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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

General Locotenent (r.) Alexandru GRUMAZ

THE NEW AGE: THE RETURN TO GREAT-POWER RIVALRY IS INEVITABLE

Abstract:	<i>The strategic change of United States' arrangement, from the fight against terrorism to the competition with China and Russia, leads to their confrontation in several regions of the globe. In this confrontation, the Great Powers rely on the use of proxy, and this fact will alleviate the potential of a direct conflict among them, but the competition will have profound implications for the nations' stability. A series of states are susceptible to serve as theatres of competition in the energy field, others – as strategic points in the global geography. Conflicts will arise in those countries in which they hadn't existed before, and will deepen in those countries in which they already exist. In both cases, global instability will increase.</i>
Keywords:	great power,
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“Security competition is endemic to daily life in the international system, but war is not. Only occasionally does security competition give way to war”.¹

For almost three decades following the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States had no significant geopolitical rivals, and handled mainly the securitization of the European

continent, through the consolidation of NATO, receiving new members from Central and Eastern Europe. Today, USA has two rivals. The first, Russia, is an avenging power, wanting its return at the table of geopolitical decisions, but also the restoration of the former area of influence ranging primarily from Central and Eastern Europe, but also in the Asian space. Its economic stagnation, an acute dependency on oil, and a projected economic growth

¹"The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition)" by John J. Mearsheimer

rate which falls below two per cent will probably make Russia follow a descending path of its international power in the next decade. However, Russia is much more stable economically and politically than in the 1990s, allowing for the projection of its military power far beyond its frontiers. The military doctrine, generically called "Gerasimov", developed under the Russian President Vladimir Putin, has integrated the hybrid war significantly with the cyber war, with Russia's conventional military capacities and with its nuclear ones, in an asymmetrical defence strategy allowing the country to increase its weight over its own capabilities. It's hard to genuinely believe that Moscow will truly challenge the USA dominance, but will do everything to disrupt the democratic processes of NATO and EU member-states, and will threaten with military repercussions the former Soviet states, in the near future. Vladimir Putin's Russia has never ceased to consider this "extended region", bordered by the Baltic Sea, to the North, the Black Sea, to the East, belonging to the former Warsaw Pact, and south of Syria's Mediterranean outpost, part of its natural sphere of influence. Russia's invasion of Georgia and Ukraine, the takeover of Crimea, the systemic and prolonged destabilization of Moldova, the intervention in Syria and the consolidation of the fleet in the Black Sea, the surrounding of Turkey with

fortified military checkpoints (Crimea and Latakia) – all these highlight the seriousness with which Moscow approaches the competition for influence and territory in this area. Instead, United States' second rival, China, is about to become its only real competitor. In the 90s and during the first decade of this century, United States have benefitted from the desire of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (China's main reformer in the 20th century), but also of those succeeding him, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, to increase the rhythm of economic development and the internal stability, at the expense of geopolitical power. But, after President Xi Jinping has assumed his position in 2012, Beijing has explicitly sought to reestablish its regional hegemony in Asia. Nowadays, China is about to be the world's biggest economy until 2030, in terms of GDP, and China's technological sector is already nearing that of the United States, both regarding the expenses for research and development, and the market size. By the beginning of 2024, China's military power in Asia will rival that of the United States, although the American army will preserve significant advantages worldwide. 90% of the ballistic arsenal of Beijing is composed of intermediate-range missiles (experts claim that, for each of the 10 American aircraft carrier, there are 1,900 Chinese missiles which can hit them), the military fleet is upgraded with new types of class

T005-battleships, the latest ship of this type being Nanchang Battleship, equipped with 112 vertical launch cells capable of launching either surface-to-air or anti-ship missiles, and with two new aircraft carriers, similar to the Soviet-manufactured aircraft carrier "Lioniang", modernized in the naval station of Shanghai. The "11 Type 052D" destroyers will enter, as well, in the endowment of the Chinese navy (6 of them are being built in Dalian, and 5 in Shanghai), which draws China's naval power closer to that of the USA, turning the South China Sea into a true naval fortress. Both Russia and China wish, in their own way, to defeat the West: Russia wishes to fragment it, China wishes to replace it. And there is no other place where they are more determined to do so than starting from here, from the area of the Black and the Mediterranean Seas.

These are uncertain times. The balance of power is continually shifting worldwide. The multipolar world order is coming to an end and it's being replaced by a two-bloc system led by China and Russia on one side and the United States on the other side. Now become clear that we are in the early stages of a dramatic change in world order that necessitates a change in grand strategy. Geopolitical competition between the major powers has been intensifying for several years. Russia became much more aggressive in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. China grew more assertive in East Asia. What we did not know, until

very recently, was that this competition would also directly and negatively impact the lives of citizens in Western democracies and in newly democratic country from Central and Eastern European democracy. It's different from the Cold War? Yes. It is not only about vital geopolitical space nor about ideology, it is about the fact that the world is divided over technology. Instead of picking between American and Soviet military alliances as it was during the Cold War, the world is being forced to choose between American and Chinese tech deals. For example: US squeezes allies to exclude Huawei, China has already banned American tech giants Google and Facebook—and two technological systems are developing in parallel. Even Russia has made its own internet. But the new war it is about more than cell-phone sales. It is about data and communications fundamental to almost all forms of business and military activity. This competition could spill over into other areas and threaten "globalization itself." In the same time in this competition Russia want to get back his own old sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and in Middle Orient. We have a revanchard Russia which want to turn back on the table of geopolitical decision and with a China who wants a New Silk Road to surround the globe.

Before proceeding to the analysis, two subjects are worth mentioning. The first is connected to

social media and its influence on the political life and on the international relations, and the second is linked to the Russia-China relation, apparently an unshakable one.

New leaders, internet and fake news-new trend

What is change in the last time to affect our live and our way of thinking? In this era of information and confrontation Internet has done a lot to change our social lives, but equally it's affected our politicians who will run the business in the future. A new type of them has emerged, thanks to Twitter and Facebook: "hyper-leaders". From Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez to Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, these new leaders connect directly with supporters, break down old political lines, and are now more important than the parties to which they belong—all by using personality-driven politics and Twitter-style argumentation. From a speech kept in 1990 by a politician which sent message-disciplined sound-bites, as a response to cable news, now he needs to change the ways in today's social-media environment in order to survive. Who started the new race? Russia. May be! Certainly, Moscow takes advantage of day to day social-media. Russia is seen by the Europeans leaders as the main source of false information and therefore as a factor in influencing the agenda of European Commission and not only. Moscow is

accused of having influenced both the Brexit vote and the US presidential election in 2016. This is a real challenge for our democratic systems. In November 2018 a cyberattack on a media outlet in EU member state Lithuania caused an agitation. The news portal "Kas Vyksta Kaune" announced that unknown persons had posted a false report on its page to discredit NATO. The false report stated that the military alliance was planning an attack on Belarus. And this is only one example from the chain of fake news launch by Russia main media structures Sputnik and Russia Today. In December, 2018, the European Commission published an Action Plan which provides subsidies up to 5 million euro to counterattack the multitude of fake news. But this is apparently just a insignificant sum of money in view of the hundreds and hundreds of millions of euros Russia has made available for its "information war" against the West. Because, yes, we have such a war with Russia. In Europe any crisis is important for Russian social media activities which in this very moment primarily focus on President Macron, not on the yellow vests (#giletsjaunes). British and US media reported in early December 2018 that Russian social media trolls were apparently involved in nurture the French "yellow vest" protests, for instance by disseminating disinformation like fake protest pictures. Are Russian trolls actually targeting Macron or the French society

and what mean this think? A fight for a new leader in France may be a populist one because this is the trend (!?). France will remain after Brexit the main military power in the European Union. It is a fight for power and influence inside the European Union. The Russian influence campaign in 2016 in US and after was run by a St. Petersburg company called the Internet Research Agency. The company is owned by a businessman, Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, who is a close ally of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. Prigozhin and a dozen of the company's employees were indicted last February as part of the investigation of Russian interference by Robert S. Mueller III, the special counsel. After the election the report produced by New Knowledge, a cybersecurity company based in Austin, Tex., along with researchers at Columbia University and Canfield Research LLC say that the Internet Research Agency put up some 70 posts on Facebook and Instagram that mocked the claims that Russia had interfered in the election. Be sure nothing of all of these came to an end soon!

Hidden Animus in the Russia-China Friendship

Putin boasts of Russo-Chinese friendship, but tensions brew beneath surface. *„Official Russian discourse on the status of relations with China is as upbeat as it can possibly be. Andrei Denisov, the long-serving ambassador to*

Beijing, claims that the two countries are enjoying the best period ever in the history of their partnership (RussianCouncil.ru-March 3, 2019). Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his recent address to the Federal Assembly, described relations as “equal and mutually beneficial,” before starting on his vitriolic diatribe against the consequences of the withdrawal of the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (Kremlin.ru, February 20, 2019). It is certainly beneficial for Moscow to advertise the strength of mutual affection, and Beijing finds it useful to play along; but in reality, suspicions run deep in both states as trust and respect are in short supply. A recent editorial in Nezavisimaya Gazeta illuminates this hidden context. It is an article about Chinese economy, which is going down, and the Chinese embassy in Moscow send is message from Guo Yunhai, the embassy's press secretary to remove it”². It was unclear why the article attracted the ire of Chinese officials but sometime you think that all of this come from the 60 years ago when the soviet clash with the Chinese somewhere on their border³. The moment marked the rupture of Chinese Soviet relations. At that very moment on the world stage, the US emerged through President Nixon, who created a bridge between the US and China that will mark Beijing's arbitration in Eastern Europe occupied

²Jemestow Foundation March 11, 2019 -- Volume 16, Issue 33, Pavel K. Baev

³50 years ago, Soviet and Chinese troops engaged in a local but fierce clash on tiny Damansky Island on the Amur River

by Moscow. Now Putin is eager to demonstrate his perfectly cordial relations with President Xi Jinping and to prove that Russia is a valuable ally to China. The crisis in Syria and in Venezuela apparently provides an opportunity for that. Moscow is the main supporter for the regime of Nicolás Maduro. Beijing is involved in reconstruction of Syria. 120 Chinese companies were present at a fair in Damascus in October 2018. Russian high military official has deep reservations about China's military superiority in the Far East, but it has to pretend that the bilateral partnership is greatly strengthened by the invitation of Chinese troops to take part in the Vostok 2018 exercises. Beyond the face of a friend China has its own different road to Russia does not matter how many military exercises will do together in Asia, the Mediterranean Sea or Black Sea. The relation is one based on economic trade and on military sales and in the end on supporting each other for common geopolitical interests who primarily target US supremacy. That's all!

China's superpower vision

China has its own strategic vision generically named **One Belt One Road**, a strategy that provides it with economic hubs and access routes all over the world, from Shanghai to Tripoli or Piraeus, or from Beijing to London via the railway crossing Siberia. When speaking of a project of such magnitude, the economic

dimension is simply swallowed by the strategic dimension. The "String of Pearls", i.e. the ports surrounding the Indian Ocean and where China invested massively, in addition to being an alternative route for energy supply, these new ports/outposts will be the 21st century version of the 19th century mining station of the British Empire, as reckoned by American analyst Kaplan⁴. China is in fact building a maritime empire in the Indian Ocean. To exit from the South China Sea area, Beijing is faced with what was dubbed the "Malacca dilemma". It is too reliant on the Strait of Malacca, towards Indonesia and Malaysia, too narrow and congested for the supply of oil and natural gas from the Middle East. For this reason, China had to get involved in the construction of ports in Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which at some point will be able to be connected via roads, motorways and oil pipelines directly to the Chinese provinces in the west of the country. Access to the Indian Ocean, the energy highway of Asia, is vital for China's energy supply. China's ascension in the Indian Ocean area has evidently alerted India, with which it already has a tense relationship as early as the armed conflict of 1962, when the triggering pretext thereof was a dispute regarding a common border in

⁴Robert D. Kaplan, a member of the Center for a New American Security and author of the paper "Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power"

Himalaya⁵. The construction and modernization of ports in so many countries in the region is rather concerning for Indians, who feel that they are surrounded by the Chinese. What will India do? In its turn, India increased its naval base in the south at Karwar in response to the Chinese involvement in Gwadar, but also started to modernize its armed forces together with Russia and the USA. Thus is foreshadowed the great arms race of our century, a race between the world's most populated countries, between the top two emerging powers of the 21st century: China and India. For this reason, the relation with India will be a first rank priority both for Washington, and for Beijing or Moscow. Who will succeed?

Bipolarism

The international scene is experiencing a double bipolarity: an economic one, represented by the USA and China, and a military one, represented by the USA and Russia. In 1947, Chip Bohlen⁶, Russian affairs

counselor to the Secretary of State George C. Marshall, stated before the Congress that *"instead of unity among the great powers, there is a total confrontation, and Russia does its best to accentuate this disunity"*⁷. This statement echoes through to this day in the National Security Strategy of the Trump Administration, which announces a new motto: "great power competition returned." The two strategies of Truman and Donald Trump cannot be too different. The wars waged by proxy by Americans and Russians, particularly in Vietnam and Afghanistan, foretold the post-Cold War conflicts and the current fights in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, where less powerful adversaries use asymmetric strategies, ideology, most often based on religion, and social tensions to brave the two powers. The threat of terrorism will extend into the following decades due to the use of new technologies to the advantage of militants. China and Russia gained confidence in their military and economic capacities, while regional aggressors and non-state actors discovered new opportunities to promote their interests. The uncertainty regarding the evolution of the United States, the West that is focused on the problems worrying the Union and the erosion of conflict prevention norms and of human rights have encouraged China and Russia to provoke the USA in different regions of the world. Thus, an

⁵There had been a series of violent incidents on the border after the Tibetan Uprising of 1959, when India granted political asylum to Dalai Lama. India launched a policy of placing outposts along the border, including several posts north of the McMahon line, the east portion of the Effective Control Line proclaimed by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 1959.

⁶Chip Bohlen was the USA ambassador in Moscow between 1953 and 1957, being deemed one of the best Western specialists in Soviet policy. He was Harry Truman's counselor when George C. Marshall was Secretary of State.

⁷New York Time, 24th of July 1955.

aggression on a “gray area” belonging to the two powers, China and Russia, and the various forms of global / regional institutional disintegration will not generate a conventional war, but they will result in deep risks. Even if war is avoided, these trends lead to a division of the spheres of influence in the world. The risk of regional conflicts is enhanced by the diverging interests of the great powers, a growing terrorist threat, the ongoing instability in “weak” states and a dissemination of lethal and disruptive technologies. Failed states and non-state groups have access to technologies to create weapons of mass destruction and to use cyber-attacks against the critical infrastructure in various states. If the old continent does not develop a European approach to regulating new technologies, China and the USA will do so without us. They will also take over the leadership in global policies if Europa does not change its mindset in terms of defense and diplomacy. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation, in revealing the European strategy of administration, deputy-secretary for European and Euro-Asian affairs A. Wess Mitchell bluntly said: *“Europe is, without a doubt, a place of serious geopolitical competition. . . . We have to take this reality seriously. . . . America has to take this seriously”*. The USA pivots beyond the 70 years of foreign policy, a policy that promoted European integration as the primary security option for America. The main pillar of security and prosperity was the NATO Alliance. Nowadays, America is

competing with a part of Europe and seeks bilateral agreements with European countries similar to the one offered to France, as well as to the ones offered to the countries in the Three Seas Initiative. Europeans should pay attention to this new reality. The European leaders failed to influence the United States on the major problems affecting their interests, ranging from the customs taxes for imported goods to the withdrawal of the USA from the nuclear deal with Iran – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. How did Europe react to the Trump administration? If European leaders believe waiting out the term of the current American administration is enough, they are wrong. President Donald Trump is heading towards the second term. What are the arguments to this? The 3.2% growth rate of the gross domestic product in the first quarter of 2019 outlines the first reality to be noted in November 2020, as it conveys the real image of where the American economy will be then: not in recession! Recessions occur when the GDP growth is negative for two or more consecutive quarters, which is not the case in the USA. Indeed, the economy under President Donald Trump is strong and going stronger. Innovation accelerates, it does not slump. A recession before Election Day seems increasingly unlikely. It is no wonder that Trump dominates the GOP with an approval rating upwards of 80%. The deregulation of his administration is accelerating.

Preparedness levels in the American army were renewed and funds were allotted for high-level modern endowments. The relationship between America and its strongest ally, Israel, is at its highest level in the last decades. Meanwhile, the Democrats are faced with a Hobbesian choice⁸ between Bernie Sanders or Kamala Harris or former Vice President Joe Biden. Sanders and Harris are too much to the left, Sanders quite very much so. Biden is well below the level of his last years as Vice President of the USA. The nomination could go to someone else, such as Pete Buttigieg, the 2012 Mayor of South Bend Indiana, a 37 years old former American Navy Intelligence Officer. The Democrats have to create a campaign with new, charismatic people, approaching topics other than the economy, low unemployment in all professional environments, clarity about allies and enemies abroad and military reconstruction. We mentioned these aspects simply to understand the need for European leaders to rehabilitate their personal relationship with the US President and reconsider their position towards the transatlantic relationship under different conditions than those at the end of the Cold War.

⁸Thomas Hobbes was an English philosopher best known for his treatise, "The Leviathan". Hobbes wrote about political philosophy and other topics, providing a definition of human nature as a form of cooperation. Thomas Hobbes particularly believes that humans will naturally compete and fight for their own interests.

Donald Trump's policies towards transatlantic relationships are a response to the European weaknesses and division. Previous USA administrations have appreciated the transatlantic relationship and the joint ideals that bind the two parties together, particularly during the Cold War. In order to stay relevant, Europe must learn how to play in the competition between the great powers, it must learn to live with the new foreign policy of the US and with President Donald Trump. Since the end of the Cold War, European elites and decision-makers believed their multilateral decision-making model - i.e. the soft power and institutional interdependence model - was the future of international policy. Wrong! If Europe would rather be an actor than a chess table for the great powers to compete on, then European leaders must take responsibility for defense and security, to call their economic powers into play and to consolidate a solid nucleus within NATO, a nucleus that reinvents European security, instead of dreaming up improbable scenarios a utopic European army that is impossible to achieve not only because of the excruciating logistics that would have to be ensured in the theaters of operation (USA have a single type of Abrams tank, Europe has 15 types; USA has two types of frigates, Europe has 18; USA has a single specification of MEDEVAC helicopter, Europe has 18 - not to mention the diversity of

communications equipment!). New efforts such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund are moving Europe in the right direction, but still fall short of achieving military autonomy. The UK should take the leading role, as although it left the EU, it did not leave Europe. France, an ambitious country, could take a more assertive role in the regional conflicts in The Levant rather than waiting for US leadership. Germany, which is Russia's largest trade partner, could flex its economic muscle to push back against Putin. Europe should continue to engage the United States and push for its interests, but first and foremost, it should seize the moment to develop a vision for Europe's role in the world. Without European support, the United States will find it difficult, but not impossible, to compete with China and Russia in other theaters. Yet if Europeans truly want to make their case heard in Washington, they need to start at home. You have to have a strategy for all the geopolitical critical areas and join your strategy with that of America.

Rivals

The growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China is determined by the change in the power dynamics and the competing visions for the future international order. China's One Road One Belt initiative is a significant indicator of the magnitude of China's global

ambitions. The intention behind the initiative – be it economic or strategic – caused significant concern in the United States and in other Western chancelleries. While Beijing is painting the infrastructure development initiative as a benign investment project that is beneficial for all the parties – and in some cases this was clearly true – there are strategic manifestations that contradict this description. Washington is skeptical of this initiative, warning about the risks for the recipients and about the prejudice this will cause to America's strategic interests abroad. Yet many American partners are rejecting this facet of the financial support granted by China. Over the course of its development, the initiative that started out as an economic one has taken on a geostrategic profile. More than 150 countries and international organizations in Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa have given an affirmative response to this initiative. One Belt One Road is not seen as a traditional aid program, but as a money investment and an opportunity for China to enhance its connectivity. *There will be many benefits, for many countries, to China's \$1 trillion global infrastructure-spending plan,* Parag Khanna writes in Politico Magazine. *China's Belt and Road Initiative has caused anxieties in the West, but it will open important new markets; the 6 billion citizens of Europe, Asia, and Africa are now the "center of gravity of the world economy,"* Khanna writes. This strategic program of China also caused anxiety

for Japan, who is also a partner in providing alternative capital options for countries that need investments in infrastructure. Tokyo recently undertook a series of significant reforms to enhance its capacity to compete with and complete the projects of Beijing. Washington is in the position to take proactive measures to counter China's strategy (Format 16+1) in Eastern Europe. Thus, the USA supports the Three Seas Initiative in Eastern Europe. The project can be best understood looking at a map: the space of the 12 states that joined this endeavor appears to be a route uniting the North and the South of the old continent, cutting through the age-old division between the West and the East. The Three Seas Initiative tells the story of a project that, in its turn, has also stirred up worries in the capitals of great powers and that could be seen as a defense wall for the heart of Europe against influences stemming from Russia and Asia. Meanwhile, Russia has put up an *Iron Curtain* in the Black Sea and continues to militarize the maritime area. Crimea joins the two A2/AD areas (anti-access/access denied) created in the north of Europe in Kaliningrad and in Syria at Latakia, creating a Bermuda Triangle where military confrontations will be extremely rough if NATO Allies fail to take counter-measures or deterrence measures under a strategy that has already been shaped in the USA and was titled the "Porcupine Strategy". The implementation pivot

for the strategy would be the Constanta Port for the Black Sea.

Conclusions

With a level of economic and military power unequalled in the history of mankind, the United States could have pursued a foreign policy that would try to prevent the emergence of the two rivals. However, in 2008 the United States took a tumble. The wrong steps in the Middle East war, followed by the global financial crisis, signaled to its competitors that Washington was no longer invulnerable. Nowadays, rival powers China and Russia actively participate in the liberal order, even when they openly challenge the primacy of liberalism. The technological advances in terms of artificial intelligence (AI) provide weaker actors with the means to compete directly with the United States. Universal liberalism is no longer on the table. In turn, the United States is trying to prevent the emergence of closed regional spheres of influence and maintain free access to the commercial routes for the transport of energy and goods. The Washington's cooperation is still necessary for global stability, where possible, with the great powers, both via world institutions such as the UN and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and via regulatory regimes, such as those established under the Paris Climate Agreement. However, in the fields that are not governed by

international norms, such as AI, biotechnology and the cyber space, it must get ready to compete with its rivals while working with its allies to set new rules for the course of legislation.

The National Security Strategy of the United States unveiled in 2018 by the White House administration was built around the expectations of a new era of intensifying international competition characterized by “*growing political, economic and military competition*”⁹ that the United States is facing. The National Defense Strategy of the United States is even blunter in its assessment: “*We are dealing with an accentuated global disturbance, characterized by the downfall of a long-term international order*”¹⁰, it states. “*Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in the US national security*”. The document points to the “*reemergence of long-term strategic competition, by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers*”, says Mattis. He identifies two countries as potential rivals: China and Russia. “*It is becoming increasingly clear*” that both countries “*wish to model a world based on their authoritarian model – getting a veto right over the economic, diplomatic and security decisions of other nations.*”

⁹The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., December 2017, p. 2.

¹⁰Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, January 20, 2018, p. 1.

What is this competition for?
What are the participants' objectives?

Thucydides¹¹ postulated that nations compete for power. States are seeking a combination of power and security. Consequently, competition and conflict are caused by several actors that try to maximize their share of power over others – not for greed, but on account of the need to ensure their survival. However, in this process, their mutual ambitions lead war. Political scientist John Mearsheimer believes this is the “*tragedy of great power politics*”¹².

A second objective of the competition is the position in the international arena. Position is a critical element for states whose identity depends to some extent on their status in the world politics. Position-related objectives generally translate into objectives from other domains, whether economic, military or geopolitical. For China, the leading position undoubtedly entails both an influence equal to that of the USA, and the execution of a strategy that propels it as leader of the Asia region. Russia's objectives are integrally connected to its request that its sphere of influence at the outskirts of its borders, the

¹¹Thucydides was an Athenian political figure and historian, author of a wide monography of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in the second half of the 5th century BC. Thucydides directly involved in the events he narrates, in his capacity as strategist for Athens.

¹²John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton, 2014, p. 2.

former soviet states, return under its authority. It also wishes to return to its status as a major military power, projecting its forces by means of a string of military bases along and across the globe. Aside from these, there are states such as Turkey, India or Iran that are worried about their position and wish to participate in this competition as outsiders, having regional position objectives that can and actually do influence the competition among great powers.

Insofar as they wish for geopolitical results such as power, security and position, major powers also pursue economic objectives such as prosperity and economic influence. From a historical point of view, the pursuit of economic objectives is manifested in a series of economic strategies. The economic competition between the USA and Japan in the 1980s is a prime example (although the two countries joined in a military alliance and cooperated regularly in geopolitical matters), with Washington officials accusing Tokyo that it wished to dominate the industries that were providing technological supremacy.

Moreover, states seek control and access to resources. Traditionally, when raw materials were an important element of state power, these were a primary source of conflict between states. This is does not hold as true nowadays, and an integrated global economy where resources can be obtained via trade – and where the primary sources of competition result

from the application of knowledge rather than from the use of raw materials – made the competition for resources a less central aspect of international relations. There is, however, one exception: fuels. Fossil fuels continue to be an area of competition for resources, particularly oil and gas deposits in various regions of the world (South China Sea, Mediterranean Sea/Cyprus and the Black Sea).

Nations have traditionally competed on territorial topics. In many senses, territorial limits are the fundamental form of competition. A state is comprised of borders that one country can claim sovereignty over and can expand its political mandate. Unresolved borders are among the primary causes of war. The two most significant of these are China's claims over Taiwan and the "nine-dash line" in the South China Sea. Frozen conflicts (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia) that can generate regional conflicts involving major actors are also lethal subjects.

The nations compete to influence the international order by influencing international rules, norms and institutions. Thus, starting with the Concert of Powers, the League of Nations and the United Nations' post-war system, nations compete to set the rules and determine who will have the right to judge their enforcement. This was a major desideratum of the United States' 1945 foreign policy and determined the post-war order, an

effort that has certainly led to a competitive geopolitical advantage of the USA. China and Russia now want a change in the international system established after World War II, they want a new architecture of the international institutions.

How are great powers competing? What strategies, tools, techniques and capabilities are used to reach their objectives? Do the nations in this competition have a successful strategy?

