustin Bunea, *Stăpânii Țării Oltului*, Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl, București, 1910; Constantin Băjenaru, *Făgărașenii și Primul Război Mondial. Memorii și istorii (III)*, "Acta Terrae Fogorasiensis", 2014

The authors present statistical data showing the number of 12,710 participants in the First World War, representing a percentage of 16.55% of the total population at the time, 76,808 people; information is presented regarding the number of deaths, invalids, wounded, and missing persons, which represented 5.05% of the total population¹. The work materializes in a meticulous approach of centralizing the data for drawing up the tables, referring to biographical data of the inhabitants, based on the nominal tables of the localities of Făgăraș Country drawn up by Astra in 1922.



Vasile Tabără and Radu Tabără refer to the historical aspects of the time, familiarizing the reader with the political and social context, to create an overview of the main documents that accomplished the basis of this book. Each of the statistical data collected by the authors is centralized to facilitate their understanding and interpretation, beyond a simple enumeration of names.

The calculations were made by relating the resulting figures from each table to the Romanian population of the localities and to the participants in the events imposed by the war. Some tables are completed with additional data, identified from other sources, with reference to specific individuals. Vasile Tabără and Radu Tabără highlight the details that differentiate a locality, from the participation in the First World War perspective. The authors also present the ethnic structure of the localities, which was taken from the census conducted in 1910² by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. For an adequate understanding of the methodology

¹ Vasile Tabără, Radu Tabără, *Românii din Țara Făgărașului participanți la Primul Război Mondial*, Andreiana Publishing House and Astra Association Publishing House, Sibiu, 2024, p. 611

² Traian Rotaru, Maria Semeniuc, Elemer Mezei, *Recensământul din 1910 Transilvania*, Staff, Cluj Napoca, 1999

used by the authors, they specify certain clarifying aspects. Each locality's population was taken into consideration in accordance with the data existent in a certain section of each table. Where specific information was incomplete, data from the 1910 census were used, and where this was the source, mentions shall be marked in a specific way. The numerical results of the percentage calculations have 2 decimals. If the third decimal place was greater than or equal to five, the result would be rounded up to the next decimal. When transcribing names and surnames, the original spelling was generally preserved, and certain adaptations were made to facilitate reading, especially in the case of names or surnames originally written in a too phonetic manner. The meticulousness of the authors can also be seen from the accuracy with which they managed to transcribe the handwriting of certain names and surnames, mentioning that the ones that are not fully intelligible are signaled by a question mark.

The surnames at each table were arranged in alphabetical order rather than in the order in which the people presented themselves to the city hall or in which the censors surveyed each house. All tables have been prepared in accordance with the instructions sent by ASTRA.

As the authors point out, the only exception is the way refugees are registered. The requirement of writing down only the head of the house and the total members of the family was observed in most localities, while in others, each person was written down separately. The numbers presented in the nominal tables were taken into consideration for establishing the Romanian's participation in the First World War. However, the authors create the summarizing table in complete disregard to the initial structure, delivering certain changes meant to provide more clarity and more statistical data.

It is worth appreciating the meticulousness and rigor of this research, especially the impressive documentation that includes a consistent archival component, books, and specialized articles. The approach of the authors Vasile Tabără and Radu Tabără must be appreciated, and it is necessary, not only for Făgăraș Country, but also at national level.

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
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EDITORIAL SIGNAL: THE ANNIVERSARY OF A SEPTUAGENARIAN

Professor Cristian Troncotă is a professor at "Lucian Blaga" University of Sibiu, where he has taught since 2004 as an associate professor and then as a full professor (2013-2019) at the Faculty of Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies. He has been for a good period, from its foundation until 2021 as co-editor of the journal *Studia Securitatis*, where he has published a series of studies, researches, and essays on the history of secret services and Romanian and international security issues.

To mark these issues on the occasion of such a venerable age, the book "Historian Cristian Troncotă at 70. National and international security. Anniversary volume", 683 pages, in a graphic and editorial of the highest quality. The scientific content of the book is also in line with all academic standards (summaries in English of all studies, keywords, critical apparatus, bibliographies with references to the most recent published scientific results, list of authors including essential data on the professional careers, and recent scientific contributions of each author, index of names and abbreviations).



The volume contains three chapters and a postscript. The first chapter entitled "Man and his work" is composed of three subdivisions, the first two of which are essays by Prof. Corvin Lucu, with direct reference to the professional career of the anniversary historian, to which he added some "Memories with Cristian Troncotă". The chapter ends with a voluminous list of works, both personal achievements (books, studies, essays, scientific projects developed following research contracts with various academic institutions) and those that over time have seen the light of the press following collaboration with various authors, most of them well known in the field of history and security studies. It is interesting that in this list of works, we also find citations from authors from home and abroad, which attests to the unquestionable value and recognition of the contribution of these works.

The second chapter is reserved for the septuagenarian's publications in recent years, with the preponderance of "Interviews and opinions" on the most interesting topics of history and security: internal public and security policies, secret intelligence services, Romania in the Euro-Atlantic area, and international relations, the pandemic and the recent genocidal wars in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip.

The most voluminous is the third chapter entitled "Studies and Essays", which contains 24 studies on the history of the secret services, a field so dear to the septuagenarian, evaluated in the introductory study as a

true "pater familias of the historiography of the Romanian secret services", as well as studies of strictly historical interest, based on in-depth research of archival documents and works in domestic and foreign libraries. All of them stand out for their rigor, balance, objectivity, and, last but not least, for their good intention to find out the historical truth, as far as it can be contained in the current phase of research on a national and international level.

The volume ends with a "Post scriptum", in fact, two critical essays with a pondered tone of "laudațio" signed, the first one by Prof. Lucian Giura and the second one by the author's daughter, Prof. Miruna Troncotă Butnaru. The former, together with Prof. Corvin Lupu and Dr. Liviu Stan are also the coordinators of the volume.

Readers will no doubt find in the pages of this voluminous work new information, assessments, and certainties but also several questions on global security issues that can barely be outlined but by no means clarified. And all this because today's problems are yesterday's problems, and the future cannot be anticipated but only built with good intentions and a single goal: saving the planet from all the exogenous (natural) and especially endogenous (man-made) risks that beset us at almost every turn in this diverse, complex, difficult to manage world on a global scale, which we like to call post-modern.