The USA had this strategy after World War II, a strategy that allowed it to win the Cold War. China, for instance, can have unique concepts about its ways of competing and about the best strategies to be in the competition. These strategies derive from its own vision of the Asian geopolitical experience, which differs from the European one. According to the Washington Post, President Trump says that *a new arms race with Russia and China would be too expensive*. Therefore, the president stated his intention to reach new arms control agreements with these two countries in order to regulate Moscow's growing nuclear weapons arsenal and to limit the diversification of Beijing's military capabilities, such as anti-carrier missiles. Big picture: *"A trilateral nuclear arms-control agreement among the United States, Russia and China would be a watershed diplomatic achievement; separate treaties alone would be significant,"* the Post writes. *"But normally such pacts require years of*

negotiation and diplomatic outreach, a challenge for an administration that has withdrawn from arms-control treaties but has not brokered any new ones." Trump was vowing as recently as October to pursue arms races, not stop them. *"Until people come to their senses, we will build it up,"* Donald Trump told reporters. *"It's a threat to whoever you want. And it includes China, and it includes Russia, and it includes anybody else that wants to play that game."* The Wall Street Journal published its own interactive edition about how *"a fleet of American-built satellites is serving the Chinese government in ways that challenge the US"; "Nine of these satellites have been part of efforts to connect Chinese soldiers on contested outposts in the South China Sea, strengthen police forces against social unrest and make sure state messaging penetrates far and wide... A tenth satellite, under construction by Boeing Co., would enhance China's competitor to the U.S. Global Positioning System. Besides civilian uses, the navigation system could help China in a potential conflict, such as in guiding missiles to their targets."* Russia is actually waging what one might call a "Lukewarm War" against the West in a number of theaters. China does not want a Cold War or a Hot War or even a Lukewarm War with the United States¹³.

¹³On January 29, 2019, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its Worldwide Threat Assessment. Syria, a favorite punching bag of Washington's infamous regime changers, was mentioned 32 times. That's more than ISIS. It was mentioned

Also, the period we are going through is marked by a great uncertainty that is primarily due to a hostile competition between the USA, China and Russia, as well as to the lack of amicable relations between their leaders, the declining confidence and lack of transparency of the relations among them. The aggressiveness of the wishes and the nature of the objectives, primarily in Russia and China, are grounds for a tough competition in the international arena.

Nuclear deterrence remains a predominantly stabilizing factor. The structure of regional military balances is constantly changing (see the 2014-2017 period in Eastern Europe), similarly to the exponentially growing concern regarding the technologies used in the military field, which has a destabilizing effect on international affairs.

The upcoming competition will be complex and will play out in various fields of activity. We will have direct confrontations on regional ambitions, independent rivalries among regional powers with global

implications, competition for economic advantage and challenging the development and interpretation of international norms. Nowadays, the competition appears to be focusing vastly on the dissatisfactions or ambitions of having a place at the international negotiations table, on economic prosperity, on the technological advantage and on regional influence, rather than on conquests or the willful use of large-scale conventional war. In fact, the primary objective of the current competition could be the commitment of a few great powers, galvanized by the identity-driven nationalism to recover their “rightful place” in the world politics. Winning such a competition does not involve a clear conclusion. The Cold War created a false impression in this respect, moving towards an identifiable conclusion that could be called “victory”: the USSR collapse. Considering the nature of the government in Russia and China, the end will not be the same. The global situation will have to be managed on the long term and there will not be a winner without a new military confrontation. The emerging era that we are talking about is most likely a combination of cooperation and challenging, where the end is not the victory of the main players, this is a zero-sum game. The other powers will realign behind the contenders function of their interests.

China and Russia are aligned

29 times. Even North Korea was mentioned less, at 27 mentions. Iran, always the bad guy, got 72 mentions. **The winners were China and Russia.** China as a strategic competitor for American corporate power in Asia and a rival for soft power in the region was mentioned 87 times. Russia came in a close second at 85. *From the DNI's report of Jan. 29: Russia and China seek to shape the international system and regional security dynamics and exert influence over the politics and economies of states in all regions of the world and especially in their respective backyards.*

the same way they were in the mid-1950s and the relations between them are on an ascending course, although they are not always sincere. The objective of the two: USA unilateralism and interventionism and promoting democratic values and human rights by the westerners. While China and Russia are trying to expand their global influence, they erode the well-established security norms and increase the risk of regional conflicts, particularly in the Middle East and Eastern Asia.

Non-military aggression, especially in new fields where international laws are weak or non-existent, such as AI, biotechnology and the cyber space, is what is happening now and what Moscow and Beijing are involved in. It is unlikely for the UN or other global institutions to be able to obtain a sufficient consensus to promote mandatory standards for regulating these fields.

The USA endeavors to modernize alliances that are primarily created for defense against inter-state military conflict. The new elements of reinforcing the alliance between Europe and the USA should start focusing on the entire range of strategic contributions that the allies can bring to the collective defense, including in fields such as technological expertise, information exchange, planning resistance and using the power of the economic state, of the deterrence they can manage.

Accepting the fact that rivals in

the USA will have a certain influence is not the same as yielding the battlefield. To protect itself against traditional forms of aggression, the United States must maintain their military power in order to deter China, even if this means making a “violent” attempt to dominate in Asia and stop Russia via consolidated military deterrence from forcefully altering the status quo in Europe.

I will conclude this with an eloquent excerpt from “A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order” by Richard Haass: *“The challenge for the United States in shaping relations with both China and Russia is to discourage either from pursuing paths that would result in a new Cold War or worse without bringing about a confrontational relationship that would preclude selective and highly desirable cooperation on global and regional challenges. Succeeding in such an effort will be no mean feat. It is the diplomatic equivalent of threading a needle. What it requires, on one hand, is effectively shutting down the idea or temptation that coercion or aggression will succeed. Both Russia and China place an emphasis on their respective “near abroad”: the European countries to its west in Russia’s case, the South and East China seas in China’s. Use of force and unilateral actions to alter the territorial status quo need to be resisted and, if deterrence fails, responded to, with the nature of the response depending on local political and military realities. This requires the United States not only to remain strong overall but also to maintain*

both a local military presence and close ties to neighboring countries. China and Russia need to know that the United States has both the will and the ability to respond locally to anything they might do. Deterrence is obviously preferable to defense. But deterrence is never far removed from the perception that a government is willing and able to defend its interests. This argues for the stationing of military forces in and around areas that either China or Russia might claim or move against, something that translates into maintaining increased U.S. ground and air forces in Europe and increased air and naval forces in the Asia-Pacific. In the case of Russia, the United States needs to be prepared as well for the sort of "gray area" aggression carried out by irregular forces and armed locals in eastern Ukraine. Such tactics may not trigger NATO's Article 5 common defense clause, but they threaten stability all the same; what is required is training along with arms and intelligence support so that those NATO members near Russia can cope with such challenges should they materialize. Capabilities can be further enhanced through the regular dispatch of visiting forces and frequent military exercises. Such activity also underscores commitment and concern, thereby reassuring friends and allies and signaling actual or would-be foes. It is important that all this be done locally and with conventional military forces, as the United States never wants to put itself in a position where the only response to a

challenge is to escalate, whether by expanding a crisis in terms of geography or in the type of weaponry, or to acquiesce to the results of successful aggression. What the United States is now beginning to do in these regions moves in the direction of what is being advocated here.

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THE BLACK SEA – A GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Abstract:	<i>Accelerated and real implementation across the EU Member States of some strategic planning documents drawn up at European Institutions level - European Common Security and Defense Policy, EU External Security Strategy, EU Maritime Security Strategy, Integrated Maritime Policy - could represent important steps in creating a new environment that can lead to a new re-balancing action of state and non-state actors with geopolitical interests in the Wider Black Sea Region.</i>
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Introduction

Following the events of 11 September 2001, the European Union, the North Atlantic Alliance and the US have become more and more active and interested - both at geopolitical and geostrategic level - in the Wider Black Sea Area, using the area as a platform for the projection of allied forces in the fight against terrorism in the theaters of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Began in October 2001, the Afghan War waged by a coalition

formed of the United States and the United Kingdom was subsequently taken over by NATO. This conflict is one of the examples identified in contemporary history with regard to this last factor of the equilibrium of threats - the offensive intentions of the state. Afghanistan's level of power was clearly far below the level of the United States and the cumulative power level of NATO member states. But by using Afghan territory as the basis for the al-Qaeda terrorist

organization, the Afghan state has become a considerable threat.

The latest NATO Strategic Concept and European Security Strategy are proofs of the notion that the principle of balance of threat rather than of power is the current engine of international relations. Thus, after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continued its existence based on the emergence of other risks to the security of Euro-Atlantic states: extremist nationalism, ethnic tensions, inappropriate political change, internal political struggle, domestic economic problems, and terrorism and weapons of mass destruction after September 11, 2001.

Russia in the geopolitical and geostrategic framework of the Black Sea

The post-September 11 geopolitical developments in the international system called for a special focus on the Black Sea Enlargement Area. The main changes to be taken into account both for the establishment of regional and global balance of power are: Eastern enlargements of the European Union and NATO; increasing Europe's energy dependence on the Russian Federation; increasing the strategic role of the Caucasus and Central Asia through NATO involvement in Afghanistan; European aspirations of Turkey; the "colored" revolutions in Georgia and

Ukraine; frozen conflicts, instability in the former Soviet space; the aggression of the Russian Federation through the invasion of Georgia (2008) and the intervention in Ukraine, finalized with the annexation of the Crimea (2014).

The expanded Black Sea region has become significant to the North Atlantic Alliance with the launch of the war on terror, facilitating the transport of troops and the logistics of Afghanistan's theater of operations. By extending NATO to the East, the influence of the Russian Federation on the countries of the Wider Black Sea Region was significantly reduced. The principles of collective security are reflected by the interests of the United States in the Enlarged Region of the Black Sea, which is based on the idea that the expansion of peace and democracy in this area has a beneficial effect on the United States.

Russia's actions to increase its own security generate a counter-balance on the part of the international coalition. The effect of these operations is to reduce or cancel their own shares by balancing the regional power balance. Political cooperation between the caucasian republics and the Russian Federation is diminished by the Kremlin's economic and energy blackmail. However, if the benefits of cooperation and the costs of the conflict are high, the rational behavior of the belligerent parties can overcome the regional security dilemma. Improving communication between

the parties is a good solution, thus avoiding misinterpretations.

Russia aims at restoring its own sphere of influence, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, blocking or slowing the process of expanding the North Atlantic Organization in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and maintaining control over European countries' access to Caspian energy resources. In its ambition for the role of a regional power center, Turkey has proven to have the necessary capabilities to engage in diplomatic and economic confrontations for access to Caspian natural resources and to become a viable alternative to securing future energy routes.

It is noteworthy that Turkey has moved from the remote attitude of the Cold War, to Moscow, to cooperation and openness. Turkey's policies and strategies were sometimes similar or close to those of Moscow. A significant aspect is given by the fact that the strength of Turkey's naval military forces is clearly superior to the Russian fleet of the Crimean Black Sea.

The states belonging to the Extensive Black Sea Region have a double hypostasis, the difference being given by the original position of the perspective: from the point of view of the European Union, these states are part of the eastern neighborhood of the Union, while the Kremlin's perspective places them in the "close "of Russia. The region has many problems, ranging from interethnic conflicts and

mosaics of religions to instability, authoritarian regimes, economic underdevelopment, state failure, frozen conflicts¹⁴.

At present, Russia is strong enough to force the change in regional security architecture. On the other hand, Turkey continues to pursue its objective of gaining a prominent role in the international relations scene, making intense efforts to shape an independent foreign policy. The opposition of some of the EU member states to the continuation of Turkey's EU accession talks has been frustrating, emphasizing Ankara's tendency in forming its own direction to tackle the problems of the wider Black Sea region.

Russia is confronted with the energy independence trends of the former Soviet states, with the delayed effects of the 2008 economic and financial crisis, and with the difficulty of defining its international status. In parallel, the body of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a regional organization under Russian co-operation, is no longer familiar with the same initial solidarity, as more and more Member States are interested in the EU, and Moscow is trying, by all means, to strengthen the status of a regional leader able to create and

¹⁴ Gabriel Naghi, *European Security: Normative and Institutional Basis*, C.H.Beck, Bucharest, 2010, p.87.

coordinate an economic and political-military bloc¹⁵.

Regarding the relationship with NATO, the Russian Federation perceives the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance as a threat to its own security and its sphere of influence. For two decades after the end of the Cold War, until the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict in 2014, this situation was weighted by the cooperation between the two entities within the NATO-Russia Council. But following the annexation of the Crimea, the situation has changed dramatically, because the meetings of the council have been suspended and only contacts have been maintained at the highest level.

In March 2018, in an interview with the US press, Vladimir Putin said before the presidential election that *"The United States and NATO are threatening Russia and trying to block the country's development by sanctions."*¹⁶ The current Russian president spoke about Russia's plans to counter military threats, denying again allegations of Russian interference in the US presidential election, and finally tackling internal and external policy issues.

¹⁵ Cătălin Iulian Balog, Security and Balance in the Extensive Black Sea Region, in "Infosfera", 1st year, no. 4, 2009, pp. 29-30.

¹⁶<https://www.mediafax.ro/externe/interviul-acordat-presei-americane-de-vladimir-putin-inaintea-alegerilor-occidentul-vrea-sa-blocheze-dezvoltarea-rusiei-moscova-poate-respinge-amenintarile-video-17068070>, visited on 17.02.2019.

Asked about the announcement of a new type of missile capable of overcoming the anti-ballistic systems of the United States and NATO, Vladimir Putin reiterated the idea that Western anti-ballistic elements, including those installed in Romania, pose a threat to Russia that developed capable weapon to destroy NATO anti-ballistic systems. Referring to the nuclear weapons arms race, Putin said that *"this began when the United States decided to withdraw from the anti-ballistic treaty . We wanted to prevent this."* We asked our American partners to cooperate (...) We have not decided to withdraw from this treaty but the United States was the one who decided to do that. We have always said that the development of an anti-missile system (by the US) creates a threat to us, I have always said this. Our US counterparts do not recognize this, arguing that the system is mainly directed against Iran, but they have gradually admitted in the conversations that the system will destroy Russia's nuclear disarmament potential."¹⁷

In response to NATO military activities, the Kremlin leader reiterated that Russia has developed systems that can overcome Western anti-ballistic installations. *"All the systems we have presented can easily overcome the Western missile defense (...) There is an anti-missile system installed in the state of Alaska, the distance between Russian Ciukotka*

¹⁷<https://www.mediafax.ro/externe/interviul-acordat-presei-americane-de-vladimir-putin-inaintea-alegerilor-occidentul-vrea-sa-blocheze-dezvoltarea-rusiei-moscova-poate-respinge-amenintarile-video-17068070>, visited on 17.02.2019.

peninsula and Alaska is only of 60 kilometers. In Eastern Europe there are two anti – ballistic systems, one being in Romania. The construction of the other is almost completed in Poland. There are also naval forces. US military ships are very close to Russia both in the south and in the north. Imagine how it would be if we were deploying anti-missile systems near the US-Mexico border and between Canada and Mexico and sending military ships to these areas...because it is too expensive and we do not have such resources. We do not know how it will work. But in order to maintain the strategic balance to avoid the annihilation of the Russian nuclear deterrent forces, we will develop attack systems that could destroy US missile defense systems," Putin said.¹⁸

Turkey's role in the regional security setup

On the one hand, Turkey asserts its position as a trustworthy player in the areas of interest of the European Union and the United States. On the other hand, there is an opinion that Turkey intends to regain its influence in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. This view is confirmed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davudoglu's proposal, which as early as 2010 talked about the direction towards an ottoman pax. At the same time, Turkey is raising concern among European observers due to the tense situation with Israel in the Gaza

region, but also because of the tough statements of the current prime-minister Erdogan, issued by Turkey's prime minister.

After the 2011 elections won by Recep Tayyip Erdogan's party, Turkey's political leadership has produced important constitutional changes. In addition, Turkey's dynamic and ever-growing economy, foreign policy aimed at resolving conflicts with neighbors is soft power elements used to strengthen its regional power. Turkey has the advantage of a special strategic position within NATO. The internal disturbances generated by the fragile balance between the moderate Muslim government and the representatives of the national armed forces have failed to change the status of Turkey's regional power.¹⁹

Turkey has initiatives to stabilize the Middle East,²⁰ after normalizing relations with Syria and Iran by reducing conflicts, boosting trade, integrating infrastructure, expanding visas, launching strategic partnerships. This new foreign policy can be interpreted as a departure from traditional allies in Europe and the US, but at the same time it can be seen as a complementary direction and at the same time dependent on ties with the West. The policy of resolving conflicts with neighbors has fed into relations

¹⁸ Francis Ghiles, *Why Should Turkey Play by Western Rules*, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, january 2011

¹⁹ Cătălin-Iulian Balog, *op.cit.*, p. 30.

²⁰ Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints, Europe Report, no. 203, April 2010.

with Syria and Iran and can be used as an example for this area.

Another consequence of the 2011 foreign external politics is Turkey's retention to become a member of the EU. Negotiating chapters in this regard are not closed, focusing on the issue of Cyprus unification, with weak chances of concession from the ruling party in Ankara.²¹ An independent foreign policy of Ankara is considered to be in the Middle East's leadership aspirations and will place Turkey in contradiction with the interests of the United States. In the same direction, Turkey will restrict its activities within NATO, in order not to affect its interests in the wider Black Sea region, Caucasus and Central Asia. However, Turkey's foreign policy is unlikely to be against the interests of the European Union. Following the annexation of the Crimea and the outbreak of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Turkey has again become an active member of the North Atlantic Alliance, engaging in political and military engagement in naval maneuvers in the Black Sea basin alongside US naval vessels and NATO clusters as well as bilateral exercises regional initiatives aimed at ensuring maritime security.

The coup d'état in July 2016, corroborated with the subsequent successive actions of releasing

thousands of soldiers, police officers and magistrates (in key / key positions in state-owned institutions) has considerably removed Turkey from Euro Atlantic democratic values.

Turkey has a developed economy, being ranked seventh in the world rankings and a relatively young population of 78 million, with 26.9% of the population aged 14 and over.²² This is an argument favorable to Turkey's accession to the European Union through the infusion of a young population among the European peoples, for which the proportion of the young population under 14 is significantly lower (Germany - 13.5%, the United Kingdom - 16.5 %, France - 18.6%, Italy - 13.4%).

On religious level, Muslims account for 99.8% of the population, most of them being of Sunni origin. According to 2011 polls, the majority of Turkey's population supports the new active foreign policy and leans towards a European path to the EU member state. These polls show the willingness of those interviewed to make government efforts to reach favorable agreements, but also the claim that Turkey's foreign partners recognize the legitimate interests of the country.²³

By drawing up the profiles of the Russian Federation and Turkey,

²¹ Karol Kujawa, The Elections in Turkey. The Consequences for its Domestic and Foreign Policy, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, June 2011.

²² Carol Migdalovitz, Turkey: Politics of Identity and Power, Congressional Report Service, september 2010.

²³ Guenther Seufert, Foreign Policy perception in Turkey, The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, june 2011.

the binomial power between the two states stands out because both are economic powers with great significance and influence in the geopolitics of the Extensive Black Sea Region. The meaning of the binomial power phrase lies in the fact that the two states are also the most powerful and influential regional actors.

1. Romania – a regional security pillar

Romania may be an active player in implementing NATO's most important security and defense decisions in the wider Black Sea region. Its geographical position transforms it into a pillar of NATO's south eastern flank stability, reinforced by its regional policy focused on the principle of good neighborliness. Its regional role can be extended to facilitate cooperation between NATO and the countries of the Wider Black Sea Region. Referring to Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and the Baltic States, Jens Stoltenberg was conveying, as early as December 2017, that *"NATO and EU member states must improve infrastructure conditions to allow for better mobility of the military in Europe."*²⁴

The Black Sea region is a production and distribution zone of strategic importance for EU's energy

security. Considering this aspect, Andris Piebalgs, European Commissioner for Energy, stated that *"Romania is one of the biggest member states, a country with important resources and an excellent potential in renewable energy resources. It is a country that brings within EU many pieces of information regarding energy security... Of importance is also Romania's relation with the states from the Black Sea and Caspian Sea region. The last EU enlargement brought a completely new situation for member countries: for the first time EU has borders at the Black Sea, and this brings closer countries that seemed far-away, like Kazakhstan. Romania can bring ideas regarding cooperation and stability in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea region."*²⁵

Immediately after launching the Annual Report of 2017, the NATO Secretary General said he appreciated Romania *"because it is investing heavily in new defense capabilities. Romania has announced that it will achieve NATO's 2% target for military spending in 2018, reflecting the fact that between European Allies Romania makes a step forward (...)* In 2018, just like in 2017, Romania has massively invested and has considerably increased defense spending, while Romania is making major steps towards strengthening its armed forces. This is a real happiness for me, and the investments have effect on long-term."²⁶

²⁴ <http://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/jens-stoltenberg-pentru-calea-europeana-tarile-nato-si-uniunea-europeana-trebuie-sa-imbunatateasca-conditiile-de-infrastructura-pentru-a-permite-o-mai-buna-mobilitate-a-fortelor-militare-in-europa/>, visited on 12.02.2018.

²⁵ Ibidem.

²⁶ <http://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/exclusiv-interviu-secretarul-general-al-nato-2018-va-fi-un-an-important-pentru-romania-care-dintre-aliatii-europeni-a-investit-masiv-si-a-crescut->

The space east of Romania is in a process of geopolitical and geostrategic realignment that is not yet very clear and has divergent trends. Romania has stated its vision on the Black Sea in the White Book of Security and National Defense. Thus, Romania acts and will act as an important player in stabilizing the regional security environment, through its role of catalyst of cooperation policies, ensuring a stable climate in the Balkans and promoting the positive effects of multinational cooperation from South-Eastern Europe to the Black Sea and Caucasus.

The Black Sea region can become, on the medium and long term, a democratic, stable and prosperous space, functionally connected to the European and Euro-Atlantic space and having balanced relations of political cooperation with its Eastern neighbourhood, on the background of largely accepted power relations and instability risks, hesitations between distinct foreign policy options, a limitation of economic development as an effect of frozen conflicts, amid unclear and unpredictable global power relations. These elements of a negative scenario cannot be excluded. Important factors for approaching one scenario or the other will be the political options of the countries in the region, the reform processes of NATO and the EU and the evolution of the relations between the United States,

EU, Russia and Turkey. For all modern states, energy is a vital necessity and, therefore, their energy security represents a complex problem, essential for the functioning and developing of the society, in its entirety.

Due to the dynamics of the continental and regional geopolitical transformations, the statute of the Black Sea has not yet been finished, numerous controversies existing on the type of process that we are witnessing: coagulation or fracture. We believe that Romania has the obligation to play the role of the catalyst, as a pole of bringing together all the forces and efforts needed to fasten the region to the European and Euro-Atlantic space.

Conclusions

The balancing behavior of states in the Extensive Black Sea Region is generated by all four terms of threat equilibrium theory: power, proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions. The balance of the threat is broadly the ability of the system to maintain its state or control the pace of system state evolution by compensating for the variation in the behavior of some elements of the system. The resources at its disposal, the economic and commercial potential, the geographical position and the special military-strategic importance of the Wider Black Sea Region have brought this space to the

considerabil-cheltuielile-pentru-aparare/, /, visited on 17.02.2019.

attention of state and non-state actors with regional and global valences.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in an interview after the publication of the Alliance's 2017 Annual Report that *"NATO is the most powerful Alliance in history. We are by far the most powerful military alliance in the world today and we are able to provide discouragement and a credible defense. We are capable and ready to defend all our allies against any threat The reason NATO is a successful alliance is that we are able to transform ourselves as the world is changing. Now the world is changing and that's why we transform NATO both through collective defense in Europe and through our efforts to fight terrorism."*²⁷

Russia's new hybrid war in Crimea has embraced various forms of aggression, such as diversion, subversion, attraction in the race, finally culminating in putting the Ukrainian army in a non-combative position through accepted proposals to pass on the Kremlin administration, under the impetus of better pay. Putin did not just stop at this aggressive action and supports the front in eastern Ukraine, where the separatists are fighting for autonomy and their subsequent attachment to Russia, following the Crimean model.

Naval forces have the dominant role in the balance of power of the

Black Sea riparian states. The Russian Federation, with a significant number of ships, aircraft and submarines, equipped with a rather outdated technique, belonging to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, but also by annexing the Crimea and having administrative control in Sevastopol has a strategic regional power. These elements of Russian domination are balanced in the restoration of the Black Sea Enhanced Power Balance by the Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish naval forces - the latter being technically superior to those of Russia, as well as ensuring the permanent presence, by rotation, of a NATO ship or grouping.

In our point of view that the future security environment will include a combination of military and non-military challenges from state and non-state actors, with hybrid threats as a favorite form of manifestation.

²⁷ <http://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/exclusiv-interviu-secretarul-general-al-nato-2018-va-fi-un-an-important-pentru-romania-care-dintre-aliatii-europeni-a-investit-masiv-si-a-crescut-considerabil-cheltuielile-pentru-aparare>, visited on 17.02.2019.

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CONCLUSIONS ON HYBRID WARFARE

Abstract:	<p><i>A pioneer in the field of Public Relations, Edward L. Bernays, emphasized the use of words as weapons in his work entitled „Propaganda” in 1928. In „Public Relations”, he considered the word and image to be the representation of tools for building peace or war. Therefore, in 2013, the chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov stated that „the non-military means have proved to be used four times more frequently in modern conflicts than in conventional conflicts.”</i></p> <p><i>The Russian Federation is led following Lenin’s idea: “If Russia cannot control a country, then the respective country must be at least destabilized.</i></p>
Keywords:	hybrid warfare, techniques of persuasion, the word as a weapon of war, invisible government, special forces, misinformation operations, threat, subversion, green men, cyber-attacks, Russian hackers, asymmetric tactics, NATO, EU, The Russian Federation, USA, mineral resources
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Hybrid warfare, probably the last manner of waging current wars was defined by NATO as: „a large array of hostile actions of which military force is just a small amount which are used in a focused, concerted manner, as part of a flexible strategy with long-term goals.”

The Chief of Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov stated in 2013 that „non-military means proved to be used with a four times bigger

frequency in modern conflicts than in conventional ones.”²⁸

Therefore, resorting to political, economic, information, humanitarian and other non-military measures, besides other non-military measures and special forces in addition to local population can decide the fate of a war (see the model used by the Russian Federation in Georgia, but especially in the Ukraine).

²⁸Revista Geopolitica nr. 74 (2/2018), p. 37

Everything is achieved in time, during several years, for consolidating the intentions of this new way of waging war through means such as the following: propaganda, unconventional military training, perfect acknowledgement of the terrain, of the state of the population in the targeted areas controlling it very well, being able to succeed in large measure in whatever „tzar” Putin had set out as goals.

Hybrid warfare is not declared by any state; no action is conducted, taking advantage of all the weaknesses of the targeted state, such as those ethnical or organizational, where the case may be, in order to accomplish the goals set.

Mass-media plays an especially important role in this kind of war, influencing in large manner the morale of military, security and public order forces as well as that of citizens generally speaking.

It is not merely by chance that the founding father of Public Relations, Edward L. Bernays²⁹, emphasized even as long ago as 1928 using the word as lethal weapon in his work *Propaganda in Public Relations*; thus, the word and the image it creates become tools for building peace or war.

By making use of persuasive techniques and supporting a minority of people, in this case, forces trained especially for this purpose get to put

into practice that invisible reality that afterwards becomes official.

As a result, this type of wars waged by the Russian Federation is no longer declared as such and they are conducted outside the usual patterns, such as that in Ukraine especially.

Differences are erased between the following: the state of peace and the state of war; involving militaries and involving civilians; classical offensive - attack - actions and defensive actions:

- Differences among special forces, which are quite large in number, intelligence services and the simple soldiers;

- The role of undercover officers grew significantly, bringing an extremely important, even decisive, contribution to a complete collision, sometimes with dramatic consequences;

- The mobilization undertaken at a certain time disappears, being replaced by the secret one a long time before performing the intended actions;

- Gathering intelligence has been and still is of capital significance; the most important way of obtaining victory, even without military measures and classical, routine operations;

- All possible measures are used, not necessarily the classical ones, especially for decreasing the morale of people in the targeted state, by making use of the means of influencing the behavior of the respective population.

²⁹Edward L. Bernays, *Relații Publice*, Editura Alexandria Publishing House, Suceava, 2014, p. 3

Examples in this regard are the situation in Ukraine as well as that in Romania in 1989, when Romania was subject to disinformation operations.³⁰ These were added „a series of unexpected explosions, arsons in factories, public places, National Theater, 23 August Plant etc.³¹

„The investigation made by Romanian Senate upon the events in December 1989 mentions a sudden increase of Soviet tourists from 30,000 up to over 67,000 in December 1989 who remained in the country, without legal permission, one more year, until October 1990, when they were officially asked by the Romanian Prime Minister to leave Romania.³²

A common practice used by the USSR was „stirring ethnic minorities in order to bring Romania on the Soviet path”³³, as well as inculcating the idea that „Romania is unable to rule Transylvania.”³⁴

Budapest also used Hungarian paramilitary forces that spoke Romanian and were dressed in Romanian traditional attire against Hungarian and German ethnic population in Transylvania.³⁵

We have mentioned but a few of the numerous actions made by the

USSR (Russian Federation) and Hungary against Romania, while at the same time, „High Commissioner on National Minorities of European Council and independent organizations in the West talked about Romania as a model regarding the management of ethnic relations.³⁶

There is an invasion of fake news for generating complete confusion and, implicitly, a decrease in soldiers’ morale as well as in the state of mind of public safety and order forces and population itself.

It is increasingly popular to make use of software products and applications for monitoring the audience’s opinions.

Extremist materials are issued in huge quantities in order to intimidate citizens and make them submissive.

Another current strategy is the open use of the threat with conventional weapons, as well as the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Russia’s example in the hybrid warfare in Ukraine is relevant in this respect: the means used there were propaganda, corruption, threats, manipulation, subversion, intense migration in the latest years in Europe and the exploitation of ethnic and religious problems etc. Conventional military attacks were used alongside non-military ones, and even assassinations.

The goal of the hybrid warfare is Ukraine waged by the Russian

³⁰ Larry L. Watts, *Ferește-mă Doamne de prieteni*, Editura Rao, București, 2011, p. 32

³¹Idem pct. 3, p. 710

³²Idem pct. 3, p. 55

³³Larry L. Watts, *Cei dintâi vor fi cei din urmă*, Editura Rao, București, 2013, p. 223

³⁴Idem pct. 5, p. 226

³⁵Idem pct. 5, p. 242

³⁶ Idem pct. 3, p. 54

Federation was to destabilize the state power exercised over the territory without being forced to take into consideration the rules and losses of classical warfare.

Thus, Ukraine actually turned into a huge range area for experimentation for this type of modern warfare, a combination between conventional military attacks, coupled with disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and the use of all kinds of corruption plus manipulation of energy issues: gas, electricity, other mineral resources, etc.

The use of "little green men" in Crimea, who were actually soldiers from the Russian special-forces, without military insignia, but benefitting from excellent equipment and high-level training – physically, mentally, and militarily – ultimately produced significant results.

Those professionals, helped by other people, carefully prepared in advance, Ukrainian citizens but attached to the Russian cause, occupied the strategic points of interest in Crimea and the South-East of Ukraine, such as the Parliament and International Airport in Simferopol, they blocked all Ukrainian military units, other institutions from outside the capital city while in the capital city of Ukraine, authorities were busy with "Maidan" action.

According to specialists in the field, Ukraine turned into a huge laboratory and testing range for these

multiple and especially efficient forms of modern warfare.

The victory in this area was also facilitated by the cyber-attacks conducted by Russian hackers in the latest years in Ukraine, against NATO and, why not, all over Europe in the very near future.

Military specialists in the field consider that this type of warfare was actually initiated in Russia, determined by losing in the economic competition and thus hoping to influence the public policies of the Western world.

The official employment of soldiers in the Russian Federation could be accomplished in the final phase, namely the activities related to peace keeping in the respective areas in Eastern Ukraine for being as close to reality as possible.

The need to take again its place as super-power held by the Russian Federation next to the USA led to Russia's return to the forefront of world politics, by any means, including by taking advantage of the alliance with China which has a detached leading role in the world regarding its GDP of over 23 trillion dollars.

Hybrid wars are not declared by states; the military component of a hybrid war is not explicitly assumed as it is not the only one used, but rather advantage is taken of the military and non-military weaknesses of the targeted states, the internal tensions and frictions, their weak, corrupted

institutions, as well as their economic or at least energetic dependence.

Ambiguous, asymmetric, hybrid tactics were used – in one word, “unconventional” – carefully adjusted to the area, taking advantage of the enemy’s weaknesses and making use of the „small steps policy”.

This is what the Russian Federation did in Crimea, Lugansk, Donetsk, Transnistria, Moldova, Georgia etc. A lot of the actions were based on the support of Russian-speaking community and not only, according to current Karaganov doctrine.

Moscow wishes to rule over its neighbors in order to prevent them from coming too close to the Western world as well as to undermine its main opponents: the USA, NATO, the EU; furthermore, it wishes to regain its influence in the Balkans, Northern Africa, the Middle East, by cultivating its relationships with Turkey and by establishing a partnership with Egypt, while by conquering Crimea it comes back as a main power at the Black Sea. Clearly, Putin’s ambitions do not stop there..

The Russian Federation has as a creed Lenin’s idea that „If Russia cannot control a country, then that country has to be at least destabilized.”³⁷

The new Russian strategy of returning to the superpower position is going to intensify the rivalries among

the great powers, namely: Russia – USA, China – USA etc.

The policy of modern Russia, as a legitimate successor of USSR, is determined by historic traditions, in addition topromoting a new government strategy, by making use of tough measures for raising the rating, such as the overnight emergence in Russia of disasters, fake terrorist attacks, serious explosions, with lots of casualties followed by the inevitable conquering of the targeted territories by Russian Federation.

Putin threatened several times the USA and the EU with the possible annexation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine and the US and Western countries’ reactions were quite weak.

It should not come as a surprise that Kremlin’s ambitions are not going to be satisfied once and for all with Ukraine, the history proving just that.

Unfortunately, the EU is confused, it lacks valuable leaders, a clear position generated by consensus and hence the present consequences that bother the population raising their level of discontent.

The prevention measures of hybrid tactics are complex and they pertain to all the fields of activity, starting with defense, public order, finances, intelligence services, diplomacy, efficient combating of cyber-attacks, political consensus and a firm position of EU leadership against Russia.

³⁷ Geopolitica nr. 67 (4/2016), p. 122

We should keep in mind that the perception on Russia has almost always been reduced to a feeling of contempt and aversion in many countries of the world, and especially Europe.

In hybrid warfare, the essential issue is finding the weak points of the leaders of the targeted states, of their armed forces, public order forces, intelligence services, corruption, economic and energetic dependence etc.

What is important is the adhesion and support of the population and not really the actual invasion of the targeted areas. It is also believed that Russia is going to always choose national pride over people's prosperity.

Putin, aided by his former KGB colleagues, appointed in highly influential positions in Russia, started a few years ago an aggressive, expansionist policy of the country, despite considerable costs for the country.

Western sanctions, international isolation, the crisis determined by the decrease in oil and natural gas prices have not yet managed to bring "tsar Putin" down on his knees.

The intensification of rivalries between the great powers is going to become pure certainty, such as the confrontation Russia – USA, China – USA, including through the battle for acquiring the last reserves of mineral resources in the world, including those in Antarctica.

Thus, we are witnessing a fierce race for mineral resources as well as water and fresh air resources.

At the same time, Russian Federation will act for consolidating its position in Europe, especially against ex-socialist countries, encouraging nationalism, undermining NATO, the EU and the USA, and increasing again the role of military forces in international relations as well as, and especially between the relations among the world's greatest powers.

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REGIONAL SECURITY

Security Strategies and Policies in the EU

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EUROPEAN UNION'S NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

Abstract:	<i>The beginnings of the European Union's nuclear non-proliferation policy date back to the 1980s, but only starting from 2003 the EU became strongly involved in this field, as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, adopted in December 2003, marked the institutionalization of the EU's non-proliferation policy. Although the document was supposed to bring more efficiency and efficacy, the truth is that more than 15 years passed since its adoption and the European policy of nuclear non-proliferation can still be considered as having rather moderate results. The European Union's nuclear non-proliferation policy had so far a limited impact and a moderate efficiency not due to the lack of instruments and means but mostly because the instruments foreseen in the official documents are either not used or are improperly used. The Treaty of Lisbon did not bring, as it was supposed, more coherence and consistency in this field, and in these circumstances it becomes important to analyze what could and should European leaders do in the near future if the desiderate is to develop a real nuclear non-proliferation policy.</i>
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**I. Weapons of mass destruction
- a threat to international and
European security**

The beginning of the nuclear era is considered by most analysts to be placed at the end of the Second World

War, but as noticed by David E. Newton in the work *Nuclear Power*, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki only brought to the surface a technology that started to be researched many years ago³⁸. The existence of nuclear energy was obvious for the scientific community once the proton was discovered at the beginning of the 20th century.

Coming closer to our century, the United Nations report entitled "*A more secure world: our shared responsibility*" mentions the main threats to international security. According to this document, nuclear proliferation is an essential preoccupation for the international community, alongside with international terrorism, interethnic and interreligious conflicts, networks of organized crimes; environment problems; and the deepening of the development gaps between the North and the South³⁹.

This conclusion should not come as a surprise if we analyze the evolution of nuclear proliferation. If in 1945 only the United States of America possessed the nuclear technology, being also the only state to have ever used nuclear weapons, the end of the Second World War brought a real arms race between the two superpowers and the beginning of the first nuclear era.

The end of the Cold War brought instead what came to be known as the second nuclear era, this time the arms race being between the developing states. During the second nuclear era there can be noticed an intensification of states' efforts to combat proliferation, in the first phase these efforts being determined by the desintegration of the Soviet Union and the possibility for a large part of the soviet nuclear arsenal to remain and be used by the former soviet states now independent. Fortunately, this problem was solved as the former soviet states returned to Russia the entire nuclear arsenal located on their territories.

Another feature that strongly distinguishes the post-Cold War period is the raising interest of developing states to have indigenous nuclear programmes. Accordingly, while in some regions of the world, which formerly used to be involved in the nuclear arms race, nuclear weapons become less important and efforts are being made to limitate their number (Europe, America, the former soviet space), other regions seem to be moving in the opposite direction (Asia, South-East Asia)⁴⁰. The most relevant examples are the ones of India and Pakistan, both states having tested nuclear arms in 1998, which have caused a regional nuclear arms race,

³⁸ D. E. Newton, *Nuclear Power* (New York: Facts on File, 2006), 3.

³⁹ United Nations Organizations, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility* (New York, 2004), 2.

⁴⁰ D. Howlett, „Nuclear Proliferation“, *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, John Baylis and Steven Smith (eds.), Third Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 501.

with unpredictable consequences on the long term. The year 2006 marked the entrance into the nuclear club of North Korea, while starting from 2003 Iran started to attract the attention of the international community due to its national nuclear programme which is suspected of having military dimensions.

In these circumstances, in June 2003, the European Council started to analyze more closely the nuclear proliferation problem and adopted the *Declaration on non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, a precursor of the *European Union Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, which was adopted in December 2003. Although adopted as a declarative document without any legal value, the strategy represents a novelty in comparison with the former weak attempts of European states to have a common position in problems related to international security. The *European Union Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, clearly mentions that "weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are a growing threat to international peace and security"⁴¹, a threat that cannot be ignored by the European Union.

The beginnings of the European Union's nuclear non-proliferation policy are analyzed in the first part of the paper, while the second part

focuses on the development of this policy field starting with the adoption in 2003 of the *European Union Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (EU WMD Strategy). The third part of the paper critically analyzes the instruments that the European Union has at its disposal to fight against proliferation, while the last part includes an evaluation of the policy as well as recommendations for the future development of a real, consistent and coherent nuclear non-proliferation policy.

II. The beginnings of the European Union's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy

From 1945 to 1970, nuclear non-proliferation seemed to be a preoccupation only for the United States of America, while the members of the European Community (EC) were rather salient in the field. Due to the interest of many states in acquiring nuclear technology, a large debate emerged on the transfer of nuclear technology and numerous export regime controls were created in the 1970s to which also the EC member states were parties. The EC member states were also members of the Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) established in 1958, but the treaty that established this Community mainly aimed at preventing proliferation among the member states and most notably by Germany and thus only established a system of safeguards and export controls.

⁴¹ The European Council, *The European Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (2003), 3.

These initiatives from 1970s prove that nuclear proliferation was considered an important issue by most European member states, but two main constraints impeded them to develop a policy in the field. These two main constraints are the different nuclear status of member states and their attitudes towards nuclear weapons complemented by the different transatlantic relations.

Although the legal and policy bases for developing a non-proliferation profile existed since the creation of Euratom in 1958, the first EC initiatives with external dimension in the field of nuclear non-proliferation date back to the 1980s. The Council decided in 1981 to set up a working group on nuclear issues in the context of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), and while "Euratom had the task of dealing with proliferation within the Community, the EPC working group on nuclear questions was concerned with averting proliferation externally"⁴². The Single European Act introduced the concept of European Political Cooperation, and in this way formalized also the evolutions in the field of nuclear non-proliferation which was established as a goal of EPC⁴³.

⁴² C. Portela, *The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond*, PRIF Reports No. 65 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2003), 2.

⁴³ D. Fischer and Müller H., "Non-Proliferation Beyond the 1985 Review", in *Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Papers* (Brussels, n° 26, 1985), 34.

As noted by Camille Grand, the cooperation of EC member states in the field of nuclear non-proliferation intensified in the period 1985-1990, as the working group met more frequently and bilateral consultations became common⁴⁴. Still, in terms of external activities, the evolutions were not remarkable as the activities were limited to common declarations of the member states presented within different international organizations. The European Community preferred during the 1980s and most of the 1990s to maintain a soft security approach in the field, as it could not manage "to gather enough political consensus amongst its Member States to engage in issues such as non-proliferation, disarmament or the prevention of biological and chemical warfare"⁴⁵.

There were two important factors related to the international security environment that radically changed the position of EC member states and made them more willing to cooperate on nuclear non-proliferation. Firstly, the end of the confrontation between the East and the West brought to the forefront concerns related to the future of the Russian nuclear arsenal located in different former satellite states. Secondly, the war in Iraq in 1991 revealed the need to strengthen the

⁴⁴ C. Grand, *The European Union and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons*, Chaillot Paper 37 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), 10.

⁴⁵ R. Kobia, "The EU and Non-Proliferation: Need for a Quantum Leap?", *Nuclear Law Bulletin*, Vol. 2008, No. 1 (2008): 35.

international non-proliferation efforts after the disclosure of a secret nuclear program. Thirdly, and related this time to the internal situation in the EC, in 1992 France became party to NPT and thus removed the last obstacle for developing a common policy in the field.

The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Union, offered an impulse to intensify cooperation in the nuclear field, as the new pillar of the Common Foreign and Security Policy covered all areas of foreign and security policy. As remarked by Bruno Tertrais, a "EU non-proliferation policy began to take shape in the mid-1990s with the use of the CFSP toolbox (Presidential Declarations, Common Positions, Common Strategies, and Action Plans) for non-proliferation purposes"⁴⁶.

In the first half of the 1990s, the EU became more involved in nuclear non-proliferation using several instruments which unfortunately then as now were not organized in a very coherent system easily to be understood. For simplification, in this paper we consider that the main instruments used by the EU to fight nuclear non-proliferation can be summarized as being: a)

multilateralism, with reference to the support offered by the EU to universalize the international non-proliferation regimes, support offered to international organization with tasks in the field and cooperation with strategic partners to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime; b) external assistance offered to third states; c) intervention in regional nuclear proliferation crisis.

Concerning multilateralism, one of the most notable successes of the European Union has been the indefinite extension of the NPT during the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The preparation of the conference has been the subject of a common EU action and several instruments have been used to promote at the international level the indefinite extension of the treaty before the conference took place. External assistance concentrated in this period on Russia and the former communist states in order to support them to dismantle their nuclear arsenals and to strengthen the physical security and safety of nuclear facilities.

The weakest instrument has proved to be the intervention in regional proliferation crisis with EU having attempts to intervene in North Korea by offering financial assistance to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, India and Pakistan through financial and technical assistance for confidence building in the region and for the implementation of export control

⁴⁶ B. Tertrais, "A European Perspective: The European Union and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Does Soft Power Work?", *Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Transatlantic Debate*, by Ettore Greco, Gasparini Giovanni; Riccardo Alcaro (eds.) (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2014), 38.

regimes⁴⁷. It is sufficient to mention that the common EU response to the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 were some declarations condemning the tests and inviting both countries to join the NPT and the CTBT, while member states adopted individual measures according to their preferences- with some member states freezing their aid for these two states while others refrained from taking any measures considering that it is the best reaction towards two states which are not parties to the NPT.

For almost a decade, 1995-2003, the EU had no major initiative in the non-proliferation area with the exception of "two joint actions that are more technical than political, a few common positions and a series of statements by the presidency on behalf of the European Union"⁴⁸. The analysts consider that this regress is attributable to the primacy of national interests, to the tyranny of the lowest common denominator and to the irreconcilable positions of member states on nuclear disarmament⁴⁹, which in practice meant that most of positions and actions lacked ambition and that the level of attention for different subjects varied considerably according to these preferences.

⁴⁷ E. Denza, "Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The European Union and Iran", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005): 296.

⁴⁸ C. Grand, 21.

⁴⁹ *Idem*, 30-33.

III. The European Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The international environment changed once again after 2000, determining the member states to develop a more coherent and stronger nuclear non-proliferation policy. The 2001 events in America followed by the actions in Afghanistan and Iraq turned the attention of the international community towards terrorism, while the US clearly indicated after the beginning of the new millennium that they were not willing anymore to play an important role in non-proliferation. In consequence, the EU could fill this gap by becoming a major player in nuclear non-proliferation and at the same time could use this opportunity to restore its credibility affected by the split during the Iraq war. Moreover, to these factors one can add also the fact that the enlargement of the European Union with ten new member states was approaching, and could have determined the European states to adopt a stronger stance in nuclear non-proliferation before the interests and preferences of these new member states could affect the development of a policy in this field. Lia Caponetti correctly appreciates that "a framework was needed to accommodate new states with different security capabilities, traditions and routines"⁵⁰.

⁵⁰ L. Caponetti, *European Union's WMD Non-proliferation policy: the competence-sharing*

In 2001 the European Council of October analyzed for the first time the possible links between the terrorist threat and EU efforts on non-proliferation, "opening the path for the gradual development of a new policy at the European level"⁵¹. But it took two more years for the European Union to signal its willingness to become a major player in nuclear non-proliferation by adopting comprehensive documents that deal with the subject and by acting united in Iranian nuclear crisis.

There were several documents adopted in 2003 with direct reference to nuclear non-proliferation that preceded the adoption of the EU Strategy against WMD in December 2003. In February 2003, upon the initiative of Sweden, the General Affairs and External Relations Council formally agreed to review EU non-proliferation policy. On 10 June 2003, the Political and Security Committee of the EU agreed on the *Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, which includes also an *Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*. The Action Plan grouped measures to be undertaken by the EU into two categories: measures for immediate

action and measures to be implemented over a longer period. Both these documents originated in a Council decision dating back to April 2002, which was taken within the framework of the fight against terrorism. In November 2003 the Council of the European Union adopted the non-proliferation clause as a mean to promote non-proliferation through its external relations, included in the strategy one month after.

The final version of the *EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* was adopted by the member states in December 2003 alongside with the *European Security Strategy* entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. The EU WMD Strategy identifies WMD proliferation and their means of delivery as being a "growing threat to international peace and security"⁵², while in the European Security Strategy they were considered as being "potentially the greatest threat to our security"⁵³.

Furthermore, the EU WMD Strategy defines multilateralism as the cornerstone for combating proliferation of WMD, while the promotion of a stable international and regional environment is a condition for fighting proliferation and for close cooperation with key partners crucial for the success of activities in the field. The document lists the instruments available for fighting proliferation in the order that they should be used according to the

between EU institutions (Catania: Jean Monnet Centre, 2014), 4.

⁵¹ T. Renard, *Partnering for a nuclear-safe world: the EU, its strategic partners and nuclear non-proliferation* (Brussels: European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, 2013), 9.

⁵² The European Council, 1.

⁵³ *Idem*, 3.

crisis the EU has to face: “multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally-coordinated export controls; co-operative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers (including trade and development policies); interdiction of illegal procurement activities and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter”⁵⁴.

Although adopted as a non-binding document, the EU WMD Strategy marked the institutionalization of the European nuclear non-proliferation policy. The strategy is considered more a symbol of European unity than a guiding document for action. The main three merits of the EU WMD Strategy are that it has made non-proliferation one of the main objectives of the external action of the Union, it builds on the EU's successes in areas where it has done relatively well and foresees the possibility that its diplomatic efforts can fail⁵⁵.

The EU WMD Strategy has set multilateralism as the cornerstone principle in non-proliferation, together with other guiding principles, such as the mainstreaming of non-proliferation in all policies and agreements, support to multilateral institutions, the commitment to co-operate with like-minded partners, and the recognition that increased efforts are necessary. The European Security Strategy and

the EU WMD Strategy describe the application of “effective multilateralism” as including the following stages: addressing the root causes of proliferation, alleviating security concerns that drive countries to acquire WMD in the first place; strengthening multilateral treaties like the NPT by improving detection and assisting with compliance, reinforce export control regimes, and devise new treaties like the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; and where political measures fail, applying coercive action (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) through the United Nations. While some analysts consider multilateralism as the main innovation brought by the strategy, others prefer to stress the conditionality or the fact that for the first time the use of force is mentioned as a last resort measure to combat proliferation.

As a consequence of the EU WMD Strategy, the Council publishes biannual reports on the evolutions of non-proliferation efforts, intensified its activities in the field and established in 2006 a WMD Monitoring Centre which aims to ensure a cooperative working method which allows the Council, the High Representative, the Commission and the member states to work together on the subject.

The New Lines of Actions have been adopted by the EU member states in 2008 and aimed to offer more coherence and effectiveness to the EU

⁵⁴ *Idem*, 8.

⁵⁵ C. Portela, 29-30.

WMD Strategy by emphasizing internal integration, creation of common policies and promoting convergence of practice between the member states. Still, the changes brought by this document are generally viewed as modest.

The *Lisbon Treaty* slightly affected the responsibilities of different institutions in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. Both the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Council President had received the task of representing the EU in international non-proliferation organizations. The new European External Action Service prepares policies for the Council and the Commission and ensures consistency between different policy areas and houses the personal representative of the High Representative responsible for non-proliferation⁵⁶.

IV. The European nuclear non-proliferation policy: actors and instruments

Apart from the different nuclear status and attitudes of member states towards proliferation and towards the transatlantic relations, the institutional constraints and divergences on competences severely hamper the development of a genuine European nuclear non-proliferation policy. After

2003, year in which non-proliferation officially became one of the main objectives of CFSP, the Council of the European Union was responsible mainly for the implementation of the EU WMD Strategy and international agreements while the European Commission was in charge with the long-term capacity building activities⁵⁷.

In 2006 the EU WMD Centre was created with the aim to implement and develop the EU WMD Strategy and to create synergy among the various European actors. Consequently, from 2007 until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission and the Council officials met once a month, and every six months with member states in the Centre. The establishment of the Centre is a proof that member states recognized that there is a high need for horizontal and well and vertical institutional consistency and coherence in the non-proliferation policy.

Following the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the European External Action Service (EEAS) now centralizes many non-proliferation policies. However, coordination remains highly important even within the EEAS, given that competences are divided among thematic desks, geographic desks and the Foreign Policy Instruments' unit. In addition, several Commission Directorates-

⁵⁶ Y. Pettersson, *EU Actorship in the Non-Proliferation area-An Analysis*, Master Thesis (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2013), 25.

⁵⁷ T. Renard, 11-12.

General (DG) maintain some influence over this field, while Euratom also plays an important role in EU non-proliferation policies, not least because it has the exclusive right to conclude supply contracts for nuclear materials with the rest of the world.

The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the ending of the pillar structure did not translate into a more coherent and efficient institutional structure in the European nuclear non-proliferation policy. There are still gaps and duplications in the competences attributed to several European structures and institutions. Lia Caponetti remarks at this point that "this new and more "Communitarian" framing of EU foreign policy hides old and new rivalries and loyalties, triggering a vicious cycle. The attempt to bring coherence and coordination through the HR and the EEAS is indeed undermined by the HR's priority to "satisfy" the European Council to which he/she is accountable and Member States' strategic interests"⁵⁸.

Even in terms of instruments and means available to implement the European nuclear non-proliferation policy, the situation is not better. As already mentioned, for simplification, in this paper we consider that the main instruments used by the EU to fight nuclear non-proliferation that can be summarized as being: a) multilateralism, with reference to the

support offered by the EU to universalize the international non-proliferation regimes, support offered to international organization with tasks in the field and cooperation with strategic partners to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime; b) external assistance offered to third states; c) intervention in regional nuclear proliferation crisis.

As for the evolution of the EU policy in the field of nuclear non-proliferation in the last decade that passed since the adoption of the WMD Strategy, one needs to appreciate that the activities of the EU in the area have diversified and multiplied considerably and also the geographical scope of the EU action has extended. Multilateralism refers according to the EU WMD Strategy to the universalization and strengthening of the main treaties, fostering the role of the UN Security Council, enhancing political, financial and technical support to verification regimes, strengthening export control policies and practices.

An analysis of what the EU has done in this field in the last decade reveals considerable evolutions since the adoption of the strategy in all of these areas: EU offers financial support to international organizations active in non-proliferation with more than 20 decisions adopted since 2003 through which considerable funds have been allocated, is active and had a more coordinated position within the UN,

⁵⁸ L. Caponetti, 46.

the NPT review conferences and specialized groups.

The EU also makes diplomatic efforts to promote treaties and regimes in the field of non-proliferation. At this point, it can be mentioned the Common Position of the EU dating from 1999, which was renewed in 2003 and accompanied by an Action Plan, for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Unfortunately these efforts have not been very successful, as the treaty has not been ratified by a sufficient number of states in order to enter into force.

Not lastly, the EU offers considerable financing for the international organization active in the field of non-proliferation. For example, the EU has adopted a Joint Action for support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including a financial contribution of 10 million Euros for three years (3.3 million Euros for 2004) to its Nuclear Security Programme (2004)⁵⁹. Financial support is also offered to smaller multilateral initiatives in the field of non-proliferation, as for example G8GP which is a G8 disarmament initiative entitled the *Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction* aiming to secure and dispose of the relics of the Cold War, or the Proliferation Security Initiative which global effort supported by more than 100 countries that aims to stop

WMD trafficking, their delivery systems, and related materials involving states and non-state actors that have been identified as potentially dangerous.

In terms of cooperation with strategic partners to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is important to mention that the Union has strategic partnerships with ten countries (Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States). Even if these partnerships are not all equally relevant to the EU's non-proliferation efforts, they do constitute a useful instrument at the service of a more effective strategy. Most of these partnerships' objectives in terms of non-proliferation are not very well defined. Therefore, not all partnerships are relevant for non-proliferation, but still they can contribute to the following purposes: opening bilateral channels to share global views, to exchange expertise and capabilities; facilitating contacts and cooperation on specific cases of proliferation; strengthening the regional and multilateral regimes through the deepening of privileged relationships with key players; facilitating cooperation on nuclear safety and security with important countries⁶⁰.

One of the most debated instruments that the Union uses to promote the universalization of treaties and regimes is the non-

⁵⁹ B. Tertrais, 40.

⁶⁰ T. Renard, 11.

proliferation clause. Adopted in November 2003, the WMD clause aims to promote non-proliferation through EU's external relations and “was intended to be included as an essential element in all new, renewed or revised ‘mixed agreements’ between the European Union (EU) and non-EU states (referred to by the EU as ‘third countries’)⁶¹. The non-proliferation clause has a standard model adopted by the Council, but it is meant to be flexible and can be adapted depending on the third state and on other interests that the EU might have in that specific country. Three years after its adoption, the main obstacles for its implementation in practice were already obvious: the form that the clause should take in agreements with different countries and the response that the EU should have in front of the resistance to the clause from countries of proliferation concern⁶².

The record so far shows that only two mixed agreements that include the WMD clause have entered into force (Albania and the revised Cotonou Agreement), while in the case of other countries the clause has been preliminarily agreed but not signed with (China, Libya, South Korea and several Central American states) and some progress has been achieved in negotiations with other states (Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines

and Vietnam). In case of countries that are of proliferation risk, the clause has no or very limited value and attempts of the EU have been met with resistance, while the clause has applied additional conditionality on states of no or little proliferation concern.

Against this poor record, Lina Grip suggests three options to breathe life into the non-proliferation clause, namely: rethinking the purpose of the clause, which so far has been defined as mainstreaming, redrafting the clause in the sense of moving away from generic standards to a more context-based approach, and enhancing transparency around the clause, including on failed negotiations⁶³.

As second instrument, the European Union also uses external assistance offered to third countries as a tool to promote non-proliferation, but this does not represent a novelty since the Union has used this instrument well before the adoption of the WMD Strategy. The European Union has many instruments at its disposal through which it funds projects in third countries, some of these instruments being part of the CFSP budget and others part of the Commission's budget.

In 2007, the Commission tried to reform the funds for non-proliferation

⁶¹ L. Grip, *The EU Non-Proliferation Clause: A Preliminary Assessment*, SIPRI Background Paper (November 2009), 1.

⁶² *Idem*, 5.

⁶³ L. Grip, *The European Union's Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Clause: A 10-Year Assessment* (Brussels: The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks, 2014), 14.

and developed the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation with an allocation of €524 million for the period 2007-2013, and around €225 million foreseen for the period 2014-2020, comprising a larger geographical area than the former TACIS Programme which applied to former communist states. Other budget instruments of the Commission used for financing non-proliferation activities are: the Instrument for Stability, the Instrument for Pre-Accession, the Development Cooperation Programme and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument. Despite of these and other funds allocated to non-proliferation projects, the conclusion that many analysts come to is that although proliferation is considered a growing threat, nevertheless the funds allocated to combat it are limited and dispersed in way too many instruments between which there is a lack of coordination.

The last of the means used by the European Union to fight proliferation, namely its interventions in solving regional crisis, has grown considerably as intensity since 2003 with the EU attempts to try to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis. Indeed, the Iranian nuclear file has been the first instance that the EU acted united in order to prevent nuclear proliferation. The European states have accepted the position of main negotiator since 2003 and succeeded in the first years to sign two agreements with Iran with the aim of halting the progress in the evolution

of the Iranian nuclear programme. Later on, the EU became part of the P5+1 group (comprising the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) and started to use sanctions, multilateral and well as unilateral, as part of its strategy of coercitive diplomacy.

Negotiators from the P5+1 group and Iran announced on July 14, 2015, after 20 months of negotiations, that a comprehensive agreement aimed at limiting Iran's nuclear capabilities had been reached, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Under the agreement, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges for 13 years. For the next 15 years, Iran will only enrich uranium up to 3.67%. Iran also agreed not to build any new heavy-water facilities for the same period of time. Uranium-enrichment activities will be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges for 10 years. Other facilities will be converted to avoid proliferation risks. To monitor and verify Iran's compliance with the agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities. The agreement provides that in return for verifiably abiding by its commitments, Iran will receive relief

from U.S., European Union, and United Nations Security Council nuclear-related sanctions⁶⁴.

In other cases of proliferation the EU has not been that active. For example, in the North Korean nuclear file the Union is more of a bystander. Despite some voices asking for more involvement in this case, the EU actions are limited to maintaining a political dialogue with North Korean authorities and imposing sanctions, while the actual negotiations are left on the hands of the six-party talks. A similar lack of reaction can be noticed also in the case of India and Pakistan, although here the reasons are not necessarily related to distance but to economic interests. India and the Union have signed a strategic partnership which touches also the issue of fighting nuclear proliferation, while at the same time India remains outside the NPT framework.

Based on these cases, it is only fair to say that the European Union intervention in nuclear proliferation cases strongly depends on the distance and on the other economic interests at stake. The Union prefers to focus on its immediate neighbourhood, and "its level of engagement diminishes with distance"⁶⁵.

⁶⁴ Politico, *Full text of the Iran deal*, 2015, available via <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/full-text-iran-deal-120080>, cited 15.01.2018.

⁶⁵ T. Renard, 15.

V. Conclusions and recommendations

More than 15 years have passed since the adoption of the *European Union Strategy Against Weapons of Mass Destruction* and the emergence of the EU nuclear non-proliferation policy and the European Union fears and concerns are still there. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime is not stronger, the nuclear programmes of the so-called proliferators have evolved significantly despite the efforts of the EU and of the international community.

In these circumstances, it becomes evident that the EU nuclear non-proliferation policy did not succeed in attaining its objectives and strongly needs to be reviewed in the near future. While some authors prefer to evaluate the policy as a total failure, others prefer to declare that it had a moderate success due to the obstacles that it has to face. Bruno Tertrais underlines five main obstacles that impeded the EU nuclear non-proliferation policy to be more successful, and these can be summarized as being: the complexity of EU policies which involve the Commission as well as the Council, the budgetary practice which impedes for a single and bigger budget to be allocated to non-proliferation, the competition that the EU has to face from national states in this field complemented with the diversity of "nuclear cultures" within the Union, and the preference of EU member

states to maintain sovereignty and independence⁶⁶.

Focusing on the subject of improving the EU nuclear non-proliferation policy, Anthony Ian and Lina Grip make the following recommendations for the EU decision-makers in order to revive the policy: matching the WMD Strategy with the changing security discourse in the European Union, developing a strategic approach based on the security of European citizens, improving the organization of EU efforts and making full use of available resources and tools, enhancing democratic oversight of the policy, developing and promoting common standards, engaging relevant stakeholders, expanding bilateral cooperation with key countries, exploring opportunities for inter-regional cooperation and creating a single profile for EU non-proliferation⁶⁷.

Although the evaluation of the policy could discourage EU politicians in continuing efforts in the field of non-proliferation, the past has shown that the EU's financial resources, its attractiveness as trade partners supplemented by its preference for a policy of engagement with nuclear proliferators are all advantages that can contribute to EU

becoming an important player in the international nuclear non-proliferation policy.

As long as the EU members states continue to view non-proliferation as a top priority and agree that proliferation represents one of the most important threat to European security, a review of the policy in the sense of developing a more common general framework for actions in the field that in time could lead to a genuine EU "common" nuclear non-proliferation policy should be possible.

⁶⁶ B. Tertrais, 43-44.

⁶⁷ I. Anthony and L. Grip, *Strengthening the European Union's Future Approach to WMD Non-Proliferation* (Stockholm: Stockholm Institute for Peace Studies, 2013), 50-52.

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CYBER SECURITY THREATS. COMBATING FAKE NEWS. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S VISION

Title:	CYBER SECURITY THREATS. COMBATING FAKE NEWS. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S VISION
Abstract:	<p><i>The activity of ad-terrorism, taking advantage of too easily influential media, is an active generator of negative feelings among the civilian population. 2017 was introduced on the list of time intervals for the most monstrous terrorist attacks, not because of countries such as Iraq, where 267 1446 dead, 1661 wounded and 12 abducted persons were executed, due to the over-mediation of attacks on the territory of European states such as the United Kingdom, which generated about 4% of the attacks by SI in 2017, but which represented the first media news media.</i></p> <p><i>Practically, the media is responsible for the gap created between helping, supporting and building security between the West and the Middle East through ignorance of massacres on the Asian continent and the outlook for the Muslim population in the area.</i></p>
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Introduction

From the perspective of the fake news evolution concept, starting with an early development to a gradual accumulation of digital disorder and misinformation, we assist to a radical change of this phenomenon nature, in part due the coupled within technology that has affected it on

global, regional and local level. The term well known until recently “not news” is almost captured by “fake news”, widely used. After Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing in 1439, fake news took off at the same time and began to circulate widely. In this period was very hard to verify the real news, there was no concept of

journalistic objectivity or ethics. As printing expanded, so was this phenomenon; the rise of web-generated news specific to our era's journalistic, generated the fact that fake news became a powerful force; digital news trend has decimated the force, measured in both money and manpower, of the traditional, objectively minded, independent press⁶⁸.

Fake news, in its purest form, is completely made up, manipulated to resemble credible journalism and attract maximum attention and, with it, advertising revenue⁶⁹. Even if the institutional disinformation is older than at least one hundred years, which is new now are the social networks, which exponentially propels the fake. This aspect allows the propaganda entities to multiply inside the body of virtual society. The fake message intentionally generated is reposted by the trot and boot armies involved in the informational war⁷⁰.

Inside the information warfare, fake news is considered that represents a step-change, an emerging form of

cynical profiteering, an engine for energizing all-right and other digitally mediated grassroots political mobilizations around the world, a partisan battle cry for a new liberal ministry of truth, an unwanted byproduct of the online platforms which organize our digital societies, or a canary call signaling a collapse of consensus around established institutions and processes of knowledge production, heralding a new post-truth era in politics and public life⁷¹. The entire current information ecosystem is affected from two points of view:⁷² misinformation – the inadvertent sharing of false information and disinformation – the deliberate creation and sharing of information known to be false. The same author considers that, in order to understand the current information ecosystem, there are three elements needed to focus on: the different types of content that are being created and shared, the motivation of those who created this content and the ways this content is being disseminated⁷³.

⁶⁸ Jacob Soll, *The Long and Brutal History of Fake News*, available on <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-violent-214535> (26.02.2019)

⁶⁹ Elle Hunt, *What is fake news? How to spot it and what you can do to stop it?*, available on <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/dec/18/what-is-fake-news-pizzagate> (26.02.2019)

⁷⁰ Marian Voicu, *Matrișka mincișilor. Fake news, manipulare, populism*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2018, p. 19

⁷¹ Liliana Bounegru, Jonathan Gray, Tommaso Venturini, Michele Mauri, *Afield Guide to "Fake News" and other Information Disorders*, Public Data Lab., Amsterdam, 2017, p. 6

⁷² Claire Wardle, *Fake news. It's complicated*, available on <https://firstdraftnews.org/fake-news-complicated/> (26.02.2019)

⁷³ Idem

The position of the European Commission on the fake news phenomenon

In order to protect security and European values, European Commission taking further steps to combat misinformation. The position of European Commission is highlighted in the statements of some European officials.

Commissioner Andrus Ansip, vice-president for the Digital Single Market: “disinformation is not new. It has been a weapon of political influence for many centuries. In this century, what have changed are the speed, aggression and ease with which it spreads. We see campaigns to undermine elections, public institutions, critical infrastructure – with a clear motive to influence, disrupt or destabilize. Elections have proved to be a particularly strategic and sensitive target of hybrid threats. By 2020, EU countries will have held more than 50 European, national, regional and local elections. Since it was set up in 2015, our East Stratcom Task Force has identified and analyzed more than 500 disinformation cases (...) Many Member States have already taken action to counter these threats. We need to work together and coordinate our efforts. In a European way, protecting our freedoms (...) we set up a rapid alert system with Member States so that disinformation can be quickly countered with hard facts. More sharing and assessment of intelligence. More and better analysis

of threats. We also ask online platforms to deliver on their commitments to counter disinformation. At the same time, we will increase our support for media, teachers, fact-checkers and researchers, because we want our societies to become more resilient, disinformation-proof”⁷⁴.

Mariya Gabriel, commissioner for Digital Economy and Society: “We now appeal to all parties involved, especially social media platforms and networks, who have a clear responsibility in this area, to act on an action plan aimed at creating a common approach at European level so that citizens can effectively protected against misinformation and have the necessary means to do so. We will closely monitor the progress achieved and, if the results are not satisfactory, it is possible to propose further actions by December, including regulatory measures”⁷⁵.

Julian King, commissioner for the Security Union: “We face a range of cyber and cyber enabled threats. The spread of deliberate disinformation – Fake News – to influence and

⁷⁴ *Statement by vice-president Ansip on the action plan to counter disinformation and progress achieved so far*, available on https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/ansip/announcements/statement-vice-president-ansip-action-plan-counter-disinformation-and-progress-achieved-so-far-press_en (26.02.2019).

⁷⁵ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/gabriel_en#timeline (27.02.2019).

manipulate behavior, to sow doubt and division is a real threat to the cohesion and stability of our societies and our democratic institutions. And when such manipulation is attempted by foreign actors it can have serious potential consequences for our security (...) when it comes to disinformation online, we are effectively in a kind of war. But it is a new kind of combat, with no rules of engagement. Disinformation as such is far from new; it stretches back centuries. But the digital tools that exist today enable it to spread on a scale and at a speed not seen before, with an unprecedented degree of intrusion. And while we are starting to wake up to the enormous potential impact disinformation and Fake News can have on our everyday lives, there is still a lack of understanding about how it works, and what we can do about it”⁷⁶.

In order to deal with the fake news phenomenon, European Commission defines misinformation as “a series of false or misleading information that can be verified, which are created, presented and disseminated in order to obtain economic gain or to mislead the public deliberately and which may cause

⁷⁶ Commissioner King`s remarks at the press conference on the Commission proposal; to tackle the spread of disinformation online https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/king/announcements/commissioner-kings-remarks-press-conference-commission-proposals-tackle-spread-disinformation-online_en (27.02.2019).

public injury”⁷⁷. This definition is part of the Final Report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News an Online Disinformation, from March 2018.

Working tools of the European Commission

On 16th of May 2017, Jean-Claude Junker, President of the European Commission, through a mission letter addressed to Mariya Gabriel, commissioner for the Digital Economy and Society requiring: “(...) developing and implementing measures to make Europe more trusted and secure online, so that citizens and business can fully reap the benefits of the digital economy. I would like you to work with the Vice-President/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Vice President for the Digital Single Market, and the Commissioner for the Security Union on a strategic and ambitious plan to make the EU a leader in cyber security preparedness and trustworthy information and communication technologies, and to increase the confidentiality of communications.(...) Facilitating, under the coordination of the Vice-President for the Digital Single Market, the adoption by the European Parliament and the Council, of all the legislative proposals

⁷⁷ Final Report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News an Online Disinformation, available on <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation> (27.02.2019).

presented over the past two years by the Commission to complete the Digital Single Market. Delivering on these proposals is of essence for citizens and businesses”⁷⁸. According to these requests, the team headed by Maryia Gabriel presented the report, considered to be the beginning of a process meant to deliver concrete options that will safeguard EU values and benefit for every European citizen.

This aspect is also important from a different perspective, that of the European Parliament elections in 2019. This is why, in February 2018, the Commission adopted a list of recommendations looking ahead to the 2019 elections to the European Parliament calling for: “competent national authorities [...] to identify, based on the experiences of Member States, best practices in the identification, mitigation and management of risks to the electoral process from cyber attacks and disinformation; In the light of risks to the electoral process from cyber attacks and disinformation seen in recent elections and campaigns, sharing experience among Member States on

related issues should be encouraged”⁷⁹.

Public Consultation on Fake News

Between 13th of November 2017 and 23rd of February 2018 took place the public consultation on fake news and online disinformation. The public consultation received a total of 2986 replies⁸⁰: 2784 from individuals and 201 from legal organizations; the largest number of replies was from Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, also from Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania⁸¹. The main objective was to prevent the spread of disinformation online, but also for a better understanding of the rationale and possible directions for action at EU and national level.

⁷⁸ *Mission Letter* sent by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission to Maryia Gabriel, commissioner for the Digital Economy and Society, Brussels, 16th of May 2017, available on https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mission-letter-mariya-gabriel.pdf (28.02.2019).

⁷⁹ European Commission, *Commission Recommendation of 12.02.2018 on enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament*, p. 5-6, available on https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/recommendation-enhancing-european-nature-efficient-conduct-2019-elections_en.pdf (02.03.2019).

⁸⁰ *Summary report on the public consultation on fake news and online disinformation*, available on <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/synopsis-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-online-disinformation> (01.03.2019).

⁸¹ *Summary report of the public consultation on fake news and online disinformation*, p. 1.




Fig. 1 The opinion of respondents on the third question⁸²

In the same report it is shown, as objective of the consultation, that the results will help assess the effectiveness of current actions by market players and other stakeholders. Information collected will have the purposes to establish a definition on fake information and their spread online, to build an assessment of measures already taken by platforms, news media companies and civil society organizations to counter the spread of fake information online and to establish the scope for future actions to strengthen quality information and prevent the spread of disinformation online.

The largest proportion of respondents represented private news media companies, followed by civil society organizations, other type of organizations, online platforms, research and academia and public authorities, national and local.

⁸² *Synopsis report of the public consultation on fake news and online disinformation*, available on <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/synopsis-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-online-disinformation> (05.03.2019).




Fig. 1 Number of respondents by countries⁸³

Eurobarometer on fake news and online disinformation

It is important to present the previous events that conduct to the actions taken by the European Commission in early 2018.

The first important step was taken in 2015, when was created the East StratCom Task Force, set up to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaign. In March 2015, the European Council tasked High representatives in cooperation with EU institutions and Member States to submit an action plan or strategic communication⁸⁴. The objectives of this plan, presented in June 2015, were three: effective communication and promotion of EU policies towards the Eastern Neighborhood; strengthening the

⁸³ *Synopsis report of the public consultation on fake news and online disinformation*, available on <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/synopsis-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-online-disinformation> (02.03.2019).

⁸⁴ European Council, *European Council Meeting, Conclusions*, 19th and 20th of March, 2015, p. 15, available on <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21888/european-council-conclusions-19-20-march-2015-en.pdf> (02.03.2019).

overall media environment in the Eastern Neighborhood and in EU member states, including support for media freedom and strengthening independent media; improved EU capacity to forecast, address and respond to disinformation activities by external actors⁸⁵. The Task Force has been working in the European External Action Service since September 2015, improving the EU's ability to predict, address and raise public awareness of pro-Kremlin misinformation activities.

From our point of view, the second important step was Eurobarometer published in November 2016⁸⁶ showed that European citizens are worried about the independence of the media and levels of trust in media are low: “most of respondents, 53%, agree their national media provide trustworthy information, while 44% think it does not. Only 2% of respondents say they do not know. In spite of the diversity of the media, the majority of respondents say neither their national nor their public service media are free and independent. Furthermore, almost three in ten think their national media are less free and independent than they were five years ago. These results

⁸⁵ *Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force*, available on <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-the-east-> (02.03.2019).

⁸⁶ *Special Eurobarometer 452, media pluralism and democracy*, available on http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/new_sroom/image/document/2016-47/sp452-summary_en_19666.pdf (01.03.2019).

highlight that, in the eyes of Europeans, there is still considerable work to be done in ensuring the independence of national media – a vital cornerstone of a democratic EU. The widespread experience of hate speech, abuse and threats in online spaces also needs to be addressed to ensure all citizens feel free to safely express themselves in the online sphere”⁸⁷.

The third step is taken by The European Parliament, in 15th of June 2017, when was adopted a Resolution on online platforms and the digital single market⁸⁸. Resolution focused on the following aspects:

✓ points out the crucial importance of clarifying the methods by which decisions based on algorithms are taken and promoting transparency in the use of those algorithms; calls on the Commission and the Member States, therefore, to examine the potential for error and bias in the use of algorithms in order to prevent any kind of discrimination, unfair practice or breach of privacy; urges the Commission to continue to promote the growth of European online platforms and start-ups and strengthen their ability to scale up and compete globally;

⁸⁷ Ibidem, p.9-19.

⁸⁸ *European Parliament Resolution of 15 June 2017 on online platforms and the digital single market*, available on <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0272+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (02.03.2019).

✓ calls on the Commission to maintain an innovation-friendly policy towards online platforms in order to facilitate market entry; regrets the EU's low share of market capitalisation in online platforms; stresses the importance of removing the obstacles that hamper the smooth operation of online platforms across borders and disrupt the functioning of the European digital single market; highlights the importance of non-discrimination and the need to facilitate switching between platforms offering compatible services;

✓ calls on the Commission and the Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure full respect of citizens' rights to privacy and to protection of their personal data in the digital environment; emphasises the importance of correct implementation of the GDPR, ensuring the full application of the principle of privacy by design and by default;

✓ points out that the EU's presence in the world market is regrettably low, in particular owing to the current fragmentation of the digital market, legal uncertainty and the lack of financing and capacity to market technological innovations, which make it difficult for European companies to become world leaders and to compete with players in the rest of the world in this new, globally competitive economy; encourages development of an environment for start-ups and scale-

ups that fosters development and local job creation⁸⁹.

The recent Flash Eurobarometer on fake news and online disinformation measured the perception and concerns of 26,576 European citizens⁹⁰; was conducted via telephone interviews in February 2018 in all EU member states. The results revealed that the fake news is widely spread across the EU with 83% of respondents saying that fake news represent a danger for democracy. The key findings are as follows, as are showed in this report and we are taking the information from there⁹¹:

✓ Respondents perceive traditional media as the most trusted source of news: radio (70%), television (66%) and printed newspapers and news magazines (63%);

✓ 37% of the respondents come across fake news every day or almost every day and 71% feel confident on identifying them;

✓ 85% of respondents perceive fake news as a problem in their country and 83% perceive it as a problem for democracy in general;

✓ In respondents' view, journalists (45%), national authorities (39%) and the press and broadcasting

⁸⁹ Idem.

⁹⁰ *Eurobarometer on fake news and online disinformation*, available on <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-results-eurobarometer-fake-news-and-online-disinformation> (04.03.2019).

⁹¹ Idem.

management (36%) should be the main responsible for stopping the spread of fake news.

Report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation (HLEG)

In January 2018, the European Commission set up a high level group of experts to advise on policy initiatives to counter fake news and disinformation spread. Its members, 39⁹², had different backgrounds, including academia and journalism, written press and broadcasting organizations, online platforms as well as civil society and fact-checking organizations. European Commission, during this report, prefers to use the word “disinformation” over “fake news”; disinformation, inside the Commission vision includes all forms of false, inaccurate or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit⁹³. Romania is represented by Alina Bârgăoanu⁹⁴, PhD Professor at National University of Political Studies and Public Administration.

The HLEG do this for two reasons:

Firstly the term is inadequate to capture the complex problem of disinformation, which involves content that is not actually or completely “fake” but fabricated information blended with facts, and practices that go well beyond anything resembling “news” to include some forms of automated accounts used for identify networks of fake followers, fabricated or manipulated videos, targeted advertising, organized trolling, visual memes, and much more. It can also involve a whole array of digital behavior that is more about circulation of disinformation than about production of disinformation, spanning from posting, commenting, sharing, tweeting and re-tweeting⁹⁵.

Secondly, the term fake news is not only inadequate, but also misleading, because it has been appropriated by some politicians and their supporters, who use the term to dismiss coverage that they find disagreeable, and has thus become a weapon with which powerful actors can interfere in circulation of information and attack and undermine independent news media. Research has shown that citizens often associate the term fake news with partisan political debate and poor journalism

⁹² Lists of the 39 members of the High Level Expert Group on fake news chaired by professor Madeleine De Cock Buning could be seen on the report at page 39.

⁹³ Ibidem, p. 3.

⁹⁴<http://comunicare.ro/en/index.php?page=alina-bargaoanu> (05.03.2019).

⁹⁵ Wardle, C. & Derakhshan, H. Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making, 2017. Report to the Council of Europe. <https://shorensteincenter.org/information-disorder-framework-for-research-and-policy-making/> (01.03.2019).

broadly, rather than more pernicious and precisely defined forms of disinformation⁹⁶.

The HLEG's tasks were to advise the Commission on all issues arising in the context of false information spread across traditional and social media and on possible ways to cope with its social and political consequences. The main deliverable of the HLEG was a report designed to review best practices in the light of fundamental principles, and suitable responses stemming from such principles⁹⁷.

The multi-dimensional approach recommended by the HLEG is based on a number of interconnected and mutually reinforcing responses. These responses rest on five pillars designed to:

- ✓ enhance transparency of online news, involving an adequate and privacy-compliant sharing of data about the systems that enable their circulation online;

- ✓ promote media and information literacy to counter disinformation and help users navigate the digital media environment;

- ✓ develop tools for empowering users and journalists to tackle disinformation and foster a positive engagement with fast-evolving information technologies;

- ✓ safeguard the diversity and sustainability of the European news media ecosystem;

- ✓ promote continued research on the impact of disinformation in Europe to evaluate the measures taken by different actors and constantly adjust the necessary responses⁹⁸.

The report was adopted by the HLEG on 7th of March 2018 with the support of 38 members out of 39. The recommendations were split in two parts: for the short to medium term and for the longer term. We select the main recommendations from this report⁹⁹, according to the recipient:

The European Commission should:

- ✓ In light of the Progress Assessment Report mentioned above, and by March 2019, consider options that may include additional fact-finding and/or additional policy initiatives, using any relevant instrument, such as competition instruments or mechanisms to ensure a continuous monitoring and evaluation of self-regulatory measures – short term;

⁹⁶ Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis, and Lucas Graves, *News You Don't Believe: Audience Perspectives on Fake News*, Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2017.

⁹⁷ *Final Report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation*, available on <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation> (27.02.2019).

⁹⁸ European Commission, *A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation, Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation*, p.7.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

✓ Facilitate the creation of a multi-stakeholder Coalition against disinformation and assist stakeholders in developing a Code of Practices and in evaluating its effectiveness – short term;

✓ Sharpen actions in support of media and information literacy for all citizens, including exchange of best practices and training for teachers (e.g. through Erasmus+, Training and Education 2020 and similar schemes), and the promotion of media literacy in EU curricula reforms and OECD PISA competency rankings. Special attention should be paid to the specific needs of certain sub-regions (e.g. Baltic or Eastern Europe) – long term;

✓ Increase funding in support for quality journalism, including cross-border collaboration and data-driven journalism – long term;

✓ Ensure that sufficient resources within the current Horizon 2020 and future programmes are made available to promote research and innovation actions aimed at improving technologies for online media services and for the modernization of newsroom – long term.

The Member States should:

✓ Providing funding to research organizations that operate innovation hubs or living labs open to fact-checkers, accredited journalists and researchers from different relevant fields, as well as representatives of

Press Councils and platforms – short term;

✓ Sharpen actions in support of media and information literacy for all citizens, including integration of media and information literacy in teacher training and national curricula requirements – long term;

✓ Step up public funding, consistent with EU State aid rules, of activities to improve the long-term sustainability of a pluralistic news media landscape – long term.

Civil society organizations should:

✓ Work with academia, educational psychology professionals and the media industry to formulate skill and age-specific media and information literacy approaches and monitor their effectiveness – long term;

✓ Design specific actions for citizens of different age groups aimed at sensitizing voters to the importance of integrity of elections; promote literacy programs to enhance the quality of information around elections; and support a fact-based and data-checked public debates – long term.

Platforms should:

✓ Develop tools to share standard information sheets to users developed by independent (educational) institutions within media and information literacy programs, raising awareness of digital disinformation and emerging findings about digital risks – short term.

News media and organization should:

- ✓ Cooperate with CSOs and academia to formulate and implement skill and age-specific media and information literacy approaches, and for all ages, while pursuing their media literacy projects in cooperation with schools and other educational institutions that target younger generations – long term;

- ✓ Ensure the highest levels of compliance with ethical and professional standards to sustain a pluralistic and trustworthy news media ecosystem – long term.

EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation

On 26th of April 2018, the European Commission proposed measures to tackle disinformation, including an EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation, support for an independent network of fact-checkers, and a series of actions to stimulate quality journalism and promote media literacy. This action was preceded by the events concerning Facebook/Cambridge Analytica; the document shows: “the recent Facebook/Cambridge Analytica demonstrated exactly how personal data can be exploited in electoral contexts, and are a timely reminder that more is needed to secure resilient democratic processes. Today the European Commission is taking steps forward in the fight against

disinformation to ensure the protection of European values and security¹⁰⁰.

For the short to medium term, the HLEG¹⁰¹ suggests, as a first step, a self-regulatory approach based on a clearly defined multi-stakeholder engagement process, framed within a binding roadmap for implementation, and focused on a set of specific actions. All relevant stakeholders, including online platforms, news media organizations (press and broadcasters), journalists, fact-checkers, independent content creators and the advertising industry, are called upon to commit to a Code of Practices.

This Code should reflect stakeholders’ respective roles and responsibilities. The intent should be to promote an enabling environment for freedom of expression by fostering the transparency and intelligibility of different types of digital information channels. In particular, the HLEG has formulated 10 key principles to be enshrined in this Code, which define clear objectives for platforms. To make sure that the necessary steps will be taken, the HLEG recommends establishing a Coalition representing the relevant stakeholders for the purpose of elaborating such a Code of Practices and ensuring its

¹⁰⁰ European Commission, *Tackling online disinformation: Commission proposes an EU-wide Code of Practice*, available on http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3370_en.htm (02.03.2019).

¹⁰¹ European Commission, *A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation, Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation*, p. 6.

implementation and continuous monitoring and review.

As a second step, the Commission is invited to re-examine the matter in spring 2019 and decide, on the basis of an intermediate and independent evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of these measures, whether further actions should be considered for the next European Commission term. This may cover options for additional fact-finding and/or policy initiatives, using any relevant instrument, including competition instruments or other mechanisms to ensure continuous monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Code¹⁰².

Digital Education Action Plan on competences and technology

This plan includes 11 actions in order to support technology use and digital competence in education¹⁰³ and was adopted by the European Commission on 17th of January 2018. It reveals the importance of education and training as the best investments in Europe's future. The main aims of this document refer to making better use of digital technology for teaching and learning, developing relevant digital competences and skills for the digital transformation, improving education through better data analysis and foresight.

¹⁰² Idem.

¹⁰³ European Commission, *Digital Education Action Plan*, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:22:FIN>.

The Action Plan outlines European initiatives that the Commission, in partnership with Member States, stakeholders and society, will implement by the end of 2020. It forms part of the Commission's broader ambition towards a European Education Area, complementing the Recommendations on Common Values and Key Competences. The Action Plan will be implemented as part of the European cooperation in education and training (ET2020) process. It will also support the European Semester, which is a key driver for reform through the education-and training related country-specific recommendations.

The Commission will launch dialogue with relevant stakeholders on how to implement the proposed actions. In the follow-up to implementation, the Commission will work with the ET2020 Group on Digital Skills and Competences. The Commission will also draw policy lessons from how the actions are implemented. This will contribute to the emerging discussion on future European cooperation in education and training¹⁰⁴.

Conclusions

During this research, we have been confronted with some information that puts us in a position to give answers to certain questions about fake news as a necessity or a

¹⁰⁴ Ibidem, p. 10.

trend; if there is a necessity where it comes from. Also, is it possible to consider that the purpose is a political one or could be politically hijacked, given the fact that the Eurosceptic, which grow in polls, could be accused by making fake news when will refer to corruption and group interest inside EU. A certain issue emerged from our research refers to the EU instruments protections in front of fake news: as these were created for prevention, could it be used also in creating fake news, with minimal technology corrections.

We consider that a set of rules are necessary in order to prevent this phenomenon, and European Commission is preoccupied to study and to give solutions, being aware of the fact that disinformation affects trust in institutions, also in traditional and new media, causing negative effects on democracies. States should consider freedom of expression and media as a primordial attribute of democracy but, in the same time have to establish possible measures in order to protect citizens in front of this phenomenon. From our point of view the education could be a solution; we consider that the Digital Education Action Plan on competences and technology in education adopted by the European Commission is a good initiative.

An important element regards to the cooperation between European and national entities. This is why, in April of 2019, the Code we mentioned

in our research, will be reviewed, in order to ensure the continuous effectiveness of the document.

Our research conducted us to the idea that, in order to prevent the fake news phenomenon, there shouldn't be any interference by public authorities with editorial independence, protection of fundamental rights is a primordial aspect and it is need a public support for developing the HLEG program.

There are different ways in order to diagnose, define the phenomenon of fake news. We believe that a distinction must be made between fake news and false news. From our point of few, false news become fake news when the story presented is retransmitted by hundreds of websites, picked up by a dozens of other blogs or cross posted over thousands of social media accounts. For managing of how fake news travels online we must understand and to inform about it. It is important to make the difference between media and social media networks, in order to understand the complexity of this phenomenon. Both have certain characteristics. The consumer of traditional or digital contain has few ways to detect digital disinformation. From our point of view, the rational aspect should be used in detecting fake news and also a type of emotional skepticism for reducing the informational noise and disorder.

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HUMAN SECURITY

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CURRENT ISSUES OF ETHICS AND MORALITY THROUGH THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN SECURITY

Abstract:	<i>The article "Current issues of ethics and morality through the perspective of human security" addresses the issues of ethics of scientific research, of the morality of the contemporary scientist, including that of the military and defense fields. The problems of ethical and aesthetic harmonization in human activity, including those related to plastic surgery and cosmetics, are discussed as well. The author does not identify ethics with morals and morality. Morals is - an element of culture, a form of social consciousness. Ethics is a philosophical discipline that studies morals or the moral theory. Morality - a subjective result of the human beings' acquirement of morals and objective ethics. The crisis of morals and morality threatens human security.</i>
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Introduction

Contemporaneity is characterized by various crises: environmental, cultural, demographic,

various political crises, etc. One of the most burning and threatening is the crisis of human morality. It is largely this that depends on the resolution of

other crises. The high morality of the people could lead to solving many of the problems of the contemporary age, and could also give an impetus to the further development of human culture and civilization.

Morality is practicable in all areas of human life and activity. We can talk about the morality of the fields of journalism, state institutions, science and scientific research, medicine and the "beauty industry" etc. All of these areas have some problems. Failure to do so may lead to insecurity for humans. It is impossible to tackle in one article all the mentioned issues and others of their kind. That is why I am going with an analysis of only some of them.

The objective reality with its problems, relating to ethics, morality, and human security, has provided us with material for analysis. The methods used in the research are primarily dialectical, comparative analysis, extrapolation and unity of history and logic.

Discussions and Outcomes

It is necessary to start by specifying the terms of morals, ethics, morality, human security and the current problems.

Morals are one of the main components of social consciousness, or culture. The last one characterizes only humans. It is created by humans and can only be mastered by a human individual. A child is born only a

potential man. This potential can transform the child into man, but only under certain conditions. Only by appropriating culture, including morals as an element, the child can become man. None of the various fauna species on Terra can assimilate human culture and therefore cannot be human. Even the smartest animals do not have the capacity to acquire culture, and therefore, they cannot become thoughtful, rational beings like humans. It is known that the child grown outside the culture that becomes mature biologically remains an animal with a human body. The one grown in culture, in human communication, as an element of culture, becomes, to a greater or lesser extent, human, a bearer of culture. The more endowed of these contribute to the further progress of moral culture and civilization and ethics.¹⁰⁵

Morality, in my view, is the result of human being acquiring the collective morals in which it is born or active. Knowing the collective moral norms by the individual is a necessary thing, but this is not enough for the formation of his morality. Compulsory for the constitution of morality is the process of transforming the knowledge of morality into personal beliefs. Moreover, this is not enough; the person must also have the will and the ability to act in accordance with the norms, principles and moral ideals.

¹⁰⁵Vidan Teodor, *Teritoriul moralității*, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Agronaut, 2014.

These determine the degree of morality of the individual - high or mediocre.¹⁰⁶

Ethics is moral theory or philosophical science about morality, abducted and consolidated in ancient Greece by Aristotle. Socrates was the first philosopher of antiquity to redirect philosophy from nature, universe to man. According to Cicero, "Socrates has lowered the philosophy from heaven to earth". That is, man and not the Universe is the basic problem of philosophy. Man is good and moral, so thought Socrates. Ignorance is the cause of amorality, not malice. Man does evil from ignorance. If he knew, he would do only good things and not bad things. Thus, Socrates addresses the ethical issue, elaborates even some of its categories and its principles. He is not, however, the founder of this philosophical science.

Plato, the most important disciple of Socrates, did not found ethics, even though he developed ethical thinking. Aristotle, the brightest disciple of Plato, succeeded in elaborating and substantiating not only the logic, aesthetics, metaphysics, and the beginnings of many sciences, but also ethics - the science of morality.

Many contemporary theorists assert that the traditional ethics consisting of 70 percent of Aristotle's ideas and concepts are no longer

present, and that it should yield the place of another ethics that corresponds to our times. Thus, a number of professional ethics or deontologists have emerged and actively manifest. Each of them has the right to exist because they all contain a certain morality and morals. It should not be forgotten, however, that there are general human moral norms and that they are eternal. It is through them that the traditional ethics, or the Aristotelian ethics, which, of course, has its own aspect, outdated ideas, which must be replaced by new ones corresponding to our times.

Ethics, whatever it may be, is intended to demonstrate the validity and invalidity of certain norms, principles, moral ideals, and to develop and substantiate new ones that will be approved or responded by public opinion to be included in the morals of the given culture.

People, like everything in the world, need security, which should represent a balance between them and the environment. This, throughout history, has been and is constantly threatened by man, or by nature and various natural and techno-genic cataclysms. It may even be said that the fear of insecurity, and not the innate organic capacities or the ones acquired throughout life, has made man progress in a cultural way and to civilization. Through knowledge and the ability to apply knowledge in practice in the making of weapons and mechanisms, man went to be above all

¹⁰⁶Sîrbu Ion, „Etica ecologică globală: probleme și realizări”, *Ecologia, etica, morală. Materialele simpozionului științific internațional*. Chișinău, Editura ȘEAREC – COM, 2001, pp. 15-20.

terrestrial beings, overcoming them by force. Going for safety, man himself has become a source of the insecurity of terrestrial nature, whether organic or inorganic. The permanent competition of man with the terrestrial nature and his peers has given rise to global problems, the main current problems, threatening his very existence and the terrestrial nature, including the second nature - created and maintained by man. The global problems of humanity, unlike the other issues, threaten the whole of humanity and the entire earthly nature and not only some of their components, as it was until the middle of the 20th century. That is why humanity is destined to permanently strengthen itself, or otherwise it does not have a future.¹⁰⁷

Following the above ideas, it may be mentioned how I.S. Țuțuianu commends that "the remarkable evolution he has recorded in the General Security Problem is the crucial issue of respecting human rights"¹⁰⁸. According to I.S. Țuțuianu there are processes of institutional transformation and reference of the existing relations among the main actors of the international relations system.

In the UN case, mentions I.S. Țuțuianu, the point of reference for

this process is the 1992 Agenda for Peace, a true programmatic manifestation of the World Organization's institutional transformation process... The main coordinates of this transformation process includes changing the content and finality of one of the most important UN functions, that of maintaining peace, a function that evolves in this period from the very interposition with the agreement of the parties to the active intervention in the mediation and settlement of the conflict situation, up to the current dimension of peace, i.e. from a conceptual system and purely reactive implementation tools to the development of preemptive concepts and action structures.¹⁰⁹

The changes made by NATO and the EU also correspond to the new post-Cold War realities, which cannot be said about the OSCE. "Involved predominantly in conflict management in the former Soviet space, OSCE, - according to I.S. Țuțuianu, - failed to overcome the functional features of the Cold War in the context of which it emerged. Unable to make a substantial contribution from members for fundamental and coherent operation in the range of missions assumed, the OSCE found itself in a situation where it was not convenient to cover, to perpetuate the presence of Russian troops or to re-establish it in the regions from which it had previously been obliged to withdraw (We are first

¹⁰⁷Macoviciuc V.; Crăcium D., Morar. V., *Etica afacerilor*, București, Editura Paideia, 2005.

¹⁰⁸Țuțuianu I.-S, *Apusul Westphaliei? Statul național și sistemul relațiilor internaționale în anii post - Război Rece*, București, Editura Militară, 2011, p.87.

¹⁰⁹*Ibidem*.

concerned with how the OSCE has managed the frozen conflicts in ex-Soviet space)".¹¹⁰

People in Moldova accuse the OSCE emissaries of corruption. Perhaps there is no live corruption. However, realizing that Russia supports a considerable part of the organization's budget, it could talk about indirect, camouflaged corruption. We could also talk about aids and subsidies granted by OSCE books to various non-governmental institutions and NGOs in Transnistria, much more frightening and more consistent than those from Moldova.

The Russian Federation presents itself as the main threat to regional and international peace, stability and security. As a result of the annexation of the Crimea, the support of the reactionary regime of Syria and the rebels in the East of Ukraine, the unprecedented arming, the creation of new military bases and the reintroduction of the Military Marines and Aviation Flight into the Mediterranean Sea and the World Ocean has become one of the most acute global problem of humanity. "On February 5, 2010, I. S. Țuțuianu asserted, President D.Medvedev approved the new military documentary of the Russian Federation, on the basis of which pre-emptive strikes on states deemed to be threatening the security of Russia with

nuclear or conventional weapons are authorized."¹¹¹

Recently, in 2018, re-elected President Putin says that he does not see the future of the world without Russia. Therefore, he is ready to destroy all humanity, the whole of Terra's life as a result of a thermonuclear war if someone threatens the Russian Federation. Putin threatens the whole world that he is ready to use weapons of mass destruction.

Does not all this demonstrate the lack of morality at the highest levels of decision-makers? What moral guides those who organize acts of terrorism in Allah's name even among the Muslims? Is the harassment of the Taliban, the Syrian president and his accomplices, including the Russians against their own citizens, talking about morals and morality? What philosophers, what ethics could substantiate and justify such facts as moral and the said leaders as moral? Did the enormous achievements of today's civilization not take precedence before morality, before human values? Of course, yes. That is what demonstrates the crisis of morals and morality and therefore the crisis of the whole culture.

Culture today remains far behind civilization, although it is inherent to the former. However, civilization appears at a certain stage in the development of culture, and in

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 90.

¹¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 190.

turn, it gives an enormous boost to its further development. The development of both requires their harmony. Only in this case will the man who needs both - culture and civilization, develop.

Civilization and culture.

Civilization, its achievements, are related to the material aspect of reality, but also to the organization of people, production, state, urbanism, science, technics and technology, education, medicine, etc. Civilization is not national, but international, it can be mastered by all people and human communities through different cultures. The latter are national or ethnic. A number of ethnicities, including nations, correspond to the same number of cultures. The main components of culture are of spiritual, ideal kind, rendered by material, material objects. A vase, or an amphora, for example, holds both culture and civilization. The civilization aspect is related to the material it is made of, the technologies and equipment used to create it, the paints and oils used. The cultural aspect is shape, the patterns and the lines, the geometric figures or the flowers, the animals that embellish it and how they combine together. Thus, the same object combines culture and civilization, cultural and civilizational aspects. Culture is always national with general human elements, and civilization is cosmopolitan with aspect or national elements.

The enormous achievements of today's civilization can only lead to the further development of the human species if they are based on culture, which, as mentioned above, is primarily spiritual in the harmonious development of human being, morals and morality. The achievements of civilization or at least some of them that are out of culture can lead to stagnation in human development, the destruction of human species and even the entire land life.

Ethics could refer to the scientists themselves or to the scientific research. Science and scientific research are based on civilization; it is a product that can be used by all people and their communities, regardless of ethnicity, race, etc. It is also a matter of culture, which in the broad sense of the word also includes civilization. The scientist, by applying scientific achievements, creates the technique and various technologies that can be useful and can ease the life, practice of, and human activity. The same scientist can also create monsters - techniques and technologies that can destroy life, including human ones. Hence, the need for a scientist and scientific cognition ethics, the amoral scholar can intentionally create monsters called to destroy life. "Any scientific research activity - affirms C. Enăchescu - implies responsibility on several levels: scientific, moral, social, political, etc. The scientific researcher carrying out a research is directly responsible for

it".¹¹² Not always the scientific researcher can predict everything, all the consequences of his discovery. The way of making his discoveries does not depend on him only. The same discovery can be used for the benefit of humans, but also in their detriment. Undoubtedly, however, the scholar's duty remains to act for good and not for malice, the harm of people. The ethics of scientific research is the moral side of the activity and considers the result of scientific research to be a product for which the researcher is responsible. The results of the research are undermined by the values they produce and are directly related to the researcher's moral consciousness. We can consider in this sense the ethics of research as an applied branch of general ethics.¹¹³

Moral censorship must accompany any scientific research. This is a certain thing, an axiom that does not require special demonstrations. The moral censorship must be doubled with a legal one in the cases of "theft of ideas" or "intellectual theft" and especially in cases of "experiments" on human beings, "the most serious degeneration of scientific research", C.Enchesches.¹¹⁴

We agree with C. Enăchescu when he states that "Scientific research must be a product of the knowledge of

the intellect served for humanity and not the result of primary pulses, of hidden forms of aggression and hatred. Scientific research as the product of reason must serve the humanity and ultimate goals of the human being. Only in these cases, the "great discoverers" in the field of science become "heroes of humanity", exemplary guiders respected and cherished".¹¹⁵

The ethics of scientific research, which seeks to discover the truth, according to Enăchescu, can be expressed through some mandatory requirements. Any scientific research must be organized and carried out in accordance with a strict system of rules that requires moral conduct for the researcher or the team of researchers.

These rules derive the pattern of conduct, communication and work style, interpersonal relationships between researchers throughout the scientific research until the end of the project. There is a certain attitude towards the object investigated, to the actual activity represented by seriousness, fairness, perseverance. It is also necessary to make a correct assessment of the possibilities of scientific research activity, avoiding exaggerations or ignoring the research "limits" in pursuing absolutely all the situations of obtaining the scientific truth, which must be proved and demonstrated.

¹¹² Enăchescu C, *Tratat de teoriacercetăriștiințifice*, Iași, Editura Polirom, V. II, rev., 2007, p. 424.

¹¹³ *Ibidem*, p.425.

¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p.427.

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

The ethics of research morally obliges the researcher to be honest, showing self-respect, but also with the results obtained, to have a modest attitude, to be animated by the discovery of the truth, and thereby to make a personal contribution to the development of science. Ethics of research excludes any kind of competition between researchers or parallel collectives or different research from the same field, mutual influence, or what is very serious, "the theft of ideas" or "stealing methods" in order to obtain early scientific results which do not belong to him rightly. The ethics of research implies, for these reasons, seriousness, discretion, but also sincere cooperation, especially since, in the case of major modern scientific research projects, multiple forces are engaged, interdisciplinary teams of researchers performing in different but concentric specialization directions, the same joint project.¹¹⁶

Human security

All these positive aspects of the scientific research and the scientist ethics reinforce human security, are directed against, and forelimination of insecurity. By human security in the broad sense, it is meant to protect man and the entire human world - all human societies and communities, societies and cultures created by man, society and human civilization in general. Human security in a narrow

sense implies the protection, not simply of human individuals, but of the human species as such and not only now, in the present, but also in the future. In other words, the present determines the future. Today we undermine the foundations of the man of the future.

By using genetically modified organisms (soy, wheat, corn etc.), animal and bird meat contaminated with antibiotics, drinks with chemical components, etc., we still do not know how they will act and how people, their bodies will look like because of it in the near and distant future. Air, water, and polluted soil act adversely on man's genetic machinery. How long will medicine have its positive effects in maintaining human health? It can be assumed that human security in these conditions decreases, and insecurity increases. Can we change something for the better or not? Are we sovereigns or only utopians?

According to M. Ungheanu, "Sovereignty means that man is a being with a special position within nature, who is not controlled by the direct reaction to stimuli, who can educate his impulse system and who can order and take possession of nature, the environment, etc., and utopia represents this ability to order and configure the real to the pathological".¹¹⁷ Fantasies and utopias

¹¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 425-426.

¹¹⁷ Ungheanu Mihail M, „Despre conceptele de utopie și suveranitate. O scurtă privire”, *Revista de filosofie*, LXIII, Nr. 4, București, 2016, p. 458.

regarding the future of man must be based on reality, on the tendencies of this reality, which are both positive and negative. They must also be based on a high culture and morality, a responsibility of those who do them, a high culture and morality of all human beings. The crisis of morals, morality, and therefore of culture, threatens human security and the earthly world.

This security is threatened by aesthetic offensive to the detriment of ethics in the contemporary world. Contemporary society demonstrates the tendency towards aesthetics of the world of value and ethics as such.¹¹⁸ Numerous contemporary thinkers, such as M. Foucault, Jean Baudrillard, Mikhail Bakhtin, et al. believe that the moral requirements that the individual brings to oneself and others are aesthetically colored, and morality is more and more often conceived not as a set of norms intended for the preservation and reproduction of the Whole (Society) but as a component of techniques that ensure the happiness of the individual, who contemplates life as an end in itself, and self as an object of aesthetic care.¹¹⁹ Thus, the aesthetic evaluation refers primarily to human body and only secondly to the natural and techno-genic environment. Even here artificial beauty is often appreciated, not the natural one.

¹¹⁸ Попова О.В, „Этика эстетики в контексте развития пластической хирургии“, *Вопросы философии*, № 4, Москва, 2017.

¹¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 95 – 96.

Artificial flowers and greenery are found not only in cemeteries but also in people's homes. Because of this and other similar situations when fires occur, people in the room are even poisoned quicker because of the toxic smoke that accompanies the burning of the materials.

Surgery, human body and beauty As O.V. Popova mentions, even the human body is no longer natural. He, for the most part, is a social and cultural product that is technologically predetermined to be beautiful. This means that he is thrown into the ruthless will of the beauty industry, strict ascetic diets, aesthetic surgery methods, exhausting strength training, hormonal therapy, and genetic doping.

Integrating the aesthetic evaluation and technology trends leads to an anthropologically convergent effect. This is manifested in the modification to the non-recognition level of the human body, with the present similarities of the temporary, racial and gender indices, with the sensation of an unlimited manifestation of personal identity and absolute morphological freedom.

In the space of expectations emanating from the fashion industry, the body began to function in the logic of social translation of the image in vogue. Incorporating the rhythm of the reproduction of the exterior model, the individual body "generalizes", more precisely, seems to "float" into the collective body - dissolves the will of

the subject in the same patterns of behavior and expression, exterior types and standards of beauty that are proposed by the consumer market. In such a body, attention is focused on the particular parts, the enlarged forms of the eyes, the hair, the muscles, etc., which increase the sexual attraction of their owners and at the same time introduce elements of unreality and surplus.

Of course, in the light of the tendencies described above, a special status is held by plastic surgery, the possibilities of which are used for amoral purposes, endowing the individual with faith in eternal youth, in the permanent force and non-ephemeral beauty.¹²⁰

Besides the term plastic surgery, we also use those of aesthetic, cosmetic, reconstructive surgery. Often these terms are also used as synonyms. However one needs to consider their nuances. O. V. Popova, while giving definitions, takes into consideration some nuances. The concept of plastic surgery to an important extent closely correlates with treatment practices. When it comes to not perfecting the body, but creating masking effects in patients whose appearance has been deformed, mutilated as a result of catastrophes, military conflicts, or surgery. In the case of plastic surgery, it can be about compensatory blending, related to the deformation of the appearance.

Cosmetic surgery is a subdivision of plastic surgery, and aesthetic surgery is often regarded as one of its parts responsible for improving the appearance of man, taking it closer to the beauty canon. At the same time, aesthetic surgery in some cases corrects the pronounced defects of the exterior, and in others, it is used to perfect the already beautiful body, making some of its areas even more seductive and attractive. This ambiguity of goals is reflected in the practice of using the concept of aesthetic surgery. Therefore, a certain tension causes the restoration of the bodies that have suffered as a result of the military activities or the correction of the expressive monstrosities in the children ("rabbit" lip, etc.) in the field of cosmetic surgery.

At the everyday level cosmetics, at all its levels, is associated more with a decorative, easy, playful effect, rather than with sufferings and deformations. At the same time, the professional language of doctors actively uses the notion of reconstructive surgery as a variety of cosmetic surgery, which precisely deals with correcting the defects of the exterior, the causes of which were physical traumas or heavy diseases. Thus, cosmetic surgery and plastic surgery for face rejuvenation and reconstructive plastics when it comes to massive external injuries.

When it comes to whom to pay for surgeries, the patient or the state, charity and insurance funds, there is also the issue of fine differences

¹²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 96 – 97.

between the types of operation. The problem of the purpose of the physician's mixture is updated: is it therapeutic, reconstructive, restorative or it is about perfecting the already beautiful body. Society, as a rule, is ready to financially support the first case.¹²¹

The plastic surgeon's morality, as well as the representatives of other medical fields, is desirable today, much more demanded than in the past. New technologies and new medical tools can deliver unbelievable and unmatched results comparing to previous past stages. At the same time, however, they can affect human security as it has not been seen and imagined so far.

Ethics as the science of morals, which proposes and substantiates new moral norms, collides today in this area with a conflict of the most important principles, that of the patient's autonomy and of the patient to not be harmed in the end by his doctor. These principles underlie the current bioethics and ethos of the contemporary physician. As O.V. Popova mentions, the right of the patient of autonomy (which takes the form of independence of having his own body, which means satisfying any fantasies regarding the modification of his / her own) may be in contradiction with the medical principle "not to harm". In this regard, the ethical requirements of the plastic surgeon

presuppose his willingness to be able to reach an axiological balance, to constantly seek an average between the respect for the norms and the values of the patient and the respect to the norms and values of his own professional activity, as well as the ethical requirements put forward by culture and society.

Medicine, according to O.V. Popova, while performing plastic aesthetic manipulation, has to play a double game, when exercising caution with respect to the patient's right to change his own exterior, and when, acting for the patient, taking a firm paternal position of what body norms he should match. One of the key issues here is the use of plastic surgery methods in gender transformation.¹²²

Is the gender change surgery moral? I think it is amoral from both medicine and patients side. The "man" in whom the woman has turned into as the result of the surgery is not really a man, only the appearance of a man. The same can be said about the "woman" into whom the man has turned, she is not really a woman, although she has the face of a woman. These individuals lose their human essence when they change their individual essence.

The morality is even more threatened in the case of marriages of individuals of the same gender. The "given family" cannot fulfill its basic social function - it is not capable of

¹²¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 97 – 98.

¹²² *Ibidem*.

having descendants. Moral is only that which leads to development, progress and not the regression of the human species. Society is amoral when it legitimizes these couples. Yes, individuals have rights, but they must not violate human rights. Individuals can do what they think is right, but they do not have to ask society, the state to stand to their positions. Why should they be sanctioned by the state? To prove that they are the same as others? But they are not. Some still have the boldness of asking for the right to adopt children. What for? To make them resemble them? I have nothing against their other human rights, but I feel obliged to defend the fundamental rights of human society, the future of normal children. Human security, human society is above all. Family security that can fulfill its reproductive function is an integral part of human security.

Conclusions

Human security is closely related to morals and morality. Their crisis threatens human security.

Morality and ethics are progressing with human progress. The high morality of people depends on education and always progresses. Strengthening humanity leads to progress, division - to regress. All fields of human activity need individuals with high morality.

Professional responsibility may contradict the unlimited requirements of the patient, the plastic doctor.

Gender modification operations do not coincide with high morality, with the individual's moral responsibility towards society.

Giving that high morality contributes to human survival and security, to its sustainable development, it can be considered as a strategic im

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**MISSING PERSONS IN ARMED CONFLICTS:
SOME PRACTICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS**

Abstract:	<i>History rounds up the number of victims. One thousand and one become one thousand – as if a single victim had never existed. The text presented here is a succinct attempt of analyzing the phenomenon of the missing persons in armed conflicts, and comprises a short historical note, the state of the national legislation concerning this issue and the conformity thereof to the provisions of the norms of international law, as well as the enhancement of the efficiency of the implementation and execution instrument.</i>
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The effective observance of the human rights and liberties is an imperative. Only that state which prioritizes this principle can be considered a democratic state, with a rule of law. The Republic of Moldova has created a legislative framework whose general guidelines are in accordance with today's spirit and requirements. The state *has joined* the majority of the legal instruments referring to the international humanitarian law, including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional Protocols of 1977.

Hundreds of thousands of families in the whole world have no news on the fate of their relatives, disappeared in armed conflicts and internal turmoil. Irrespective of the circumstances in which people disappear (during wars or becoming victims in internal conflicts), their relatives have the right to know the truth about the fate of their close ones.

¹²³ Colonel (R), fost șef adjunct al șefului Marelui Stat Major al Armatei Naționale, președintele Asociației Absolvenților din Moldova al Centrului Marshall.

Missing persons are considered those persons whose place of stay is unknown to their families, and/ or who, based on some reliable information, have been reported missing in international and non-international armed conflict, in a violent situation or turmoil within a country or in any other situation in which the services of a neutral and independent mediator are required.

The phenomenon has been addressed within the framework of the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, held in Geneva, in December 2003: "Hundreds of thousands of people – the Final Declaration concludes – suffer without knowing anything about the fate of their missing family relatives, disappeared as a result of an armed conflict or violence. The mothers, the parents, the wives, the husbands, the daughters, the sons, and other relatives want to put an end to the painful uncertainty, and to know where the loved ones are, what their fate is. The uncertainty they have to bear generates great sufferings and rage, which oftentimes persists long after the violent situation has ended."

The issue of the missing persons is relevant for the Republic of Moldova. The fate of many co-nationals, disappeared during the Second World War, during the Soviet military aggression of 1979-1989, in Afghanistan, and during the armed conflict on the Dniester, in 1992, is still unclear.

Humanitarian international law sets out provisions aimed at limiting the consequences of armed conflicts, and at preventing the disappearance of persons, while the families have the right to be informed regarding the fate of the missing relatives. The authorities are bound to take measures to prevent people's disappearance, and, if this happens nonetheless, to take all the appropriate measures for the search and return thereof.

The basic principle is exposed in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and in their additional Protocols of 1977, which refer to "the right of families to be informed about the fate of their relatives". According to these acts, each party to the conflict is bound to communicate on the disappearance thereof.

The missing persons are either dead or alive. In case they are held in detention by the enemy, they have the right to the protection provided by the humanitarian international law to those categories of persons of which they are part (civilians, prisoners, wounded and ill). Additionally, humanitarian international law contributes so as the majority of persons are not considered disappeared without a trace.

In armed conflict, when the person is deprived of postal and phone connections and of private trips, the family ties need to be recovered. This is possible when the parties to the conflict observe the commitment to

promote the information exchange and the family reunification.

If a person disappears at the fact that the opposing party holds his/ her in captivity, or he/ she is hospitalized, humanitarian international law provides that this should be communicated to the family through:

- notice on the hospitalization, captivity or arrest;
- sending of a postal record regarding the captivity or internment;
- the enforcement of the right to correspondence;
- the authorities holding persons in captivity are bound to answer.

In case the person disappeared without a trace has died, it becomes more difficult to inform the family. There is no obligation for the parties to have identified each body found. The collection of information is necessary, which would help in establishing the identity of the deceased persons. This would include an agreement regarding the creation of investigation teams.

Humanitarian law does not provide for the families' rights to get the remains of the loved ones, for the funeral or entification. However, the dead need to be treated humanely, they need to be interred, and their graves, marked. The relatives have to have access to the burial sites, and the remains can be returned to the relatives through an agreement

between the parties concerned, usually after the conflict has ended.

The measures taken for the search and the identification of the victims would include:

- the clear assignment of the command structures of the armed forces and of the military groups, in order to ensure an effective control;
- ensuring the procurement without restrictions of identity papers;
- registering all the persons exposed to risk;
- registering the deaths and issuing the respective certificates;
- the adoption of the administrative norms and the provisions in accordance to the recognized international standards regarding arrest, restraint, detention, and captivity;
- ensuring the manpower of the armed forces with distinctive chips;
- the establishment of the Central Information Agency (GIII, art.123), for war prisoners, with the mission of collecting information officially and of passing them on to the prisoners' country of origin. Since 1960, the institution is called the Central Research Agency;
- the establishment of the Graves Registration Service (G III, art. 120 and 122; GIV, art.136);
- ensuring the delivery of news and mail between members of armed forces (formations) and their families, at least once a month;

- ensuring the security and physical integrity of all those who are not or are no longer taking part in the hostilities, including persons deprived of their freedom;
- the proper handling of the remains of the dead ones.

An important aspect is represented by the special material, financial, psychological, and legal needs within the families of the missing relatives. Oftentimes, they need the assistance of the authorities and of other different organizations. The emergency measures for meeting the material needs of the families are anticipated by finalizing the legal status of the persons declared missing, as well as the legal position of the families thereof. The state has the obligation to carry out certain measures in achieving the international commitments. Depending on the circumstances, these measures refer to the competence of the central and local authorities, of one or several ministries, of the legislative power, of the courts, of the armed forces, and of other state bodies.

The Second World War

In the former USSR, there have been multiple statistics regarding the number of civilian casualties, including the missing persons in armed conflicts, as well, figures from 7 to 26.6 million dead Soviet citizens being laid down.

A latest official version¹²⁴ of the Russian Ministry of Defence reveals the figure of 11,444,100 persons as irrevocable military casualties, of which 8,668,400 military have lost their lives.¹²⁵ Clearly, these figures are closer to reality, as the almost equal number of prisoners (4,559,000 Soviet soldiers and 4,376,300 German soldiers). From the proposed data, it appears that, from the Soviet camps, 86,5% came back (3,787,000 German soldiers¹²⁶), while, from the German ones, 44,2% (2,016,000 Soviets¹²⁷). The number of Soviet prisoners is concurrent with the data from the Diary of combat actions of the German ground troops specifying that, on the 20th of December 1942, in the German captivity, there were 3,350,639

¹²⁴In 1993, at the declassification of several documents from the archives, a group of researchers led by Russian General Grigori Krivosheev, has conducted a statistical study regarding the Soviet human losses during the wars of the 20th century.

¹²⁵The military who cannot take part in hostilities anymore: the dead, the seriously wounded (with disabilities), the missing persons, taken prisoners. Lightly injured soldiers (those who could continue being brought into operation) belong to the sanitary losses. The number of dead military is defined as the sum of the irremediable losses, less any seriously wounded and returned from the enemy's captivity or from behind the enemy's lines.

¹²⁶ Taking into account the 220.000 Soviet citizens who took part in the war on the Third Reich's side.

¹²⁷ Taking into account the 180.000 soldiers who emigrated in other countries or returned in their motherland, by passing the collections points.

persons¹²⁸. In the first months of war, after 22nd of June 1941, approximately 500,000 Soviet military and recruits were captured right on their way to the military units. Out of those disappeared without a trace, approximately 450,000 – 500,000 are military killed or wounded left on the enemy-occupied battlefield. According to General Krivosheev, 1,783,300 military never returned from captivity. Following a rigorous checking, approximately a million prisoners liberated from the camps were sent back in the trenches, 600,000 landed in the “work battalions” – the co-called “Рабочие батальоны”. Approximately 339,000 prisoners, who compromised in captivity, landed in the “NKVD” camps¹²⁹.

According to statistical data, 53,900 Bessarabians lost their lives on the front¹³⁰, and every fourth of them is reported missing without a trace. Impressive is the percentage of 0.621 of locals fallen in battle, out of the total number of dead. Of my relatives, two uncles, after being recruited in the autumn of 1944, lost their lives in the battles for the town of German philosopher Kant, Koenigsberg,

currently Kaliningrad, a regional centre of the Russian Federation. Out of the approximately forty nationalities of the former USSR, which registered casualties, those of our blood are among the first 15 in the “death ranking”. 47,242 inhabitants of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova were forced to leave for hard labour in Germany.

Approximately 20,000 of Moldavians fought in the Romanian army against the Soviet Union, of whom 5,000 died, and 14,129 were taken prisoners. After “Iași-Chișinău” Operation and the “liberation from the German-Romanian occupation”, 256,800 persons were deployed in the Red Army, and 40,592 Bessarabians lost their lives on the front, in the period 1944-1945¹³¹.

Following August 1944, when the territory on the right bank of the Dniester is controlled by the Soviet administration, measures are carried out for “matching” the data with the Nazi atrocities. In June 1945, the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova issues a resolution “regarding the results of the accounting of the damages and the investigation of the atrocities of the German-Romanian occupiers in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova”. For the late completion of the works regarding the

¹²⁸<http://www.historia.ru/1999/01/krivoshev01.htm>

¹²⁹Кривошеев Г. Ф. и др. *Россия и СССР в войнах XX века. Потери вооружённых сил: Статистическое исследование* / Под общ. ред. Г. Ф. Кривошеева. – М.: Олма-Пресс, 2001. – 608 с. – ISBN 5-224-01515-4.

¹³⁰ Филимошин М. В. *Людские потери вооружённых сил СССР*. – 4. – Мир России, 1999. – С. 92–101.

¹³¹ Istoria Republicii Moldova: din cele mai vechi timpuri pînă în zilele noastre / Асоциация учёных Молдовы им. Н. Милеску-Спэтару: Elan Poligraf, 2002.

accounting of damages, five presidents of the district executive committees and two people's commissars were penalized. Apart from elucidating the material losses, the results of this "inspection" aimed also at propagandistic load, and they should have proved the toughness of Antonescu's regime on the soil of Bessarabia, by mentioning the 37,475 hanged persons, dead in prisons and camps, as well as the 2,603 prisoners dead as a result of inhumane conditions.

There is, also, another facet of the problem, which the former Soviet authorities, including those in Chişinău, addressed with hostility... It is the issue of our former fellow countrymen, fighters in the Romanian army, many of whom dead, wounded and taken prisoners on the Eastern front and in Crimea. Many of them have "been branded and jailed" in the GULAG's camps. The situation and the estimates cannot be equated with those in Russia or in other CSI countries, where those who fought on the German side were clearly considered traitors. However, the fact is that over 1.8 million Soviets, for the most part Russian nationals, fought in the German auxiliary and police units, and the Russian liberating army – "POA" –, led by General Vlasov, had about two hundred thousand soldiers.

The Soviet Union was not party to the Geneva Convention of the 27th of July 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. On the 12th of

October 1939, at the ICRC's request to reestablish the contact with the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies of USSR, the Soviet ambassador to Paris replied that "USSR has not signed the Convention relative to the prisoners of war of 1929, which means that its conditions are not mandatory for it." The Red Cross missions in the Soviet Union were forbidden. The consequences are well-known: the prisoners on both sides of the Soviet-German front have been deprived of all the essentials, hundreds of thousands couldn't bear the inhumane conditions and died of hunger, of loss of strength or lack of medical care.

The historians that gained access to the declassified soviet documents, concluded that "Stalin himself wanted the faith of the soviet prisoners to be as terrible as possible, so that the soldiers and the officers of the Red Army to not even think of becoming a prisoner and to fight to the last breath, because they had only one choice – victory of death"¹³² As it is known, Stalin didn't even spared his son, the major lieutenant Yakov Dzhugashvili, shot by Nazis in a concentration camp.

Despite the fact that, according to the international conventions, immediately after the hostilities where over, the prisoners should've been released or to be part of an exchange, thousands of Romanians remained in

¹³² Yuri Teplyakov, *On the other side of the frontline*, Moscow News, on the 13th of May 1990.

Stalinists concentration camps for years.

Despite the humanitarian rights, after the war, the Romanian and German military cemeteries and the graves were devastated and destroyed. The rehabilitation and care of this is our duty. The European idea is to know and tell the truth about past events. Otherwise, we will continue to believe that our heroes are your war criminals!

A unusual case took place several years ago when unknown persons devastated the heroes cemetery from the Romanian village Țiganca. Outside the village, on summer of 1941 were buried 1020 Romanian soldiers, tow hundreds of whom were unidentified. Horrible! In Italy, for example, to the gravers of the combatants that fought in The Antifascist Resistance and also in the Mussolini army, every year, different people, with different political and religion opinion, come with flowers to those graves. It is a profound human and Christian movement.

In the context of our reasoning about the missing persons, it is impossible not to approach **The Memory Book**, with its seven volumes dedicated to the locals that remained on the battle fields of the last world war. The research was based on the Decision No. 696 form 20 July 2001 of the Republic of Moldova Government about resuming the development and publication of The Memory Book.

The war in Afghanistan

Not less present is the issue of our compatriots, numbering over twenty and a half thousands that participated to the conflict between 1979–1989. In this Asiatic country lost their lives four hundred compatriots. The faith of three military recruits form Moldavian SSR declared missing and of other 417 soviet combatants is unclear.

Conclusive is the case of **Leonid Vîlcu**, originally form Cimișlia district, whom, on 4Th of October 1984, in province of Parvan was caught and held as a prisoner. It is known that the soldier got a Moslem name - Azizola and accepted the Islam “not as a personal believe, but as a chance to survive.” One of his comrades was killed because “he showed exaggerated familiarity and manifest irreverence to the Koran.” In Moldavian Republic, Vîlcu returned after nine years of wandering. While he was prisoner, he took notes hoping to write a book about that “unfair war”. Did he succeed? It is not known. Vîlcu had a meeting with the former Ministry of Defense, Pavel Creangă. The official handed the keys of an apartment in Chișinău.

For a while he lived in Syria: he spoke Persian. Since there were few teachers, he taught algebra to the Syrian peasants and children. From Belgium, succeeds to send to the family the message that he is alive. After returning, between 1993 – 1994, was student at Cluj-Napoca

University, then he went to the West. In the public opinion, the history of Leonid Vilcu is full of controversy. In some of the counterintelligence documents, he was seen as a traitor and "he was going to be captured, and if that were impossible, he was going to be murder." Some references plead Vilcu's involvement in the assassination of the prisoners, being labeled with involvement in the Taliban movement. Can it be that? I hope, in time it will be known.

Life gives us a lot of strange things. Soldier Nikolai Bystrov, sent to bring marijuana, wounded and captured, meet the legendary Ahmad Shah Massoud, a leader of anti-Soviet resistance. Bystrov was converted to Islam and became the bodyguard of this "field commander". In 1999 he returned with his Afghan wife and daughter to his native Krasnodar region of the Russian Federation.

The armed conflict on Dniester, from 1991-1992

The ceasefire took place after the Agreement on Principles of Peaceful Resolution of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova, signed on 21 July 1992 in Moscow by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Mircea Snegur, President of the Republic of Moldova.

Unfortunately, the exact number of deceased and missing persons has not been established. In the Book of the Memory of those who

have fallen in the struggles for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, are photos and data about 208 people. The military department operates with a little less than three hundred dead. The reasons for this uncertainty have both subjective and objective roots. The reasons for this uncertainty have both subjective and objective roots. Former combatant and volunteer on the left bank of Dubossari, Vlad Grecu, claims that between March and September 1992 dozens of unidentified bodies were discovered by the inhabitants of the villages on the Dniester. According to Grecu, these terrible discoveries "are evidence that the separatists have killed patriots and intellectuals from the left bank of the Dniester, suspected of collaborating with the authorities in Chisinau."

Compared to armed conflicts in the Caucasus, the number of human losses and missing persons in the Republic of Moldova is lower, but this does not make the issue less acute than in other bleeding regions. The armed conflict on the Dniester provides many instructive lessons in the context of issues related to war prisoners and missing persons. It is, as well, the case of war prisoners from "Ilascu Group". The case received an international legal assessment after the "Ilascu trial" at the European Court of Human Rights.

As part of the Joint Control Commission, a group of operational investigators from Chişinău and Tiraspol was created to investigate the

fate of missing persons. Information about group activity and results are partial and insufficient. For a long time in this group was not a member from Chisinau. In the summer of 2008, a high-level representative from the Prosecutor's Office was appointed.

The representative of the Working Group within the Unified Control Commission Andrei Ciriac at a round table held by the Humanitarian Law Association on 9 June 2009 informed that, at that moment were found 63 persons, 58 bodies were identified, 234 exams were made, and 131 bodies were described, including the Chişinau cemetery "Doina"¹³³.

Even though the number of the dead and disappeared on the banks of the Dniester in 1991-1992 is much lower than those from the conflict in Georgia and Azerbaijan, this fact does not make the issue any less important. There is also the case of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine where at this moment there are 13,000 dead, tens of thousands of missing persons and hundreds of thousands internally displaced.

In this context, there are some important aspects:

- creating a data management system that takes into account the interests of families and the recognized rules on the protection of personal information and respect for the dead;

- establishing of some mechanisms to ensure the participation of more stakeholders in this process;

- establishing, through joint efforts of employees, of a procedure for initiating and handling cases;

- punishment in case of confiscation or destruction of information that may be necessary to establish identity.

Some conclusions and recommendations

The Republic of Moldova is a party to the international normative acts in the field of the law of armed conflicts and, after the proclamation of independence, it makes important steps to strengthen the instruments for the implementation of the norms of international humanitarian law, including the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of July 10 1977.

The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova requires the State to comply with the international treaties to which it is a party (Article 8, paragraph 1). The Basic Law provides for the supremacy of international law rules only for international treaties on fundamental human rights (Article 4, part).

The Republic of Moldova has adhered to the Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. Participation in this important international criminal court is a guarantee in preventing the

¹³³http://www.newsmoldova.ru/news.html?news_id=227116&date=2004-02-04.

disappearance of protected persons during armed conflicts. Court has jurisdiction over cases involving the most serious international offenses: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression.

The guidelines on the application of humanitarian law rules to the National Army of the Republic of Moldova are defined by Order of the Minister of Defense no. 275 of 5 December 2006 "On the Implementation of the Regulation on the Application of Armed Conflict Rules to the National Army". The Regulation regulates many aspects of captivity, the detention war prisoners and internment. The Order defines the duties of the deputy commander for legal activity (officer-lawyer) in the armed conflict. This person becomes a legal adviser¹³⁴, thus realizing the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

Concerning the social protection of the families of the missing and dead between 1991-1992 it should be noted that on August 5, 1992 was adopted the Decision of the Government of the Republic of Moldova no. 520 "On priority measures for the social protection of persons who participated in hostilities in order to protect the integrity and independence of the Republic of Moldova and to provide

the necessary assistance to the citizens and families affected by the military conflict".

Along the way, the legislator adopted the Veterans Act 190-XV of May 8, 2003. According to several experts, this law provides legal and social protection for the families of the dead and missing and, unlike other legal acts, operates with the notion of "missing persons in armed conflict".

Within the Military Academy of the Ministry of Defense "Alexandru cel Bun", under the curriculum "Humanities" is studied the "Basics of Military Law" course. Practical exercises with humanitarian themes are held in the applications. It can't be overlooked the participation of military personnel in African international operations which represents not only an unusual possibility of documenting and practicing the provisions of humanitarian law but also of acquiring the necessary experience for the military of the army.

Within the National Army there was a special unit, the so-called 22th Peacekeeping Battalion. Training is done based on a special program. The activity of the unit is carried out in accordance with Article 7 of the Law of the Republic of Moldova on the participation in international peacekeeping operations. The program provides a series of sessions under the Geneva Conventions. Militants study, besides general issues, the issue of

¹³⁴ Обязанности юристических советников в мирное и военное время основываются на требованиях статьи 82 Дополнительного протокола I к Женевским конвенциям 1949 года о защите жертв войны от 8 июня 1977 года и других нормативно-правовых актов.

human treatment of the civilian population.

According to foreign experts, Moldovan soldiers are doing well. This is evidenced by the participation of Moldovan units in the post-conflict settlement in Iraq and Kosovo, as well as in the UN operations in some African countries.

Intergovernmental agreements play an important role in the care of war graves and in search of missing persons. Such agreements are concluded with Romania, Germany and Hungary. From May 20, 2006, on the Doina street, on the outskirts of Chisinau, a cemetery was built with the bones of German soldiers fallen in the World War II. The territory of about three hectares was allocated by the government. The sections of the cemetery are symbolically designated by groups of granite crosses. The names of the former combatants are written on the plates.

In the village of Țiganca, the Kantemir district in 2006 was refurbished the memorial cemetery of the Romanian heroes fallen in the battles of the summer of 1941. It was rebuilt at the initiative of the National Office for the Remembrance of the Heroes of the Romanian Government. The monumental gate and the triptych, brought from different counties in Romania, are made in national style. Near the cemetery is a small church of the Bassarabian Metropolitan Church.

Efforts are being made to improve material support and to train

specialists to identify unidentified human remains, as well as adequate equipment, including for genetic analysis, aspects difficult to achieve.

It is important that military personnel have ID chips. It is necessary to return to the practice of issuing in the army the annual normative acts that would determine the procedures for studying and introducing into the troops the provisions of the international legal acts. It is about the annual orders, methodological-organizational recommendations, and the inclusion of the theme in combat training programs.

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- Филимошин М. В. Людские потери вооружённых сил СССР. — 4. — Мир России, 1999. — С. 92—101.

ROMANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

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LANDMARKS OF THE NAVY ROLE IN THE ROMANIAN HISTORY

Abstract:	<p><i>The geographical position of Romania, a European continental state and a riparian state to the Black Sea and to a fluvial arm of European importance – the Danube -, which has direct access to the center of Europe, has been giving our country along its history both the possibility to plenarily manifest its political-military potential and the right and obligation to detain, within its national defense system, a military respectable and notable naval component.</i></p> <p><i>For Romania, its position to the Black Sea represents more than a mere relation to the geographical area. The geopolitical significance of this position underlines that Romania fundamentally belongs to the Ponto-Caspic area. The importance of the Black Sea area leads to the conclusion that the Romanian people lies in the neighbourhood of a genuine „hub” of international exchanges that has made the water transport to be not only a craft, but also a tradition and even an art. Within this context, the navy has represented along the history a fundamental base of the Romanians' existence in this area where the interests of the great powers meet and therefore the history of the navy is an essential component of the national history.</i></p>
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„Each country should have an accurate naval policy, based upon the political environment, the enemies' forces and possible military theatres of war.”

Commander I. Bălănescu (1928)

In agreement with its own general interest, each country adopts a military doctrine that stands for that country's conception on its respective national defense system. Within this doctrine, for maritime countries there stands distinctively a naval doctrinary component¹³⁵. Setting up the Romanian united Flotilla during Alexandru Ioan Cuza¹³⁶ and acquiring the state independence in 1877-1878 - that also brought back Dobrogea within the Country's boundaries-created favourable prerequisites for the development of the Romanian Navy.

Although until the period between the two world wars there was no clear Romanian naval doctrine, we could say that the statement of the great political personality Mihail Kogalniceanu - *“The key to our salvation is the seaway”* - largely defined the importance and significance of the Romanian maritime interest during those years.

¹³⁵ Rear Admiral, Professor PhD. Gheorghe Marin (main coordinator), *Marea Neagră, spațiu de confluență a intereselor geostrategice*, Editura Centrului Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, București, 2005, p. 247.

¹³⁶ X X X, *Monitorul Oastei*, I (1860), nr. 41 din 22 octombrie, p. 698; Georgeta Borandă, *Colonelul Constantin Petrescu, primul comandant al flotei muntenești și comandant al flotei Principatelor Unite*, în *Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Române*, tom V, 2002, pp. 235-238.

After the very first endowments¹³⁷ that formed the nucleus of an active Military Flotilla¹³⁸ the years when Romania involved in the new Balcan crisis which had been reopened between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Tsarist Empire that allowed our state to become independent proved that the Romanian state needed a consistent naval force able to protect its national boundaries.

The Romanian Military Flotilla's missions and actions during the War of Independence showed that a naval doctrine had to effectively sustain the general efforts of the nation towards the defense of its fundamental interests.

1. Missions and Actions of the Romanian Navy during the War of Independence

During the War of Independence (1877-1878), the actions of the Romanian naval forces consisted both in riskful missions for the strategic protection of the Danube line and actual fighting actions especially during the operations from Plevna and Vidin when they directly contributed to the adversary's defeat. ¹³⁹. On the

¹³⁷ Commander PhD. Marian Moșneagu, *Evoluția Marinei Militare Române în perioada 1860-1914*, în *Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Române*, tom III/1, 2000, pp. 135-136.

¹³⁸ X X X, *Statul Major al Forțelor Navale. 1860-2005. Tradiții și perspective*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2005.

¹³⁹ Cristian Crăciunoiu, Raymond Stănescu, *Oțel, aburi și torpile. Marina română în războiul de*

night of May 13 to May 14, 1877, a remarkable group of mosquito-crafts led by „Randunica” attacked by surprise and finally sank the enemy Turkish armour-plated gunboat „Hivzi Rahman”¹⁴⁰. This success eased the action of the Romanian ships that during the strategic protection operations of the Danube installed mine barrages in different locations on the river, transported troops, war techniques and ammunition, materials used to build the boat bridges across the river.

After the second Ottoman monitor, „Podgorita”, one of the most powerful firing ships on the Danube, had been sunk by the mortar battery „Perseverenta” on November 7, 1877, the Romanian Navy limited the Turks’ manoeuvre and action possibilities on the river¹⁴¹

The War of Independence showed that a strong Danube fleet was needed, and the reinclusion of Dobrogea within the national boundaries opened significant development perspectives to the Navy, including the need to organize a sea fleet. This imposed the adoption of corresponding endowment

independență. 1877-1878, Editura Modelism, București, 2001.

¹⁴⁰ Georgeta Borandă, *Contribuții la istoricul confruntărilor navale de pe Dunăre, din anul 1877 - partea I*, in *Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Române*, tom IV, 2001, pp. 94-95.

¹⁴¹ *Idem*, *Contribuții la istoricul confruntărilor navale de pe Dunăre, din anul 1877 - partea a II-a*, in *Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Române*, tom V, 2002, pp. 103-104.

programmes, 3 of such plans being adopted between 1878 and 1916¹⁴².

2. War Flotilla Modernization Programs during 1878-1916

Between the War of Independence (1877-1878) and the War of Reintegration three naval endowment programs were accomplished within the Military Flotilla¹⁴³. The first program was adopted in 1880 and was aimed to endow the Maritime Flotilla with ships necessary for its specific activity. At this moment the brig „Mircea” remarkably enters service (in 1882) standing for a traditional symbol school-ship for the training of Romanian Navy staff.

As new credits for the growth of the fighting ships fleet were granted, the year of 1887 represented the beginning of the second flotilla endowment program. We should underline that in 1888 the battle-cruiser „Elisabeta” entered service¹⁴⁴.

The third Navy endowment program started in 1906¹⁴⁵, when a

¹⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 117.

¹⁴³ Commander (r) PhD. Ion Ionescu, *Primele elemente și principii ale doctrinei navale românești (1878-1916)*, in *Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Române*, tom VIII, 2005, p. 153.

¹⁴⁴ Professor PhD. Valentin Ciorbea, *Crucișătorul „Elisabeta” - de la idee la construcție*, in *Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Române*, tom IV, 2001, pp. 165-170. Expatriated upon in Valentin Ciorbea, Georgeta Borandă, *Istoricul crucișătorului „Elisabeta”*, Ovidius University Press, Constanța, 2004.

¹⁴⁵ The year of 1906, the fortieth year of the kingdom of Carol I, marked the beginning of

financial fund was obtained with the purpose to construct new ships. This way, in 1907, 4 monitors ("Al. Lahovari", „I. C. Brătianu", „L. Catargiu" and „M. Kogălniceanu") and 8 safety vedettes could be purchased¹⁴⁶.

Until the first world conflagration began, the necessity to have the own naval doctrinary politics had been alleged by texts such as the one named *Misiunea Marinei noastre* (1909) - *The Mission of Our Marine* - that underlined that *the most secure way to progress is the joint parallel development of Marine and industry*. The controversial matter regarding the size of the maritime fleet was seen in relation with the political needs of the country, sustaining however that *only when we raise our Marine to an appreciated rank and the Danube mouths are sufficiently protected and when this*

the second flowering epoch of the Romanian Navy, its existence being then funded on the real grounds of its call to protect the national sea and river shores. His Majesty noticed with content the progress made by the Romanian Navy and, by his speech at the launching of the S.M.R. *Romania* ship in Constanta, he expressed his will that the commercial marine should grow in peace, under the full shield and protection of the Navy.

¹⁴⁶ Specialist in Museography Cornel Greavu, *Programele navale în marina română. 1880-1943*, in *Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Române*, tom II, 1999, pp. 151-158. The vedettes endowing the Navy in 1907 were named after heroes of The War of Independences fought in 1877-1878: Mr. Ene Constantin (V1), Cpt. Nicolae Lascăr Bogdan (V2), Cpt. Mihail Romano (V3), Mr. Dimitrie Giurescu (V4), Mr. Gheorghe Șonțu (V5), Mr. Nicolae Grigore Ioan (V6), Lt. Dimitrie Călinescu (V7) și Cpt. Valter Mărăcineanu (V8).

protection stretches and ties to the fortification flank we'll have the right to be proud to be the Danube sentinel.

The missions accomplished by the Romanian Navy units during the War of Reintegration confirmed this conclusion.

3. The Romanian Marine during the War of National Reintegration

During the First World War, the Romanian Navy accomplished a wide range of missions, the most important being the following: the attack against the Austro-Hungarian fleet at Rusciuk on August 14th, 1916, the action of the Danube Escadrille's ships which defended the bridgehead from Turtucaia and safeguarded the Romanian troops' withdrawal out of this area, the supporting action of the right wing of the land army located in Dobrogea by the ships of the Operation Navy under the fire of the German artillery¹⁴⁷.

Referring to the way in which the fleet supported our land troops, being able to forge ahead under the fire of seven heavy German batteries, in his memories, the rear-admiral N. Negrescu¹⁴⁸ showed that *The days when*

¹⁴⁷ Commander Candidate for a PhD Ion Ionescu, *Concluziile reieșite din participarea marinei române la primul război mondial*, in *Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Române*, tom III/2, 2000, p. 187.

¹⁴⁸ About the commanders of the Marine units during the First World War, Commander (r) Nicolae C. Petrescu, *Cu tricolorul la catarg. Comandanți ai Marinei Militare în Războiul*

the left wing of the German army was chased and the days of Rasova will write everlasting glory pages for our small, but brave and tireless Romanian flotilla.

Even though during the autumn of 1916 the fleet had had certain success, being able to advance under the fire of German batteries and even to free a number of Dobrogea localities previously conquered by enemies, it ceased its offensive actions in December 1916 while the Romanian army withdrew to Moldavia for recovery and limited its actions to defensive operations, based especially upon the evacuation of the entire ship fleet of the Marine on the Chilia arm.

In 1917, the Navy together with the land army contributed to defending the Danube front, bombing with its ships' artillery the enemy's batteries located in Tulcea as well to securing the water transportation between Galati and Danube mouths.

During the last year of war (1918), the fleet was given the most difficult mission, namely to clear the mines off the Danube and sea to restore navigation ways during peace times.

4. The Interbellum Naval Doctrine

After the national unity had been achieved in 1918, the Romanian state had to set its objectives to defend its boundaries by its army forces. The newly united length of the seashore and the economic power generating great transportation and fighting capacities determined the assertion of a proper naval doctrine, even though that times' Romanian naval doctrine wasn't a sufficient one.

In the work entitled *Avem nevoie de Marina Militară? (Do we need the Navy?)* and published by the commander E. Rosca and the lieutenant-commander G. Koslinsky in 1923, the stringent necessity for the creation of a significant Navy was underlined: *The naval power does not owe either to hazard or improvisation, but results from the scrupulous preparation of its constituent elements. Let us create, then, the Navy we need. Let us set our naval programme, let us form our staff and let us prepare a naval base. Let us prepare the naval power with our entire precaution and perseverance*¹⁴⁹.

The Romanian naval doctrine imprinted the role the Navy and, by extension the Marine, had to play, under the circumstances where the initial general tendency expressed even from the political scene was to abandon the maritime politics on the

pentru *Întregirea României*, Editura Europroduct, Pitești, 2002.

¹⁴⁹ Vice Admiral (r) Constantin Iordache, *Pagini din gândirea navală românească interbelică*, selecție, Editura Ex Ponto, Constanța, 2003, p. 28 and the following.

grounds that Romania would never have a fleet to confront the most powerful Black Sea riparian state. For the Romanian Marine, the new situation imposed by the enlarged state boundaries reflected in a more complex approach to logistics that had to be reconfigured, as well as in modernization and renewal measures of its techniques and endowment means.

After 1918, the security and protection of the new boundaries of Greater Romania had as political, military and economical support the system of peace treaties adopted within the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920), the Romania's accession to the League of Nations (1919), the defensive Romanian-Polish military conventions together with the conventions founding the Little Antante (1921). On July 25-th, 1921, another important act took place: signing the Paris Convention that established the definitive status of the Danube through which the river navigation was declared free and opened to all flags. The rights were guaranteed by the *Danube European Commission*, headquartered in Galati, for the maritime part of the river, and by *The International Danube Commission* for the „fluvial Danube”. We should also mention the conclusion of the Lausanne International Convention in 1923 on the Bosphorus and Dardanel strait that stipulated the freedom to navigate for all states' ships.

In the equation of the new naval doctrine, an outstanding part was the relief of the Romanian coasts which were generally opened, without any gulfs, islands or other natural harbours that could have offered large possibilities for harbouring or masking and for this reason the defense of the military bases involved an approach to certain defensive measures of the most varied nature. Besides a well-organised system for the protection of coastal ways by the coast artillery the creation of an efficient supervision device by patrol ships was also imposed. The possibility to rapidly install mine barrages that would prevent the enemies - which aimed to control the interest areas - to come near the seashore should have been also taken into account. There was equally necessary to create an offensive - defensive system, with ship units (mosquito crafts, submarines and destroyers) that could develop rapid hitting possibilities to an as large distance from the Romanian coasts as possible.

From a doctrinary point of view, the manoeuvre applied to the Navy arms had to be reconceived. The coast artillery would have been used under more adequate conditions by endowing it with high caliber cannons and supporting it with terrestrial artillery mobile units.

Even though the theory upon *the inferior fleet in action* was not

explicitly affirmed¹⁵⁰, the perspective of the vision on the coordination of a Romanian military fleet actions – with the declared purpose to reach competitiveness to defend the integrity of the Greater Romania – had the features of such a concept.

As regards defending the border in the Danube area, the Romanian river forces seemed to be insufficient for such a mission, although a part of the intervention area could be excluded thanks to the existing political-military alliance with Yugoslavia. Should a war with the Soviet Union have occurred, the foreseen tactical principle was to use the river flotilla for the army flank that would have relied on the river and also to increase the flotilla resistance with complementary fighting means against a more powerful enemy, through mine barrages and coast batteries. Should a war with Bulgaria have begun, a less offensive attitude could be permitted due to a weaker enemy, but only within the borderline.

To accomplish these visions, corresponding endowment measures were obviously imposed. The doctrinary requirement relating to performance was materialised through the orders aimed to modernize the heavy artillery equipment in 1937 placed to the Metallurgical Plants in Resita. The anti-aircraft warfare was going to be purchased from Germany and Switzerland.

To defensively protect the seashore, the doctrinary orientations were imposing modern compatibilities regarding the Marine fighting forces and warfare possible to be used, but the first option was to use mine barrages – considered as an efficient and cost-effective warfare category available to any state with a smaller economical power that intended to protect its coastal areas or to forbid navigation by certain districts.

The defense – by artillery of the own mine barrages – and the hit firing of the enemy ships approaching the seashore were going to go to a new force that had to be built to face these challenges. This way, as a direct requirement of the naval doctrine, coast artillery units were settled and in 1936 a battery composed of three cannon pieces – 152 mm Armstrong type cannons – was installed in the North of Constanta (“Tataia” area).

The Romanian naval doctrine was also requiring a navy aircraft, as the Navy did not have such a category but only had cooperated with the Hydroaviation Flotilla of the Military Aeronautics that had as main mission the supervision of the seashore at sea.

In a conference held in 1928 entitled *The maritime power as a civilisation and national defense factor*¹⁵¹, the commander Ioan Bălănescu, future commander-in-chief of the Navy during 1934-1938, showed that the maritime power and all the elements

¹⁵⁰ Commander (r) Ion Ionescu, *Politica navală a României între anii 1919 și 1941*, pp. 51-52.

¹⁵¹ Vice Admiral (r) Constantin Iordache, *op. cit.*, p. 79 and the following.

that determine the functions of a fleet within the national defense system should arise from the state naval polity. *The naval policy* – the officer affirmed – *sets the attitude and development of the maritime power towards the problems of national defense.* He also showed that: *We cannot conceive a Merchant Navy without a Navy that has the mission to protect commercial ships and harbours. To defend the Merchant Navy, the Navy should be able to rule the sea and marine communication means and to use them for its own purposes while forbidding the enemies to do so.* According to I. Balanescu, the missions of the Romanian Navy had to be the following: - *securing the maritime communication means for its own traffic; forbidding maritime ways in front of the enemy; - defending theseashore or defending the coasts.* To accomplish such missions imposed by the national defense system, our fleet had to be endowed with: *surface boats* (battle cruisers, destroyers, anti-submarine crafts, mine sweeping vessels and mine planters) and *aircraft units* (scout hydroplanes, torpedo-planes and fighting planes). As a conclusion, the commander I. Bălănescu was underlining the duty of each Romanian towards the country maritime power regarding the construction of *our Sea Fleet*, its modernization, the development of the merchant fleet, of harbours... everything to *spread and uplift the*

*national flag of our Marine on the world seas*¹⁵².

In 1932, the Colonel G. Vizanti and the Mayor Scarlat Urlatianu, well-known military theoreticians, published the paper *The Romanian strategy for the future war* (The Royal Court Publishing House, Bucharest) with a distinct chapter on a Romanian military doctrine. The settlement of an army with naval, terrestrial and air forces was appreciated to be able to answer precisely to well-defined political purposes. To shape a military doctrine, it was primarily necessary to set the general framework of the state policy that would have been nothing but the logical conclusion of its international political situation, its national tendencies and aspirations as well as of its internal political situation¹⁵³.

In 1936, the evolution of the Romanian-Sovietic relations determined the Navy specialists to draft a complex document entitled *Studiu asupra aparării coastelor* (*Study on coast defense*) that was a conceptual version relating to the maritime-fluvial defensive in case of an open military conflict with the great neighbour state. This study emphasizes some new ideas: transfer of forces, making efficient the sea-terrestrial cooperation, increase of defensive bases importance,

¹⁵² Candidate for a PhD. Maria Petru, *Marina Națională Română - „Lux sau necesitate”* (opinii exprimate în perioada interbelică), in *Anuarul Muzeului Marinei Române*, III/2, 2000, p. 191.

¹⁵³ Commander (r) Ion Ionescu, *Politica navală...*, p. 48.

delaying the enemy effects in case of landing¹⁵⁴.

The beginning of the second world conflagration in 1939 brought again to discussion the maritime-fluvial defense dimension. From a conceptual point of view, during the ardent period between September 1939 and June 1941 (Romania's neutrality and expectance), the existence, composition and strength of the War Navy had to rely on the recognized economical and military interests. The Marine had to fulfil multiple objectives but with a limited number of resources. The satisfactory settlement of such a requirement imposed:

- knowledge of Romanian maritime and fluvial interests as well as knowledge of the interests of possible enemies in the Black Sea area;

- to identify objectives by prioritization;

- to cover the deficiencies¹⁵⁵.

Under the given circumstances, the main maritime interests of the country were:

- to benefit from the relation with Bosphorus with an aim to increase the economical and financial potential;

- to intercept the maritime communications that were linking the harbours from Caucasus, Crimea, Ukraine to allow the switching of the military values within this area to the benefit of Romania;

- to defend the seashore against external actions with the purpose to strengthen the land army forces and secure their freedom to act on other fighting lines¹⁵⁶.

The first obstacle was stated to be the adversary forces both in relation with the defense of own interests and the attack of enemy's interests. The doctrinary conception was completed by the fact that the maritime strategy, unlike the terrestrial strategy, allowed the co-existence of two elements: *forces* and *interests*. For this reason, the maritime objectives could be multiple and sometimes contradictory, and setting their importance and order was varying depending on the very circumstances. All these ideas and conceptions were exposed in December 1940 within a complex document entitled *Planul de înzestrare al marinei militare* (*The Navy's Endowment Plan*). *Hypothesis 15*¹⁵⁷.

Former minister of war during the Goga-Cuza Government (1937-1938), in 1940 General Ion Antonescu sent to the whole army a document entitled *Directive pentru noua orientare doctrinară a armatei* (*Directives for the new army doctrinary orientation*), in which the doctrinary requirements were characterized by the increasing of the *offensive* and *cohesive* factors corresponding to the new political orientation the country was heading to at those times. The directives explained

¹⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 49.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 57-58.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 58.

¹⁵⁷ Romanian Military Archives (A. M. R.), fond 3837, file no. 2847, f. 16.

that the naval doctrine, like the military doctrine, was dictated by the people's needs related to their living and unity, being rather required by possibilities than by intentions ¹⁵⁸.

In conclusion, we can affirm that the naval doctrine was a complementary framework to the national military doctrine stating the terrestrial forces freedom of action. As the *Directives* sent over by General I. Antonescu were showing, this was a doctrine of possibilities rather than a doctrine of intentions, which took into account the need of compatibility between its exigencies and application measures into the maritime-fluvial area and the Romanian state's offer to fulfil all its interests – as there were no objective limits in economical and financial area.

The most important effect of the naval doctrine was that, during the period preceding the participation of Romania in the Second World War and during the following period, the Navy remained the only element that could have reaffirmed the state suzerainty in the Danube Delta and could have secured the sea and river shores if the terrestrial forces in use had been demobilised.

5. Romanian Navy Modernization Programs during 1918-1941

The fourth Navy endowment program, drafted before the First World War ¹⁵⁹ that regarded the service entering of 4 torpedo-boat destroyers to strengthen the maritime defense capacity was not accomplished anymore due to the beginning of the world conflagration. This program was partially accomplished only after the war, in 1920, by endowing the Navy with the destroyers „Marasesti” and „Marasti”.

In 1924 the fifth naval program was drafted¹⁶⁰, with a several year execution, which regarded, among others, the endowment with 12 submarines, 12 mosquito-crafts, one plane-carrier, but because economical and financial reasons, this program could be only partially achieved by purchasing the destroyers „Regele Ferdinand” and „Regina Maria” in 1930 as well as the submarine „Delfinul” in 1936.

Setting up the Ministry of Air and Marine in 1936 resulted in a deeper concern on the Marine development, the sixth naval program being thus drafted¹⁶¹; this sixth naval program pursued the construction of certain ships in the country and in 1928

¹⁵⁸ X X X, *Directive pentru noua orientare doctrinară a armatei*, București, 1940, p. 3 and the following.

¹⁵⁹ A. M. R., fond 2988, file nr. 460, f. 60.

¹⁶⁰ A. M. R., fond Minister's office, file nr. 506, f. 472.

¹⁶¹ George Petre, Ion Bitoleanu, *Tradiții navale românești*, Editura Militară, București, 1991, p. 228; Specialist in Museography Cornel Greavu, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

The National Fund of Marine was set up to efficiently support new ship and harbour arrangement works. Following these measures, in 1939 the mine-layer ship "Amiral I. Murgescu" was launched to water at the Ship-Yard Galati, and the following year the construction of the submarines „Rechinul” and „Marsuinul” started (they became operational in 1943). This support made that, at the moment Romania entered the second world conflagration, most of the ammunition necessary to the Romanian artillery was produced in the country, at the Resita Works where *Wickers* mines (British license, with anchor and contact explosion) were produced for the sea barrages.

6. The Navy Epic during the Second World War

During the years of the Second World War, the Romanian Royal Navy forbade control by the Soviet Fleet of the vital area located in the Western and North-Western basin of the sea. The main missions of our Navy were:

- to stop the attempts to land on the Dobrogea seashore;
- to secure the Danube mouths against possible enemy incursions;
- to secure the maritime transportation to supply the South front and the oil ships heading to Bosphorus¹⁶².

¹⁶² Commander Dorin Mara, *Marina Regală a României în cel de-al II-lea Război Mondial*,

The Navy actions in the Black Sea during the Second World War – the Eastern campaign – took place during several chronological stages starting from the main accomplished missions: June 22 – August 8, 1941 was a period during which the navy forces had as main mission the defense of the seashore by counter-attacking the landing attempts related to the Romanian seashore; August 8, 1941 – July 28, 1942, stage when the Romanian naval forces mainly secured transports; July 28, 1942 – April 5, 1944, when they executed direct and indirect support missions of the land army and supplying transports; April 5 – May 13 1944, when the sea naval forces took part in the evacuation of the Romanian and German troops out of Odessa and Sevastopol; May 13-August 23, seashore defense missions.

One of the epics the Romanian Navy took part during this conflagration was „*Operation 60000*”, the greatest naval operation in the Black Sea accomplished between April

Editura Economică, București, 2000, p. 51 and the following. See also Nicolae C. Petrescu, *Marina română în războiul antisovietic*, Editura Europroduct, Pitești, 2008.

We should remember that between June 22, 1941 and September 1, 1943, the activity of the Navy Forces was materialized in 21,586 marching hours while 22,678 sea miles were covered. Transports of 1,773,695 tons (out of which 316,537 tons were carried by Romanian ships) were convoyed. 507 missions were carried, causing the enemy losses counted to 15 submarines, 17 planes, 6 war ships and one commercial ship.

and May 1944 when the naval forces successfully participated in the evacuation of the Romanian and German troops out of Odessa and Sevastopol¹⁶³. Another outstanding action is the convoying by Sea Division ships – on the seaways – of the ships that carried Jewish emigrants in 1944. This operation places the Romanian Royal Navy on the front pages of the Second World War annals¹⁶⁴.

For the way the Navy actioned and accomplished its missions during the years of the Second World War, the Chief of State quoted through a *Nation and Army Order-Paper* the Romanian Royal Navy with *all its naval, air and terrestrial units on land and sea for bravery, fighting spirit, competence, initiative, moral and professional qualities*¹⁶⁵. This order-paper no. 54 issued on February 10, 1944, is worth being mentioned *in extenso*:

The Romanian Royal Navy is cited through a Nation and Army Order-Paper with all its naval, air and terrestrial units on land and sea for:

- the bravery it launched in fights since the very beginning of the war against

an enemy who was superior in number and redoubtable in the war tactics applied;

- the fighting spirit and competence held together with its initiative, compensating for the quantitative inferiority with its higher moral and professional qualities along all its missions.

Due to these qualities, the Royal Navy succeeded to guarantee the country and army:

- with the seashore inviolability;

- with the seaways for war transports that fortified the life and action force of all our fighting elements located outside our country;

-by preventing the enemy from using the seaways for its own purposes.

*Such sacrifices shall stand for the future as an endless tradition source and this tradition should be the foundation of a new sea destiny of the Romanian people*¹⁶⁶.

7. The Navy Evolution during the Post-War Period

On the solid foundation of the lessons taught to the Romanian Navy during the Second World War, after the war there were formulated several theories about Romania being involved in a possible conflict, a maximum naval endowment program being then drafted for the Navy, which was to be accomplished within 10 years. The issue regarding the organization and efficient use of the Navy forces in a future armed confrontation aimed at the following operational objectives:

¹⁶³ Commander (r) Professor PhD. Jipa Rotaru, commander PhD. Ioan Damaschin, *Glorie și dramă. Marina regală română. 1940-1945*, Editura „Ion Cristoiu”, București, 2000, pp. 132-158.

¹⁶⁴ Florin Stan, *Portul Constanța - poartă deschisă evreilor spre „Țara promisă”. Studii privind „problema evreiască” în România. 1938-1944*, Editura Muzeului Marinei Române, Constanța, 2007, p. 70.

¹⁶⁵ Commander (r) Professor PhD. Jipa Rotaru, commander PhD. Ioan Damaschin, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

- maintaining their own communications between national harbours;
- maintaining external communication through Bosphorus;
- interception of enemy communications;
- defending coasts against possible enemy offensive actions;
- attacking enemy coasts and harbours, alone and in cooperation with the land army¹⁶⁷.

In 1947, the general mission of the Navy was to cooperate in order to defend the sea and river shores during the border security mission which came to our army forces according to the Treaty of Peace from Paris (1947). Within the *local border defense action*, the Navy was to stand as a main and conclusive element for the sea front due to its possibilities to extend the sea force action up to the normal limit of the sea border which was the enemy seashore. In the *Instructions on Fluvial Flotillas* and in the *Instructions on joint actions of land troops and Navy forces* drafted in 1953, the Danube Flotilla was stipulated to be composed of *ships, air forces, terrestrial troops and seashore defense units*. According to the *Campaign rules of the army forces*, the missions of the Navy were:

- to destroy the enemy ships on land or installations;

- to disorganize the sea enemy communications;
- to destroy the enemy military and industrial objectives located on the seashore;
- to fight against the enemy air force;
- to support the land troops by sea;
- to defend the sea installations;
- to protect their own sea communications.

The principles that formed the foundation of the approximation of crew training tactics to the Soviet model – as it is well-known, Romania was under the Soviet Union influence – were also established on the basis these missions. This fidelity except certain doctrinary tones and operational detachment, taken place especially at the beginning of 80', survived until the events of December 1989 that brought about the end of the totalitarian socialist regime in Romania.

The December 1989 Revolution put the Navy to action under real fighting conditions. Although December 22-nd brought the total Army commitment to the Revolution since the very beginning of the new democratic regime instauration, starting with the very same day the Romanian Army was subject to an informational war aimed at undermining its actions by providing false information. As to the Navy Command, it took all the measures necessary to lead to a complete victory

¹⁶⁷ Expatriated upon in the paper signed by PhD. Marian Moşneagu, *Politica navală postbelică a României (1944-1958)*, Editura Mica Valahie, Bucureşti, 2005.

of the Romanian Revolution. The war ships were alarmed and the seamen secured the most important strategic objectives within their military competence. Special order was given to use the war ammunition only in case of extreme necessity.

During the post-December evolution of the country, the Navy distinguished itself in the Romanian general effort to strengthen its regional stability role, to develop cooperation and dialogue between all the Black Sea states, contributing both to the regional security and to good neighbourhood relations; Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group - *BLACKSEAFOR* - where the Romanian Navy participated with specific actions is an outstanding proof of this.

Within the context of the military institution reform, the Navy forces became, not at all accidentally, the first completely professionalized force category.

After Romania accessed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, the Romanian Navy tradition and historical values are valued together with its NATO allies and Western partners in the people's interest within the globalization context.

The Romanian Navy forces are currently continuing the significant tradition of this very military force category which aims to fulfil people's interest and defend generous ideals such as border security, fluvial and maritime security and complex

military and diplomatic relations development at the Black Sea and everywhere else Romania places its geostrategical interests.

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ECONOMIC SECURITY

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THE ECONOMY OF SOCIALIST ROMANIA, ITS POST-DECEMBER 1989 ASSESSMENT AND THE „SECURITATE”

- The challenge of developing under international pressure -

Abstract:	<i>This article and others to be published on the same topic refer to the assessment of the economy of Socialist Romania after December 1989 and the causes that were conducive to the semblance of economic inefficiency of a country that became the only one in the world to be free of debts to anyone, that was supporting an entirely free of charge, universal and lifelong healthcare system for all its citizens, an entirely free of charge and mandatory education system from nursery to doctoral studies, and a system that provided housing for its entire population; a country that supported the financing of a large network of scientific research institutes, in all the fields of activity, a wide investment program adding up to 33% of the national revenues, and that was paying wages to date for 12.5 million employees and 4.5 million pensioners. This article is the beginning of giving an answer to the question: how could the economy that supported such a country-wide project be deemed “bankrupt”?</i>
Keywords:	Economy of Socialist Romania, Securitate, covert officers, foreign trade, destruction of the Romanian economy, traitors
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One of the great enigmas to emerge after the coup d'état of December 1989 related to answering this challenging question: *How was it possible for the Romanian economy under*

the Ceaușescu regime to pay its external debt in full? This question became viral and a matter of significant interest for a part of the public opinion, all the more as the new political regime that

took control of Romania on the 22nd of December 1989, led by ethnic minorities, presented the state of the Romanian economy as disastrous. How was it possible for that economy, presented by the new ethnic minority leaders of Romania as being bankrupt, to produce and sell at such a rate as to pay the external debt and support the enormous social expenses? I refer here to the state expenses related to all the levels of education that were free of any charge, to the state expenses for healthcare, which was provided to the entire population lifelong and free of charge, to the expenses for supporting the financing of a wide network of scientific research institutes in all the fields of activity, to the expenses for paying wages up to date for 12,5 million workers, etc., and at the same time to finance a wide investment program amounting to 33% of the national revenue.

In any type of analysis, an economy that was so harshly and unremittingly criticized, could not have supported such policies and have the country free of any debt, being a unique case in the world. There is a very steep contradiction between the negative image of the Romanian economy, as projected towards the public opinion in the country and abroad after 1990, and the magnitude of the projects that this economy supported.

In the following pages we will bring to your attention a yet unapproached aspect, that for a long

time was known by very few people and the knowledge of which entailed a risk of death, which is why history researchers have always avoided it, particularly in the history of economy.

In general, all the post-1990 analyses on the Romanian economy, both in the West and in Romania, reported the Romanian industry to the most developed economies in the World, namely the USA, Japan and the most developed economies in Western Europe (Germany, Great Britain, and France). All the reports by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other bodies were based on comparisons with the economy of the aforementioned. Romania, however, as stated by Nicolae Ceaușescu, was a developing country that aspired to become one with a medium level of development. In their analyses, certain dishonest specialists incited us to be eyeing for top positions in the world! And as we nowhere on the top three places in the world, had to destroy our own economy and replace it with a foreign one!? It was not even possible for us to be one of the top three countries worldwide and this was not the country's objective.

Nowadays in Romania there are companies working at the highest levels worldwide, but they do not belong to Romania, they are not Romanian, instead they belong to foreigners that use the human and natural resources and marketplaces in Romania to maximize their profits.

They circumvent fiscal authorities, illegally export profits, and obtain government facilities via political pressure on subservient governments, thus acting per the classic colonial model. If these companies were to manufacture in their own countries, they would bear large costs related to raw matters and transportation thereof, and they would have to pay their workers in accordance with the wage levels in their respective countries; also, in their home-countries they would have to be very thorough in paying their fiscal obligations, while state aid in strong and developed countries in the West are granted only for foreign market penetration and for the purchase of lands, resources and competitor enterprises abroad. In their home-counties, multinational companies cannot evade all kinds of charges, the payment of VAT, taxes, etc. Some countries try to circumvent the law even there, in their countries, but they are often caught red handed and pay fines worth tens of times the amount of their fraud. In Romania, in addition to the fact that multinational companies compel the Romanian state and local authorities to procure them all sorts of facilities and various tax exemptions, they also commit colossal tax evasion and export their profits via tax crimes tolerated by the institutions of the Romanian state, primarily by prosecutors, by the National Agency for Fiscal Administration and the Police, all three of these institutions being fully controlled by the Romanian

Intelligence Service (SRI), and this entire grouping of state institutions that favor foreign criminality in Romania is managed by the president of Romania. This is a reality proven by a part of the media, by some politicians, as well as by independent political and economic analysts. This is the cruel reality.

When we end up in a situation such as the present one, it is mandatory that we reevaluate from an anew perspective the efforts that were made before December 1989 and understand how challenging it was to do something and to develop when there were so many major international powers that wanted to enforce a different state of affairs. I remember Ceaușescu's speeches on the 20th and 21st of December 1989, when Romania was attacked and the then-leader was saying that "the secret services in the East struck a deal with the secret services in the West to seize the Romanian economy". At the time, very few Romanians believed him, and immediately after his assassination, very few Romanian understood that he was right; however, as many of us at that time were avid and loyal listeners of Radio "Free Europe" and other foreign channels, we did not believe Ceaușescu. It took us many years to figure it out, to see with our own eyes that he was right, but when we were completely in the know, the Romanian economy had already been plundered, liquidated and replaced by a foreign economy. Romanians have this very

old saying that roughly translates to “If only I knew then, what I do now” (in Romanian: *Dă-i românului mintea cea de pe urmă*)”.

A careful analysis of this projection of the “bankrupt socialist economy of Romania”, however, is conducive to more nuanced conclusions, and even a modification thereof. Firstly, we will ascertain that there was a major interest in vilify the former economy of Romania. This interest belonged to those who aimed to liquidate the Romanian industry, take over its marketplaces and replace it with their own economy. Another category of detractors of the economy of Socialist Romania includes those who were set on destroying the country’s economy the initial spearhead being Petre Roman, the first post-communist prime-minister. In fact, he continues to publicly champion the idea that the Romanian economy was food for nothing.¹⁶⁸ Also, other stakeholders interested in advertising this false theory were those representatives of the Securitate, particularly those of the Foreign Intelligence Service (CIE), who worked in the field of foreign commerce and international economic cooperation, at

¹⁶⁸ On the 16th of April 2019, at the headquarters of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, Petre Roman held the conference titled “The economic and social status of Romania in December '89. A panoramic overview of the Romanian economy between 1938 and 2019”, which reiterated the same premises on the complete inefficiency of the Romanian industry before 1990.

ICE “Dunărea” and the other economic enterprises of the Securitate, and sold Romanian products abroad, retaining a large part of their value, so that the accounts of the enterprises only featured a part of the selling price of the products, with economic analysts only considering this portion of the revenues.

We will try to show that the Securitate played an important part in the apparent failure of the Romanian economy, by means of a genuine pillage it exerted in the foreign trade activity.¹⁶⁹

Regarding the constant comparison between the Romanian industry and the most highly-developed industries in the world, next to which the Romanian industry was evidently inferior, we must mention that the first to make an analysis of this kind were the representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Thus, this is the core of our discussion and I believe we should have a brief review of a few moments regarding the collaboration between Romania and IMF. In 1985, the Fund’s delegation compared our industrial units to those measuring up to the highest standards worldwide and told us that ours were unsuitable and that

¹⁶⁹ On this subject that is approached very little in the recent Romanian historiography, see also this paper: Corvin Lupu, Ioan Bălbă, *Trădarea României socialiste în viziunea unui ofițer de securitate-Dialoguri despre Securitate și economia României socialiste-*, Editura TechnoMedia, Sibiu, 2019.

we needed 60 billion dollars (equal to approx. \$ 250 billion nowadays), which the IMF offered to lend to us at the rates applicable at the time, in order to catch up our technologies and productivity to that superior benchmark of development in the world. Of course, by the time we were done implementing the IMF's proposals, the West kept on progressing and our race for keeping up with the rest of the world would have to resume, entailing new loans and interest rates. However, the IMF and its western partner states were setting conditions that affected the sovereignty of Romania and introduced the IMF's control over the Romanian economy, which at that time and under that leader was utterly unacceptable.

Ceaușescu broke the deal with the IMF when the latter unilaterally doubled the interest rates, and then a law was enacted that banned the government to get any other foreign loans.¹⁷⁰ Concurrently, Ceaușescu launched discussions with the leaders of several 3rd world countries for the purpose of setting up an international monetary fund for developing countries that would finance the needs in the economies of the respective states at low interest rates and without

any political or other kind of constraints.¹⁷¹

For all these, Ceaușescu was harshly criticized by the western world and Romania was hit with an undeclared embargo on several planes, in order to sabotage the development of the country and undermine its policy of national independence. Nowadays, though, as we are living in full-fledged Euro-Atlantic "democratic" regimes, other neighbor countries of Romania have also broken off their agreements with the IMF.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Between 1987 and 1989, to avoid depending on the IMF, Ceaușescu wanted to transform the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade into the second World Bank, together with China, Iran, Kuwait, Libya and other Arab countries. One first step towards this project was associating with China, Iran and Libya in a bank that would grant loans at low interest rates to developing countries. The bank would keep its name as BRCE (Banca Română de Comerț Exterior, in English: the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade), which was already a brand in the international world of finance and had financed the entire external debt of Romania.

¹⁷² For instance Hungary, which one-upped Ceaușescu's move and had the IMF's clerks based in Budapest, who had financed the opposition mass media in the neighbor country, declared *persona non grata*, expelled them from the country and drove them to the airport using a Police car with the beacon lights on. Poland also ended its deal with the IMF and signed no further deal. Many countries nowadays no longer work with the IMF, which proved – beyond a shadow of a doubt – to be a ruthless loan shark and champion of liquidating national economies in favor of multinational clientelist companies that erode national states and nations and that finance occult projects aimed at destroying the European nations for the purpose of destroying nationalism, the greatly feared adversary of Judeo-globalism.

¹⁷⁰ On the 18th of April 1989, the Great National Assembly voted the *Law for forbidding foreign loans*; Article 1 of the law stated that "state bodies, state, cooperative and popular companies, as well as banking units are forbidden to contract loans from abroad."

In September 2014, post-communist “democratic” Romania also decided to pay its debt with the IMF in full and to not sign a new agreement. The government followed in Ceaușescu’s footsteps. The proposal was made by the then-minister of finances, Darius Vâlcov, and was supported by the then-prime minister Victor Ponta. Darius Vâlcov proved that the IMF’s project for Romania was detrimental for the country.¹⁷³

This benchmarking of the Romanian economy in the Ceaușescu era against the highest world standard of development that we are referring to was an argument for prime-minister Petre Roman (at the origin of the Neuländer family) to immediately start liquidating the Romanian economy, completely falsely arguing that “the industry is a pile of scrap iron”. Nowadays, this gentlemen no longer admits to making this statement, but there are other deeds, more serious than this statement, that accurately identify him as a deliberate demolisher of the Romanian industry. I refer here to deeds that are evidenced by confessions from the managers of major enterprises and research institutes, by the results of journalistic investigations and quasi-identical

conclusions reached by a large number of economy specialists, whether they be theorists or holders of executive positions. Thus, Petre Roman’s government removed the majority of highly competent industry managers, ordered to halt the completion of some investments that were almost ready, willfully destroyed the major brands of Romania, mandated the renaming of industrial enterprises that were very well-known throughout the world using names that were completely unknown on the market and serving various arguments, particularly that the previous world-famous names of the enterprises were of communist origin, as if foreigners knew the meaning of names in Romanian such as “Steagul Roșu” (*The Red Flag*), “13 Decembrie” (*December the 13th*), “Steaua Roșie” (*The Red Star*), etc. Moreover, the Petre Roman government¹⁷⁴ stopped controls and

¹⁷³ The impact on the interests of the world leaders caused the SRI+DNA “binominal” to come into operation, but for foreign, not Romania-centric reasons. Minister Darius Vâlcov was arrested and accused of alleged deeds said to have been perpetrated many years before, and prime-minister Victor Ponta was eliminated from the high-level political game.

¹⁷⁴ Petre Roman’s first wife, Mioara Roman, née Dragomir, was a diplomat, therefore a security operative. Petre Roman’s father, by his real name Ernő Neuländer, was an army general and chief of the Upper Political Directorate of the Army. During the Ceaușescu regime, Petre Roman travelled in the West without difficulties and studied in France, which would not have been possible without the support of the Security. In December 1989, after the coup at the Central Committee (CC) headquarters of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), the forced removal from the government’s headquarters and arrest of Nicolae Ceaușescu, along with the group of conspirators that he was a part of, with the help of the Security, Petre Roman had access into the headquarters of the Ministry of National Defense, the Television and the PCR CC, where he was appointed as prime-minister of Romania. His connection with the Security is unchallengeable, irrespective of his public

allowed managers to get rich by means of pillaging.

The partners of the new post-December government in the latter's endeavor to destroy the Romanian industry for the sake of external interests that started in January 1990 were the men in the former Securitate, who were interested in becoming the first new "capitalists" of Romania and to reap as much personal gain as possible from the dismemberment of the industrial colossus and of the material basis of the Romanian society.

Regarding the matter under discussion, we must mention a few aspects on the history of the Securitate. At the end of the Ceaușescu era, the Securitate's manpower comprised 65% covert officers and only 35% overt officers, the latter being the ones known by public as such, the ones that papers wrote about after December 1989 and those whose numbers were published in the media. The post-socialist secrete services did not hand over to CNSAS the files of covert officers, nor did they hand over the files of many of the collaborators of the former Securitate, for the sale of operative interests. The only files that were handed over were those of Securitate officers that were deemed to be of low operative interest and that could be sacrificed.

However, using the research and the database accumulated on the operating mode of the former

statements recanting the regressive institutions of the former regime.

Securitate we can draw clear conclusions regarding the capacity as Securitate operatives of certain categories of workers of the state apparatus. Thus:

1) All diplomats, without exception, were operatives of the Securitate's CIE.

2) Another aspect: Per verified research and certain statements, as of 1969 the Securitate recruited the best graduates of University of Economic Studies and integrated them as Securitate officers in the governmental white-collar system for foreign trade, in the diplomacy, in Romanian enterprises for foreign trade, in banks and in the Institute of World Economy.¹⁷⁵

3) In 1982, the Securitate took over the administration of the entire foreign trade activity of the country from the Romanian Government. From that point on, all the staff operating in foreign trade, in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation, in the Romanian economic agencies abroad, the economic attachés in embassies and diplomatic missions, etc., were covert security officers. Some of them deny this reality, quite

¹⁷⁵ See also the confessions of the former president of the Council of State Security (CSS), Ion Stănescu (Ianos Szilagy) and the chief of the Counterintelligence Directorate of CSS, gen. See Neagu Cosma, Ion Stănescu, *De la iscoadă la agentul modern în spionajul și contraspionajul românesc*, Editura Paco, Bucharest, 2001, p. See Corvin Lupu, Cristian Troncotă, *Prăbușirea mitului Securității*, Editura Elion, Bucharest, 2018, pp. 90-91.

vehemently, some have filed lawsuits for slander, refusing to admit to their capacity as covert officers. The hardcopy files of covert officers were destroyed, only preserving microfilms that are archived in secret location in the country.¹⁷⁶ Each Securitate officer/petty officer/sergeant in the field of foreign trade had their position doubled by that of a counterintelligence officer of UM 0195 under CIE, managed by colonel – then general – Ioan Moț. Therefore, each position entailed two officers, one of whom was the counterintelligence and protection officer. Thus, each Securitate operative in the field of foreign trade had two separate files at the institution. One was the operative's personnel file, or the professional file as it was named after 1990, and the other was their informative surveillance files. After 1990, to put a check on exposing these Securitate officers, DUIs were often used from the CI unit in order to portray these officers as victims of the Securitate, which had them monitored, tapped them, surveilled their families, etc. Duplicity was the primary trait of these covert officers.

After December 1989, these formerly covert officers in the field of foreign trade were the first to be interested in the dissolution of the socialist state, in order to take over, via personal business ventures, the activity

they had performed as state employees. They were also interested in dissolving the former Securitate, wishing to cover their tracks, as well as enable the destruction of the institution's financial documents and peculate the enormous amounts of money that had collected in the transitory accounts opened with various banks worldwide and that were managed by the 330-plus credit managers, all being Securitate officers, the only ones to know the access codes and passwords to the respective accounts.

Unofficial calculations based on insider information from the institution, considering assessments based on the value of the percentages retained by the enterprises of the Securitate from the value of the exported production, and based on the approximate assessment of interest rates cashed for deposits of large amounts of money into the accounts and that were not handed over to the Romanian Government¹⁷⁷, add up to tens of billions of dollars, which was colossal for a country with a medium level of development such as Romania. It is worth noting that over the thirty years that have passed since, the value of the dollar has dropped about seven times, so nowadays the approximately 30-32 billion dollars would be worth more than two hundred billion!

¹⁷⁶ See also the paper by Gheorghe Rațiu, *Cutia Pandorei. Dosarele Securității, surprize și capcane*, Editura Paco, Bucharest, 1997.

¹⁷⁷ Between 1982 and 1989, the interest rates used in the international banking system were much larger than nowadays in terms of percentages.

I would also like to mention that, as is well known, in the last years of the Ceaușescu regime, Romania experienced a food, consumer goods and energy crisis. This crisis was induced by the large circle of party leaders and Securitate leaders, who wanted the nationalist policy to change, to have Romania return under the Soviet Union's control and to replace Nicolae Ceaușescu with a socialist leader devoted to Moscow.¹⁷⁸

Of course Romanian companies were more modest compared to companies in Japan, USA and Germany; but if the Romanian industry was not the number one industry in the world, did it have to be liquidated and replaced by a despoiling foreign industry? Do Romanians not realize what has been done? These are rhetorical questions that the society must necessarily reflect upon. It all started from the betrayal of the Securitate and some leaders of the PCR, those who were supposed to act by all possible means and in good faith in favor of the Romanian people and, if needed, fight at the cost of their life to defend the country, as the leaders of the Securitate and the senior state officials had sworn. When Romania was attacked by the foreign secret services in December 1989, the Securitate was on the side of the attackers. Romania was defeated and

its industry was destroyed and alienated.

Abbreviations

- NAFA = National Agency for Fiscal Administration
- CC of PCR = Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party
- CI = Counterintelligence
- CIE = Foreign Intelligence Service
- CNSAS = National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives
- DNA = National Anti-Corruption Directorate
- DUI = Informative surveillance file
- IFM = International Monetary Fund
- ICE = Foreign Trade Enterprise
- SRI = Romanian Intelligence Service
- USA = United States of America
- VAT = Value added tax
- UM = Military unit

¹⁷⁸Regarding the induction of the food, energy and consumer goods' crisis between 1982 and 1989, see also Corvin Lupu, *Trădarea Securității în decembrie 1989*, Editura Elion, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 86-97.

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BOOK REVIEWS

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Author: Gen. (r.) Mircea Chelaru

**Title: Naționalismul și Europa Națiunilor. Despre patologia civilizației europene /
Nationalism and A Europe of Nations. About the pathology of the European
Civilisation
– Book Review**

A great personality of the Romanian Armed Forces after the fall of communism, Gen. (r.) Mircea Chelaru, published in the year 2018 this great book at the Uranus Publishing House in Bucharest.

Gen. Chelaru enters, once more, the important and unfortunately less numerous group of conservative nationalistic researchers and authors with an important role in the ethical and moral analysis of politics, international relations and the field of the security studies.

We have to notice that Gen. Mircea Chelaru is one of the few personalities who had access to important positions in the Romanian defense system who dared to be a whistleblower and to speak out some security threats within the Romanian Armed Forces. He also tried to have an objective position regarding the Romanian military history and was criticized for this.

The book has four chapters and three – let's call them Annexes. Among these he inserted The Paris Statement “A Europe We Can Believe In”.

The author begins his book by defining nationalism. It is a very welcome scientific step as nationalism is nowadays presented as extremism or ultra nationalism in order to be compromised. Mircea Chelaru shows that the true nationalism does not include xenophobia, discrimination, anti-Semitism or other negative sentiments, thoughts and actions but rather positive ones like empathy. These ideas, many others and some important concepts are part of the first chapter.

The second chapter describes and criticizes the way the development of the E.U. and the propaganda towards the European citizen and citizenship affects the roots and true values of the European peoples and in the end even the foundations of the

E.U. This is another perspective which we enjoyed reading and which we find welcome in a country – Romania – where the globalist main stream media controls the formation of the public opinion.

The author also made a specific analysis of the problems above regarding their impact on his country – Romania, and on his co-nationals – profoundly affected by the globalization and the European integration.

In the last chapter of the book the author shows the destructive effect of migration over the European Nation, comments the wrong political decisions made by some important political leaders from Germany, France, Belgium. He also analyses the threats of migration by showing the demographic imbalance between the North Africa on the one hand and Europe on the other hand. His perspective seems to be a very objective and well argued one.

The Annexes help the reader to better understand the knowledge universe of the author and also complete the book. The important Paris statement was included in the book by Gen. Mircea Chelaru because he considered that the Romanian media overlooked this important step and noticed that only some little newspapers announced the publication of that text.

We enjoyed reading Gen. Chelarus book and we consider that it is a very welcomed reading for the

students in the Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies faculties, as well as for their professors. It is not often that persons who had the panoramic view on the society by having important positions manage to write such valuable books! Please accept our sincere congratulations, General Mircea Chelaru!